THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW

VOLUME XV. AUGUST—NOVEMBER, 1870

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

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

NONCONFORMIST ESSAYS ON CHURCH PROBLEMS.

Ecclesia: Church Problems Considered, in a Series of Essays. Edited by HENRY ROBERT REYNOLDS, D.D., Principal of Cheshunt College, Fellow of University College, London. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1870.

IN a recent number of this Review, we brought before our readers a series of Essays by distinguished Churchmen, entitled "The Church and the Age." The present volume is a pendant to that one, coming as it does from the opposite region of Ecclesiastical thought.

Among the noticeable phenomena of our Church life in the present day is the emergence of Nonconformist thought as an element no longer to be put aside. Hitherto, the literature of Nonconformity has been almost as strange to us Anglicans as if it were in another language. Watts, and Doddridge, and Robert Hall, and a few other illustrious names, had the *entrée:* but whether there were not others worthy of being ranked with these,—or indeed what was the tendency and calibre of religious thought outside the Church of England, has been, till within a few years, a matter of supreme indifference to so-called Churchmen.

But even the more exclusive among us are beginning to learn that this can be so no longer. Every year is widening our acquaintance with Nonconformist religious literature. This has been owing

partly to its own intrinsic excellence, partly to our gradual escape from narrow Anglicanism. But deeper causes than either of these have been working on both parties. The strong common sense which has been of late the prevalent force in our social and political changes, has begun to make itself felt even in the less matter of fact region of religious thought. "Sirs, ye are brethren"—words many times spoken to unheeding ears, have at length begun to sound in the inner hearts of the sober and practical as well as in those of the sensitive and enthusiastic. And the result has been a gradual, and therefore the more safe and certain, drawing together of good and earnest men, not in disregard of the doctrines which keep them apart, but in recognition of the primary duties of Christian discipleship, and of the necessity of union for their common Christian work.

We shall recur to this movement, and its present point of progress, at the close of this article. At present it may suffice to say that the volume before us is written entirely in its interest, and is penetrated with its spirit. Containing, as it does, firm and consistent assertion of Nonconformist principles, it is full of brotherly sympathy and frank recognition. Refusing as its writers very properly do, the lofty condescension of those Churchmen who contemplate their re-absorption into the State Establishment,—holding on principle that there can be no real brotherhood till all are politically equal,—they are guilty of no railing against our Church government or customs: and as far as we have seen, indulge in no word of disapproval which earnest Churchmen themselves could not adopt, and even carry further.

Now there is no denying that *prima facie* the Nonconformist occupies, as compared with the Anglican, vantage ground for the consideration of Church questions. Anglicanism may be good or bad, right or wrong, but at all events it is the result of a compromise, and has an awkward position to defend. The first step for an Anglican apologist must ever be, the abandonment of logic. Logically, his position is altogether indefensible. Any one of his arguments, which begin so fairly, will, if carried out, land him either in Rome or at Geneva.

Of course we do not regard this as fatal to his position. His position shares the predicament with everything else that is English. There is not an institution in our realm that is logically defensible. Everything English either is, or is in course of being made, the best that can be had under the circumstances. We are as yet, Church and all, a kingdom that is of this world: an image mingled of gold and silver and brass and iron and clay: battered and weather-stained, assailable at every point:—we prefer energizing, though maimed, to perfect symmetry on a pedestal.

But while this is the Anglican's answer, we must take it as it

comes, with all its disadvantages—and one of these unquestionably is, that the Nonconformist shows better in argument. The Churchman is beaten every day; but he has the happy faculty of not knowing when he is beaten, and of fronting men and angels with all his scars. The Nonconformist has fewer corners to turn, fewer perils of proving too much. Let us willingly accord him this advantage, and use it for our instruction.

It may instruct us thus. A day has come upon us, when we are all beginning to look about for realities. I suppose it is not want of charity to say, that for one man now, who simply sets himself to defend his own position *coûte qui coûte*, there were ten men a century ago. I suppose it is no unreal optimism to say, that the commoner thing among thinking persons now is, simply to be pursuing the enquiry after the best working form of truth, regardless in the main of the consequences to themselves. Poor human nature, it is true, is where it was: we have only taught our self-interest to see a stratum deeper, and to perceive that to be rendering essential service is after all the surest way of advancing ourselves. But this is a step worth gaining, and in the direction of the highest and truest view of all.

Now in the pursuit above-mentioned, we may learn much from the unfetteredness of Nonconformist thought as compared with our own. Not that they have not a groove to run in, but that it is a wider one than ours, and this very fact produces in them a healthier tone of thought. The little dishonesties of argument are not so frequently met with. We do not encounter, or we meet very seldom, that harking back, and hedging, which are so provoking in our Church divines: that alternation of seemingly generous concession with neutralizing cautions, which characterizes the writings of more than one of the able Anglican prelates and authors of our day.

I.

The first essay, on "Primitive Ecclesia," is from the pen of Dr. Stoughton, the well-known author of the "Ecclesiastical History of England." It is written in a sober and thoughtful spirit, as all who know its author might have predicted; and combines firmness as against a national church establishment with refusal to follow the exaggerated conclusions of extreme Nonconformity. Dr. Stoughton concedes, for example, the religious character of the nation, and even the legitimacy of certain State ceremonials: he contends, on the ground of political security to the liberties of the nation, for the maintenance of a Protestant succession to the throne. We are glad to see that one who is so severe in his demands on us for conformity to the New Testament Ecclesia can submit sometimes to the logic of history as opposed to that of mere reason; for surely if there be a necessary anomaly

in our national free constitution, it is this same Protestant succession. We find Dr. Stoughton, in company with all sensible men, repudiating the practice so triumphantly exposed by Hooker, of demanding a text for every Church practice. We do not know that this would have been worth mentioning, were it not that the other day some one of our numerous anonymous monitors forwarded us a sermon of Mr. Spurgeon's on the words "Thus saith the Lord," in which the old demand of a text for everything was made with as much assurance as if it had never been questioned,—and the whole system of the Church of England was arraigned and condemned accordingly. We had hoped that the whole realm of ecclesiastical controversy was long ere this well rid of the fallacy; and we are glad to find no trace of it in these essays.

The latter part of Dr. Stoughton's paper is occupied with an enquiry, how far the principles, which in the former part he has maintained, may be found in operation among the Churches of our own country. It may be interesting, as briefly as possible, to follow him in the results of this enquiry:—

"Congregationalists, including Independents and Baptists, regard their Churches as close approximations to original Christian Institutes. They profess to bow to Scripture authority upon all ecclesiastical as well as all theological questions; and where Scripture supplies no formal directions, to fall back for guidance upon the spiritual nature of Christianity. They believe that Churches are formed for the maintaining of truth, and for the edifying of believers; fellowship being based upon common faith, and a common range of spiritual sympathy. It is a fellowship of religious life, experience, and action. Care is employed in the admission of members, lest persons should intrude themselves with mistaken views or for improper ends. Discipline is exercised, and in cases of immorality, delinquents are forbidden to receive the Lord's Supper. Upon proofs of repentance such persons are restored. Bishops and deacons are popularly elected. Each Church is complete in itself, and independent of others; nevertheless, County Associations and National Unions are formed for conference, counsel, and co-operation. Both the denominations specified are opposed to a hierarchy, to an official priesthood as distinguished from the priesthood of all the faithful, and to what is generally meant by Ritualism in worship. They protest against every method of supporting religion, except that which is voluntary.

"These principles, generally considered, are in harmony with the ideas of primitive Churches, conveyed in the first part of this Essay. How far practice is in conformity with these principles, and how far the principles, as sometimes expounded, come up to the ideal which is acknowledged and upheld, is another question:—principles, and the organized systems into which they are wrought, are not identical; and with certain general principles different particular opinions may be connected.

"It would be beside the mark to enter fully into this complicated subject, but since I do not assume the function of a special pleader for English Congregationalism as it is—since I wish to be, if not a disinterested, at least an honest critic—I may be permitted to remark, that it appears to me that Ecclesiastical principles of Divine authority have been decidedly seized, but not thoroughly grasped by Congregationalists; that with attainments reached there are defects betrayed."

These defects he believes to consist, partly in the disregard of what he terms the municipal limits of Churches,—in other words, the establishment of many Church societies in one and the same town.

"I am quite sure," he says, "from long experience, with considerable opportunities for observation, that unchecked divisibility is working disastrously to the interests of religion. It creates rivalries. It promotes alienation. It entails feebleness. It occasions the impoverishment of pastors. It wastes time and strength, which, husbanded and employed in a large society, might secure results the most beneficial."

The following passage is important, as laying before us a phase of the Nonconformist view to which we have not been much accustomed :—

"Further, all true Churches are divinely related to the world. Patriotism is their duty. They cannot be indifferent to politics. Their field is the world, and it is their business to sow the earth with 'the good seed of the kingdom.' It is unfortunate that controversy has driven some to overlook the position of the Christian Church as to the institutions, the laws, and the well-being of the nation; and it is idle, with the history of New England before us, to deny that Congregationalism can give a tone to national life. I must confess that I cannot regard the State simply as political and economical—a nation is not a mere aggregate of human bodies, it is a congregation of human souls, and as such it stands in a moral and spiritual position towards God, religion, and the Church. I believe in the possibility of a Christian State without an Established Church. So far as England is, or ever can be, a Christian State, it must be so through the common worship of Almighty God, the holiness of national life, the justice of law, the equity of government, the mercy which tempers justice, the honesty of commerce, the purity of literature, the humility of science, and the nobleness of art :—and in the promotion of these ends every Church is competent to take its share. Perhaps the majority of religious people in Great Britain and Ireland at the present day are connected with voluntary denominations, and all of them are able, and all of them are required, to help in the true Christianization of the whole State; nor is there room to doubt that, if the whole population were to imbibe the voluntary sentiment to-morrow, instead of diminishing, it would increase the efficiency of godly men, in their endeavours to improve the character and tone of national life."

He traces defects also in the non-utilization of resources, pecuniary, social, intellectual, and spiritual. Independency is almost limited in its action to purely pastoral work, and has no spheres in which other beneficent agencies, corporal and mental, can be exerted.

Our Essayist combats the narrow views of each sect in believing itself to be the only embodiment of divinely sanctioned Church principles, and concludes by shewing how portions of the primitive system are being even better illustrated in the Establishment than by the present practices of Nonconformity. He concludes with the following striking appeal :—

"Finally, may I ask whether the time be not come for State Churchmen to consider more dispassionately the questions at issue between themselves

and Nonconformists? Is it any fairer for them to charge their brethren with spoliation and robbery, or with envy and jealousy, or with hereditary blindness, or with ignorance, or with an incapacity to apprehend reasoning, or with narrowness, bitterness, and want of candour, than it is for their brethren to charge them with corresponding faults? Many State Churchmen are actually adopting the practices, if not the principles, of those whom they misrepresent or misapprehend. They are forming voluntary associations, raising voluntary funds, and doing many things after a manner which of old would have shocked the Anglican, and filled the Puritan with joy. Some modern religious movements, redounding to the honour of Churchmen, would have aroused the anger of Whitgift, of Laud, and of Sheldon; and would have won the sympathy of Cartwright, Calamy, Baxter, and Owen. This makes it manifest that there is a practical approach in the Church now towards the usages of those who formerly were deemed the enemies of all Churchmen. Should not this circumstance at least induce a disposition frankly and without prejudice to regard the ecclesiastical controversies of the day? And should not the members of that denomination which is established and endowed in this country be more generally ready to acquaint themselves with the principles and proceedings of their Christian brethren of other names? Many are wisely seeking information upon a subject which so obviously calls for their close attention; but many more are content to remain ignorant of what is being professed and achieved by their fellow-citizens living next door to them—thus betraying a kind and an amount of indifference which can only be paralleled by the perfect unconcern of the upper classes in the Roman Empire to the early progress of Christianity, as it spread day by day amongst their neighbours, and under the very shadow of their own house-roofs.

"Human nature is made responsible for very bad things, and it may be deemed Quixotic to expect any good from that quarter. Some who deny the doctrine of its depravity have, notwithstanding, the worst conceptions of mankind. Yet, after all, do we really wander into a fool's paradise when we hope for a better spirit in the treatment of religious controversy, and in the relations of ecclesiastical parties? Is there to be everlastingly a life and death quarrel between one denomination of Christian Englishmen and another, instead of a manly and patriotic application of mind and heart to practical problems, pressing for solution with increasing earnestness day by day? Conscience and interest point in the same direction. Nobody can deny that we ought to turn over a new leaf, and putting aside recrimination, to look at the immensely important subjects before us, in the sight of God, and in the spirit of charity. History shows the mischief of dogged resistance to change, and of the resentments which that resistance enkindles. It shows what may be feared from obstinate conservatism on the one side, and from fanatical revolution on the other."

This Essay, in its firmness, moderation, and candour, is a valuable contribution to the understanding of the position of the best class of English Nonconformists. We have noticed but one slight inaccuracy, the correction of which tends to throw the argument more to the side of the independence of local churches than it stands on Dr. Stoughton's pages. He says, page 12, "The seven-branched candlestick, chosen by the Son of Man as the emblem of the seven societies, signifies at once their organic independence, and their moral unity." But there is no mention in the Apocalyptic text of

any "seven-branched candlestick." The Churches are represented by *seven golden candlesticks:* and to one of them the threat is sent, that its candlestick should be removed out of its place. Their mutual independence is complete. Their only union is in Him who stands in the midst of them.

II.

The second Essay, by the Rev. J. Radford Thomson, is on the Idea of the Church in its Historical Development. It is tersely and perspicuously written, and shews a thorough acquaintance with its important subject. No one can summarize well, who has not mastered details previously. We own however to some regret, that the two opening Essays of the series should have had so much of their subjects in common, and that Mr. Thomson should thus have again gone over the ground already occupied by Dr. Stoughton. The present Essayist might well have begun where the last left off, and thus have gained more space for what is the really valuable part of his paper;—his account of the development of the Church idea in modern times. And of this account the best portion, to our mind, is that which he has devoted to the evidence as to the position of the Church of England afforded by the fate of attempts to promote what is curiously called the "unity of Christendom." Few things in the Church's history have been fuller of instruction. The *Quis tulerit Gracchos* has been turned unanswerably on the amiable dreamers who have met from time to time to report the issue of friendly advances repulsed with unabated anathemas. So far indeed they illustrate the precept which Christians obey, that when Rome smites one cheek, they turn the other to Constantinople to be smitten also. But they are profoundly oblivious that the same discourse which contains that precept includes also another, to cast the beam out of our own eye before we offer to take the mote out of our brother's eye. Among the spectacles of human weakness and inconsistency, can there be one more pitiable than Anglicans banded together to promote union which if gained, could be only nominal and questionable, with far distant and alien Churches, while their own great sin, the schismatical Act of Uniformity, remains unrepented of? By that Act, they cast out and refuse communion with, one half of the whole Church of God in Britain. Their own maxim, *extra Ecclesiam nulla salus,* suffices to condemn them in this matter. There are dwelling hundreds around them, of whom not the most rigid among themselves would presume to predicate the latter words of the maxim: by what possible rule then of consistency or of justice do they assert of them the former?

Mr. Thomson's remarks on the unfortunate Society, which repre-

sents this movement, shew us the estimate of a sensible and moderate man looking on from without:—

"They can indeed scarcely boast of any remarkable measure of success in the efforts they have hitherto put forth: plain Englishmen might even say that they have been cruelly snubbed in high places. But they put the best face upon the matter, and are not slow in informing their friends of any successes they may have gained. The literature which this party has produced has been abundant in quantity; volumes of sermons and essays by various writers members of the several communions, and separate works, tracts, and pamphlets in profusion. Satisfaction the most confident in their own position, contempt the most sublime for all dissidents, are prominent characteristics of their literature."

Meanwhile we are thankful to believe that the true and solid union of Christendom is being served among us in far other ways: in ways which some of the prominent members of the movement just mentioned have been the first to repudiate and anathematize.

III.

The third Essay in this volume is a really masterly enquiry, by the Rev. Baldwin Brown, into the influence of the "religious life" upon Christian society. The term "religious life" is of course used in its close technical sense of *monasticism*. The writer thinks that the Evangelical Nonconformists have been in danger of taking a one-sided view of this matter: have been too ready to confound the whole form and spirit of mediæval Christianity with the Papal system; to make the word "Roman" to "cover everything in the constitution and movement of Christian society during the middle ages, which did not square with the Puritan interpretation of the Apostolic standards." It is impossible to abridge Mr. Brown's Essay. The object of it may be stated as being, to deliver his readers from the confusion just mentioned. "Roman Christianity," he maintains, "has only three centuries of history: dating from the time when the Papal See formally and finally rejected the principles of Reformation. Then Romanism was born. Then the movement commenced, of which the dogma of Papal Infallibility, hard as the more liberal Roman theologians may struggle against it, is the inevitable consummation."

Long, long before this, nay even in the secret cradle of Christianity itself, were the principles working which led on to Monasticism. Some of the very strongest sayings and precepts tending this way are found in the Gospels themselves.

The great problem of Providence during all the early ages was the formation of Christian society. And it continues, Mr. Brown justly observes, the problem still. But it has constantly been misunderstood, and by none more than by the great Evangelical party. Every attempt to solve it as a Church problem, to form a Christian community within the bosom of the world, to compress the progress

of humanity within the forms of religious life, has utterly and lamentably failed. We make our Churches too narrow; and the secular life, straining outwards as it grows, "most blessedly bursts the bands; and compels us to an ever-widening conception of the nature and range of the kingdom of the Lord."

The formation of Christian society implies the creation of a social life which should be Christian to its very foundations. And this recognition of the Christian constitution of society was the characteristic feature of the life of Western Europe from the fifth to the thirteenth centuries. The Church was the most powerful agent at work on its nations during the middle ages. The history of the Church is that of mediæval society. Of this subject, the most vital portion concerns the influence of the Benedictine rule on the development of Western Europe.

Thus far we have been describing, almost in Mr. Brown's own words, the introduction of his subject. He pursues it by tracing the influence of Christianity on the Teutonic mind. When this contact fairly took place, the great work of Christianity opened. Of this St. Paul, pressing on to the bounds of the West, had a keen prevision. And his great secular precursor, Cæsar, in his pressing Westwards, was all unwittingly opening the path of the Gospel. "It was in the new land, and among the new peoples in the old land, that Christianity had to seek its triumphs. The new Adam of the Church found his helpmate in the Teutonic Eve." From this point Mr. Brown traces onward the history of monachism. It was not of Christianity to begin with. Every religion which has aimed to solve the problems of human life in the interest of humanity, has developed itself in this direction. Buddhism counts its monks by millions.

At the root of monachism lies the idea, mainly Asiatic, that the mind needs special gymnastic culture as well as the body. Beneath this view is the devil's suggestion that mind and body are repugnant. The devil's—for while unity is of God, schism is of the devil. That there is little noble or beautiful in Oriental monachism, is owing to this Manichæan taint, which poisons all its springs. "War against the body, with a view to mastery and use, was, *in the main*, the key to Western monachism; war against the body, for hatred and revenge, was the key to that of the Orientals." Broad statements like this require qualifying touches. Flowers of rare and exquisite grace are scattered over this monkish waste. "But there was a rottenness at the core of Eastern monachism, and growth but developed it. It went with its eyes and organs inward, and self-enfolded nothing can live."

The monachism of the West looked out of itself, and lived. There is a clear, bold, working aspect about it from the very first. But

until the sixth century, it had little form and method. Then arose Benedict of Nursia, and settled, by his rule, the character of Western monachism for all time. His power lay in interpreting to itself that spirit which was abroad in society, and giving it a wider and freer range. The rule which bears his name simply brought out into clear form and order the ideas which were floating in the powerful and practical minds of the founders of monachism in the West. For both of these they were.

"The great monks bear full comparison with the greatest soldiers, statesmen, and kings. We may lament or condemn the form of life which they elected, and see clearly whitherward it tends. But we must bear in mind that it was for ages the chosen field of action of some of the very strongest, ablest men, and the noblest, purest women whom God sent forth into the world.

"One is tempted to some impatience when our divines and scholars, to whom 'sitting under their own vine and fig-tree, no man daring to make them afraid,' is the ideal of a social state, speak with lofty superiority of a mode of life which men like Benedict, Severinus, Columba, Columbanus, Bede, the two great Gregories, Boniface, Anselm, and Bernard deliberately elected, and loved with a devotion so passionate that they were ready at every moment to seal their vows with their blood. We speak with compassion of the superstition which drove such 'good men' to bury themselves in a living grave. I can fancy St. Bernard passing with a smile of yet loftier compassion through our city streets, reading our leading journals, visiting our Exchange, looking into our banks and assurance offices, our pauper infirmaries, and our casual wards, or the gold room in New York. Perhaps the superstition which we pity would not be the saddest thing in his sight, fresh from the visions of the celestial world. At least let us be sure that there is nothing which calls mainly for pity in a life which had a strong attraction for some of the ablest and bravest spirits whom the world nursed for ages; and that, however monks might grovel and sin, and make their profession a by-word of scorn through Europe, a high and noble inspiration was at the heart of a movement which occupied such splendid energies, and left such marks on the higher development of mankind. There can be no doubt that the rule included a vast crowd of weak, dreamy *fainéant* devotees; but, on the other hand, it would be hard to find, in any other sphere of human activity during the Middle Ages, a grander company of clear, strong, firm, and far-sighted men. We are bound to believe in this life as one which had a specific rightness of adaptation in its times, or its secret will remain veiled."

We cannot trace onward Mr. Baldwin Brown's further following out of his thesis. We have thus given a specimen of his matter and style, and must refer the reader to his Essay for the rest. It must suffice to say that what follows is even more important and startling. He vindicates the Benedictines from the stupid taunt of proclivity to choice of luxurious sites, by the proof that it was they who made desert marshes to blossom like the rose. In writing of the establishment of perpetual vows as in inner reality the destruction of self-denial, he observes that even this did not destroy the virtue and power of the institution, adding, with admirable candour,—

"And it is quite possible that there may be a high use of teaching and influence in an institution, which if allowed to run its whole course would be fatal to society. I suppose that we are most of us doing the world some service by institutions and methods, which, if they had the whole field to themselves, would be fatal to its life. A dark thought sometimes crosses one, as to how things might go, if the whole world were suddenly turned into a huge Independent Church."

Then the process is traced by which the monks, at first simply laymen, became not clerics only, but the elect of the clerical order. And then further, the instructive history, how the monks became the army of the Papal Church.

But Mr. Brown's object is not to sketch out history alone. It is to connect by a philosophical analysis of the causes of this great institution, its working of old with its working now. *Whence did all this spring?* Was it, as no less a writer than M. Guizot holds, from the idleness, corruption, and unhappiness of society at the time? Did the absolute submission of the monk to his abbot, appearing as it did under the Roman empire, arise out of the worship of the Imperial majesty?

Mr. Brown justly rejects this hypothesis. "The mainspring of all great human movements is attraction and not repulsion." While the wretchedness of life under the decaying empire helped the movement mightily, nothing on this scale and of this force is primarily a refuge. The history of asceticism has never shewn the attraction of the monastic life to be in inverse proportion to the industry, security, and prosperity of the secular life of the times.

"We may live to see a powerful monastic movement, under new forms but with the old spirit, developed out of the intense activity, the restless liberty, and the splendid prosperity of our nineteenth century life."

Beneath all these, at the heart of all these, as the living germ which all these helped to stimulate and develop, we must place—*the imitation of the Lord Jesus.* The conversion of St. Anthony at one end of the scale, that of St. Francis of Assisi at the other, testify how profoundly the idea of this imitation ruled the noblest minds through the monastic ages. In the monk's submission to his abbot, the same is seen.

From this springs, as a corollary, the inference of Mr. Brown, that "the religious" were from the first the distinctly Evangelical element in the Church: meaning by the term, that in religion which lives by vital personal fellowship with the living Christ. He works this idea out with considerable courage, skill, and candour: courage, in vindicating for Evangelicalism its assumed high place as leader of human movement: skill, in bringing out successfully the somewhat startling parallel: and candour, in frankly acknowledging the great damning

faults of modern Evangelicalism, which render it hardly lovely, even when placed by the side of monachism itself.

"And we hold that during the ages in which the conditions of human life and thought made it desperately difficult for men to hold clearly in view the essential truth of the Gospel, 'the religious,' by the passionate earnestness of their devotion to the Saviour, by their studious imitation of the form of His example, by their vivid preachings, writings, and biographies, did keep some warm though distorted image of Him who is the very core of Christian doctrine, before the world. And again I urge, that the age is coming, nay is already come, which will be as startled at the image of Christ which we have been presenting during the doctrinal era which is closing, as we are at the image which was presented in a monastic life. We judge these men as if the pure form of the truth were ours at last. We shall live to be as ashamed of the impurities which we have mixed with it, as Boniface was of Pope Zachary, Bernard of his friend Eugenius III., Catherine of Siena of Gregory XI., or Luther of what he saw under Julius II. at Rome. We have not yet reached the point which might justify us in judging the monastic life by our standard. If we compare it with the standard of Christ, let us place ourselves beside the monks as we judge them, and own for them and for ourselves a double shame.

"It would be easy to quote from the writings of the great monks down to quite recent times, a series of passages full of intense and passionate devotion to the person of the Saviour; and those at all acquainted with the sermons of modern monastic preachers, will know how deep a strain of Evangelical thought and passion breathes through their words. The question of course arises how far their principle helped or hindered their witness for the living Christ. We can see how much it distorted; we can measure the shame which the inevitable degradation of the Order brought upon his name. But we find something similar in all Churches and Church movements. And when we see a certain tone of thought and feeling conspicuous in the great leaders of a school through successive ages, and tinging the whole current of its life, we are bound to believe that there was something in the principle of the school which fostered it. Nor is it difficult to see how their mode of life and their special abnegations made the living Saviour very real and very dear to them; though the same habit of life might as easily lead men away from Him in these more instructed days. Fearful as were the evils which the monks wrought in Christendom, we cannot question that in the formative ages of its growth this witness to the Lord Jesus left a large balance of blessing to be placed to the account of the 'religious life.'"

The Essay concludes with a rapid and masterly survey of the whole field: of the part which the monks played in relation to the Church, the invisible body: their connexion with the inward and outward life of men—the human affections, interests, and duties: and the service which they rendered incidentally to the culture of Christendom and the unfolding of the life of secular society.

The two closing paragraphs are too remarkable to be passed over, and at the same time present a specimen of Mr. Baldwin Brown's best style.

"Two subjects remain for notice—each of them worthy of a treatise,

while on each I can allow myself but a word. They are, the sphere which monachism opened to woman, and the principle and fruits of monastic ministry to the poor. On the first point we may say with truth, that when we have found for woman in the secular sphere, a position and a work which may mate with that which the Middle Ages offered to her in the monastic, we shall have solved successfully one of the most pressing and perplexing problems of modern society. Their work for the poor is open to greater question. In the later monastic ages it was vicious and demoralizing in the extreme. But nothing can be more unjust than to argue from this, that the influence of the large and lavish monastic charity was on the whole baneful, in the ages when misery was abundant through war and tyranny, when pilgrims were many, and when the great monastic ages were the only hostelries and almonries of the poor. They made as much poverty as they cured, is the charge of the economists. Quite possibly. But have we found the *juste milieu?* The monastery erred grievously on the side of indiscriminate lavishness. The modern system, which has now touched its nadir at St. Pancras—where niggard charity leaves dying paupers to fight with rats, and stifles them with the stench of sewers—does not look beautiful beside the tender courage of St. Francis in a hospital of lepers, or even the gentler ministries of the sisters of St. Vincent de Paul. It is easy, however, to indulge in sharp and bitter remarks on what is confessedly a profoundly difficult and intricate subject. It may be enough to indicate here that the tendency of the best thinking as well as feeling on the subject in England is at present not in the direction of St. Pancras, but in the direction of that personal, intimate, and considerate ministry of Christian intelligence and charity to poverty, which the monks made illustrious throughout the earlier Middle Age.

"In closing this Essay I am, of course, not unmindful of the fearful picture of corruption, of the tales of unutterable abominations and horrors, which I might draw from authentic monastic history. A life of such high tension, kept at full pitch so long, inevitably, when the tension relaxed, sank into dark, sad depths. Great spiritual movements are powerful for a time only; their lees are always noxious, though there is little in history so foul as the lees of the monastic. Very noble, beautiful, heroic, much of it was while the red blood of its youth was in it; very pallid, foul, and base it became when it dragged on a dull mechanical existence after its work in the world was done. But to judge it, I think that we must look at it in its prime; in the light of its aims, aspirations, and hopes. It is the true judgment; it is the key, perhaps, to the merciful judgments of God. It would be easy to show what dragged monachism to the dust; it is more profitable to consider what enabled it, in spite of this constant human proneness to corruption, to regenerate itself so often, and to endure so long.

"On the whole, we must say, to sum up the matter, that nothing in the long run and on a large scale succeeds in God's world but God's law. Extremes on either hand are ultimately fatal. 'In the beginning God made them male and female,' body and soul, man and the world. All rebellion against his institution is in the end futile and ruinous. The man who stands open all round him to the influences, and bound with the bonds of both worlds—that is, the man who stands in Christ at the point where they are one—is the religious man, and his life alone is the 'religious life.' To bring forth this man is the great problem of Christian history; and I often think that humanity has to be shaped for it much as a sculptor moulds his clay. Much has to be taken into the first rude shape, which will be paired off and toned down into the harmony of the form as the develop-

ment proceeds. Masses have to be added here and there to make an organ or a muscle, which are destined to vanish and yet to leave an invaluable line as a legacy. Were the monastic orders attached thus to the great body of Christian society not to be permanently wrought into it in their integrity, but to leave, as Time pares them away, some clear line, some essential feature, in the living body which shall survive the process, and shall stand up as the complete humanity in the day of the manifestation of the sons of God?"

We have been somewhat careful in analyzing this Essay, because of what seems to us its remarkable power, as to both matter and style. On the latter indeed we might, were we so disposed, play the critic somewhat at length. Full of vigour and beauty, it is also full of faults. One of the most striking is, carelessness, due apparently to haste of composition, in the repetition of words in contiguous clauses. And, with all allowance for the inevitable mannerism of genius, we feel a little repulsion at some of Mr. Brown's pet expressions cropping out at almost every turn. The somewhat *Daily Telegraph* verb "begem" comes several times: and the adverb "mightily" kept putting in an appearance so often, that at length we took the trouble to count, and found the sum total not indeed what the sated ear had anticipated, but still far too great for even the most ample allowance in the use of an exceptional and sensational word.

To say that this Essay is all we know of Mr. Baldwin Brown's writings, is, we suppose, to illustrate the sentence with which this article opened. But the Essay tempts us, and we hope will tempt our readers, to know more. The man who can thus write must wield no small power over his circle of readers: and from the character of this sample of his work, we can have no doubt in what direction and with what effect, that power is used. We are not aware of any Anglican writer quite to be named in competition with him.

IV.

Mr. Eustace Conder's lucid essay on Church and State seems to us to labour under the imperfection which affects almost all other Essays written in the same sense.

Up to a certain point, the logic of their argument is perfect in its agreement with the conditions under which our practice must be conducted. Let us explain. Mr. Conder, after laying down what we in common with him hold to be the undeniable principles of the mutual relations of Church and State, then proceeds to answer the question, whether the State is to be regarded as entirely irreligious? And this he answers, by representing that in the ultimate state of things which he contemplates, all bodies and individuals in the State would be actuated by the common principles of Christianity, and consequently the acts of the State which was made up of those bodies would of necessity be themselves Christian.

Now, with all deference, this seems to us merely shifting the issue. If we are not stating what is technically correct, of the general truth of the statement we have no doubt, when we say, that this, while it repudiates the establishment of any special form of Christianity, maintains the establishment, in a manner, of Christianity itself: while it repudiates the principle of the religion of a *small* majority being incorporated into the life of the State, it sanctions the notion of that of an *overwhelming* majority ruling the political course of the people. In short, it is only another form of a phenomenon now frequently presented to us. A logical thinker pursues his object with a clear view up to some point where a complication arises, the dealing with which will render his logic inapplicable. At that point, having hitherto spoken free as air, he closes the door, and declines further consideration of the matter. If an illustration of this weakness were needed, it would be found in the conduct of the Evangelical Alliance with regard to Unitarianism. Every principle that underlies their action requires, that they should admit into their fellowship all who call Christ Master. But at the point where they meet Unitarianism, the complication arises. Its recognition as Christian would require a wider and more consistent assertion of the fundamental principles of Christian union than the Evangelical Alliance are prepared for. At this point therefore they *close the gate*—meanwhile claiming credit for the bold and free assertion of their great principles.

It appears to us, that the same has been the case here. For take up the argument of Mr. Conder at the point where we left it, and then introduce the further elements, inevitable in a State, of *non-Christian* populations. Is, we ask, the logic of Mr. Conder's argument to be suspended at this point? Are no religions to be allowed the benefit of it, except the Christian? No doubt, every Christian in his conscience would shrink from other religions being taken in: but this is not the question. The question is, How are we to deal, on Mr. Conder's principles, with the assumed religious character of a nation, made up of Christians, Jews, Mohammedans, and Hindoos?

Let us not be supposed to mistake the position assumed in the Essay.

"While the perfect development and right action of the Church require complete independence of all governments, corporate bodies, and associations of men in any other capacity than as Christians banded together for spiritual objects; the kingdom of Christ, on the contrary, demands for its complete realization the submission of every form of human government and society, national or other, to Christ's supreme authority. 'For in that He put all in subjection under Him, He left nothing not put under Him.'

"If this be granted in reference to states or governments, it will scarcely be denied of any other form of human society. It can be denied in reference to governments or states only on one of two assumptions: either

that these possess an authority independent of—equal or superior to—that of Christ; or else that they are incapable of obedience. The first supposition is absurd. Take whichever view of government you choose, either that under whatever political form it is administered, civil government is God's ordinance, and the magistrate, as such, God's minister; or else that the government of a country is the embodiment of the popular will, and the magistrate the minister of the sovereign pleasure of the majority. In the first case, it is certain that God has ordained no authority which he has not placed in subjection (*de jure*, though not yet *de facto*) to the Lord Jesus. In the second case, the stream cannot rise higher than the fountain. Men cannot create an authority superior to that by which every man is bound. The second supposition is equally absurd. Nations with their governments are composed of men. Men cannot be free collectively from laws which bind each man individually. By entrusting fifteen men with great public offices and calling them a Cabinet, or choosing 658 men to make laws and calling them a House, you cannot destroy the obligation every one of them is under to act, speak, and think as a Christian. A prime minister or legislator may be much more bound, but cannot be less bound, than a household servant to do whatsoever he does 'unto the Lord.'"

Of course as Christians, holding and maintaining the absolute sovereignty of Christ, we fully agree to this statement of what we believe to be the truth; we assume the duty of universally applying it, and yearn for the day when this application shall have taken place. But in so doing, how can we be said in any sense to be acting on Mr. Conder's principle of the freedom of religion in the State?

At the present moment, Christianity is probably, in Great Britain proper, the professed religion of an overwhelming majority. It may be almost said to be the religion of those who profess any religion at all. Still, however narrow the line which divides this "almost" from "altogether," even thus the demand, that the nation and its governors should act on Christian principles, is a claim that the religion of the majority shall rule in the councils of the nation; just as much so, as when the members of one Christian sect demand for it a dominant authority.

But this is not all. Owing to our insular position, we are so accustomed to regard the British coasts as limiting our national area and character, that it is strange to our eyes to rise to the conception of what really constitutes, at the present moment, the British nation. Yet this conception lives not in the idea alone. At the time when our Sovereign assumed personal rule over India, her style and title were changed so as to express this fact, and cognate facts not hitherto taken into account. That style and title now runs thus (or nearly thus, any mere verbal inaccuracy being unimportant): "Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, and of all colonies and dependencies of the same."

Let the description of the nation follow the style and title of its Chief Magistrate, and Christianity is no longer the religion of the

majority. It has fallen from this position, and is now the religion of the stronger as against the weaker. It has on its side the standing army, with its guns and ships. It has on its side possession, with all the power and prestige which possession confers. Is Mr. Conder prepared for the consequence?

Now we are arguing thus, not to prove that the carrying out of Christian principles is not to be required of the nation and its government,—but to show that the practical application of Mr. Conder's undeniable *à priori* truths breaks down at the very point where we might look for its complete carrying out:—and in showing this, to illustrate by one more example the necessity, at some point or other in this application, of resort to a compromise.

If this be established, then the question for Church and State is, at what point, and in what form, this compromise may best be adopted. Whether the answer be that we shall pause at the point indicated by the present Anglican system,—whether we agree to advance further, and to fix it at the form of Christianity common to the Anglicans and the so-called Orthodox sects,—whether we throw the bounds still wider open, and make the platform of the nation's religious obligation the bare recognition of Christ as Redeemer or Teacher,—whether, to take the extreme case, we rule the line for the nation's conduct outside Christianity altogether, and according to the presumable moral conscience of mankind,—in any and every of these cases we abandon Mr. Conder's theories at some point or other for a practical compromise: and the question is no longer, for the nation, What is right? but, What will work best?

Possibly we have already discovered the best form of compromise, and it only remains to reduce it into consistency with itself: possibly, a better might be found by adopting as the national platform our common English Christianity, and, within its bounds, shewing special favour to none. On this important and difficult matter, we pronounce no opinion here; but we do say thus much, that it must be decided, and it will be decided by the nation, not in obedience to the rules of inexorable logic, not according to any fair *à priori* system, but by the mature consideration of what will work best for the spiritual and social benefit of all classes of her people.

We have been, by Mr. Conder's omissions, led so far into the practical examination of the subject, that we have only room to characterize his Essay as ably and candidly written,—with, perhaps, a somewhat too large adornment of rhetorical figure and fine writing, tending sometimes to distract and puzzle the reader.

V.

The Essay on "the Forgiveness and Absolution of Sins," by the Editor, is hardly at all concerned with the Ecclesiastical aspect of that subject, but is principally employed in a rather severe and almost scholastic discussion on the nature of forgiveness or pardon. We own to disappointment at this, as we were prepared for some deliverance in this volume on the deeply interesting question how far the power of discerning spirits, and in consequence of approximately pronouncing the actuality of the forgiveness for which a penitent seeks, may be conceived to belong to the shepherds of God's flock. We can conceive none better qualified to speak disinterestedly on this matter than an able and learned Dissenter like Dr. Reynolds: and we regret exceedingly that he has not anywhere in his Essay entered on it. Still more do we regret that when the practice of priestly absolution is referred to, it is dismissed with the trite, and, as it seems to us, irrelevant statement, that "assurance of salvation is a part of religious experience, and all the priesthoods are powerless to arrest it, to frustrate it, or even to supply its necessary conditions." So, no doubt, is the assurance of convalescence matter of physical experience; but may we thence infer that all the doctors are powerless to arrest it, to frustrate it, or even to supply its necessary conditions? So far from casting a slight on the declaratory absolving power of the ministry, we should be inclined to maintain that there is hardly any department of pastoral work so immensely important in its consequence for good. Nay more; we should go further, and say that among the Nonconformists themselves, there is no pastor with any kind of advising acquaintance with the individual members of his flock, who does not almost day by day exercise this power. We are unable to see how without it there can be anything deserving the name of the cure of souls. And while we are fully sensible of the evils arising from compulsory confession in the Church of Rome, we make bold to say that it is in the confessional that she exercises that immense power for good which none will deny her. Even Dr. Reynolds is not indisposed to admit this:—

"The claim of the priesthood, which has prevailed throughout episcopally-governed Christendom for so many centuries, must not be dismissed as a valueless and perilous assumption. It does cover a great truth and a deep reality, viz., that there is life-giving power and holy contagion in the mutual communication of a common hope, in the united exercise of solemn faith and prayer. One sinner can help another to believe and to repent. The confident expression of Christian hope and faith does kindle human hearts, and bring them into holy fellowship. The Spirit of God does work with human affections and in the interchanges of religious experience.

Many a Roman priest has gained as much as he has imparted in the confessional. The reality of Christ's love has flashed back from the soul of the believing penitent, and lighted up his own with new love and higher trust. The solemn utterance of the law of Christ, and of the power of His cleansing blood, has often lifted the burden from the conscience and saved the souls of men; but this has happened millions of times, when no sacerdotal claim has been preferred, in the pastorate of every godly minister, in the Sunday-school class, on a thousand death-beds, on battle-fields, in the mission-station, in wretched homes and hearts, which have been reached by Christian faithfulness and love."

Of course there is truth in the last sentence, as we are all thankful to know and feel. But the question is, whether this solemn utterance cannot be more judiciously and discriminatingly made to the individual soul by those who are specially trained to the work, than by others, whose sole qualification is Christian faithfulness and love.

Observing on what we do find in Dr. Reynolds's Essay, we may say, that we have the momentous subject of the existence, consequences, and pardon of sins entered upon and worked through with the connecting grasp of a practised thinker, though, as we hinted before, in a somewhat scholastic and technical style. Some of the terms used fairly beat us; others do not yield up their meaning till after a disentangling process. This may be our own fault: but surely it will be that of many others also. Few will at once attach an idea to "limiting the annotation of an original pictorial root-form;" few have ever before seen the verb "incremented," the noun "controvertist," the "concept of Deity;" an "analogue of creative power;" the adjective "disciplinary," and several other terms scattered up and down on the pages of this Essay. But while we could wish that some of these had been simplified, we are bound to thank Dr. Reynolds for the great interest with which he has invested his deep and difficult subject. In all his propositions we are not quite able to agree: for instance, when he says that whatever else pardon may include, it must involve the *removal of the consequences of the sin pardoned.* Is this so? Nay, may we not almost rather say that these consequences are the precise things which pardon leaves intact, nay sometimes even enhances? David's sin was "put away." Its *ultimate* penal consequence, death (whatever that may mean), the casting out of God's presence, and taking away of God's Holy Spirit from him,—these consequences were removed, it is true. But did David suffer less, or more acutely, the misery which his sin brought upon his house, for being a pardoned penitent? The real effect of pardon cannot be better stated than in that verse of Psalm li. which we have just cited. It is the annulling of that exclusion from God's favour which unpardoned sin would induce; the retention of the sinner in his forfeited place in God's family. It does not alter

the nature of sin, it does not alter the nature of God: the pardoned sin is just as deep a moral wound, just as evil an example, just as fertile in corruption and disaster, as the unpardoned sin: and God is as jealous and as just, has entered into no alliance with iniquity. And therefore pardon of a sin is doubly conditioned. There must have been some taking away of *the sin of the world*, some great general act whereby universal pardon has potentially passed: and there must be an act of the penitent whereby he applies to himself that act of universal pardon. And it is just in the ensuring the fulfilment of this latter condition, that ministerial examination and assurance are so valuable. The human heart is, in all its introspective acts, so apt to deceive, that in its verdict on the efficacy of repentance it needs the aid of an impartial adviser. Let it be noted that, in all which has been said, we have exhibited no sympathy whatever with the monstrous figment of derived apostolic authority to absolve. The authority which the Apostles had, that same, whatever it were, have we Anglicans, have the appointed ministers of every Christian body: not because of power carnally descended from them, but because the ministers of Christ, in all ages, lawfully set apart for His work, are sent by Him and endowed with His Spirit.

VI.

Mr. Dale has contributed to this volume an exceedingly able Essay on the Doctrine of the Real Presence and the Lord's Supper. He travels out of the beaten path, as indeed, when it is considered how broad and well beaten is the way, he might well endeavour to do. "The account given by Albertinus of the various interpretations of *Hoc*, in the sentence, *Hoc est corpus meum*, occupies twenty folio volumes of tolerably compact Latin; and yet he does not profess to give all the interpretations that have been suggested, but only those which are more common, and which, on account of the eminence or number of those who have adopted them, may be thought the more probable." What wonder then if a sensible writer shrink from a course of which mankind has been made so weary? There were serious fears on the part of some of the Sacramental writers, lest insanity should be the consequence of reading their books. This same Albertinus is quoted by Mr. Dale as extracting from one Catharinus the following: "Lector consideret laborem et angustias usque (pene dixirim) ad necem fere omnium scribentium, dum rogati quid significet pronomen illud, *Hoc*, tot et tanta scribunt et adeo varia ut valeant ad insaniam redigere Lectorem nimium considerantem."

There is, however, no fear of such a result for the reader of Mr.

Dale's Essay. Nothing can be more lucid and orderly than its style and arrangement.

It is not within the scope of this Review to report the discussion of deep theological matters. We will only say thus much, that Mr. Dale holds a middle place between the high Anglican,—which is, with all its ostentatious difference in terminology, the Roman view,—and the Zwinglian. He points out the declension from the Savoy Declaration which has taken place in modern Congregationalism; and, while declining himself to accept some things which that Declaration affirms, he claims for the Ordinance a very much higher place than such theories as the "subjective," the "didactic," or the "impressive," would assign to it. One portion of his argument is new to us, and strikes us as having considerable force:

"It is impossible to conceive how the superstitious corruptions of both Ordinances, which began to appear in very early times, could have arisen at all, if the original conception of them gave exclusive prominence either to the 'subjective,' the 'didactic,' or the 'impressive' element. No error can grow without a root. The very weeds reveal the quality of the soil. The Docetic denial of the humanity of our Lord is an unanswerable proof that the early Church could not have believed that He was merely a man. The immorality of the Corinthian Church, sheltering itself under the cover of Christian liberty, would have been impossible, if St. Paul had taught that we are justified by works. The argument drawn from the excesses of the same Church in the celebration of the Lord's Supper, against the Romish and Anglican theories of the Eucharist, is decisive. It is inconceivable that such excesses could have been committed by a Church, which had been taught that the consecrated Bread is supernaturally changed into the Body of Christ, and the consecrated Wine into His Blood.

"It is, however, equally inconceivable that the Sacramental errors, which began to appear early in the second century, could have been developed from any such theory as that which is taught in the Congregational 'Declaration of Faith and Order.' That theory affords no soil in which superstitious reverence for the Eucharist can take root; and this is a proof that it could not have been the theory held by the Apostles. The Apostolic conception of the Lord's Supper did not render impossible the irregularities of the Church at Corinth, and must therefore have been very different from that of the Council of Trent and the Anglican Ritualists; it did not render impossible the mysticisms of Ignatius and Justin, and must, therefore, have been very different from that of the 'Declaration of Faith and Order.' In the original conception of the Service, as given in the New Testament itself, the Corinthian excesses and the Ignatian mysticism have their common origin and explanation."

Mr. Dale also does good service to the Christian view of the Lord's Supper by pressing against Mr. Cobb the parity of inference as to Real Presence in both Sacraments alike.

"When Ritualistic writers tell us that to deny their theory of the Real Presence, is to degrade the Lord's Supper into the celebration of 'an absent Lord,' and to deprive the Service of all spiritual and supernatural power, they forget their own teaching on the efficacy of Baptism. Both the

Sacraments are alleged to 'unite us to the very Person of Christ Himself.' 'In Baptism we are made members of Christ; parts of His Sacred Body, "even as if our flesh and bones were made continuate with His." . . . We become "children of God and inheritors of the kingdom of heaven."' (Pp. 230, 231.) 'Baptism unites us to Christ through the power of the Holy Spirit.' (P. 234.)

"But in the Water of Baptism there is no 'Real Presence;' and yet the rite is effectual. What propriety, then, can there be in such fervid language as the following:—

"'No phantom body was given for our salvation, and no figure can convey to us the life of Jesus. . . . . The very necessities of the case—the needs of man and the purpose of the Eucharist, as carrying out the ends of the Incarnation—require the Real Presence of Christ with the means He has appointed for supplying those needs and carrying out those purposes.' (Pp. 244, 245.)

"Is there, according to the Ritualistic theory of Baptism, anything of the character of a 'phantom' in that rite? Is it a mere 'figure,' because there is 'no personal conjunction between the Water and the Spirit?' If the power of the Holy Ghost in the one Sacrament is exerted immediately on the soul of the recipient, why should it not be exerted in the other Sacrament in the same way? Does the writer of the tract believe that men become less truly one with Christ in Baptism than in the Eucharist? If he does, let him tell us what solitary blessing is withheld in the first Sacrament which is given in the second. Are we not in his belief made members, through Baptism, of the regenerate race of which Christ is the Head? And must not this distinction and blessedness come to us through that Sacred Humanity, which is the channel of all grace and glory? If we are made partakers of the nature of Christ in Baptism, for which the 'Real Presence' is not claimed, why is that 'Presence' necessary in the Eucharist, in order that the life already conferred may be strengthened and perfected? All the scornful words which are flung at the theory which refuses to recognise the union of Christ with the bread and the wine of the Eucharist, may be flung back by any one who chooses to do it, at the theory which refuses to recognise any union of the Holy Ghost with the water of Baptism."

It is no small praise that Mr. Dale keeps entirely clear of fine writing, so sore a temptation to Nonconformists in general. Even in his masterly description of the founding of the great Ordinance, while he enters fully into the majesty, and the pathos, of the "same night that He was betrayed," he does not allow himself, in any one phrase or word, the licences of an ostentatious rhetoric.

VII.

Few men have done more for Congregational worship than Mr. Allon. Himself an accomplished musician, and possessing well-earned influence over a large and wealthy congregation, he has practically illustrated the "Worship of the Church," which in this Essay he explains and enforces.

Its main object is the discussion of the questions now rife in the Nonconformist bodies as to the legitimacy or expediency of various modes of conducting praise and prayer. Of these, the two principal

have reference to rhythmical chanting and to the use of forms of prayer. Of the former, Mr. Allon is the zealous advocate: not in the spurious and incongruous wedlock of rhythmical recitation to metrical words, which has been by some Dissenters resorted to, but in its genuine and only lawful application to the purely rhythmical lyrics of the Psalms.

There is one objection to the adoption of the practice by Nonconformists which Mr. Allon does not notice: the very imperfect adaptation of the Bible version of the Psalms to the chanting cadences. It is one of the outlying problems of Scripture revision, what is to be done with the Prayer-book version of the Psalms. It is beyond doubt far less correct than even our present Bible version: but it is admirably suited for chanting, and in beauty and melody of language vastly surpasses the other. It should be an "instruction" to the Revisers of the Psalms, to bear this in mind, and in their revision to have in remembrance the rhythmical use of that delightful book: so that eventually there may be but one version in use. No part of the Scripture will want touching more skilfully and delicately.

The question of the use of forms of prayer is answered by Mr. Allon as only it can be answered by any sensible Christian man. First, he disposes of the fallacy in which this question has been entangled in England, owing to the conception of liturgical prayer being limited to the Book of Common Prayer as used in the Episcopal Church. On this his remarks are severe, but not more severe than just:

"If the question were simply an alternative, the Liturgy of the Established Church as it is, or the free prayer of Presbyterian or Nonconforming Churches as it is, it would scarcely be necessary to debate it here. Probably there is no Nonconformist—certainly there is no Nonconformist Church which would even hesitate in its preference for the latter. The uniform use of the Episcopal service is not the alternative to free prayer that we have to consider. Of all Church service-books it includes the noblest elements and the most anomalous and incongruous forms. An accidental combination of three separate services imposes meaningless repetitions, and inordinate length. Its imposition, as the uniform service, is one of the miserable results of the Act of Uniformity—surely more fatally charged with the elements of retribution upon its authors than any measure of ecclesiastical oppression that history records. With fatal infatuation, it seems to have been the chief solicitude of the Established Church of this country not only to exclude from her communion men of the most conscientious honesty, and of the noblest freedom of spiritual life, but also to disable herself from receiving into her worship any fresh inspirations of God, however transcendent, and from exercising any discretional freedom, however desirable in itself, and however imperative changing circumstances might make its exercise. The devotional elevation and compass of the service-book of 1662 are its limit as well as its ideal of human perfection in worship."

But happily there is a way out of this:

"It is at any rate conceivable that liturgical forms might be used, including whatever is excellent in the Book of Common Prayer, and avoiding its incongruities, its monotonous repetitions, and its disabling exclusiveness. The rich materials which the devotional genius of Christendom has accumulated, including those which the Book of Common Prayer contains, might surely be combined into several distinct offices—each moderate in length, distinct in character, and yet general enough for common use—and which, at the discretion of the minister, might be used optionally, as hymns and psalms are used. There might be advantage in thus providing for the expression of such sentiments and necessities as are common to worshippers of all classes and of all generations, while ample opportunity was afforded for the embodiment in free prayer of the desires which special wants and circumstances produce.

"This is the real alternative before us; and it is the one which alone is worthy of consideration, in weighing the various arguments that are urged for and against liturgical forms. Neither advocacy should be embarrassed by any accidental accretions that may characterize any actual embodiment of either method."

The extent to which the Anglican Church is fettered in this matter has lately been put in an almost ludicrous light. An admirable Harvest-service of thanksgiving has long been prepared by the Houses of Convocation. But not only do the ordinary obstructions which lie against every form of Church action, beset its way: it seems as if there were no authority on earth that can give us legal power to use it: and so it lies locked up in the archives of Convocation, while a generation is passing away without being edified by it.

Still more absurd, if possible, has it been of late, to see a Church Synod, composed of men in the full use of their façulties, debating the question whether we ought or ought not to be allowed the selection of Lessons and Psalms suitable for special occasions. The absurdity has taken almost incredible forms. We have listened with admiration to the ingenuity of some of our brethren who have maintained that every chapter of Scripture and every Psalm is applicable to every occasion: who can find elements of special congruity between Daniel's penitential prayer (ch. ix.,—1st Lesson for Aug. 23, evening) and a Harvest Festival, between the seeking of a wife for Isaac (Gen. xxiv.) and a missionary sermon.

But we are wandering from Mr. Allon's Essay. The rationale and the history of Liturgies are very thoroughly discussed by him. While, amidst their acknowledged disadvantages, there is much really to be said for their use, the universal repudiation of them by the free Churches in England has been a consequence of the deliberate and wanton intolerance of the Bishops at the time when concession might have been useful, and comprehension possible:—

"Concerning both the Convocation and the Parliament of 1662, Cardwell affirms that, 'instead of any wish to admit Nonconformists to public power or privilege within the Church, there was a distinct and settled desire to restrain and exclude them.'

"The truculent reply of Sheldon to Dr. Allen is well known. 'Pity,' said Allen, 'you have made the door so strait.' 'Not at all,' replied Sheldon; 'had we supposed that so many would have conformed, we would have made it straiter.' It was a well-known determination and saying on the Episcopal side, 'We'll make them knaves if they conform.' Baxter was always in favour of a national State Church. Calamy would gladly have conformed; so, he tells us, would probably two-thirds of the Dissenters of his day. Howe, Bates, and others pleaded for reasonable comprehension; but the Episcopal authorities were as supercilious as they were uncompromising. South preached at Oxford against comprehension one of his most virulent sermons, comparing the admission of Dissenters to 'permitting a thief to come into the house to avoid the noise and trouble of his knocking at the door.' (Ser. xxxiv.) The last opportunity for comprehension was lost, and England and the Church were spared from what would probably have been a great damage and disaster to their noblest life and liberties."

Mr. Allon urges very forcibly, that mere liturgical forms will never serve for the utterance of the prayers of the Church. This among many others, is a lesson which the Church of England has yet to learn. It is a matter which we conceive must be wisely and cautiously handled, and with all reservation of the common prayers of the people, that we may never fall into the meagre, threadbare extempore prayers so usually heard in "free" churches. But that the pastoral yearnings of a minister, arising out of the circumstances of his flock, should have *no public utterance allowed them*, is surely a monstrous thing—a mark which at once condemns the Church of England as quenching, rather than giving scope to the influence of God's Holy Spirit—as holding that the decorum of historical formulæ is a better and a safer thing than the voice of the spirit of prayer.

Mr. Allon's conclusion will, happily, in these days be that of the immense majority of English Christians:—

"Failing to recognize Divine prescription in forms or modes of worship, we must regard them as matters of pure expediency to be determined upon general principles of human nature, spiritual life, and social circumstance. We must, therefore, concede to every Church the most absolute right to determine its own forms of worship, subject only to those general criticisms which are applicable to all human thoughts and things. History can guide us, not by authoritative precedent, only by illustrating tendencies and recording results. We may argue against systems in the light of general principles, but clearly no man has any right to make his preferences or expediencies the law of another man's conscience. For both individuals and Churches there is but one valid law, viz.,—that, so far as is practicable, each shall embody its worship in such modes and forms as are the best adapted to its own life. Of worship itself there is but one great use and end —that it bring a brotherhood of men to the feet and heart of the great Father in heaven—there to speak to the eager sympathy of His love, all their adoration, and all their desire."

VIII.

We purposely invert the order of the two remaining Essays, that we may reserve for our conclusion that one which bears most directly on the present state of the Church.

Dr. Mullens, the Foreign Secretary of the London Missionary Society, has contributed a paper on "Modern Missions and their Results," of which it is surely no mean praise to say that it forms an admirable pendant to that of Sir Bartle Frere in "The Church and the Age," lately noticed by us. Dr. Mullens gives another and a worthy answer to the shallow scoffs of the ill-informed and the secularists at what they are pleased to call the failure of Christian Missions. We are sorry, if it is only that we miss the pleasure of recording triumphs hardly known to the English public, that we cannot follow him in his candid and unbiassed survey of the missions throughout the world. While he is naturally stirred with the enthusiasm which belongs to his position and work, this examination of missions is conducted with a sobriety which is a guarantee for its scrupulous accuracy. As he approaches the end of his task, he kindles into fervour of expression on looking back on the results of his inquiry :—

"Surveying as a whole the varied results which we have enumerated, how truly great they appear in comparison with the moderate amount of labour that has been employed to produce them. There are solid fruits of toil at home, solid results abroad : results in some lands wide-spread, deep-rooted, amazing in their grandeur and completeness. We have created great systems of agency, skilfully adapted to the states of society with which they have to deal. The message preached, and the holy life enjoined, are enforced by translations of the Bible, and by a Christian literature, published in all the principal languages of the world. We see native Churches, strong in numbers, growing in character, sound in the faith. We have trained and devoted native pastors, and we know that some native missionaries have been distinguished for Apostolic zeal, and have braved a martyr's death. We see tribes and nations that have laid aside their old superstitions, and through a Christian civilization are taking a new place among their fellow-men. Great barriers against the profession of Christian faith have given way—bigotry in Turkey, caste in India, exclusiveness in China. Many of the idolatries, of the ancient wrongs, of the black vices of the world have entirely disappeared. We see Christian nations growing more Christian, more humane ; and Christian men rendered more earnest in doing good. We see the dark world coming to the light ; and the lands where Christians dwell, revived, enlarged, refreshed. Is it not an impiety to call missions a failure ? Rather may we exclaim with wonder, and with gratitude, 'What hath God wrought !' "

IX.

"The Congregationalism of the Future" is the subject of an Essay by the Rev. J. Guinness Rogers. It is written in a somewhat more polemical and "denominational" style than some others in the

volume, from the strictly Congregationalist point of view, and under the influence of the idea that the religion of the future is taking and will continue to take, that form rather than any other. With this view we shall not enter into conflict. We do not share it: but neither do we charge it with arrogancy or unreasonableness. Least of all would we predicate either of these of Mr. Rogers's way of putting it forward. Many of his pages are spent in pointing out some of what he holds to be the narrow and indefensible practices of modern Congregationalism, and in shewing that, without abandonment of scriptural principle, these might be modified, and the feelings and consciences of other men consulted. In the former part of his Essay, he animadverts somewhat severely on Mr. Matthew Arnold for having "forged a class of weapons which are likely to embitter controversies without contributing at all to their settlement," instancing this in his having attributed to Dissenters in general "a provincial tone," and charged them with being "religious Philistines." But his main complaint is that a recent writer in this Journal, "with a remarkable want of generosity, and with an arrogance which is the fault rather of the system than of the man," reproduced these nicknames, taunting the Dissenters with having "chosen to separate themselves from the current of the national life," and with their "exclusion from the national Universities" as having "increased their provinciality."

We hope that the reply which appeared in our pages to that over-pungent article, and still more his collaborator Mr. Dale's strictures on Mr. Arnold, may have ere this tended to right us in his esteem. But we entirely sympathize in his remarks on the disservice which Mr. Arnold has done, in the present state of religious parties, to the great cause which all good men have at heart. An inventor of nicknames has always much to answer for. If a late learned divine had never written an article in the *Edinburgh Review* on Church parties, very much calling of names and misunderstanding of good and earnest men might have been avoided. Happily, Mr. Arnold does not deal in monosyllables, nor in popular explanations of his nomenclature: his "Philistinism" and "provincialism" have very little chance of doing as much mischief as has been achieved by "high," "low," and "broad." We are sorry for this little bit of asperity in Mr. Rogers's Essay; it is somewhat of a fly in the ointment, out of keeping with a very able and charitable book. It is true, no one can say it was unprovoked: but it does not therefore follow that this was the place to display it.

In the main, Mr. Rogers handles his subject with moderation and with charity. The following remarks, which will justify the eulogium, apply, let it be remembered, to his own body as well as

to ours. That they have been made in substance again and again, and in spite of outcry and obloquy, by some within the Anglican communion, is only a sign how, in God's good providence, various hearts are now being touched to the same issue.

"The Church has set up orthodoxy as an idol, and the injustice of the demands made on its behalf have been so extravagant, and the deeds done under its sanction and for its glory so glaring, that they have provoked indignant opposition, and many, in the violence of their reaction against the bondage to which it has been sought to subject their intellect, are disposed to scoff at all dogmas, and to declare that all creeds are equally true, and equally false. Recoiling from the monstrous conclusions, to which the attempt to confine the Christian world within the limits of a narrow creed would have led them, they have in many cases asserted principles inconsistent with the maintenance of any faith in the Gospel at all. But this is nothing more than what might have been anticipated, and it is to be met, not by scornful indifference or angry denunciation, still less by unworthy concession, the abandonment of any doctrine we hold to be true, or anything approaching to acquiescence in the idea that in relation to religious truth there can be no certitude. The more excellent way in which the Church needs to be instructed, is that of a wise and comprehensive charity, that charity which would teach us that there may be a simple faith in the Saviour, even where the theory as to the nature of His sacrifice and its relation to the Divine government may, in our judgment and in that of the majority of Christians, be erroneous; that men may have reached the cross, and found shelter and safety under its shadow, though it has been by different paths from those along which we have travelled; that, though it be after the way which the Church has branded as heresy, they may be sincere believers, and therefore, members of the mystical body of Christ. It is possible, surely, to maintain the authority of the truth in all its integrity, without insisting on our own infallibility; to respect the convictions of others, without relaxing at all the earnestness with which we hold our own; to seek even to correct what appear to us the errors of our brethren, without treating them, because of these differences, as heathen men and publicans. What is necessary is not a less definite creed, but a more comprehensive spirit; not a depreciation of sound opinions, but a higher estimate of a Christ-like spirit, as the sign and evidence of Christian discipleship."

We may be excused if we pass from this Essay to the more general subject, and set down some concluding remarks on the present aspect of Church and Dissent.

On the morning of June 22, 1870, the chapel of Henry VII. in Westminster Abbey witnessed such a scene as has not been enacted since the name of Christ was first named in Britain. Between the latticed shrine of King Henry VII. and the flat pavement tomb of Edward VI., was spread "God's board:" and round that pavement-tomb knelt, shoulder to shoulder, bishops and dignitaries of the Church of England, professors of her Universities, divines of the Scottish Presbyterian and Free Churches, and of the Independent, Baptist, Wesleyan, Unitarian Churches in England,—a representa-

tive assembly, such as our Church has never before gathered under her wing, of the Catholic Church by her own definition,—of "all who profess and call themselves Christians." And when that assembly, being many, declared themselves one body by partaking of the One Bread, and all drank into the same Spirit, many a heart beat high with thankfulness and onward hope. Some, who had been toiling for this, and for the great work which this was subserving, through years of obloquy and disappointment, remembered the bread cast upon the waters, and took courage.

It is a subject of equal thankfulness that the spirit of that auspicious morning has signally and continuously rested on the company whose labours were thus inaugurated. For the first time in the history of the Church, Christians of these varying forms of faith have sat day by day round one table, earnestly labouring over the text of the Word of life: men, not one of whom would surrender one point of the faith which he holds sacred,—but from whom there issues not a word, because there dwells not in them a thought, of asperity or discourtesy: among whom, when a member rises to give his opinion, is no question who he is, but simply what he contributes to the common deliberation. What may come of those arduous and toilsome deliberations, He only knows who has the issues of man's work in His hand: but it is more than the reward of a life of struggle for union, to have witnessed, even thus far, the embodiment of our hopes in action. Even should no more come of this beginning, it can never cease to be reckoned among the choicest blessings of our course, that we have been permitted to witness so bright an instalment of our onward yearnings.

It might have been thought that the announcement of such a beginning of the work of Scripture Revision would have gladdened the hearts of every disciple of Christ in England. One would have believed that, if not in form, in spirit at least, there would have gone up from her Church a voice of general thanksgiving, that now at last had come a day when long alienated Christian brethren had met round the table of the Lord, and girded themselves for their common work of faithfulness to His Word. But it was evident to any who had watched the signs of coming events, that this was not to be looked for. Some mutterings of the tempest had already been heard. A curiously indiscreet letter had been admitted into the too *un*guarded columns of the *Guardian*, in which the writer, full of wrath at the composition of the Biblical Revision Companies, hazarded the assertion that it would be impossible for them to receive the Holy Communion together, or even to offer up prayer for a daily blessing on their work. It was easy to see to what the feeling would lead, by which this letter was dictated. It is true, the spirit enjoined on



STRIKES AND LOCK-OUTS,

FROM THE WORKMAN'S POINT OF VIEW.

THE origin of strikes is in the reluctance of the working-man to barter the exercise of his industry and skill for less money than may suffice for the decent maintenance of himself and his family, leaving something over for the future. The origin of locking-out is in the indisposition of employers to regulate their profits from the combination of capital with labour in due regard to the fair claims of those persons whom they employ. It is not denied that the men may sometimes push their demands too far, may make mistakes in mode, manner, and spirit, as to the assertion of them; nor is it insinuated that the masters are always governed by a greedy and selfish mind in refusing the full of such demands. On the contrary, it is readily admitted that the men, no less than the masters, ought to consider what is due to the other party while insisting upon justice and fairness to themselves.

Disputes between employer and employed began early in the history of the world and continue late. Although Laban was Jacob's father-in-law, the shrewd patriarch (who, it must be confessed, looked well after his own interest) had to complain that he "changed his wages ten times." From the proneness of selfishness to take advantage of dependence, it was found necessary to instruct Moses to lay down as a law, that "the wages of him that was hired should not abide with the hirer all night until the morning," an interdict, by-

the-bye, which strikes at the root of all truck. The uncompromising prophet who descended from the same stock as the great lawgiver, pronounced one of his many "woes" upon "him that built his house by unrighteousness, and his chambers by wrong; that used his neighbour's service without wages, and gave him not for his work." The last of the Hebrew prophets, in like manner, was commissioned to declare that his divine Master would be "a swift witness against those that oppressed the hireling in his wages," as guilty of one of the most heinous sins; and, in the most practical of the epistles addressed in the name of Jesus Christ to the Jewish converts, we have this ringing protest against all similar oppression, "Behold, the hire of the labourers which have reaped down your fields, which is of you kept back by fraud, crieth; and the cries of them which have reaped are entered into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth."

While quoting the sacred Books in seeming admonition of employers who withhold from the employed any portion of their due, it would not be manly to disguise the fact that the same records have a few words of exhortation, or of rebuke, for discontented or improvident hirelings. John the Baptist bade the soldiers of Herod "be content with their wages," though this would hardly have been said if their pay were not adequate to the services rendered; and Haggai the Prophet conveys a lesson by which not a few workingmen of this age and nation might profit, when speaking of "him that earneth wages," as "earning wages to put it into *a bag with holes.*"

To borrow an expressive proverb from the same source, "If these things were done in the green tree, what would be done in the dry?" If, in countries and among nations which have the rigid law of Moses, and even the exalted morality of Christ, the working classes found cause of complaint against those who hired them, what might not be expected in lands and among peoples not hedged in by these restraints, or favoured with these advantages! Along the whole line of human history, therefore, one might expect to observe continuous traces of what are known to ourselves as "trade disputes." But there is neither space nor time, nor any occasion withal, for going over so wide a field of inquiry. Our own island and its inhabitants being the intended sphere and subject of present observation, attention had better be confined to them. Nor, even here, would a far-back retrospect be of much use. Enough, and more than enough, that the last hundred years might be too truly spoken of as a chronicle of dissensions betwixt capital and labour, employers and employed. If, however, the nature and the accompaniments of those disagreements in the earlier years of that hundred be impartially compared with the character and consequences of similar misunderstandings of more recent occurrence and present existence, the result of the

comparison will appear to be so much in favour of both parties in this generation as to encourage the hope of a mutual settlement of such differences, and that, perhaps, at no very distant day.

In the face of what has just occurred at Cork, of what preceded it by a few weeks at or near Manchester, and of certain disgraceful facts elicited by the inquiry at Sheffield, it would be wrong, foolish, and unavailing, to affirm that violence and outrage have entirely ceased, or even that the antipathy to machine in aid of hand labour has been wholly appeased. But it is universally acknowledged, at least by all fair-minded and unprejudiced men, that, in the respects named, there is between our time and that of our grandfathers, a difference as palpable as that between light and darkness, or peace and war. Where, now, are the "assassinations" with which working-men used to be taunted? Where the vitriol-throwing, the machine-breaking, and the mill-burning, with which they were once reproached? In the worst of times, none of these were either so numerous, so malignant, or so rife, as in sweeping statements they have been represented to be. At any rate, they have now entirely disappeared, or so nearly so, as that a stray circumstance of the kind only serves in equitable minds to enhance, by the rarity of the exception, the prevalence of a happy rule. Few men understand this subject better than Mr. Brassey, Member for Hastings. "I place," he says, "a firm reliance on the industry and common sense of our working-people; and I believe that happier and brighter days are yet in store." In a preface to his able speech, delivered this time last year, he prefixed to the sentence just cited a Latin quotation, which, as Englished by a scholarly friend, means, "As we have endured worse, God will carry us through what remains."

From that speech, in several passages expressing opinions to which working-men might take exception, the strongest corroboration of what has been advanced in favour of their present attitude and temper, may be adduced. Some of the most trusted leaders of the trades' unions, says Mr. Brassey, are averse to strikes; and he instances the Amalgamated Engineers as even "anxious not to waste their money in injudicious conflicts with their employers." He avows the hope, that, when these unions shall have received proper acknowledgment from the State, they will generally act with equal wisdom and discretion. It is, indeed, as benefit societies more especially, that he speaks of them as "having effected, and as capable of very great good. They encourage a noble spirit of self-help. It should, therefore, be the care of a wise statesman diligently to encourage them." But the eulogy does not stop here.

"Even if a strike should unfortunately occur, it is likely enough," says Mr. Brassey, "that, under the control of a trades' union, the conduct of the

workmen would be more reasonable and temperate than if no organization existed to check a lawless disposition. In this respect the conduct of the trades' unionists, while out on strike, will probably be as much superior to that of the rioters in the manufacturing districts in the early part of the present century as the discipline of a standing army is superior to that of a guerilla band."

Mr. Rupert Kettle, who has acquired a high reputation among both masters and men by the impartiality and the rectitude of his decisions between the two, is in a situation to be more equitable in his views and judgment than a Member of Parliament and a capitalist who, how honourably soever he may have spoken, takes the side of capital, and not that of labour, as at least the labourers themselves regard it. Even the President of the Wolverhampton Working Men's Club, likewise, freely points out what he considers to be their mistakes in opinion and even in practice. The trades' unions, he declares, however,

"Have promoted free thought and free action among the hand-working classes; and, moreover, have taught them to respect the law, and rely upon moral means for obtaining what they believe to be right. We have now no bloodshed, no rioting, scarcely an angry word, in the bitterest and most protracted strikes. Although we owe this salutary change partly to the improved education and the higher moral tone among the labouring class, we owe it much more to the direct and immediate influence of trades' unions. A master might be proud of having the chairman, secretary, or committee-man of a union in his employment."

By this learned gentleman, as will be noticed, strikes are considered, not as the outgrowth of trades' unions, but rather as movements among the working-men, which those unions may restrain, direct, or control; and strikes and lock-outs, rather than unions of either men or masters, are the immediate subjects of remark. The characteristic differences between the two may seem to be obvious. It is necessary, however, for truth and justice, to point out their respective features.

Strikes are of two sorts: aggressive and defensive. An aggressive strike may be said to have been entered on, when a resolution has been taken by a certain number of workmen in the same factory or trade to desist from labour except on certain terms and conditions. Yet, in no sense or degree is this line of action binding upon any who are not voluntary and consenting parties to the determination made. Upon all who voted for it, the course is obligatory, if not by public law, yet in common honour. But whoever dissented from it, or stood aloof, having no hand either way in the matter, that man is perfectly free to act as he may see fit.

But, it may be asked, under what circumstances does an aggressive strike take place? The answer is, Seldom, one would like to say Never, without due deliberation. An occasion must first arise. Something must have occurred affecting either a single factory or

workshop, or a whole trade. The one master, or firm, or a whole body of masters, either local or general, must have adopted and declared a measure, or measures, which the men affected by them regard as unfair, unjust, or oppressive. The aggrieved confer among themselves. They agree to remonstrate and to advance a certain claim as to the matters on which they are at issue with the firm, or with the masters in general. That firm, or those masters, either persist or they give way. If the latter, there is an end of the affair; if the former, then the dissatisfied men feel that they have no alternative but to give timely notice of their refusal to continue work on the new conditions, or on any but those which they state in their notice. This may lead to an interview between the parties, either by deputations or in whole bodies; or the master or masters concerned may accept the notice. Sometimes the interview is satisfactory, but by no means so often as could be desired. When neither side will give way, the notice takes full effect, and there is a strike.

It is expedient to be thus particular in specifying the stages between the strike and its moving cause, because some persons insinuate, or more frequently with rashness affirm, that strikes are fomented by the officers of trades' unions. The truth, however, is, that they grow naturally, as described, out of the spontaneous resolution of the men concerned, or a majority of them, not to work at all rather than to work on the terms and conditions sought to be imposed. They begin, how aggressive soever they may be, in some act or measure of the employer or employers; and they never reach completion until every practicable and reasonable method has been tried, and tried in vain, to obtain the withdrawal of the obnoxious change, or the concession of the consequent demand.

But do strikes of this order never come under the notice of the officers of the trades' unions? No doubt they do; and then it is seen how far such observers as Mr. Brassey and Mr. Kettle are warranted in their opinion, that it is better, and not bad, for trade disputes to come under the cognizance of those officers. If, on being asked for their opinion, they find the strike in question a warrantable one, they say so; if otherwise, they are equally frank; and, on a fair examination of the whole case as affecting them, it would be usually seen that they exercised a dispassionate judgment and a sound discretion. Temerity is always blundering. This fatal association of qualities prevents many critics of the working-classes from perceiving, that, where trades' unions, by the action of their officers, acknowledge the justifiableness of a strike, they virtually pledge the trade which they represent to extend to it material support, and that they are not likely to bring so heavy a burden upon the backs of their constituents without a cool and careful weighing of the

whole subject-matter in all its practical bearings and probable consequences.

A strike may be distinguished as defensive when, instead of arising out of an original demand made by the men upon the master or the masters, it takes the form of united resistance to a threatened reduction of wages, or to some encroachment upon established trade privileges, affecting, for example, the proportion of apprentices to journeymen, the quality of work as superior or inferior, the security of the lives and the preservation of the health of the hands employed, or other points. "Other points" is a convenient phrase to cover a variety of incidents which may occur in the relations of employer and employed. In large establishments much is necessarily left in the hands of foremen and over-lookers, who, according to their tempers and dispositions, have it in their power either to conciliate or to irritate the work-people under them. Often of their own accord they may do the one or the other; and generally, especially at times of excitement or of fluctuation, they may have special instructions from their principals to pursue a particular course with regard to the workmen. When, for reasons in the breasts of the master or masters, it is deemed expedient to act upon a policy not likely to please the employed, it is convenient to use these middlemen as instruments for the purpose. Without unjustly arraigning the whole class, among whom there are the same moral varieties as among the rest of mankind, it will be readily conceived that the best are not free from human infirmities, while the common propensity in go-betweens to magnify their office in a manner disagreeable to flesh and blood, is proportionate to native tendencies and to circumstantial opportunities. When, for example, individual workmen, or groups of workmen, are discharged on grounds which strike their comrades as vindictive or unjust, the public opinion of the factory or workshop naturally revolts at the capricious exercise of arbitrary power. This is more emphatically the case if, through the intervention of foremen, or in any other way, the weight of the master's displeasure is made to fall upon those men who, in any expostulation or negociation on the part of the whole body, have undertaken by deputation to represent the sentiments of the employed to the employers. Such are some of the occasions which, unless the employers repudiate the offensive action of the foremen, or effect a conciliation of the hands with respect to whatever may have proved a cause of misunderstanding or dissatisfaction, may, in the minds of the employed, acquire importance enough to justify recourse to a strike, which, in that case, would be entitled to be considered as in no way aggressive, but as purely defensive.

Lock-outs are entirely distinct from strikes. The difference is so

great as hardly to need description, except for the information of readers who have paid no attention to the subject. Strikes are the acts of men; lock-outs, of masters. In the one case as in the other, the name is exactly descriptive of the thing. When the key of the factory or workshop is turned, nobody can get in. While, therefore, a strike leaves it perfectly optional for any man to continue work who wills, a lock-out compels all to desist from work. In short, the place of business being locked up, the whole body of the hands are locked out; the contented no less than the discontented, the innocent, if you please, as well as the guilty.

We hear much of chassepots and needle-guns, of Armstrongs and mitrailleurs. Lock-outs, in like manner, are the most formidable weapon with which masters at war with men have learned to fight them; and, as in so-called improvements of material armour, their operation is as cruel as it is sweeping. The multitudes thus treated, together with their helpless wives and unoffending children, may retort in the words of the national poet, "You take away my life when you do take away the means whereby I live." If it be replied that the husbands and the fathers who provoked the lock-out, must bear the responsibility of its results to their wives and their children, it may be rejoined that, be the force of this reasoning great or be it small, its application does not touch those involved in the suffering without any fault, real or only imputed, of their own. Nor, in a question of comparative power, and the exercise of it as between masters and men, do the effects of a lock-out terminate with the deprivation of all means of living to the men locked out, with their wives and little ones, and this without any distinction between offenders and non-offenders. These are the mere incidents of warfare as waged by capital against labour; the essential things are, that by a lock-out the employers bring into subjection the employed, whom they regard as their enemies; and that, by the same act that subjugates themselves, their fellow-workmen are prevented from affording them the least comfort or assistance in their adversity.

A lock-out—the sole work of the master or masters, the grand *coup d'état* of the capitalist—is, according to its extent, a *paralytic stroke* inflicted upon trade and commerce. It is, in all respects, a declaration of war against society, which is fancied by some to consist of the rich and luxurious few, but which must everlastingly consist of the comparatively poor and hard-living many. It is a dragonnade of humble and peaceful homes. The rape of the Sabine mothers was hardly more ruthless, and certainly not more immoral. It is a moral massacre of innocents. More pitiless than sword or gun, it shrinks not from inflicting the worst horrors of a siege. "Famine!" is its watchword. It falls upon the helpless, and

deliberately makes them houseless and hopeless. Who, then, are the men that betake themselves to a weapon like this for the accomplishment of their designs? Are they not husbands and fathers themselves? Do they not profess and call themselves Christians? How would they like their wives and children to be exposed to the consequences of measures like those to which they have recourse against fellow-husbands and fellow-fathers without apparent compunction? Nay, are not these men believers in the same God, and clients upon the merits of the same Saviour? Or which alternative do they mean to choose, on the supposition of their determination to repudiate the bond of fellow-Christianship between themselves and the flesh-and-blood portion of their machinery? Do they honestly renounce the title of Christian for themselves, or do they haughtily deny it to the subjects of their oppressive action? If the latter, then, on the principles to which they pretendedly adhere, "the merciful man is merciful [even] to his beast;" if the former, in that case we will be dumb, and not open our mouths, but silently behold the awful spectacle in which the Author of love and faith will have allowed His memorable words to be bodied forth in self-convicted fact, "Ye cannot serve God and Mammon."

In further inquiry into the origin or cause of strikes and lock-outs, it may not be amiss to follow up the heavy indictment against such as have recourse to the latter expedient with mention of the aggravating circumstance, that it has often been called into use against men for joining a trades' union. We are not now discussing those associations; but, to the eyes of those who allow them to be legitimate, the declaration of lock-outs for the direct purpose of their repression must surely appear in a very dark light. As for strikes, they really originate, as a general truth, in the persuasion of the working-man that he is not receiving a fair reward for his toil, does not reap a proportionate share of the wealth which his industry and skill undoubtedly produce. In the detail of individual instances, it might perhaps appear that such persuasions are sometimes overweening or mistaken; but, as a broad universal fact, who will venture to deny that the producer of wealth is entitled to a fair and full share of that which but for him would not have been produced? Yet, in actual affairs, that which should be the invariable rule, is, at best, the rare—one had almost said the solitary—exception. What do figures show? The capital of the country has increased during the last fifty years say three hundred and fifty per cent.; wages but twenty-five, or, at most, thirty per cent. The yearly income of the country is reckoned at about £814,000,000 sterling; and how is this magnificent harvest, from the combination of mere money with physical industry and intellectual skill, divided

between the partners? It is not even cut into equal halves; but that is nothing compared with the gross inequality of the distribution of the two moieties in respect of the numbers of the two classes of recipients. The bigger half is partitioned in huge nuggets among a million and a quarter of our lucky fellow-countrymen, while much the lesser has to be beaten out into thin leaf, in order that there may be a few square inches of the flimsiest gold for each one of the other nine-and-twenty millions. The logical consequence of such a state of things is, that the capitalist (as typal of his class) is ever growing richer, and the labourer, representatively considered, poorer and poorer still. The *logical* consequence; for it is not forgotten, nor is it sought to conceal the fact, that there are differences between labourer and labourer, though imperceptible in presence of the wide gulf betwixt rich and poor. But, while a nominal increase in wages may be cited (though against that is to be set the far more rapid advance in the cost of living), that advantage, such as it may be, is neither equally shared nor universally extended, never reaching to the most numerous section of working-men, and, at the most, coincident with a state of things which, while giving to the best-paid a scanty and precarious subsistence, leaves a large and an increasing number without employment, and therefore without money, and consequently without bread.

In one word, strikes and lock-outs are opposed, like pole to pole, force to force, army to army. The ultimate object of strikes is to procure for labour the fair proportion of the wealth which it produces, and which no amount of capital, barren capital, except as developed by labour, could produce without it; while the constant aim of lock-outs is to monopolize profit for the mere capitalist, to restrict wages to the lowest point, and to compel labour for the longest number of practicable hours.

From statement, explanation, and argument, let us now pass on to evidence and illustration. A concise review of strikes and lock-outs in leading trades may suffice in exemplification of such events among trades in general. It was intended at first to begin the list of examples with the great Preston strike of 1853; but the space will be better occupied by a statement of the condition of things from that time to the present, for the correctness of which Mr. Thomas Mawdsly, secretary to the Northern Association of Operative Cotton Spinners, will be ready to vouch.

"Since the great Preston lock-out in 1853, we have had neither strike nor lock-out extending over a whole town or district, except the Stockport strike in 1867 against a reduction of wages, after several months' duration eventuating in favour of the men. Strikes and lock-outs are, indeed, only too common in the cotton trade; but they are generally limited to one or more mills at a time, and, though disastrous as far as they go, are not

seriously felt, nor deeply impressed upon the public mind, although sometimes of several months' duration. These minor disputes about wages relate to spinners' piecework; in other words, to payments by the weight and length turned off. Lists of prices are agreed to by masters and men. So long as the conditions are honestly fulfilled, all goes on well; but, without any guarantee for their fulfilment, they are not unfrequently worse than useless, through the introduction by the employers of a worse material. In this way the workmen's wages are sometimes reduced, not a mere five per cent., but often as much as fifteen per cent.* These indirect reductions, these nibblings at the workmen's hard earnings, these swindling practices of employers, go on silently but surely, the outside public hearing little or nothing about them. It is only direct attacks upon the price lists that are brought under general notice. Should it be asked, why not take such cases before the magistrates? it may be replied that proscription is a word terribly significant to the operative cotton spinners, and, though susceptible of two interpretations—forced emigration and pauperism—neither of the two is a pleasant subject for contemplation to the father of a family. Facts like these evince the necessity for boards of arbitration, and may probably account for the determined opposition of employers to their establishment. It would not be fair, however, to charge employers generally with these nefarious practices, which, strictly speaking, are confined, or nearly so, to a needy and greedy class, aspiring to a position for which they are not qualified by either wealth or education. Their cuckoo cry is 'bad trade,' until trade really becomes such, when the honourable employer is compelled to that reduction of wages for which these greedy cormorants have, by their repeated encroachments, created the necessity. With regard to strikes and their consequences, but one opinion exists among experienced workmen. They look upon them as the result of a choice of evils, and are obliged to believe, that, if they did not occasionally occur, greater evils would follow their discontinuance. Even in the most palmy days of the Operative Cotton Spinners' Society, the want was always felt of a disinterested tribunal to which disputes between employers and employed might be referred. For the last seventeen years at least, one of its fundamental rules has required, and to this hour requires, the settlement of all wages disputes by arbitration, and that extreme measures shall never be resorted to until arbitration shall have been solicited by the workmen, and have been refused by the employers. Under such circumstances (and we challenge contradiction), must it not be evident to every impartial inquirer, whatever certain writers may say to the contrary, that for an overwhelming majority of wages disputes which for years have disgraced our manufacturing districts, the employers, and they only, are responsible?

"If boards of arbitration of a character to be effective for the prevention of strikes and lock-outs should ere long be established, the men would hail them as a great boon. But who can close his eyes to the fact that the working-men of this country are more dependent upon the capital of others than are the industrial operatives of any other country in the world? And this state of things will inevitably continue, until they insist upon the enactment of such laws as, in the language of the late Mr. Cobden, will enable them to turn over the furrows of their own freeholds, from which they have long been practically excluded."

* Since the preceding facts and observations were written, we have learned from a reliable source that instances might be adduced of wages having been reduced from 30s. to 22s. per week, a difference of eight shillings per week, through working up inferior cotton, in defiance of the price lists above referred to.

The strike in the London building trade, which, followed by a lock-out, took place in the year 1859, is the most memorable thing of the kind upon record. That severe struggle between men and masters is distinctly and directly traceable to a single point—the strong and general desire of the men in every branch of the trade to obtain a reduction in the hours of labour. They had been at work for ten hours a day: they now asked that the day's work might be limited to nine hours. The movement for this purpose really began in 1857; and among the chief promoters of it were the carpenters, the masons, the bricklayers, the plasterers, and the painters. These trades made demonstration of their strength and unanimity by the holding of a large aggregate meeting. This was followed by district meetings of principal shops. To these succeeded a conference of delegates. Deputations were then sent to reason the matter, first with individual employers, and finally with the Association of Master Builders. This series of patient efforts was spread over the long space of two years; and midsummer of 1859 arrived without any apparent sign on the part of the employers of a disposition to comply with the very reasonable and most moderate request of the employed. In July, therefore, as a last resource, a deputation of the combined trades waited upon the firm of Messrs. Trollope, to urge them, by way of example, to accept nine hours as a day's work from the hands in their employ. The answer made to this application was signally illustrative of the high-handed manner in which the capitalist mind is apt to meet such occasions. On this deputation there happened to be a mason, working at Knightsbridge. The sun of that day went down upon the wrath of his employers, by whom he was instantly discharged from the job. As a matter of course, the brother-masons at work with him "struck;" and, before the week was out, all the men of every trade employed under the firm ceased from work, by way of asserting the claim for a reduction of the hours of daily labour from ten to nine. The associated master builders made common cause with Messrs. Trollope. Nay, they did more than this; for, at a general meeting in Freemasons' Hall, they unanimously resolved to close all their own establishments, and lock out all their men, until the strike at Messrs. Trollope's should be given up. Nor was even this all. As if a stringent and ruthless lock-out were not enough to break the spirit of the men, it was further determined that though the men at Messrs. Trollope's should yield the point, for the sake of their own families and the families of their brother-workmen, no hand should be received again into any of the re-opened establishments until he had signed a document like that which the Emperor of the French has had the insolence to demand from the King of Prussia, declaring, not only that he did not then, but also

that he never would, belong to a trades' society which in any way, direct or indirect, should interfere with either the rate of wages or the hours of work. On the 14th of August the master builders, who were answered by the men as Prussia, in her just indignation, replied to the insolence of France, carried their tyrannous resolution into rigorous effect. The building operatives of every sort, non-society men as well as society men, were to a man paid off; and thus, at one stroke, all were deprived of the means of living. For eight weeks the shops were completely closed. The eighth part of the time has often sufficed to subdue the proudest cities by famine. During those pitiless and weary months, Messrs. Trollope were the only firm open to take on hands, and they not but on compliance with the slavish terms that had been dictated by the whole body of masters. Well, what was the result? The men who struck at that one shop were four hundred strong; yet, after a general lock-out of the most stringent nature, and of eight weeks' continuance, not more than a miserable minority of one hundred and fifty were at work under the firm whom all these pains had been taken to supply with servile and submissive hands. On the 10th of October the master builders at large re-opened their workshops, signally defeated in their combined and prolonged attempt to crush the last spark of independence out of the spirits of the men. That after an eight weeks' entire suspension of work a few should bow under the yoke of the Document, was matter of no surprise; the surprise was, rather, that they were so few. So very few, indeed, that the odious badge of slavery was practically withdrawn; and, confessing the defeat which they had taken the best means to insure, the masters, tired of their own measures, and now as anxious to bring in the men as they had been ruthless to turn them out, allowed as many as chose to return to work without signing, on the convenient understanding that it was implied! The men, however, understood what was due to themselves too well to rest content under this pretence. Nothing less than the revocation of the Document would satisfy their sense of self-respect and of justice. Withdrawing, therefore, the demand for a nine hours' day at the Messrs. Trollope's, they concentrated their efforts upon the whole body of the masters, and, by the mouth of their committee, declared war against the Document. The struggle was severe and long, lasting through twenty-six weeks; but courage and endurance reaped a full reward. On the 7th of February, 1860, the Masters' Association met once more in Freemasons' Hall, and agreed to the unconditional abandonment of the very badge of subjection which they previously assembled to impose.

On this memorable occasion, the comparative power of a strike and a lock-out was fairly tested. Success was on the side of brave

endurance; defeat, on that of cruel tyranny. Those master builders would fain have reduced free artizans to miserable serfs; but they would not submit to the yoke. Far from it, they showed to the whole body of the working classes, that moral means are in their possession, by which, without the breach of any law, they may assert, preserve, and even extend, on the basis of their rights as free men, the privileges to which, as men of industry, every principle of justice, human and Divine, fairly entitles them. But what, it will be asked by those financiers who flatter themselves that they have an argument against which no strike can stand,—what were the pecuniary accompaniments and consequences of this severe and protracted struggle? The question shall be frankly answered. The money collected from the building and other trades in support of the men amounted to about £48,000; and, although the war was waged through the winter months, the distress to the families of the men, trying as it must have been, did not seem to have been severe; for it was well known in the trades affected, that the mendicancy of that season was mainly due to professional beggars, who palmed themselves upon the charitable as sufferers from want of work in occupations with which they had no connection.

To the men really concerned in the battle, what was the value of their victory? In calculations of this kind, it must always be borne in mind, that, while the loss is temporary and ends with the conflict, the gain is permanent and continuous, not bounded by the immediate and proximate result. At the time when the whole body of master builders tried the power of the lock-out at the point of highest pressure, wages were at 33*s.* for a week of 57½ hours. A few months after the dispute ended, payment by the hour was begun, whereby the men obtained a reduction of two hours' work a week. In 1864 they gained an advance of wages of 2*s.* a week; and in 1866 a further advance of 2*s.* 8*d.*; both of which were won without any general effort. The value of these several concessions will be better appreciated if put in another form. Let it be supposed that, through the movement to get the working day reduced from ten hours to nine, 40,000 men were locked out and deprived of work and wages for eight weeks. This, at 30*s.* a week each man, would amount to £12 the individual, or to £480,000 for the whole 40,000. Since then, they have received an advance of 5*s.* a week each, or £13 a year. This, carried over ten years (from 1860 to 1870), would show a gain to each man of £130, and to the whole 40,000 of £5,200,000. But this is not all. They have also gained a reduction of two hours in the week, making for each man in the ten years 1,040 hours, and for the whole number 41,600,000 hours. So much for the men in London; but, in a comparison between the temporary

loss and the permanent gain, it is only fair that the reflex action of the circumstances upon the men of the same trades in the country should be taken into the account. The building operatives throughout the kingdom obtained, as a consequence, an advance in wages of from 2*s*. to 3*s*. a week, and a reduction in hours of work averaging 2½ hours in the week; gains which, multiplied by the number of the hands at work, would show a manifold harvest as the fruit of a momentary loss.

A few other exemplifications of the strike and the lock-out may be given; but it must be at less length. The case of the Leeds and Wakefield colliers in 1858 is important enough, however, to justify some detail. Up to March of that year they had no union. On the 13th of the month, the coal-owners gave them notice that, on and after April the 3rd, they meant to reduce wages 15 per cent., and that, if they did not accept the reduction, their employers would require the usual fourteen days' notice before leaving work. At a delegates' meeting of the miners on the 10th of April, it was resolved to resist the reduction and to form a union. In spite of these announcements the short pay was enforced. At several pits, therefore, where owners had been prominent in causing the reduction, the colliers made up their minds to strike. The 2,400 in the other pits, meantime, were to work at the lowered rate, and to subscribe by levy in support of the 800 men and boys on strike. When the strike had lasted several months (namely, on the 7th of September), the coal-owners met at Leeds and came to a resolution "to close all their pits in the Leeds and Wakefield districts, unless the colliers would submit to the reduction of 15 per cent., sign an agreement to abandon the union, and cease to contribute to the men on strike." Thus, again, the power of the lock-out was to be pitted against that of the strike. The resolution of the owners came under the notice of the colliers in connection with a call to deliver up their tools, and quit the employ of their respective masters on the 7th of October. The light of that day saw locked out 3,000 men and boys, numbering, with the families to which they belonged, 15,000 souls. All these, it seemed, were doomed to starvation, because they would not sever themselves from their union, although they had quietly submitted, to the extent described, to a reduction in wages of more than one-seventh. Again the much-enduring men peacefully submitted, and for several weeks smarted in silence under the new infliction. But there are bounds to human patience; and, when men both respect themselves and love their wives and children, those bounds are the sooner reached. Yet, though the patience of the colliers was exhausted, they were not excited into anger. Strong in the strength of their cause, they simply asked the owners to agree to refer the matters on which par-

ties were at issue to arbitration. There were in Leeds a number of influential gentlemen who thought that brave fellows who fetch up from the bowels of the earth the mineral which feeds our furnaces and warms our firesides, were deserving of every consideration. At the head of these was Dr. Hook, then Vicar of Leeds, now Dean of Chichester. But, though urged by such men, the coal-owners, not perhaps very trustful in the goodness of their cause, refused to go to arbitration. Under such circumstances, no alternative remained to the colliers as men and not slaves, but to remain out, and, by way of preventing absolute starvation, to receive such support as their fellow-workmen in other parts might be able and willing to give.

The quick-witted enemies to trades' unions will be swift to conclude that these owners had a full justification of the heavy reduction, in the lower price obtainable for their coal. It so happened, however, that the contrary was very remarkably the case. In those districts, the price had, in eight years, risen 75 per cent. In 1850, the price per ton at the pit's mouth was 5*s.* for best, and 1*s.* for slack; in 1858, best fetched 7*s.* 6*d.*, and slack as much as 2*s.* per ton. Moreover, as respects the union of the men in self-defence, this took place, be it borne in mind, after the dispute, not before. Be it further observed that the masters, who could not endure the thought of union among the men, had been in combination for five years. They formed themselves into an association in 1853; from which time the price of coal began its wonderful advance. The fact here stated is proved by an advertisement in the *Leeds Mercury* of March 17, 1854, announcing a meeting of coal-masters four days prior to that at which it had been resolved to reduce the colliers' wages as much as 9*d.* a day, to begin from the following week. Yet, in 1858, from four to five years later, the men were locked out by these very masters, *because they would not sign an agreement to give up a union called into existence for the sole purpose of resisting a reduction of wages equal to* 15 *per cent., when the price of coal had risen* 75 *per cent.*

Strong as is the single case of the Leeds and Wakefield colliers, it does not supersede the necessity for a brief reference to that of their brethren in South Yorkshire. These had, before 1866, been locked out for twenty-four months in six years. One effect of this hard experience was, to increase the unionists from 2,000 in 1864 to 4,000 in 1866. Since then, lock-out has followed lock-out like claps in a thunder-storm; and, at this moment, a multitude of men, with their families, are under the iron heel. But all is of no avail. The dusky heroes will not be crushed. Within the last three years they have paid £10,000 in accident claims, are paying £10,000 a year in benefits, and have granted £8,000 to other trades in distress; and, during the last year of which we have any return, the half of an

expenditure of £25,000 was absorbed in self-sacrificing resistance to a lock-out which still presses with relentless gripe upon a large body of men and their helpless families. It is not enough that very few short of fifteen thousand human lives were lost in the pits of the United Kingdom between 1856 and 1869; but those who escape from the multiplied dangers of their toil must be tortured by heavy reductions in the face of rising prices, and starved into disunion by masters who first set them the example of combining. For avaricious greed there is no cure in this life; but it may be curbed in its ferocious voracity; and, while a never-ceasing series of lock-outs have failed to subdue the spirit of the men, their strikes—always in self-defence, and never in mere aggression—have been more conspicuously vindicated by the nature and value of their results than perhaps the most justifiable and most successful in other trades. They have struck against those defects in ventilation, and construction, and protection, which spring from the cupidity of the owners, or the neglect of their agents, as well as against measures, or the absence of them, more directly affecting their means of livelihood. By strikes, or by the threat of them, they have secured a juster balance respecting the results of their labour, a diminution of the working hours, and the emancipation of their wives and daughters from the degradation of the pit; and, while they have effected these triumphs over the covetousness of their employers, they have, by similar means, secured, though much remains to be accomplished, improved ventilation, more vigilant inspection, and more effectual bratticing, with other smaller yet needful lightenings of their hard case.

The lock-out of the file trade at Sheffield in 1866 presents the action of that mode of snubbing the men under an aspect which assimilates the littleness of the policy to the littleness of the trade. Here was a purely local industry, giving occupation to some four thousand hands. Between a fortieth part of the number (the grinders) and their employers there remained an unsettled dispute; to quell, instead of settling which, the whole body of the trade were locked out. The masters fondly imagined that they had their own way; but they soon heard a voice which said, "Viper, thou bitest a file." Never, perhaps, was overreaching avarice taught a severer lesson. A sum of £20,000 was expended on the men's part in the struggle. The savings of a life-time were thrown into the scale of the weak. There was no lack of responsible bondsmen for the requisite loans to the union. The tradesmen of the town rallied round the sufferers. The men locked out found shelter under the wings of co-operation; and the co-operative works obtained the custom forfeited by the oppressors, who, foreseeing the approaching ruin of their business, made haste to capitulate.

The Boiler Makers' and Iron Shipbuilders' Executive Council have had an experience in strikes and lock-outs not without several points of importance. There was a strike at Chatham against working to instruct shipwrights. The men subsequently taken to work on the *Achilles* were put through an examination; but the common shipwrights were continued, and, with the smiths of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, professed to finish the ship, which was tight and complete as far as the good workmanship went, while, in parts left to less skilful and efficient hands, she was lined with eight or nine inches of concrete to prevent leakage! Messrs. Wigram, in a similar predicament, had recourse to the Amalgamated Smiths in keeping on the shipwrights, as the Liverpool men would not work with them. The unsafeness of the work is demonstrable in the instance of a ship built for the Trinity Board; and the mere name of the ill-fated *London* is enough to fix a stigma on the cheap bungling which produced such a specimen. At Cardiff the society gained a victory over the shipwrights, though, in that case also, assisted by the Amalgamated Engineers. At Leeds, the boilermakers failed in a strike for an advance of wages at a single shop, which stood out alone in all the trade; the Amalgamated Engineers again going to work in their places, along with any botchers that the employers could procure. At Stockton, Hartlepool, and Middlesborough, the men struck for a reduction in the hours of labour, though without the sanction of the Council. When, however, the employers began to prosecute the men contrary to written agreements, the Council felt themselves called upon to interfere; and, on the case being carried into the Court of Queen's Bench, the employers flinched and fled. The society has been taunted with driving the trade of iron ship-building out of the country. To this the answer is, that in those countries, France, Russia, and Turkey, to which it has migrated, the transfer is traceable mainly to the high wages by which British workmen have been tempted to change their abode, and to lend their services abroad. Had we been properly treated at home, they say, by employers who out of our labours have made princely fortunes, there would not now be hundreds of us at Constantinople and St. Petersburg. Men are here living in mansions who, thirty years ago, had not in gold the weight of the hobnails then in the soles of their boots. They complain that the trades' unions are ruining employers, and yet can find money by the quarter of a million to buy landed estates. The men also, notwithstanding their comparative penury, can find means to defend themselves and each other against the accidents of life as well as the assaults of cupidity. Last year they devoted nearly £900 to the support of men on strike; but the bulk of their funds was spent on objects

of pure benevolence. For sickness they paid more than £13,000; for doctors' attendance nearly £3,250; for funerals more than £3,000; for travellers in search of employment upwards of £14,300; for the aged and superannuated close upon £3,000; and for cases of accident £420.

A few strikes of minor character, though some of them in point of intrinsic claim inferior to none, may be summarily stated. The Journeymen Bakers at Manchester waged a half-year's battle with their hard-crusted employers for fewer and definite working hours. They then received a guinea a week for sixteen hours of daily labour; but, thanks to their own resolution, they have now less work at more pay, and know better when they may leave off. A seventeen weeks' strike in the Potteries cost £50,000, and 1,600 workpeople were thrown out of employ. The Flint Glass Cutters spent nearly £10,000 in calling for a limitation of apprentices; in addition to which, they are now paying £3,000 a year to unemployed hands, because the masters would not be restrained. The London Journeymen Tailors made a united effort to carry a "log" for the whole country, on the principle of agreeing that the making of a garment takes so many hours, leaving each place to fix its own rate of payment. This seemed to be a reasonable proposal, as, at first, the masters themselves appeared to acknowledge; but they broke faith with the men, who, after a heavy expenditure, found themselves no nearer to a satisfactory adjustment of the charges.

Crossing the Tweed, we come, by a few stations, to Edinburgh, where we fall in with the Amalgamated Carpenters and Joiners of Scotland—an organization which has had experience of frequent strikes and occasional lock-outs, in nearly all of which the weak many have had the best of it, and the strong few have stood second. This amalgamation comprises upwards of threescore branches, distributed among nearly as many towns in Scotland. The membership is not numerous, being under four thousand; yet the benefits obtained have been considerable, when measured, not so much by the strength of the forces as by the success of demands for advanced wages or for reduced hours. Before 1865 little more than a hundred pounds had been expended upon strikes; but, in the course of that year, strikes for an increase of wages were supported at Inverness, at Dumbarton, on the Clyde, and at Govan, at a cost of £620. In the following year there was a lock-out along the Clyde. The men desired a reduction of hours from sixty to fifty-seven, and the masters locked them out. This was the most expensive contest; costing, inclusive of some minor strikes in the same year, about £1,220. In 1867 the Edinburgh employers attempted a reduction of wages, in opposition to which the society spent less

than £200. The years 1868 and 1869 witnessed a lock-out of ship-joiners from the yards along the Clyde, provoked by a demand from the men of Greenock of 2*s.* per week advance, and occasioning an outlay of £700. The balance of success has been on the side of the men, as shown by a comparison between the hours of labour or the weekly wages in 1863 and in 1870. In the latter year, the only towns that show a maximum of hours equal to sixty are Alloa, Castle Douglas, Dumbarton, Dundee, Port Glasgow, Johnstone, and Uddingstone; but in nearly every instance of ruling importance the highest wages (30*s.*) are paid for fifty-seven hours' work. Between 1863 and 1870 there was a gain of three hours at Ayr, Clyde, Govan, Greenock, Inverness, and Renfrew; and of six at Edinburgh, Glasgow, and Leith; while at Dundee, and one or two other places, the hours range between a minimum and a maximum (say 51 to 60) which, as compared with the more fixed number of 1863, gives the advantage to the working-men. The highest wages (30*s.*) appear to be paid for hours varying from 57 to 60, as at Port Glasgow, but at Alexandria for the lower number; while 27*s.* and 28*s.* are paid for 57 hours at Clyde, Govan, Greenock, and Renfrew; and 28*s.* at Uddingstone for 60 hours. In 1863 there was no instance of wages beyond 26*s.* This was paid for 60 hours at Clyde, where now 27*s.* are paid for 57; at Dumbarton for 60, where now 27*s.* are paid for the same number; at Greenock for 60 hours, where now from 26*s.* to 28*s.* are paid for 57 hours; at Port Glasgow for 60 hours, where now from 24*s.* to 30*s.* are paid for from 57 to 60; and at Renfrew for 60 hours, where now 26*s.* and 27*s.* are paid for 57. It is honourably characteristic of the Scotch that they seem to set quite as much value, if not even more, upon diminished hours as upon increased wages; and, while the pen is in the writer's hand, the post brings intelligence of what the joiners at Perth count a great victory, in the adoption by the masters, without so much as a strike on the part of the men, of the fifty-one hours' system.

Strikes against the use of machinery, once so frequent, are become rare to obsoleteness. Mr. Kell, of Bradford in Yorkshire, quotes, indeed, an instance in which a master printer (of that town, it is presumed) had conceived a longing desire to introduce the type-setting machine into his office; but he durst not, for fear of opposition from his compositors. The case wears a highly apocryphal appearance; at least, however, it is a salutary dread which keeps back the gentleman from so Quixotic an experiment. Mr. A. Neile spoke rather more to the purpose when he referred to the Manchester bricklayers as resenting the manufacture of bricks with the aid of machinery, and to the repugnance of the Bradford masons to stone-dressing with similar appliances. It would, therefore, appear that

the tailors of Cork are not quite alone in their rebellion against the sewing-machine. Intelligent men, however, if not blinded by passion or by mistaken views of self-interest, must perceive that objections to machinery which facilitates, shortens, and improves the processes of manufacture to which it is applied, are self-condemned, and that they are based upon a false principle, which, fully carried out, would abolish every tool and implement of labour, however simple and primitive, except the human hand. It is, therefore, impossible for any sane man to countenance the mistaken men of Cork in their vain war with that beautiful and useful invention which has excited their animosity; and this the members of their own trade in London have honestly told them. The masters, consequently, have done all that could be reasonably expected of them in conceding the advance in prices asked, and in withdrawing their own hasty resolution not to employ members of the trade society. It would be strange indeed if the artizans of Britain (and why of Ireland?) should join in a crusade against machinery. By the admission of those most ready to censure their real faults, and even to charge them with imaginary ones, they have themselves been the chief inventors and machinists of the nation and country. We have only to look round upon the principal apparatus in our factories, to consult the records of the Patent Office, and to visit the International Exhibition, in order to be impressed with this fact.

That strikes are too expensive and inconvenient to be used except as a last resource will seldom be denied even by those who have had recourse to them. But, unless the men are to leave themselves entirely at the mercy of the masters, what is to be done? Can the generality of masters be depended upon for spontaneously offering an increase of wages whenever profits are such as to afford it, or prices of the necessaries of life so high as to demand it? Let the shopkeepers of the country consider these questions, and they will see that the money spent by wage-earning men and women at their counters is far more advantageous to the community than are the vast incomes of the wealthy, whether hoarded in banks, invested in land, or lavished on luxuries. Why should not a labourer live as long as a lord? Yet, according to Dr. Lyon Playfair, who would not speak on such a subject without warrant, the average age of working-men is but twenty-two, while that of wealthy men is forty-four. Is it because working-men are wicked men that they "do not live out half their days"? No; it is because they are overworked and underfed. The whole nation are their debtors, and they are themselves so nearly the nation that justice must ultimately be done them, unless the wheels of progress should be reversed and run back to feudal times. But this will not, as it ought not to be. Of the other elements that

enter into the whole mass, which of us but must, on cool reflection, come to the conclusion that we are all debtors to the people? The least that the capitalist, whose gold fructifies under their hands, can in common gratitude do, is to give them good wages; with which, being always chief consumers, and therefore the largest purchasers, they must be the better customers to the manufacturer and the merchant, the farmer and the grazier, the tradesman and the coal-owner.

Whatever else may be alleged against strikes, it cannot be affirmed that they proceed from idleness. It is nearer the mark to deprecate them as productive of excitement, of confusion, of poverty, of distress, of loss, and of detriment. The question is, what may be the final result? In the meantime, they are, in themselves, justifiable; standing upon a principle open to the adoption of all classes and persons alike. No doubt they are hateful to employers in brisk times; but then they might easily anticipate them. Of course, they are perfectly useless to anybody when labour is over-plentiful. When, therefore, the only season available to them calls them forth, the cry is raised that they check production, drive away capital, and reduce wages. These are assertions, however, which will not bear close examination. As to checking production, it might be retorted that the capitalists stand in need sometimes of a check; for, upon the recovery of trade, most of them betray an insane proclivity to over-production, which, by glutting markets, defeats their own purpose, and leads to confusion and collapse.

"When trade is good," observes Mr. Brassey, "our iron-founders and cotton-spinners are too ready to increase the productive resources of their establishments. This leads to over-production, and a consequent cessation of demand from abroad. It cannot be doubted that this spasmodic and fluctuating character of our trade produces an unhappy effect upon the operatives who are subject to its influence. They suffer a constant fluctuation in wages; the increase and the reduction of their pay following the varying course of trade, in natural sequence, it is true, but still with very inconvenient results to the internal economy of their homes."

For the rest, demands of increased wages naturally proceed from conscious skill; and capital, except when in foolish hands, will not run away from association with those whose labour can make the most and best of it, nor, eventually, it may be hoped, refuse them a reasonable share in the results. As Lord Carnarvon, among others, has clearly shown, strikes are the natural outgrowth of the modern industrial system, and can only be got rid of by its adequate modification. The point is, in his opinion, to create, or show, identity of interest among all engaged in the same undertaking. It would be a work of time to make labour and capital absolutely one, if, indeed, it be not a positive impossibility. But there is no impracticability in putting labour in a relation to capital which results in such a

community of interest as makes them virtually one. On this point let the Crossleys or the Briggses speak. But no man living is better qualified to speak with decision, and even with authority, on such subjects, than Mr. Mundella. Beginning, as he tells us, before he was ten years old, he passed through the grades of apprentice, journeyman, and manager, to that of employer, now paying thousands of contented hands. He has laid himself out, at home and from home, to serve and to raise the class from which he sprang. Another strong witness to the fact that frame-breaking, riot, and outrage *preceded* trades' unions, and that those organizations (as also Lord Elcho admits) have *put down* offences against person and property, notwithstanding the multiplication of strikes and lock-outs, the junior Member for Sheffield has distinguished himself by the powerful advocacy and the practical promotion of a conciliatory method of dealing with the dissensions of masters and men, which, as all the right-minded will agree, is far better than strikes and lock-outs.

Nothing, however, is easier than to expatiate upon the evils of strikes. In the partition of labour, cries one, the cessation of one group brings the others to a pause. This, and twenty other consequences, may be charged upon them; but the question is,—Upon whom shall the blame for all be thrown back? The resister of wrong is, from circumstances, more conspicuous to the view than the wrong-doer; but the wrong-doer is the culprit who ought to be made appear. Well, but strikes, it is strongly affirmed, never yet raised wages: why then persist in them? Let it be granted, what nobody ever denied, that a number of strikes have failed: only let equal fairness be shown to the other side. But no; so often as examples of success are cited, they are at once refused to the credit of strikes, and are put to the account of other causes. Now, no trades'-unionist, be he leader or follower, is fanatical enough to reason from the mere succession of one thing after another thing to the conclusion that the former of the two was the cause of the latter. But when, in practical affairs, a course of action is set afoot for the specific purpose of coming at a given object of pursuit, and that object is attained, then, surely, it must be certain, or the next thing to certainty, that the effect is due to the cause which contemplated it. Yet even such fair-minded men as Mr. Brassey and Mr. Rupert Kettle will not allow that ever strike fulfilled its design. The former of these dwells on points which the men do not ignore, though he fancies that they do, enlarging upon the operation of the laws of supply and demand, trade prosperous and the reverse, scarcity of labour and abundance, and meeting instances of the rise of wages, indubitable as fact, with the confident remark that wages

would have risen as much, *or more*, had trades' unions never existed! One may recover one's patience, nevertheless, on finding the same authority demonstrating, with the support of a world-wide weight of evidence, that the cheapest and best work is invariably done at the highest wages. That, moreover, which Mr. Brassey and other masters, economists by profession or not, affirm against strikes, is susceptible of denial and disproof in perfect consistency with those circumstances which they rely upon as, not the co-efficient, but the only efficient causes of an advance in wages. The advocates or the apologists of strikes never said or thought that by this means an advance might be gained under *any* circumstances, but only that a strike may prove, and has proved, successful when, concurrent with the circumstances that impelled to its adoption, there were circumstances favourable to its success.

Mr. Rupert Kettle reconciles those whom his theoretical reliance upon the doctrines of science tends to repel, by the attractive influence of his fairness between parties. If he sometimes blames the men, he never merely flatters the masters. But when he contends that his favourite rules are not mere theories, but "as easy of practical and familiar application as a spirit-level or a pair of compasses," he may be answered that there are no facts or circumstances incident to human observation or experience which might not be reduced to a science, with "rules" of quite as true and as facile an application. The error lies in the notion that political economy is something outside of us and dominant over our own free agency; instead of which, no such so-called science can be perfectly, universally, and invariably true, which does not take into account all the conditions that affect us, all the circumstances that surround us, and all the contingencies that await us.

But we shall prefer standing side by side with Mr. Kettle in a part of the field which, though not exclusively, or even peculiarly, his own, is one in which we shall have the satisfaction of thankfully and trustingly following his movements. "Establish arbitration," he remarks, "and every reasonable objection to unions vanishes. Establish some intermediate power, to which either party could, without pride or shame, freely appeal at the inception of a disagreement; but, give him what appellation you please, he must be clothed with the powers and perform the duties of an umpire." This, however, is another branch of a subject which has many ramifications; and it cannot be entered upon at present. Between strikes and lock-outs, nevertheless, there must be either arbitration or reconcilement.

GEORGE POTTER.



COLLEGE EDUCATION FOR WOMEN.

AMONG the many important topics to which public attention has been called by the late discussions on the social condition of women, two points stand prominently forward as at once most practical and urgently pressing. These are, higher education and wider scope for employment; and they are so intimately bound up together that it would be difficult to treat them wholly apart, for the question of employment must depend in some measure on the education of those wishing to be employed, while the nature of the education to be given must be more or less influenced by the prospect of a home or of a professional life. But connected as these questions are, they stand at this moment on very different levels in public opinion. Free choice of occupation for women out of home is still the battle-ground of selfishness and of prejudice; love of power and love of greed acting upon men, ignorance and timidity enlisting many women on their side, while mere ignorance and clinging to old custom affect both.

On the other hand, as regards education, the battle may be said to be won; won in principle, though the applications of the principle are still opposed and confused by conflicting views. But this is of little moment: the great point is gained. Public opinion is satisfied at length, in this latter part of the nineteenth century of Christianity, that the mental condition of half the human race,—and of that half to which the early training of each fresh generation is inevitably committed,—really is of some national importance; and no matter what other motives may be admitted or rejected, that is enough to

make the advocates of female education feel that the difficulties are henceforth a matter of detail.

Considerable help was given to a right view of this question by the reports issued by the Schools Inquiry Commission on the education of girls, which drew public attention to two facts: first, the lamentable condition of the education that generally prevailed; secondly, the monstrous injustice by which women have been excluded from all benefit in the very large endowments for educational purposes throughout the country. The first of these facts was familiar enough to most people; the second seemed never to have been thought of before; and to hear it proclaimed by a set of men, and held up as a wrong to be redressed, seemed to many women as the opening of a new era.

Much may be hoped from the efforts now set on foot in consequence of those reports; but almost all the elements for providing a better education for girls are wanting,—funds, teachers, and some definite purpose and standard,—without which no systematic work can be done. The want of public funds is seldom supplemented largely by private exertions, because parents, satisfied with the most flimsy education, will incur much cost for accomplishments only. Teachers are bad partly for the same reason, but also owing to other causes that go deep into the question of women's condition generally; such as: first, the want of any means of educating the same class of teachers as the universities supply to boys' schools; secondly, the unjust social depression of the female teacher, which causes the profession to be embraced only as a matter of necessity; and lastly, that scarcely any other calling being accessible to women above the lower middle classes, they are driven into it, though wholly unfitted by training or vocation. Some open schools as a resource against penury, when deprived late in life of other means of support; others begin early, but look upon it only as a *genteel* independence till they can marry; and all alike have no purpose but to suit the fancies of individual parents, who themselves have no guide but the fashion of their own circle in the education of their daughters. Thus there is no permanence, no system, and no standard in common either for the attainments of the teachers or the instruction of the pupils. Pages might be filled with quotations from the reports of the Schools Inquiry Commission, corroborating these facts, and proving beyond contest how very much is attributable to them of the desultory feebleness of female education.*

* The reader is strongly advised to look at the reports. Extracts from them and from the evidence have been republished, as far as they relate to girls' schools, by Miss Beale (Nutt, 270, Strand), and are thus easily accessible. The whole question of education and employment is also very forcibly put in a small book by Miss Emily Davies, called "The Higher Education of Women;" also in a book published a few months ago, under the title of "Woman's Work and Woman's Culture," and especially in Miss Wedgewood's essay in that volume.

Of what may be done to remedy the low state of the schools we need not speak here; the subject is too wide for cursory notice: we can only hope that, with the assistance of the Commissioners, a new system may be introduced which shall place effective instruction within reach of all who care to pay for it. But in the meantime some of the other deficiencies pointed out by the reports will perhaps best be met through the courageous effort made lately by opening a college, to give to women opportunities for that more advanced stage of education from which they have hitherto been wholly debarred. The term courageous may well be applied to an undertaking which opposed at once long-rooted association, triple-armed prejudice, and material obstacles of every kind. Steady determination, however, has prevailed, and in October last the first college for women, claiming a position analogous to that of the colleges in our great universities, was opened, and is now working through its third term.*

The name of college has been so indiscriminately used that it does not at first sight convey a definite meaning. Thus for many years in London and elsewhere there have been institutions so called, which, in fact, are only high schools or classes for girls, giving education of a higher order than is afforded by the smaller establishments or by private tuition, but still almost entirely confined to secondary education, terminating at seventeen or eighteen; for though great efforts have been made in some of them to prolong the period of education, and great advantages have been offered, they have seldom succeeded in retaining their senior pupils. But the college now opened temporarily at Hitchin is a college in the Oxford and Cambridge sense of the term, admitting students at the same age only as those universities, following the Cambridge course of instruction, to extend over the same period, and looking forward to the time when it may be allowed to claim full university privileges.† This first bold step in a new direction is also the first step in a course of hitherto unthought-of progress. To this small beginning may we look in time for results which shall change the face of women's education, giving to it that standard and that source of permanent

* As the writer of these pages was for a time connected with the college, it is well to mention that she can claim no share in the praise due to its establishment. She was abroad, and not even aware that the project had taken any definite shape till near the period of its opening.

† The reader is referred for a complete exposition of the views that led to the establishment of the college, and of the hopes entertained as to its effects upon the education and social condition of women, to a very able paper by Miss Emily Davies, read before the meeting of the Social Science Congress in 1868, and published in the *Contemporary Review* for December that same year. It is now also printed for private circulation (under the title of "Some Account of a Proposed New College for Women"), and may be obtained, with other papers relating to the college, from the Hon. Sec., Miss Davies, 17, Cunningham Place, or at the College itself.

influence it has wanted hitherto, sending out high-class teachers, such as the universities send out for boys, and holding up a ceaseless protest, which will be more and more loudly heard, against that senseless fashion that has closed female education at eighteen.

A distant future truly! But all seed is sown in faith; and ever as we plant the tender sapling it seems almost a stretch of fancy when we look forward and picture to ourselves the goodly tree that will spring up from it, and gladden another generation with its fruit and its shelter.

If the college did no other good than prolong the period of tuition, it would be an unspeakable benefit. All who have cared for female education have felt that sudden termination to be the great bane of all serious study.* Just when the mind is reaping some benefit from former training, and becoming fit to grapple with more difficult subjects, its whole course is changed; and in order to suit this strange arrangement, it is imperative that studies of real importance should be crowded into an earlier period, for which they are scarcely fit, or abandoned altogether, as is more commonly done. Will, then, a mere addition of three years complete the needful culture? No, indeed; but three more years of patient work and reflection may confirm habits that will better resist the change of outer circumstances, and enable the mind to come more clearly to the conviction that the work of self-culture can know no termination while the faculties endure.

That much small wit will be expended on the college and its promoters none can doubt; that the question, "What is the use of college education to women?" will be asked by those who would be equally puzzled to discover what is the use of the same education to men, this is no less certain. Also we may expect much sarcasm of the same kind to be expended on the diminutive proportions of the infant college,—on its temporary surroundings, its dim pecuniary prospects;—all these are fair game to the many whose stock of wit is about equal to their love of knowledge. When, however, the deriders are men, they would do well to pause, if they have any sense of shame, remembering how, through all the ages of this nation's life, their sex has monopolized the means of instruction, and benefited exclusively by the magnificent foundations of former times.

But it is pleasanter to turn from the small minds that scorn, to speak rather of the earnest minds that have given sympathy and encouragement—and such have been given quite as fully by men as by women—to this enterprise. Men who themselves value highly the rich opportunities placed within their own reach, can feel for those who, for the first time, are struggling to secure some of the

* See "Intellectual Education," p. 28, also chap. vii. Smith and Elder.

same privileges; but such men are not generally the possessors of great wealth, and the most kindly sympathy leaves material obstacles to be grappled with in all their grim reality.

Here again a strange contrast offers itself as regards men and women. When any set of gentlemen want a great meeting-place for pleasure or business, we see a new palace arise in our streets. And although the pecuniary condition of some of these societies allows them to be called without offence by a *sobriquet* implying the smallest possible right to luxurious enjoyment, the luxury develops none the less in full proportions. The uninitiated cannot pretend to understand the secret of these gentlemen; they cannot dig; to beg they are (we hope, at least) ashamed. Borrowing is, perhaps, not rare, and even robbery—if non-payment of debt might for once be called by its right name—is not unknown among them. By some means or other, in short, the money needed is always forthcoming; while never yet have a company of women been able to scrape together funds for an object specially their own, be it club, or reading-room, or hospital, or, as now, a college.

But even these difficulties also, we venture to hope, may be got over ere long. The money question must indeed be considered the test, not of whether women need a college education, but of whether the country is yet sufficiently advanced to recognise the need; and whether a sufficient number of parents are so far alive to the value of knowledge, and of the influence of mental labour upon character, to make a sacrifice which, to many at least, will bring in no money reward. It has been urged that it is cruel to ask parents to send their daughters from home for part of three successive years, just when they thought to enjoy their society; but I am hindered from taking the sentimental view of this point when I consider the extreme eagerness to marry daughters as early as possible; to allow them permanently to leave the nest half fledged, and with a very confused notion of what may await them in that new nest that has been so hastily built. The girl who is pronounced fit to undertake the responsibilities of married life under the scanty protection of a husband whose professional occupations probably take him away from home the greater part of every day, must surely be fit to be trusted among companions of her own sex, all engaged in the same serious pursuits, and under the supervision of some lady whose own character must have been supposed to be a sufficient guarantee for the tone of the establishment. Truly, as compared with an early marriage, parting with a daughter for the period of a college course is a matter which scarcely leaves room for condolence, however tender our sympathies may be.

The anxieties of really careful parents, however, about trusting their daughters to any other guidance but their own cannot be

lightly passed over. But they must remember that the age at which the college course begins makes it a very different thing from sending girls early to school, or even to those *finishing* establishments that are so much in vogue. In these, girls spend one or two years, waiting till the seventeenth birthday shall give the signal for casting aside all the pursuits they are engaged in except accomplishments; while at the college none can enter under eighteen, and many will no doubt be some years older. It is not in this case a child with unformed character who is to be sent into a world of strangers; but a young woman, who, if her previous training has been worth anything, may be presumed to have some fixed principle, and who will certainly give proof of some earnest purpose of self-improvement, if by her own desire she postpones worldly gaiety to a three-years' course of severe study.

Doubtless, in time, those who live in London and some other large towns will have facilities for acquiring the same instruction without entering upon a college life. And if we may hope that by that time homes will afford as much freedom for rational pursuit as they now afford license for folly; if some respect for women's occupations may be supposed to have grown up, so that they shall not be broken in upon under every trivial pretence,—then it may be possible for daughters to study at home as steadily and effectually at least as sons can do so now. Would that the time were come!

Certain objections that I have urged strongly myself* against any public education for girls, and which might seem to tell against the college, rested on wholly different grounds from those glanced at above; and owing to the change of the times, they have less weight than they once had. They considered school education in relation to the after career; and looking upon domestic life as the one destiny of women, everything that might foster a habit of looking out of home for help or excitement seemed unwise. On the one hand, it appeared cruel to expose girls to the effects of rivalry and to the possible contagion of ambition; and, on the other, there seemed more hope of forming the habit of pursuing study for the mere love of knowledge and desire after higher and higher grades of self-culture, if early studies had never known the stimulus of companionship or emulation. The reasoning still seems perfectly just, but circumstances have changed, and are changing yet more. No lives are so retired now as the lives of most women formerly were. Ferment and excitement are everywhere. And if indeed women are on the eve of gaining an altogether freer position, if they are to be allowed to make their own way in the world, so that the gifted and ambitious may find a scope if they will, and those ill-favoured by fortune shall no longer depend solely on the labour of men, or be

* "Intellectual Education."

ruined by their neglect, then the restrictions that were wise before lose their value, and it may be as well to let girls learn early, as boys do, the art of living among their equals. Doubtless far the larger number of women will remain within the circle of home-life as before; but home-life will itself feel the reaction of the changes outside. We see it even now. Few women yet have taken a share in the work of the world,—thousands have been stirred. Even in those frivolous circles that seem impervious to all the influences which affect rational humanity, the very faults that have called down so much censure of late years upon women may be only another form of the same spirit that manifests itself, in more earnest minds, in greater boldness of opinion and more active energy than young women have ever shown before. A breath of freedom has passed through the air they live in, and the confined regions adapted to another state of things will suit them no longer.

But here we are brought to the point where the questions of education and of employment converge and must be considered together; for the expediency of college studies, and the value of the opportunities thus opened to women, will not have to be decided only by those who have the alternative of a secure independence at home, but by those also who hope through its means to rise to a higher professional position than women have yet held in England. We have seen that two of the objects most needed are to create such a class of teachers as the universities supply for boys, and to raise the social status of the female teacher. These objects can be secured only by the same means which have secured them for men. There are at present but two liberal professions open to women,—medicine and tuition,—and we may consider it fortunate that they both require an unusual amount of attainment. The former has been the conquest of a few determined spirits, whose noble energy will one day be rewarded by the grateful admiration of society; the second is a field naturally opened to women, and in which they might exercise a considerable monopoly; taking the exclusive teaching of girls,—in all higher departments of which the assistance of men is now called in,—and also the entire direction of the very young of both sexes. But high culture will not suffice in this calling: teaching, and still more the power of influencing the young mind, require certain gifts which fortunately are less rare with women than with men; but when we remember that women have been hitherto forced to adopt the profession without consulting their own aptitudes, we cannot wonder at the many failures, and most unjust is the sneer with which they are met. If the various occupations that absorb male mediocrity were abandoned, and men were thrown wholly upon teaching for a livelihood, how would the comparison stand then?

Still more important than the difficulty of the calling itself is the

fact that women have seldom been trained to any calling; and it is on this point that the comparison with men must be made whenever the comparison is forced upon us by the absurd assumption that it is want of capacity that excludes women from occupation. No one gifted with common powers of observation can suppose for a moment that average women, if prepared on equal terms, are not intellectually capable of doing the work that average men are doing now. But many views of very different degrees of value have combined to make women cling to domestic life, even when they know that later they must probably provide for themselves; and thus they begin work at an age that makes exertion more painful and success more uncertain, weakened, besides, by years of idle habits. When a boy leaves school, it is only to enter upon another phase of education. Whatever his calling, whether the studies of college, the preparation for a profession, or the mere drudgery of an office, his energies will be strenuously called forth; while the girl at the same age is released from all exertion and exonerated from every useful pursuit. No matter what class we consider, the young-lady life is equally idle and empty; it may have more or less glitter on its frivolity, but whether aristocratic or *genteel*, it is all purposeless alike, or animated by one and the same undignified purpose.

A small proportion only of young men go to college, or into professions requiring much instruction; it is the work of life itself that gives a second and most valuable education to the great mass who leave school half educated at seventeen or eighteen. They may not, perhaps, in their various callings require even such scanty knowledge as they had been furnished with, but they are gradually fashioned by other methods into useful instruments for achieving the various ends of our complicated society. The change is wrought gradually by the influence of steady work, of living among their fellows—living outside the circle of their own personal interests, and within hearing at least of the great din of clashing opinions and parties, the strife and turmoil and flashing of intellects which accompany the onward march of progress. It is not in general the work itself they are engaged upon that exercises the mind and requires knowledge, or tends to impart it; it is the systematic routine of life steadily moving to a given end, the sense of responsibility for time, for expenditure, for all that goes to make up a respectable character and an honourable position or the reverse. It is the career of ambition opened to the able few, the gain alluring a greater number, and the mere social feelings of community of interests, fellowship in work, and in the hope of work's reward, acting upon the great inferior mass. These are the things which, out of our ill-educated school-boys, makes the large useful class of gentlemen workers in England. And it is, on the other hand, the abject idleness into which girls are generally plunged

from the time they leave the school-room till they marry, and often long after, till the cares of a family begin to press, that tends more than anything else to place the woman in a position of intellectual inferiority to the man, which the girl did not occupy as compared with the boy. Can we wonder when some of the best years of life are thus wasted, that aims remain low, and views contracted, and that the influence which should be ennobling and purifying social life is helping to foster some of the worst tendencies of the age?

It is true that leisure ought not to be idle; that to cultivated minds it simply means freedom for the noblest kind of work; but we have too much proof that to make such a use of leisure belongs to the few, while the many require the goad of outward necessity. Do we not see among men how rare is the love and pursuit of knowledge that brings no reward; how rare the sense of responsibility for wealth and social influence; how few remember, with a feeling of duty laid upon them, all that the nation has a right to expect from those who have time and means of culture, and no necessity to spend either in bread-winning toil? Women have failed also to see these things: they have pursued their way in vacant weariness through year after year of what might have been a period of happy activity, unable to discern how large is the world of which the smallest home is the centre; but in their failure let no reproach fall on them from men, who have done so much to make the conditions of their life what they are.

Women have been debarred from high culture, which would have made outward inactivity less irksome, even when not a real boon, as it is to the studious mind; and they have been shut out from employments which would have practically cultivated their faculties and raised their condition; and in this twofold privation we reach the root of the evil, those who would gladly work being debarred from work, and those who have leisure for mental culture debarred from culture. Of late, indeed, there have been some attempts at better things. Women may attend lectures, and even hear an argument now and then specially addressed to themselves, and society wakes up and seems to consider that the female intellect is put by an indulgent public upon its trial, somewhat to the amusement of those who happen to bear in mind the fact that the only obstacle to their doing as much before was that there were no lectures to attend! Women only who have studied under the existing circumstances of family life, and of social prejudice, know what the disadvantages are that they have had to struggle with.

I must confess to some degree of impatience when the question of the equality or inequality of mental power between the two sexes is brought forward so repeatedly, as if the whole adjustment of women's claims, or at least the recognition of them, hung upon settling that point, whereas it is, in truth, utterly irrelevant to the simple question

which it concerns us to decide. It is natural enough that the opponents of women's claims should eagerly cling to that argument, since existing facts and tradition are on their side. But it is strange that their advocates should allow the battle to be drawn to this ground, and stake the issue of a plain, practical claim on success in a discussion involving positions which, whether really tenable or not, must for generations—perhaps for ever—remain incapable of proof on either side. A mere theory it is, and must be: let it be left, therefore, as such matters should be left, for philosophical discussion by those who understand dealing with complicated phenomena. What the public has to decide is not a question of equality, but whether women needing work shall be allowed to try their capacity to perform it. We have yet to learn that men are obliged to prove their equality with the first spirits of the age before they are allowed to follow the same professional calling, or that they must demonstrate their power to become Senior Wranglers before they may be permitted to sum up the columns of a ledger or to copy a despatch.

What degree of mental power use and culture would develop in women, whether men would find them dangerous rivals in any of the higher fields of intellect, and how far society may be benefited by the addition of their labour, are questions upon which it would be very useless to speculate, and which are quite beyond my purpose. In our present state of society a large and an increasing number of women are forced to depend on their own resources; and on whomsoever rests the blame of that state of things which has made marriage more difficult and its conditions more onerous, and has thus driven women from the old sheltered paths, it is evidently a fearful injustice to let the penalty fall wholly upon them, by denying them the means of meeting the new difficulties. There has been satire enough directed, justly and unjustly, against women for marrying for a position or a maintenance; and miserable and degrading has been the system, which was, however, in great measure forced upon them. Now, if they would shake off this reproach, parents should be made to feel that, when they cannot insure their daughters an independence, they are bound to educate them, as they would their sons, to provide one for themselves; and women may justly expect that society should throw no conventional hindrance in their way, that no path shall be closed against them by law or by any legally-protected monopoly. This is the point which it is desirable earnestly to press, and which women might well be content to urge almost exclusively. Nature and time may be trusted to adjust the balance of doubtful claims, and to solve doubtful questions. Even supposing that women must fail, as many predict, they may at least, in justice, claim the right to achieve the failure, since they are determined on the risk.

And the freedom thus claimed for women will not benefit those alone who will assert and use it, but will widely influence society. The spectacle of earnest, dignified labour carried on by young women neither less attractive nor often less well-born than the idlers, will surely throw just contempt upon idleness; and, again, respect for successful workers, or even for the earnest spirit that proves success would be deserved, must raise women generally in social consideration. They have been most capriciously treated hitherto in the matter of respect as in all others; truly respected for certain moral qualities, but ridiculed for strength of character, and no less ridiculed for weakness. Now, the assertion of their own individual powers and purposes will raise them, though perhaps unconsciously, in the estimation of men. It was said long ago, that women had everything in turn but justice; and for all the lesser, and still more for all the lower ends of woman's power over man, those other things were sufficient. But now, at last, she claims justice, and the claim will be, sooner or later, a title to respect. Married life, the most entirely secluded from outward influence, will be affected in some measure; and unmarried women, it may be confidently hoped, will feel that much of the undue depression under which they have laboured so long will gradually disappear. The absurd pretensions, for instance, of male relations to interfere with their actions and property, will doubtless be given up, and the intercourse of brother and sister will be more like that of brother and brother than we have seen heretofore. Even fathers will have to remember that unmarried daughters do not remain children all their lives. The sacrifice of their whole time and faculties may no longer be taken as a matter of course, nor women be expected to drag on a weary existence to middle-age without ever having had one week or one £5 note to spend freely as they chose.

But if we may thus reckon upon a large measure of good to be effected, directly and indirectly, by the exercise of a just freedom in the matter of education and undomestic occupation; when we go beyond this to the question that has been so loudly discussed of late, of the expediency for women of entering freely into competition with men in the various callings of public and social life, we come to far more complicated problems which we may well hesitate to deal with. Quite apart from the question of comparative ability, or even the far more decisive one of physical strength, women can never stand on the same ground as men, since the latter may have professions *and* marriage, while marriage *or* professions must be the alternative for women, an alternative which seldom resting freely within their own absolute choice, must always leave a painful element of uncertainty. Nature has placed them at a disadvantage in any struggle, and it is wiser to accept the fact than to begin the song of triumph before they are even armed for the contest. The cost of the experiment

might possibly be too great, should it seriously disturb what have hitherto been deemed the natural relations between men and women; should it rouse in the weaker an unsuccessful spirit of rivalry, and deaden in the stronger sex the responsibility for a generous use of strength, which has, after all, been the general rule, however justly we may inveigh against particular laws, and against the oppression exercised very often, ignorantly and unconsciously, by men. It might cost too much if it should turn many women who can afford the quiet dignity of home-life to seek the public highways of the world, instead of those secluded paths where their footsteps have been blessed heretofore. Especially may it cost too much if women, in the eagerness of competition, in the visions of ambition, forget that the noblest of human trusts is theirs already,—theirs by right divine. For wide and honourable as we justly consider the field of social exertion, of profitable industry, of scientific research, greater—aye, and nationally more important—than all these is that responsibility for the welfare of each new generation that God has placed in the hands and bound upon the hearts of women.

Here is the danger lurking in that movement which in most of its aspects we welcome so warmly. Side by side with the new value for work and for intellectual culture, we see a half-contempt for the position whose duties and responsibilities have never yet been duly studied. Nothing but the need of working for a tangible reward would, perhaps, have sufficed to rouse public opinion to the national importance of female education, and to the fearful waste of intellect and of power that society suffers from its neglect; for the market price of knowledge will ever stamp its value with the vulgar. But those who look a little deeper, see that while higher culture is required for professional training, it is incomparably more needed to fit women for the much-neglected duties which have been theirs all along, not as wives and mothers only, but as members of society. It is because ignorance and idleness unfit them for those responsibilities that we mostly condemn the manner in which some of their best years are spent. Professions must exact a certain measure of attainment, and cannot fail to be a rigid school of industry; but those who have the responsibility of leisure must possess the habits that will enable them to be a law unto themselves; and these are more difficult to attain. The action of women is everywhere, though their presence is little seen; in what we still love to call their natural position, they influence society at every point, though aloof from its actual workings; and the culture needed to wield this power dwarfs into insignificance the preparation needed for any of the ordinary callings in which they may perhaps hereafter be allowed to follow in the steps of men.

EMILY SHIRREFF.



THE BRAHMO SOMAJ AND THE RELIGIOUS FUTURE OF INDIA.

THE presence amongst us of the Baboo Keshub Chunder Sen, the Hindu religious reformer, is an occasion which ought not to pass by without stimulating our interest in the spiritual condition and prospects of India. The religious society to which he belongs has been described in the February number of this Review; but the interest since excited by his appearance in England seems to justify our recurring to the subject.

The present paper will avoid, as much as possible, going over old ground, and will be confined to two points—(1) The reasons why English Christians should look hopefully on the religious position of the Brahmo Somaj. (2) The bearing of that movement upon the prospects of India.

I.

The history of the Rajah Rammohun Roy, who, in the year 1830, founded the Brahmo Somaj, shows the capacity of the natives of India for religious progress. With but little aid he fought his way out of idolatry into a pure Theism, with very close affinities to Unitarian Christianity; and, after devoting his life to vigorous efforts, first to put down idolatry, then to promote education and

social reforms in India, he came to England to acquaint himself with English religious and political life, and died at Bristol in the year 1833. It is true that he was never baptized, he made no formal renunciation of his religion, and the Brahminical thread was found round his shoulder when he died. But his life and labours mark a great advance; and Christians must be thankful for such an advance, even where it does not quite reach the point at which they stand.

Rammohun Roy was a man far before his time, and the work of such men bears late rather than immediate fruit. The society he gathered round him was very small, and lacked the support of any large body of educated opinion in India. Also, from a controversy between the founder and some of the English missionaries, in which the latter stated Christian doctrines in a manner hardly likely to win upon the convictions of such a man, a bitterness had been engendered between the Somaj and the Christian missionaries most unfavourable to the progress of truth. The society, therefore, for a long time, though by no means stationary, did not make any rapid progress. Even after the commencement of the movement represented by the Baboo Keshub Chunder Sen, Miss Carpenter had to complain in 1866 that the members of the Brahmo Somaj cared little for the memory of Rammohun Roy, and knew nothing of his work, "The Precepts of Jesus the guide to Peace and Happiness," and that at the same time they had a bitter dislike of Christianity.

But through the movements described in the article on Indian Theism three great changes have taken place—(1) The society above referred to has definitely broken loose from its narrow bounds: it abandons caste, and at the same time the division led by the Baboo Keshub Chunder Sen aspires to a national position, calling itself no longer the Brahmo Somaj of Bengal, but the Brahmo Somaj of India. (2) It has taken up a missionary attitude, sending missionaries to all the principal towns, who preach in a popular manner, so that there are now sixty affiliated societies in India. (3) The prejudice against Christianity has been entirely removed. It is on this last point that the main interest concentrates. The theological position which has thus been reached has features of the greatest hopefulness.

That position may be best described as a Christian Theism—a worship of the one God, and that distinctly according to the character which Christianity gives to God. This, perhaps, is best seen by looking at a few of their prayers; for in these, both in the terms in which God is described, and in the aspirations which the speaker feels in His presence, we may see the character of the God who is worshipped. Here is part of a morning prayer:—

"O merciful Father, I thank Thee that Thy loving-kindness has enabled me to enter upon the duties of another day. Before I go forth to the labours and enjoyments of the day, I would place my whole trust in Thy guidance, and consecrate the energies of my body and mind to Thee. Strengthen me for the trials that await me. May Thy counsel regulate my mind; may Thy love warm my heart; and may Thy Sacred Presence go with me as the light of my path. Curb each impure desire, restrain each worldly craving, and sanctify all my aspirations and feelings by leading them to Thee. Do Thou, O Everlasting Father and Friend, enable me to grow continually in purity and faith, that each day may find me nearer to Thee."

There are prayers for times of prosperity and affliction, prayers for fortitude and for deliverance, a death-bed prayer, and prayers for the family, the school, and the congregation. In all these, and in all the Brahmo writings I have read, God is represented as the Father, as the God of truth, purity, justice, and love. I do not think there is a word in the prayers which a Christian would hesitate to use.

Closely connected with the belief in a personal God of holiness is the pursuit of a holy life. "As the body," says the Baboo Keshub Chunder Sen, in his lecture on Regenerating Faith, "seeks food with the irrepressible instinct of hunger, so the spiritual man hungers after God and righteousness." . . . "Then are men said to live regenerate in God when they think separation from Him to be death, and therefore ever cling to Him as their 'meat and drink;' when duty becomes desirable, and the human will harmonizes with God's." In another lecture on the Character of our Lord, he speaks thus of the life which the Gospel enjoins:—

"The two fundamental doctrines of Gospel ethics, which stand out prominently above all others and give them their peculiar grandeur and pre-eminent excellence, are, in my opinion, the doctrines of forgiveness and self-sacrifice. . . . It is these two cardinal principles of Christian ethics, so utterly opposed to the wisdom of the world, and so far exalted above its highest conceptions of rectitude, which require to be duly impressed on the European and native races, as upon the proper appreciation of these, I believe, depends the reformation of their character."

In accordance with this appreciation of the life of holiness the Baboo Keshub Chunder Sen, in his journeys in India, addresses the people plainly upon plain moral and religious duties, and appeals to their consciences in such a way that they have at times thanked him, saying, "No one ever spoke to us in this way before!"

The worship of the Brahmo Somaj is very simple. It is conducted by two or three of the leaders, seated on a marble dais in the centre of the assembly. It consists of hymns, prayers, and a discourse on moral and spiritual topics. On occasions the devotions are prolonged to the length of several hours; and there seems to be a spirit of contemplativeness and a love for communion with the Unseen, in which the oriental nature comes in as an aid to faith.

Lastly, as to the reverence paid to our Lord himself. In the remarkable lecture delivered at the anniversary of the Brahmo Somaj, in 1866, the Baboo Keshub Chunder Sen drew out the character of our Lord, and sketched the history of Christianity and the essence of its teaching; and in doing this he indicated the interest of Asia as well as Europe in Christ. The following extracts will show the point to which his convictions reached:—

"Poor and illiterate, brought up in Nazareth, a village notorious for corruption, under demoralizing influences, his associates the lowest mechanics and fishermen, from whom he could not receive a single ray of enlightenment, he rose superior to all outward circumstances by the force of his innate greatness, and grew in wisdom, faith, and piety, by meditation and prayer, and with the inspiration of the Divine Spirit working within him. Though all the external conditions of life were against him, he rose above them with the strength of the Lord, and, with almost superhuman wisdom and energy, taught those sublime truths and performed those moral wonders for which succeeding generations have paid him the tribute of admiration and gratitude. Verily he was above ordinary humanity."

And again:—

"Honour, all honour, to Jesus, who so nobly set the example of self-sacrifice for truth, and to that devoted band of martyrs who, by imitating his example, extended the kingdom of truth, and conferred lasting benefits on the world."

Again:—

"I have not derived my conceptions of Christ or his ethics from the dogmatic theology or the actual life of any class of his followers. I do not identify him with any Christian sect. I have gone direct to the Bible to ascertain the genuine doctrines of morality inculcated by Christ; and it is my firm conviction that his teachings find a response in the universal consciousness of humanity, and are no more European than Asiatic, and that in his ethics 'there is neither Greek nor Jew, circumcised nor uncircumcised, barbarian nor Scythian, bond nor free.' May we all learn to draw near to God, by conforming to the spirit of these precepts!"

Nor does the lecturer hesitate to bring the matter home to his countrymen:—

"Fill your hearts," he says to them, "with the love of truth and resign yourselves to the will of God, and with self-sacrificing enthusiasm go forth to discharge your duties to your country, regardless of all consequences. And the better to stimulate you to a life of self-denial, I hold up to you the cross on which Jesus died."

Now, with regard to those who have gained a theological position such as this, there are several modes of action, which, it appears to me, ought to be avoided by Christian teachers.

We may, in the first place, drive these men to a precise definition of their present phase of belief; we may identify them with sects or persons who will say the same things as they, and from whom possibly many things which they say are derived; we may then come

to the conclusion that they are Unitarians, only unbaptized, or followers of Theodore Parker; and then may proceed to argue that they have not a sound and permanent basis for their creed. But this is to take them out of their real position. They are going up the hill, not going down. Their attitude is not taken up as against the ordinary teaching of Christianity; but they have gained a position such as best they can hold, as a vantage ground in a death-struggle against idolatry and caste and apathy and moral degradation. And if the point of contact which they naturally seize upon in Christianity is the moral purity and the spirit of self-sacrifice, and Christ is to them, before all things, a heroic leader and a spiritual purifier, who will dare to say that they have not laid hold of what is most essential for them?

Another thing we may do is to be nervously anxious for their coming up to our standard of belief and to our conceptions of Christian doctrine. It is certain that Christian teachers have often, by the peculiar manner of stating truth, thrown a stumbling-block in the way of inquirers. The bitter controversies existing among Christians on the more abstruse points of theology, and the fact, which we cannot but perceive, that the mere philosophical husk has been constantly the subject of dispute, and that this integument has had to be changed from age to age, should make us very cautious here. Rammohun Roy spoke thus of the missionaries:—

"I admire their zeal, but disapprove of the means they have adopted. In the performance of their duty they always begin by such obscure doctrines as are calculated to excite ridicule instead of respect towards the religion which they wish to promulgate. It is, however, a great satisfaction to my conscience to find that the doctrines inculcated by Christ and his apostles are quite different from those human inventions which the missionaries are persuaded to profess, and entirely consistent with reason and the revelation delivered by Moses and the prophets."

When we find that he specifies the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Atonement, as being stated in such a way as "appears to reasoning Hindoos as entirely heathenish and absurd," one cannot but suspect that, at best, very little was done to draw forth the living truth from the swaddling clothes of sectarian conceptions, and to place before those who had heard but too much of Trinities and Incarnations the heart and life of the express Image of the Father.

But I find also a tendency, even among friendly Christian writers, to disparage this movement; to fix upon the exact point where it falls short, and to prove certain moral defects in its professors corresponding to the shortcomings of doctrine; that, for example, it is through cowardice that they do not profess Christianity; or that they will admit everything, but refuse to be baptized. One review, which otherwise deals fairly enough, catches up at the close the false

story that the Baboo Keshub Chunder Sen allowed one of his followers to worship him; and all, or nearly all, taunt them with having so often changed their ground, basing themselves at one time on the Vedas, at another on the marks of God in nature, at another on Intuition. Surely the fact that they have not been constant and immovable is the very point of hope; for they have, amidst great confusion, been planting their feet on patches of solid ground, wherever they can find them. We need not push them off into the mire; for each step that they have taken is a step towards the firmer standing-place on which, through God's mercy, we stand.

Let us rather seek out the germs of truth which their system yields, and foster their natural and genial expansion. Let me take one or two of these.

In the most important matter of all, the acceptance of Christ as Lord, the essential point, surely, is a recognition of Him as the Holy One, as the representative in human nature of God's true character. I have shown how vividly this is depicted in one of the anniversary lectures. I cannot but think that if we follow St. John's Epistle, and dwell on such words as these: "God is love;" "The life which was with the Father was manifested;" "He that dwelleth in love dwelleth in God;" "He that doeth righteousness, is righteous, even as he is righteous;" we ought to hold that the recognition made in that lecture is essentially that which God would have us make; and we ought to feel sure that this recognition will light the way to all subsidiary truth.

But, as to the supremacy of Christ above all the other teachers and helpers of mankind. In the second of the Baboo Keshub Chunder Sen's lectures we have a description of great men, heroes, or prophets; and fault has been found with this because nothing is said of our Lord, and also because some heathen prophets are mixed up with the Jewish and the Christian. But, just as in Carlyle's "Hero-worship," it is hinted for the sake of those who will see that "the greatest of all heroes is One—whom we do not name here;" so the belief in God's speaking through many prophets is in no way inconsistent with the supremacy of the One central prophetic voice; and although the lecturer insists upon reckoning Mahomet and the Hindu teacher Chaitanya among the prophets, yet, practically, we never find him drawing his own moral ideas from either of these; they come direct from the Bible and the Church.

Another of the lectures is on Regenerating Faith; and the description there given of faith may be summed up in the expression of Dr. Chalmers, "the expulsive power of a new affection,"—the love of God driving out the love of the world. If it be asked, how can faith be true unless its object be accurately defined? we may answer

that the root of faith is a longing sympathy with goodness, and that the test of it is not the distinctness with which its object is perceived, but the singleness of mind with which that object is pursued.

And even when the Tracts of the Brahmo Somaj argue that revelation must be intuitional, and that a book cannot of itself be a revelation, it is evident that a little explanation of terms would go far to settle the matter. That there is an inner revelation which is made not by the Bible, but by God's Spirit to the heart, we all admit; and this is a scriptural use of the word, for St. Paul speaks of "the spirit of wisdom and revelation." Or, again, where in one of the lectures it is said that God manifests himself first in nature, secondly in human history, thirdly in the soul or conscience, we can hardly fail to recognise in this the germ of the doctrine of the Trinity. Or, lastly, when in one of the Brahmo Tracts, after an argument against the compensation theory of the atonement, it is said that the Brahmo theory "makes purity the life of atonement, repentance and amendment the condition of forgiveness," we have the germ of the doctrine in the Epistle to the Hebrews, which is, that "the first of many brethren" "offered himself without spot to God," that by his doing the will of God we are sanctified, and that thus the conscience is "purged from dead works to serve the living God."

When we try to judge of religion by the inner appreciation of it in the heart rather than by the dogmatic utterances of the lips; when we consider how much more important it is that conviction should be genuine, than that ready-made tenets should be rapidly accepted; above all, when we look to the broad facts before us, and realise that men but just escaped from the oldest and most systematic idolatry in the world, are now expressing their devotion in feelings we know to be identical with our own; it seems as if a refusal to welcome such men as fellow-believers would be hardly short of a denial of the working of the Spirit of God.

II.

It remains to consider the bearing of such a movement as this upon the religious prospects of India.

The two remarkable features about it are: 1st. That it is a product of Western civilization; 2nd. That it is thoroughly indigenous, that is, that it has sprung up by the original and spontaneous conviction of natives of India. Let us look at these two facts.

The Brahmo Somaj is a product of Western civilization. No one can doubt this who reads the publications of the Society. They are saturated through and through with modern thought. They could not by any possibility have been written a hundred years ago. Apart

from the fact that they are addressed in English to the people of India, the whole tone of thought is European. In the Baboo Keshub Chunder Sen's lecture on Great Men, the idea is evidently suggested by Carlyle, who is quoted by name; the definition of ordinary men with whom they are contrasted is taken from Victor Cousin; and the expression, God in History, comes, doubtless, from Bunsen. The line of great men is that of Christendom, only one Indian prophet being mentioned among them. The "Hindu brethren" are exhorted to honour the inspired prophets of Christendom; and the "Christian brethren" are exhorted to honour the prophets of the East. But the whole idea of what greatness is, and what it effects, is Western. No one can doubt the power of the Hindu mind to assimilate the literature, the science, and the moral ideas of Europe.

The same may be said as to religion. One might expect to find a binding together of ideas taken from the Vedas with those derived from the Bible. But there is absolutely nothing of this. We are told that the Holy Spirit must slay the old man; that we must not rest with John the Baptist, but go on to Christ; that we must not be content with Old Testament laws, but imbibe the New Testament spirit of love. The equality of all men is recognised without the least allusion to caste: the personality of God is assumed, without the smallest tendency to Pantheism.

It may be useful to refer here to an article written by M. Emile Burnouf, five years ago, on Christian Civilization in India.* He considers that, since the mutiny, the whole prospect of affairs in India has changed; that India is being governed, and will be more and more, for the good of the natives themselves; and he endeavours to estimate the European influences brought to bear, and their probable effect. Those who are apt to disparage Christianizing influences will be astonished to find one who criticizes missionary enterprises severely, yet anticipating their success. Yet even Burnouf's expectations seem to be shown to be too slight in the light of the literature of the Brahmo Somaj, and of other facts now before us. He admits the great influence of commerce and education, but thinks the institution of caste will long survive, and the essential doctrines of the Brahminical religion will not be undermined by science. The essay of Sir Bartle Frere on Indian Missions† seems to show, on the other hand, how vast a disintegrating power European education is exercising; and the wide views as to the equality of mankind proclaimed by the missionaries of the Brahmo Somaj, together with the vast change which will be effected by the education

* *Revue des Deux Mondes*, tome lvii. p. 612.

† "The Church and the Age." Essays on the Principles, &c., of the Anglican Church, 1870. Essay VIII.

There is, therefore, no reason to believe that such discussion as Burnouf anticipates must necessarily hinder the triumph of the essentially moral theology of the Gospel.

It may be said that one swallow does not make summer, and a few Brahmos are not India. But when we see the swallow we know that summer is not far off. St. Paul argued that since he was an Israelite, and had believed in Christ, the Jewish nation was not cast away. Similarly we may argue that the Brahmo Somaj disposes of many supposed hindrances in Indians accepting Christianity, and gives us room for believing that truth will win its way. Sir C. Napier used to say, "Old Indians fancy there is an arcanum about government in India. The only arcanum is justice." So we may believe that, notwithstanding the theorists and philosophers, education and moral truth will take their natural course, and prevail.

What, then, are our hopes for this? I have looked at the Brahmo Somaj as showing what European culture and ideas can effect in India. I think it still more important as showing the power of origination in the nation itself.

It is a mistake to suppose that India has lain passive for thousands of years under a stereotyped system. It has constantly produced reformers. The Sikhs are the monument of one such. The Jains or Jœnas, who are said by Burnouf to be widely spread in India, are believed to perpetuate even now the tradition of Buddhism, which, itself springing from the bosom of Hinduism, nearly won the whole of India at one epoch. The Sultan Akbar endeavoured to fuse Mahommedanism and Brahminism into one. I have already quoted from the Baboo Keshub Chunder Sen the mention of Chaitanya. Of all these attempts it may probably be said, "the time was not yet." If the account given by Burnouf of the origin of caste be correct, its maintenance was a great social necessity, for the self-preservation of the Aryan race composing the upper castes. Does any similar necessity exist now? Clearly not. And the difference between former attempts at reform and that of the Brahmo Somaj is, that those were made with many external disadvantages, whereas all the external influences of the present day—science, education, law, religion—tend to establish the Christian doctrines of the unity of God and human equality. Wherever English civilization spreads, caste and idolatry must be weakened; and the opposite doctrine now comes in with the support of Christianity, which even its adversaries must admit to have more power over men's consciences to constrain them to purity and love than any other religion that has ever existed.

The value of a movement which is really indigenous is admitted on all sides. The missionaries admit it, and the natives feel it. There is a story of a missionary who had been preaching under a banyan-tree with little or no success, when a Hindu came up to him

and said: "Sir, if you were trying to cut down this tree with an English axe, and the handle of the axe broke, would you wait till you could get a new one from England? It would be a very long process that way. You had better take a piece of the tree itself, and fit it on to the axe-head, if you want to cut down the tree." The truth thus indicated goes perhaps deeper than is commonly admitted. Every one feels that a native pastorate must spring up if India is to come into the Christian Church. But may it not be that what is wanted is not so much the joining of individuals to the European Churches, as the formation of a native Church from the centre of native society? It is said by Burnouf that every native who becomes a Christian ceases to be an Indian and becomes a European. That may be an exaggeration, but the great difficulty of rooting the Church in India, instead of draining Indians into European communities, is very widely felt. A Report of the Church Mission at Umritsur for this year says: "For some years past a great change has been taking place in our North Indian Mission. Mission work has been passing through a transition period, a transition from the condition of pupilage and dependence on the part of the native Church to one of greater independence and self-action." After speaking of the ordination of some native catechists, the Report goes on: "Little, however, would have been achieved if worthy catechists had been advanced to the ranks of the clergy, while their salaries as pastors continued to be drawn from a foreign nation and a foreign national Church." And the Report proceeds to speak of the formation of a Church council, which is assuming independent functions, and exercising real power in the affairs of the infant community.

This, doubtless, is a step in the right direction. But it hardly seems likely that the forms of European Churches can be applied ready made to India. I cannot but think that what we must look for is a recasting of the framework both of dogma and of organization in the Indian Church of the future. As Greek Christianity and Latin are very different, as the writings of Gregory Nazianzen or Chrysostom give very different versions of some essential truths from those of Augustine, so we may expect that the Indian Christianity of the future will cast Christian truth and life in a different mould, and will add new elements to those already existing in the universal Church.

It is for this reason that I think we ought to be very patient in our dealing with, and expectations from, the Brahmo Somaj. If any one thinks otherwise, let him ask himself this question: To which of the Churches into which Christianity is divided does he think that India could be advantageously absorbed? Would it not be a great loss that it should go to swell the ranks of any one communion?

Or, on the other hand, can we wish that all the divisions of our present religion should be perpetuated in India?

The lecture of the Baboo Keshub Chunder Sen on the Future Church is no doubt somewhat vague. But the following expressions of genuine conviction must surely be taken into account in all our thoughts for the future of his country:—

"India has religious traditions and associations, tastes and customs, peculiarly sacred and dear to her, just as every other country has; and it is idle to expect that she will forego these; nay, she cannot do so, for they are interwoven with her very life. In common with all other nations, we shall embrace the Theistic worship, creed, and gospel of the future church, we shall acknowledge and adore the Holy One, accept the love and service of God and man as our creed, and put our firm faith in God's almighty grace as the only means of our redemption. But we shall do all this in a strictly national and Indian style. We shall see that the future church is not thrust upon us, but that we independently and naturally grow into it; that it does not come to us as a foreign plant, but that it strikes its roots deep into the national heart of India, draws its sap from our national resources, and develops itself with all the freshness and vigour of indigenous growth."

Now I have no doubt that the vague anticipations of Theism are destined to undergo vast modifications, and that Christ, the Divine Redeemer, is the true Lord after whom all earnest thought throughout the world is feeling; but I wish to see the Brahmos come to perceive this by the real necessities of the case, not by a kind of moral compulsion on our part. A letter which I have lately seen from India, written by an Indian Christian, says of them: "I doubt not when they become Christians they will be earnest and very devout Christians. It is very strange that they have such a profound veneration for the name of holy Jesus; they even in their own way celebrate the birth of our Divine Lord on the Christmas Day, and some of them wanted to be present only to behold the blessed sacrament of Christ's body and blood. In their meeting with the bishop every one said, 'We are not worthy to utter the name of Christ;' and they try to imitate the Christians in their worship; and to those who are unacquainted with the transcendent sanctity of our sacred religion, these outward forms of Brahminism are sufficient to give them present satisfaction." This the writer looks upon, perhaps somewhat naturally, with great sorrow, as offering a resting-place short of Christianity itself. And no Christian, of course, could wish to see any individual inquirer stop short of uniting himself to the Church of Christ in name and by baptism. Yet it may please God that the work may go less rapidly in order that the foundations may be more firmly laid in circumspect conviction, by the force and stress, so to say, of spiritual circumstances.

Some course such as the following I think we may expect. When men are in the presence of Christ's teaching they cannot but feel a

desire, not merely for instruction or a good example, but for actual redemption, for a power to raise them out of and beyond themselves. Such a feeling has already issued, it is said, in a cry for help, amounting almost to adoration, addressed by weaker members of the Brahmo Somaj to their leader. He will never accept such a tribute; but the need for it will remain; and the knowledge of Christ as the Redeemer alone can meet it. Then the more the essential nature of Christ is known, and His position in the economy of God's dealings with men, the more He must stand forth above all other teachers or helpers; and when the good of all such teachers, within or without the Jewish and Christian revelations, is admitted to the full, the absolute supremacy of Him who is the centre of them all, will force itself more and more upon the conscience. Then must spring up, not merely gratitude and reverence, but a sense of entire dependence, and such a relation as amounts to actual adoration; and thence the question cannot but arise (which perhaps really determined the decision of the fathers at Nicæa), How can He whom we worship be distinct from, or essentially inferior to, God? The spiritual relation between Him and us would be idolatry if the Father and the Son were not one. And then the separate position which is now occupied by the Somaj will, we may expect, give way to a desire for unity. The bitterness of sects and parties in the Christian Church now makes a separatist position more reasonable; but the controversies which it provokes—the fact that even now the question which the presence of the Baboo Keshub Chunder Sen always raises is not, Is what he says true? but, How ought we to regard his position compared with that of other believers?—make separation most undesirable. There cannot but be a longing to be actually, visibly, at one. And this feeling will gradually make the Brahmos see that baptism is not the mere "bathing in cold water," but the real incorporation into that body of believers, which is not an inward union merely, but an outward visible one also.

Let such convictions grow up *as* convictions, as the result of felt spiritual needs, not as formal expressions into which men are to be obliged to shape their minds; and let nothing hinder us from yielding our entire sympathy to these men in the earnest life and work in which they are engaged. I cannot myself doubt that they are under the guidance of God's Holy Spirit, and that they are the nucleus of the future Church of India. Let us not dwell upon the points in which they fall short, but upon what they hold; for they hold it with no feeble grasp. What we have to learn from them is, not how they might regard certain expressions of the faith of the Christian Churches, but how they have found the words and spirit of our Lord an instrument to uproot idolatry and break down the immemorial walls of division, as a lever to raise themselves and their

country to a nobler life. Few persons, I think, can listen to their words without feeling their own Christian life strengthened by their simple and sincere estimate of Christ and His teaching.

Meanwhile, let us cease to hear the disparaging reflections upon Christian Missions which have been too often made by members of the Liberal school in our Church and country; and let us cease to look at the influence of England in India as if it had been, and could be, nothing but a violent conquest to be used for vulgar objects. The leader of the Positivist school in England some years back announced as the natural policy of this country, "That we withdraw from our occupation of India without any unnecessary delay, within the shortest period compatible with due arrangements for the security of European life and property, and with such measures as shall be deemed advisable in the interest of Indian independence and good government," and ridiculed the idea expressed at public meetings that Providence had entrusted India to us for good ends. But even Burnouf declared that since the transference of India to the Crown, the influence of English Government had been good, and nothing but good; and to the Baboo Keshub Chunder Sen every Englishman that lands in India is a friend and a brother. To him it is no doubtful thing that God's Providence has been at work, for England has brought to him and his friends the light that has set them free.

If any one still doubts the power of Christian Missions in India, let him read the essay already referred to of Sir Bartle Frere, in "The Church and the Age," which tells of the subtle, underground influence with which the Missions are working; of Christian tracts being taken up in villages where no missionary has gone, and the people spontaneously casting away their idols; of the young Brahmin, educated in English knowledge, finding the belief of his fathers simply impossible to him, and wanting as a real necessity to know what the religion of Europeans is. Science, commerce, education, intercommunication of ideas, the researches of scholars, which show the Hindus what their religion really means, the growing realization of the fact that the Aryan race in Europe and Asia are one, all are working surely, and with accelerating pace, towards a great moral and religious end. It would be a mistake to shape out that end with a minute precision which is sure to be reproved by the event; but we who were so slow to believe St. Paul cannot doubt, now that a Hindu Theist has told it us, that Asia, as well as Europe, has a share in Jesus Christ. And as little can we doubt that in the country from which this Hindu Reformer and his associates have sprung, and from which they refuse to separate their spiritual destiny, the kingdom of God has begun to dawn.

W. H. FREMANTLE.

PROFESSOR GROTE ON UTILITARIANISM.

An Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy. By the late JOHN GROTE, B.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Cambridge. Edited by J. B. MAYOR, M.A., Cambridge. Deighton, Bell, & Co. 1870.

OF all moralists not distinctly professing to take the Utilitarian side, probably no one has conceded so much to the Utilitarian theory as Professor Grote. He distinguishes, indeed, between the older Epicurean doctrine concerning happiness as the object of action, and what he calls the Neo-Utilitarianism of Mr. J. S. Mill; and it is only to the latter that he gives so cordial a welcome. He sees in it a philosophy differing much, and even in kind, from that of Bentham and Paley. But this ethical system of Mr. Mill is the Utilitarianism which is before the world now, and in which we of this generation are chiefly interested; and Professor Grote, as a philosopher of a different school, has treated it with a generosity which should tell with equally advantageous effects both on Utilitarians and on their opponents. It is extremely desirable on many accounts that the modern Utilitarianism should be understood, and should have thorough justice done to it.

The criticism which Professor Grote brings to bear on Mr. Mill's treatise at many different points is mainly intended to prove that the system expounded by Mr. Mill is *inadequate* as a complete explanation of all the facts which moral science must take into account. All Mr. Mill's positive doctrine, we might say, Professor Grote accepts; and he gives it a high place, allowing it to divide the

throne of the ethical kingdom. But he decidedly opposes the claim of Utilitarianism, in its improved shape, to be the whole of moral science.

I wish it were possible to commend this work of Mr. Grote to all those who are interested in ethical discussions as a readable book. But unfortunately, with all its merits, it does not possess that of readableness. For this the style is partly to blame, and partly the whole order and method of the work. But it would be hard to blame either the author or the editor. Mr. Mayor has done all that an editor could do in the circumstances in which he was placed. These are fully explained in the Preface. The pleasure which Professor Grote took in speculating and writing down his thoughts on philosophical questions was in a great measure neutralized by his dislike of the task of preparing what he wrote for publication. He consequently left a large quantity of essays and chapters in manuscript, in a more or less finished state. A great part of this *Examination* was written when Mr. Mill's papers on Utilitarianism came out in *Fraser's Magazine* in 1861. On the republication of these papers in a separate volume, Mr. Grote sent his criticisms to the press as far as the end of the seventh chapter of this volume; but then he changed his mind about publishing in that form, and the type was broken up. After his lamented death in 1866, Mr. J. B. Mayor, as literary executor, found himself in possession of the printed chapters, with eleven more in MS. These latter he has partly re-arranged; and he has edited the whole work with affectionate care, giving all possible help to the reader by references, summaries, and occasional notes of explanation. Such being the history of the work, we can hardly either wonder or complain that it exhibits the disadvantages of being written in a *desultory* manner. The arrangement, though not disorderly, is unsystematic; whilst the subjects discussed are so liable to be confused and made hopelessly unintelligible by indistinctness of thought, that we most of us need the helps of formal arrangement and a precise style to preserve us from lapses of discrimination, and from being victimized by besetting fallacies. If the matter of the volume had been digested and packed into half the space—if this criticism of Mr. Mill had not been much more than twice as long as Mr. Mill's treatise—the reading of the book would have been much easier.

No doubt some will also share the feeling which caused Professor Grote himself to give up his first intention of publishing this work, —that it is too exclusively *critical* in its scope. It aims at proving that the New Utilitarianism is not so well-based and complete a system of life and duty as it professes to be. But we are too familiar with the shortcomings of all human products, systems of

speculation amongst the rest. Considering how freely Mr. Grote accepts the Utilitarian as a partial theory of morals, the reader will be apt, I think, to get tired of so much trying of its weak places, and will wish to see it harmoniously and securely adjusted in the more comprehensive theory of which it is to form a part. Mr. Grote does not omit to indicate what principles, in his judgment, are needed to supplement that of the pursuit of happiness, but he deliberately declines to attempt the construction of any system, and prefers to regard human existence as too various and incomprehensible a matter to be brought, at least with our present knowledge, under any simple unity of conception. A little more enthusiasm, a more evident desire to commend some satisfying view to the reader's mind, would have made the book more interesting.

But if we miss the inspiring effects of eagerness and confidence, we feel at once in this work the presence of the most charming modesty and candour. Professor Grote is never carried by controversial warmth into unfairness. He is always courteous and gentle, always anxious to correct dogmatism in himself, as in others, by appeals to the complexity and mysteriousness of the world with which moralists have to deal. And, in the same spirit of reverence for the actual truth of things, he takes pains to be accurate in expression as in thought. His style, though involved and cumbrous, is that of a thinker who realizes distinctly what he means, and endeavours to convey his meaning in terms which shall not be liable to be misunderstood.

The following topics may serve as heads for some of the critical observations in which Mr. Grote seems to me to have touched weak points in the Utilitarian creed:—the nature of happiness, the social instinct, the distribution of happiness, the value of action, moral imperativeness.

1. Utilitarians hold, in Mr. Mill's words, "that actions are right in proportion as they tend to produce happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain: by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure." Professor Grote admits that some kind of happiness is the end of all action, that "the happiness of whatever can feel happiness is the proper object of all the action which can go on in the universe." "I hope I may be able to avoid," he says, "in controverting Mr. Mill, any disposition to value less than he does human happiness, or even human pleasure, and the action which is conducive to it. I recognise fully the worth, not only of *his* Utilitarianism, but of the older and inferior, as aiding the study, than which nothing can be more important, of the manner in which human happiness may be promoted" (p. 32). But, he inquires, do

we sufficiently know what happiness is, to be able to make general rules about it, and to use it as the one measure of the rightness of actions? Mr. Mill thinks we do. He appeals to common sense and common experience. But when attempts are made to formulate happiness, *either* we have only the more commonplace forms of it represented, *or* we have some *ideal* quality of it introduced, which does not belong to the mere testimony of experience. In describing a happy life, Mr. Mill mentions as "the foundation of the whole, not to expect more from life than it is capable of bestowing." Mr. Grote observes on this prescription for happiness, that it rather has a partial and *moralistic* truth, than is true as a scientific statement. "I apprehend that with at least an equal degree of truth we might say that it was a great thing for happiness to expect a great deal from life." "I can hardly think Nature was wrong in filling us, as she does, especially in earlier days, with hope and unlimited expectation, even though perhaps much of bitter disappointment should follow." "The advice of parents to their children is given with the feeling, on the part of the parent, that there is sure to be enough in the child of strong passion, hopefulness, enterprise, and other elements of this kind, which he only fears lest there should be too much of, but the absence of which, though they make no part of his advice, he understands would be quite as great a calamity as disregard of his advice. Mr. Mill's prescription for happiness, not to expect too much from life, is of this character. Considering the exceeding likelihood that we shall form utterly unreasonable expectations, the advice, in this point of view, is most sensible. But if Mr. Mill's view were, not simply to correct and restrain a temper of mind which he knows is sure to exist in spite of all that may be said against it, but to describe the temper which he thinks should be, I would take, for happiness, what seems to me to be the side of nature against him. And so as to Paley: if his description of what will make us happy is intended as a portrait of a happy life, without the supposition of there existing besides a mass of strong emotion, impulse, imagination, and other such elements, of which what he gives is really only a chastening and correction,* I must say

* There is a curious coincidence between this observation of Mr. Grote's and a similar one in a paper to which I shall refer again, on "The Morals of Expediency and Intuition." "All moral controversies may, we think, be reduced under four general heads. First, what is the sphere of morals, what part of human life do they cover, and of what other elements in human nature do they assume the existence? . . . The first, which is of extreme importance, has as yet been hardly touched, though it would probably be found to throw great light upon the other three. We shall confine ourselves to observing upon it that it will be found to involve, amongst other things, the principle that *all ethical systems assume the existence of a flow of passion which is to be artificially checked or quickened by prohibitions or commands.*"—*Pall Mall Gazette*, June 5, 1869.

that in my view human life as it exists is not only better but happier than he would make it" (p. 34). This seems to me an interesting and valuable piece of criticism. Mr. Mill's attempt to base the superiority of the higher class of pleasures upon simple experience is subjected to a keen analysis. "It is an unquestionable fact," says Mr. Mill, "that those who are equally acquainted with, and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying both, do give a most marked preference to the manner of existence which employs their higher faculties." To call some faculties "higher," Mr. Grote argues, implies of itself that they are worthier to be employed, and is sufficient to determine action. But it might be answered that "higher" is used *à posteriori*, to describe the faculties of which the employment is found by comparative experience to yield the more pleasure. With more effect he remarks that, in taking the judgment of those who have tried, and are *capable of appreciating* different sorts of pleasures, we are bringing in an element—capability of appreciation—which does not belong to the simple experience of pleasure and pain. We say that we ought to pursue that kind of happiness which is valued by the worthiest. He shows also that pleasure and pain are so little *separable* from the whole state of mind of the enjoying or suffering person, that a man whose existing character disposes him to enjoy one kind of pleasure is not a fair judge of the comparative enjoyability of another kind, although he himself, in a different state of mind, experienced it. "As a matter of fact we do not look upon pleasures as independent things to be thus compared with each other, but as interwoven with the rest of life, as having their history and their reasons, as involving different kinds of enjoyment in such a manner that our being able to enter into one kind is accompanied with a horror of another kind, which would entirely prevent the comparison of the one with the other as pleasures. Besides this, it must be remembered that, in the interval between the one pleasure and the other, the mind itself is changed: you have no permanent touchstone, no currency to be the medium of the comparison. Supposing a man whose youth has been grossly vicious, whose mature age is most deeply devout: most commonly I think the man will wonder that he was ever able to find pleasure at all in what he once found pleasure in. Earnestness in the later frame of mind, whatever it is, would only preclude the possibility of a cool comparison of it, as to pleasure, with the earlier one" (p. 54). "Pleasure will not bear to be looked too straight at, to be made too much, itself, the object and centre of view." "I do not think that any person who considers really what life is, while undoubtedly he acknowledges that comparability among different sorts of pleasure, as pleasure, is to a certain extent real and what we act upon, will

ever imagine that it can be to us a moral guide, or a basis for moral philosophy." "I cannot understand a general scale of pleasures, in which so many marks will be given to drunkenness, so many to love of the fine arts, so many to something else, according to the experience of those who have tried more than one of them" (p. 55).

2. But, in Mr. Mill's creed, it is not their tendency to produce happiness simply, but their tendency to produce *social* or *general* happiness, that determines the rightness of actions. The adjective *social*, in Mr. Grote's opinion, really transforms the old happiness theory, instead of merely developing it. He points out something very like a fallacy in Mr. Mill's attempt to found the pursuit of social good on the natural desire of happiness. "'Each person's happiness,' says Mr. Mill, 'is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons.' We are talking here of 'a good' as an 'end of action:' let us substitute the equivalent term, and the argument then will be, that as each man's happiness is 'the end of action' to him, so the general happiness is 'the end of action' to the aggregate. Except so far as 'the aggregate' can act, this latter clause is unmeaning. But Mr. Mill seems to consider that he has proved that, in the same natural manner in which a man's happiness is an end to him, the aggregate happiness is an end to *each individual* of the aggregate. Mr. Mill in other places, as we have seen, shows most admirably how it may *become* so: but if his proof here had held good, there would have been no need to show this; what I have called his 'Societarianism' would have been superfluous." "The real point of morals, which Utilitarianism evades, is the knowing how to meet any one who concludes thus, Since then it is *my* happiness that is the good to *me*, it is *not* the general happiness that is so, and there is no reason that I at least should act for *that*. The more a man's particular happiness appears a good to him, the more it is likely to engross his action, and the *less* he is likely to think of the happiness of the aggregate" (pp. 70, 72).

If happiness, in the bulk, were like a central body towards which human effort naturally gravitated—if it were as natural to me to seek some else's happiness as my own, simply through the attraction which happiness exercises upon my instincts,—then Mr. Mill's Neo-Utilitarian theory would seem to be well based and consistent. But it is not clear why the simple natural craving of each man for his own happiness, no other element which might determine conduct being imported, should be supposed to bind or to lead each man *to prefer the general happiness to his own*. Mr. Mill emphatically holds such preference to be right. His words can never be too often quoted: "The happiness which forms the Utilitarian standard of

what is right in conduct is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, Utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator;" "it is noble to be capable of resigning entirely one's own portion of happiness or chances of it." There could not be a higher or more exacting ethical doctrine. But does it quite legitimately spring from the observation that nature teaches every man to seek his own happiness? Mr. Mill brings in, as a fact of experience, the multiform operation of the social instincts: "The social state is at once so natural, so necessary, and so habitual to man, that, except in some unusual circumstances, or by an effort of voluntary abstraction, he never conceives himself otherwise than as a member of a body." No doubt this is a fact, and a fact of experience. Instead of questioning the importance of it, we ask whether it is not *too* important for a secondary place in the Neo-Utilitarian theory; whether the account of virtue and duty given by this theory is not based much more on the bond which unites men in society than on the acknowledged desire of each man for his own happiness. Men become conscious of relations to their fellows; the binding force of these relations grows with life and civilization; men thus feel themselves constrained to *prefer* the social good to their own. Is not the social bond the more important part of the foundation of Mr. Mill's ethics? Has not the Stoical or Christian cuckoo extruded the Epicurean sparrow? The ideal, though you drive it out with a fork, will insist on returning.

3. According to Utilitarianism, tendency to produce happiness is the sole criterion of the morality of an action. Therefore, it may be inferred, a man's actions are to be determined by intention to produce happiness. Professor Grote assumes that the latter proposition is equivalent to the former; and he presses the question, *Whose* happiness? both in other parts of his work, and especially in a chapter on "the distribution of action for happiness."

Perhaps, however, it ought not to be assumed that those two propositions are equivalent. Whether a certain kind of action is right or not, is to be settled by its bearing, to be ascertained by experience and observation, upon universal happiness. But when it has been concluded on such grounds that a certain action is right, its rightness is a law, on Utilitarian principles, to the individual agent. He is not bound or expected to have the results of the action consciously in view. I think that the remembrance of this distinction between the morality of an action and the purpose of the agent will neutralize some part of Mr. Grote's criticism. If a man is asked, "Why do you care more for your child's happiness than for that of some other human being who has no tie to you?" he

may answer, "Because it is natural and right that I should; and it is right, because experience proves that the peculiar devotion of parents to their children's good is for the general advantage." At the same time it seems to me open to question whether the Benthamite calculations which Mr. Mill persists in affirming to be the foundations of morals, are really the natural and scientific basis of the superstructure which he rears upon them.

Mr. Mill writes as follows: "The Greatest-Happiness Principle is a mere form of words without rational signification, unless one person's happiness, supposed equal in degree (with the proper allowance made for kind), is counted for exactly as much as another's. These conditions being supplied, Bentham's dictum, 'everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one,' might be written under the principle of utility as an explanatory commentary." Mr. Herbert Spencer had remarked on this dictum, that "the principle of utility presupposes the anterior principle, that everybody has an equal right to happiness." "It may be more correctly described," answers Mr. Mill, "as supposing that equal amounts of happiness are equally desirable, whether felt by the same or by different persons. This, however, is not a *pre*-supposition; not a premise needful to support the principle of utility, but the very principle itself; for what is the principle of utility, if it be not that 'happiness' and 'desirable' are synonymous terms? If there is any anterior principle implied, it can be no other than this, that the truths of arithmetic are applicable to the valuation of happiness, as of all other measurable quantities." (Page 93, 2nd Ed.) But is this principle, that equal amounts of happiness are equally desirable, whether felt by the same or by different persons, all that is meant by the dictum, "everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one?" This dictum sounds like a generous assertion of equal rights; but it has no longer any such attractiveness, if it means, for example, this, "Provided I can more than double my own happiness, I shall do this, rather than try to give only an equal amount to another." Hypothetical cases, which do not correspond to actual facts, are often misleading; but in dealing with an arithmetical philosophy, arithmetical cases are not illegitimate tests. Suppose then only two persons, say Adam and Eve, alive in the world together. Imagine Adam to be thoroughly possessed by Utilitarian first principles. He would repeat to himself, "Equal amounts of happiness are equally desirable. Eve's happiness is as valuable as mine; also, mine is as valuable as Eve's. If it is in my power to add rather more to my own happiness than with the same effort I can add to hers, Eve has no claim whatever upon me. A larger amount of happiness is more desirable than a smaller." But

what, in this surely supposable case, becomes of the self-renunciation which Utilitarianism applauds?

Mr. Mill, it has been seen, remarks that the principle "that everybody has an equal right to happiness may be *more correctly* described as supposing that equal amounts of happiness are equally desirable, whether felt by the same or by different persons." Yet he himself deliberately uses on the same page the less correct form of expression, "*The equal claim of everybody to happiness*, in the estimation of the moralist and the legislator, involves an equal claim to all the means of happiness." Mr. Mill grows warm in the assertion of equal rights, and then he affirms that the great moral duty of treating all equally "rests on a still deeper foundation, being a direct emanation from the first principle of morals." This first principle is the arithmetical valuation of amounts of happiness. But in such valuation of happiness, as Mr. Mill himself plainly states, it makes no difference whether the happiness is felt by the same or by different persons. Therefore there is no equal claim of everybody to happiness involved in the mere addition and subtraction of amounts of happiness. Enthusiasm for social justice is not to be derived from the simple arithmetic of happiness, disengaged from every other principle.

Mr. Grote, assuming that in the application of its fundamental principle Utilitarianism would teach a man to aim at giving equal happiness to all, points out the extreme unnaturalness of such impartiality. No one would tolerate such a precept as "love your father and your neighbour, your benefactor and your neighbour, alike:" "yet this is in fact what the principle of 'everybody counting for one' leads to" (p. 95). It is difficult to say how far such criticism touches Mr. Mill. On the one hand, he warns us distinctly that that principle is limited by the inevitable conditions of human life, and by considerations of social expediency; and both life and the common interest constrain a man to love his father more than a stranger. On the other hand, Mr. Mill's creed seems to look upon preferences with disfavour, as tolerated exceptions rather than as growing out of the fundamental idea, as *enclaves* in the territory of the greatest-happiness principle, which must be watched with jealousy. But, if we take Mr. Mill's interpretation of the equality of persons as being properly the equality of equal amounts of happiness, we might invoke this principle in aid, *not* of an unnatural impartiality, but of those preferences which nature so strongly sanctions. For surely a man might argue with himself in this way, "Placed in the relation in which I am to my wife, I am much more able to give three times *a* of happiness to her than to give *a* to three strangers apiece. Therefore my wife has the stronger claim to happiness at my hands." Most persons, however, would feel that if the primary and derivative

principles of Utilitarianism be respectively what Mr. Mill describes, we are better occupied in conversing with such *secondary* principles as Duty and Self-renunciation than in going to the source and assuring ourselves that equal amounts of happiness, whether in the same or in different persons, are equally desirable.

4. The difficulty, in the Utilitarian philosophy, of ascending directly from the fact, known and observed, of the universal desire of happiness, to a satisfying conception of Duty, meets us at every turn. "All men desire happiness; therefore I ought to try to promote the happiness of all,"—does not seem an inevitable deduction. But we might raise the question, whether trying to promote happiness does really commend itself to us as constituting the whole moral worth of action. Granted, that all right action promotes happiness; as to this, there is no controversy: but has the rightness of action no other element except the tendency and purpose to produce happiness? If desire of happiness is instinctive, there is also a very strong and general instinct which shrinks from contemplating the pursuit of happiness as the highest and most satisfying aim. Mr. Grote appeals frequently to this feeling, and to the experience which supports it. The following passage will illustrate his view: "To the philosopher who would make *pleasure* the proper aim of life, the moralist might use the same kind of language as the physician might use in reference to bodily pleasure,—'Pleasure, so far as man is master of it, means simply health: take care of that, and the pleasure will take care of itself: any pleasure expressly sought and indulged in will more or less disturb this, and really be more akin to, and productive of, pain than pleasure.' . . . But even to the philosopher who would make mental health and welfare the aim of life, the moralist might speak, as I suppose the best physicians would in regard to the body,—'Care of health is not the whole of life or the entire aim of it: nor is health likely to be the better in the mass of cases for such express exclusive care: it will be best consulted if the body, and each part of it, does its proper work and business.' And the work and business of the collective human race, it seems to me, is self-improvement; for the sake of the glory of God, if we take a religious view; for its own sake, if we do not" (p. 351).

It might seem from the last sentence that Mr. Grote in this passage was thinking of the collective human race as seeking its collective happiness; but his remarks apply with more exactness to the case of an individual seeking his personal happiness. And Mr. Grote has himself warned us that seeking one's own happiness and seeking other people's are distinct in kind, and that a fallacy may be involved in a *saltus* from one to the other. We may recognise, however, a modified force in his argument, if we transfer it to that other distinct

case. According to the Utilitarian, to pursue happiness in the bulk is the essence of morality. Happiness in the bulk, to me, is mine *plus* that of other sentient beings. Now, as regards my pursuit of my own happiness, there is a very general belief, which cannot be said to support the Utilitarian theory, not only that such pursuit cannot assume the character of *virtue* even in a limited degree, but also that I am more likely to be happy if my conduct is guided by other considerations than that of seeking to be happy. To seek the happiness of *others* undoubtedly assumes at once the character of goodness; but it may be questioned whether, in the close relations of life, deliberate intentional effort to promote the happiness of others is the best way to make them effectually happy. I doubt whether it would be agreeable to me to know that the people about me were uniting their efforts to make me happy. One who stirs up the hope and enthusiasm of others by pointing out to them a worthy end for which they may strive, does more to make them happy, though he may not think at all of their happiness, than if it were his understood labour to add to their several enjoyments. Paradoxical as it is, there is something which the subtler part of human nature shrinks from in the naked and deliberate manufacture of happiness.

Is there not a danger, then, of our sacrificing to a theory a portion of the dignity and higher quality, and even usefulness, of human action, if we determine to attribute to it no other, or no higher, aim than that of the production of pleasure?

5. The difficulty of obtaining an adequate sense for the word "ought,"—of extracting the imperativeness which we associate with the idea of duty,—out of the elements of the Utilitarian creed, is so obvious and familiar that no hostile critic could fail to insist upon it. Mr. Grote on this point criticizes Bentham rather than Mill. In his statement of his own views, Mr. Mill seems willing to restrict Utilitarianism to the assertion of a *criterion* of morality. Any one who will say, "I hold an action to be right because, or even if, it promotes the general good, to be wrong because, or if, it is detrimental to the general good," is with him a Utilitarian, whether he believes or not in any other sanction which binds the individual to do what is thus ascertained to be right. "The feeling of unity with our fellow-creatures" is what Mr. Mill himself appeals to, as giving the sense of obligation. He supposes a man to ask, "Why am I bound to promote the general happiness? If my own happiness lies in something else, why may I not give that the preference?" And he observes, "This difficulty will always present itself, until, by the improvement of education, the feeling of unity with our fellow-creatures shall be (what it cannot be doubted that Christ intended it to be) as deeply rooted in our character, and to our own conscious-

ness as completely a part of our nature, as the horror of crime is in an ordinarily well-brought-up young person" (p. 40). And he adds, on the same page, "The principle of utility either has, or there is no reason why it might not have, all the sanctions which belong to any other system of morals. Those sanctions are either external or internal. Of the external sanctions it is not necessary to speak at any length. They are, the hope of favour and the fear of displeasure from our fellow-creatures or from the Ruler of the Universe, along with whatever we may have of sympathy or affection for them, or of love and awe of Him, inclining us to do His will independently of selfish consequences. There is evidently no reason why all these motives for observance should not attach themselves to the Utilitarian morality, as completely and as powerfully as to any other." On this Mr. Grote remarks, "External sanctions are very slightly alluded to, and are dismissed by Mr. Mill almost with contempt" (p. 138); and it is not indeed easy to see why Mr. Mill should have thought brevity so specially suitable to the mention of them. But at whatever length they may be spoken of, it is clearly a point of great importance whether we stop short with saying, This action and that will conduce to the general happiness, and happiness is desirable for everybody; or can add, I must do what is for the good of my fellow-creatures, because I am bound to them in one body, or because I am the child of a God who desires the good of all his children.

The particular task undertaken by Mr. Mill was to defend Utilitarianism against the "intuitive" moralists; and, with reference to the *sanctions* of right conduct, he aims at showing that a morality inferred from the general good may have as strong supports in internal feeling and conscience as a morality derived from intuitive notions of duty. Mr. Grote is hardly an "intuitive" moralist, of the school opposed by Mr. Mill: if one were to remark that it is difficult to say *what* he is, that is an impression which he would have been very willing to produce. He is so moderate and hesitating in his own pretensions, whilst making it his chief business to moderate the pretensions of the Utilitarians, that he fails to give emphasis enough to his own convictions. But I gather on the whole from the Chapter on "Duty and the Utilitarian sanctions," that Mr. Grote makes the bindingness of Duty to consist in the claims which others have upon us in virtue of their relations to us. He is nearer to Mr. Mill than he is to the "intuitive" moralists; but this doctrine of *relations* as imposing duties upon us, differs from Mr. Mill's doctrine that the unity of the human race makes us all responsible for seeking each the happiness of all. Duty, as answering to relations, rests rather, as Mr. Grote observes, on *differences*

amongst men than upon their absolute equality. And it varies in stringency according to the closeness and character of the relations.

This theory of Duty and its sanctions might reasonably have been developed and insisted upon by our author, as having advantages over the scheme by which Duty is built upon the two foundations of the desire of happiness and the social unity of the human race. But Professor Grote had a curious shrinking from anything that might even look like a comprehensive science of morals. He had convinced himself that moral philosophy ought to be lowered from its scientific rank, and to be regarded as a set of sciences grouped in somewhat indeterminate relations together (page 344), or as an art, depending on several sciences. He believed that right manner of thought about morals was more wanted than systematic knowledge. (Page 7.) "What I have most dreaded," he says,—and it is interesting to note so rare an apprehension,—"has been lest anything that I have said should appear to have a completeness which does not belong to it, and lest I should bar up any ways in which the thought of any interested in these subjects might otherwise tend to expand itself." (Ibid.) He gave his admiration and sympathies to Aristotle amongst moralists, and in the large-minded moderation and patient dependence on the observation of life which characterized that "greatest of philosophers," he found qualities in which he delighted.

But if the cautious temper of mind, nourished by a sense of the vastness and variety of life, is to be compared with that craving for unity which will not rest without endeavouring to see things in their real connection and subordination, we can hardly hesitate in acknowledging the latter as the more serviceable to the progress of knowledge. In morals, not less than in other departments of human investigation, what we most want is the key to the true order of a number of things with which we are familiar. Which is first, which comes after; which is above, which below; at what point we must place ourselves so as to understand best our own life and that of other men;—these are the interesting questions of ethical study. A tentative order is not mischievous, but helpful. Let thinkers offer their solutions, and let students compare them and verify them as they can.

I cannot understand why moralists who are also Christians, and who have in their creed what professes to be a key to human life and duty, should not make open and direct *use* of it. But that has not been commonly their custom. The more orthodox amongst moral philosophers make rare and dim allusions to their "religion" as something which esoterically they add on to their morality, but for

the most part they keep it out of sight. Wishing to take "higher" views of life than the thinkers who appeal to experience, they use a kind of shadow-words to fight their battle with. Instead of God, they put forward a shadow-deity called Conscience; for the invariableness that belongs to the mind and will of God, they imagine an invariableness in the conceptions of men. There is more of reference to the will of God and the teaching of Christ in those publicans the Utilitarians, than in most of the "intuitivist" philosophers.

To Christians, the will of God must be the ultimate rule and authority. But we may look for manifestations of that will in the structure and history of the world of men, as much as in the answering voices of the inner nature.

We can therefore go with those who appeal to experience, as far as they are willing to go with us. Let us hold with Mr. Mill that all human beings are bound together in a spiritual unity; with Mr. Grote, that they are bound together in various and particular relations; with both, that all right action must tend to the good of mankind: in the facts thus admitted we have a solid *positive* basis for duty. These facts, studied and dwelt upon, will define our duties with adequate precision, and will nourish the sentiment of obligation.

But if to these facts there be added the acknowledgment of a Maker of the human race and a Framer of its relations, who desires the health and well-being of his creation; and if it be believed also that the Maker, being so related to human beings that they are capable of entering in some degree into his mind, has given them some knowledge of Himself and intends them to know Him more truly, as children know their father;—then it is evident at once that the spiritual unity and organization of the human race receive an explanation and support without which they are always in danger of being regarded as imaginary or assumed. I am not forgetting that there are difficulties in reconciling the belief in a supreme will of perfect goodness with the actual phenomena of the world. But, in the case of Christians, their belief stands in spite of those difficulties. And one of the arguments for their belief is that it supports and explains the necessary assumptions of every moral system. The will of God enfolds in its reconciling embrace all duty, all progress, all happiness. Additional duties, which are not without "positive" support in the order and progress of human life, enforce themselves upon those who recognise a Supreme will. But the duties of man to man are not displaced. Every act which can be fairly shown on utilitarian or on positivist principles to be right is invested with new dignity, and receives an accession of the most powerful sanctions.

The most simple and popular of all schemes of utilitarian morality was that of Paley. He assumed that a man must inevitably be

moved to action by a consideration of his own happiness, but he held that the prospect of enjoyment or pain in the next world would naturally have a most preponderating influence upon his calculations. According to him, the Supreme Being enforces his will upon men by the promise of reward and the threat of punishment. This system, so different from Mr. Mill's, appeared likely to become obsolete. But it has been revived by a writer of well-known vigour and acuteness, whose speculations on ethics and theology have been chiefly given to the public without his name in the *Pall Mall Gazette* and in *Fraser's Magazine.* This writer, in the *Pall Mall Gazette* of June 5th and 8th, 1869, undertakes to explain "ought" on rigorous Benthamite or Paleyan principles, and finds in it the meaning "will, on certain assumed conditions." "He ought not to commit a crime," for example, means "He will not commit it, if he pays a natural and reasonable regard to the consequences which will overtake him for doing it." And the most terrible consequences are those which belong to the next world. It would probably be convenient, and it would fall in with the usual illustrations of a writer whose ethics breathe of the Criminal Court, to leave rewards alone and to speak only of punishments. "Law," he says, "whether of the temporal or of the spiritual power, is nothing but organized and systematic intimidation." Now there is no doubt that men's action is greatly influenced by fear of punishment. Those who believe in the filial relation of men to a perfect God as giving the most complete explanation of human duty, will recognise the value of intimidation for just such purposes as the writer in question has in view. They have always held that the Law is necessary for the restraint of the unrighteous disposition; although it is not their doctrine that it is the source of righteousness or goodness.

The will of God:—but how is the will of God to be ascertained? Well, we must certainly take care, as we have been lately warned to do, not to speak of God as if He were a man in the next street. If Mr. Mill or M. Comte can show that anything is right because it promotes the general good, springs from a healthy moral state, is bound up with progress, we may readily accept the same evidence as proving the same thing to be according to the will of God. Let a practice have the strongest imaginable religious sanction, if it can be shown on sufficient evidence to be really and on the whole injurious to the interests of mankind, it is impossible that we should continue to believe it to be prescribed by the will of God. We think we have other information as to the will of God; but no other can be in the long run more convincing than that supplied by conduciveness to the happiness of mankind.

The old snare of orthodoxy is that of not merely using some

particular mode of reading the will of God, but of insisting on that mode as solitary and exclusive in its authority. If we are simply anxious to learn what it may please the Creator of the universe and Redeemer of mankind to communicate to us, by any of the processes which may be suitable to the modes of his action in the world, we may be able to welcome any contribution to our knowledge which the honest observation of facts may supply. In the physical world, we are learning to admit every well-supported theory of the modes of change and development, as not conflicting with, but illustrating, the action of the Divine Creator. Discoveries which seem to show us *how* things have come about, have no proper tendency to weaken our faith in Him who prescribes the way and gives the impulse. So, in the moral world, there is no theory as to the determination of right or wrong, or as to the genesis of conscience, professing to rest on facts, which we who look to the will of God as supreme may not gladly credit with the whole value which the facts seem to impart to it. Suppose it to be shown that moral feelings are transmitted together with physical characteristics from parent to child; suppose it to be shown that social opinion impresses its judgments by the unwearying urgency of threats and punishments with great effect upon the growing nature: why should not these be partial methods of Divine discipline? We observe in the world of mankind a marvellous and intricate order; we see incessant reciprocal influence, curious likenesses and differences, a body composed of individuals who are changed from minute to minute, yet maintaining a homogeneous growth of thought and sentiment which speaks of a common spiritual life: all these phenomena should be full of interest and instruction to us, and we should only rejoice that in the confession of a divine purpose we have a centre of unity for them all, and know how to find an origin, a meaning, and a hope, for what we see or experience. There is neither need nor inducement to make human intuitions the ultimate foundations of our building, when the will of God has been revealed to us by life and history and is illustrated by the whole progressive creation.

J. Llewelyn Davies.



THE MOABITE STONE.

Revue Archéologique, No. III. et No. IV. Mars et Juin. Paris, 1870.

IT is seldom that an archæological discovery awakes such interest in these modern times as has been aroused during the present year by the curious monument of antiquity, known now far and wide as "the Moabite Stone." In general a few students, scattered sparsely over the length and breadth of the land, are stirred more or less deeply by such an announcement as that made in March last by M. Clermont-Ganneau, while the public at large remains unimpressed and apathetic, either unaware of the fact, or attributing to it little or no importance. But the Moabite Stone, by some happy concurrence of circumstances, was scarcely introduced to the notice of the British public when it found itself famous. Like a lucky actress or singer, it took us by storm. Not in the universities only, but in the metropolis—not in learned circles merely, but in fashionable ones—it was the topic of the day. Politicians, lawyers, statists, men of business, nay, ladies—ladies, moreover, never previously suspected of having in their mental colouring the faintest tint of *blue*—talked of it, discussed it, argued about it, expressed opinions as to its age and its contents, and smiled if they met with any one who confessed to complete ignorance on the subject. We need scarcely say that these drawing-room discussions were not remarkable for depth; nor need we add that after a brief space they passed away, yielding to the more ordinary topics of exhibitions, operas, balls, garden-parties,

engagements, flirtations, vacation flittings, and the like—the usual "small change" of social intercourse in the "society" of our time and country.

It would be a curious, but perhaps scarcely a profitable inquiry, to investigate the causes which gave to this particular discovery so exceptional a notoriety. It was not the mere occurrence in the monument of interesting Scriptural names; for "Omri" and "Mesha" cannot possibly compare for interest with Ahab and Benhadad, Hezekiel and Sennacherib, names which had been discovered on ancient monuments without producing anything like a sensation. It was not that the relic could claim any extraordinary antiquity; for the monuments of Egypt, about which no special enthusiasm has ever been felt, are in many cases at least a thousand years older. It was not that there had been any great triumph of human intellect or ingenuity in the decipherment, for many scores of scholars, both in England and on the Continent, could have done the work performed by M. Ganneau equally as well, had they enjoyed his opportunity. It was rather, perhaps, in the first place, that the entire nature and character of the discovery was level to the ordinary intelligence; and, secondly, that it was ushered into the world—in England, at any rate—in a peculiarly favourable way. The "leading journal" first gave it to the British public; and gave it, moreover, with all the advantages of prominent situation, large type, and the strong remark, that it was "like a page of the Bible." General attention was thus called to it at once; and the excitement being further kept up by some controversy as to the relative share of England, France, and Prussia in the discovery, and there happening to be at the time a dearth of topics of importance to occupy the public mind, the matter acquired the prominence and notoriety which seem to us so remarkable.

We are far from complaining of the interest excited, or from wishing that it had been less than it has been. We only wish that in all cases a proportionate interest were felt in similar documents and discoveries—documents and discoveries, we mean, connected with the historical Scriptures, and authenticating the statements contained in them. Scarcely does a year pass without the exhumation from the records of Assyria or Babylonia of some facts bearing as closely upon Jewish or Israelite history as the facts recorded upon the Moabite Stone; but as they make their appearance in learned journals which enjoy but a small circulation, or in books of a solid character which are read by few, the impression that they produce upon the world is slight and almost imperceptible. It is not easy to devise a remedy for this. We are afraid the "leading journal" would scarcely undertake to disseminate each such discovery as it

occurs; yet, while they have to be sought for in the pages of the *Athenæum* or the *Zeitschrift für Ægyptische Sprache*, it can hardly be expected that they should produce any important effect upon the world at large.

Before the interest that the discovery of the "Moabite Stone" excited has altogether died away, it seems to us desirable that it should be understood somewhat more distinctly than it is, what really are the gains which science and literature have made from the document in question; what (if any) further gains are to be expected from it; and what, therefore, are its real value and proper place among the discoveries of our day. There has been, it seems to us, a tendency in many quarters to over-estimate, as there has been in some a tendency to under-estimate, the importance of the document; while very few indeed of those whose comments it has provoked have shown an intelligent appreciation of the *peculiar* value which it possesses, the respects in which it is unique and unrivalled, a treasure to the antiquarian unsurpassed in the present, and not very likely to be surpassed in the future.

First, however, not to assume too much knowledge on the part of our readers, let us briefly recapitulate the history of the "Stone." In the autumn of 1868, M. Klein, a Prussian gentleman, travelling for his pleasure in Palestine, received intelligence of a curious monument, as existing in the Moabite country, to the east of the Dead Sea; and being induced by the reports brought him to extend his travels in that direction, he saw the Stone *in situ*, amid the ruins of a town known to the natives as *Dhibán*, and copied a portion of the inscription upon it, which was at once seen to be in the character known to Oriental scholars as "Phœnician." The general nature of the discovery of M. Klein became known shortly after to the European Society of Jerusalem, and efforts were made, both by the French consul, M. Clermont-Ganneau, and the English agent of the Palestine Exploration Fund, Captain Warren, to obtain "squeezes," or paper casts, of the inscription by means of native agents. At the same time M. Klein entered into communication with the Turkish Government, and endeavoured to obtain the Stone itself through their instrumentality. Reports of the intention of the Government to interfere having reached the natives, their jealousy was aroused, and they determined to destroy the monument which seemed likely to bring them into trouble; a determination which they carried into effect by burning a fire about the Stone, and then throwing cold water upon it, whereby it was broken into fragments, which were then dispersed among the tribes and hidden away. Before, however, this had been done, M. Clermont-Ganneau had succeeded in obtaining a paper cast of the entire inscription by the exertions of a

native, who risked his life in the enterprise; but this cast was obtained under circumstances of so much difficulty, that it seemed at first to be valueless. It had to be torn while still moist from the stone, and was brought to M. Ganneau in seven fragments, all more or less rubbed and worn, so that the traces of the inscription were pronounced by him to be "imperceptible." Not long after, very fair paper casts of the two main fragments of the Stone (A and B) were obtained by M. Ganneau, and still better ones by Captain Warren, and the learned world was thus put in possession of about half the inscription. Finally, the two large fragments themselves, and eighteen smaller ones, were recovered by M. Ganneau from the natives, while certain morsels fell into the hands of Captain Warren, and were brought to this country.



Form of Moabite Stone, and position of two main fragments.

It is from these various materials, carefully combined, that the text of the inscription will have ultimately to be reconstructed. The pillar itself will, we trust, be re-erected in Paris, the extant fragments, whether belonging to the French or to ourselves, being reunited, and each fitted into its proper place. It will then be patent to the eye how much of the inscription has perished, and how much has been preserved to us. M. Ganneau calculates that the document originally contained about a thousand characters. Of these the large fragment (B) exhibits 358; the smaller fragment (A) 150; the next largest to this, 38; and the remaining seventeen in his possession, 67; making a total of 613; which, as he remarks, is above three-fifths of the whole. The portions of the Stone in the possession of the Palestine Exploration Society, which consist of eighteen small fragments, add the further number

of 56 letters; so that the lost letters appear to amount to no more than 331, or less than seven-twentieths of the original inscription. Many of these may be supplied by almost certain conjecture, and others will probably be recoverable from M. Ganneau's first paper cast and M. Klein's copy. Eventually, therefore, it is probable that a very fair text of the entire inscription may be obtained, in spite of the act of Vandalism which seemed at first to have rendered such a result almost impossible.

We think it rather unfortunate that, in anticipation of the ultimate result, attempts should have been made in France, in Germany, and in England,* to present the world with what are called transcripts of the entire inscription in Hebrew characters, and with translations of these transcripts. Such attempts seem to us premature. At present the only portions of the inscription whereof scholars generally have any means of judging are the two fragments A and B, which have been made accessible to them by the excellent photographs of Captain Warren's paper "squeezes," published by the Committee of the Palestine Exploration Fund. The remainder of the inscription is the ingenious restoration of a single scholar, M. Ganneau, whose method of procedure in the production of his text has never yet been explained,† and whose arrangement of his small fragments has been wholly unchecked by any second independent judgment. It may be that M. Ganneau has performed his extremely difficult task in the best possible way, absolutely without any error; and it may be that the most implicit reliance is to be placed upon his decipherment and arrangement; but of this there is at present no proof. Certainly the internal evidence of the document, as he presents it to us, is not such as to put his version beyond criticism, or to make us feel sure that he has neither misplaced any of his fragments nor misread any of their characters.

* Besides M. Clermont-Ganneau, the following Semitic scholars have either edited or translated the inscription of Mesha: in Germany, MM. Nöldeke and Schlottmann; in England, M. Neubauer. M. E. Deutsch has wisely declined to translate it until the *disjecta membra* are all fitted into place.

† We should have been glad if M. Ganneau had given us *fac-similes* of his fragments separately, or, at any rate, an account of the contents of each fragment, and had informed us whether or no he finds the fragments of the Stone fit into each other, like the parts of a puzzle. Again, we should have liked to have been told whether the original paper cast of the Stone, which is the only extant representation of the monument in its entirety, is found to be as indecipherable as M. Ganneau at first declared it, or whether it is mainly by following its guidance that he puts the fragments in their places. At present we can find no account of M. Ganneau's method of procedure but the following, which is, we confess, to us quite unintelligible:—"La plus grande partie de ces morceaux, même les plus minimes, peut être mise en place facilement, en tenant compte de la correspondance horizontale et verticale des séries de caractères: il suffit (!) de procéder comme pour déterminer la position géographique d'un point par l'intersection des lignes de longitude et de latitude."—*Revue Archéologique*, Juin, p. 358.

But while the complete text of the inscription, and therefore its full purport, are in our judgment still matters of doubt, its general character and its date, within certain rather narrow limits, seem to us fixed with an approach to certainty from the portions of the document preserved to us in the two large fragments. The fragment A contains the commencement of the inscription, and makes it perfectly clear that the monument was erected by a certain "Mesha, King of Moab," and spoke of a recent war waged between Moab and two, or more, kings of Israel. Now, as Israel ceased to be a kingdom about B.C. 721, the document must evidently be anterior to that date. This being the case, and a war between a "Mesha, King of Moab," and the kingdom of Israel being recorded in Scripture (2 Kings i. 1; iii. 4—27), at the distance of about a century and a half before B.C. 721, there seems to be no reasonable ground for doubting that the "Mesha" of the inscription is the same as the "Mesha" of Scripture, the only king of that name known to have reigned over Moab. This conclusion is confirmed by an indication, which this portion of the inscription contains, of the name of one of the kings of Israel who fought against Moab. In the place (line 5) where the expression "King of Israel" first occurs, and where we should look, therefore, to have (if anywhere) the name of the Israelite monarch,* the character immediately preceding the first letter of "king" (*melek*), and which should therefore be the last letter of the king's name, is *i*. Now the letter *i* is not the terminal letter of the name of any of the later kings of Israel, but only of the three early kings, Zimri, Tibni, and Omri. But of these three names, one, viz., Omri, occurs beyond a doubt in another fragment of the inscription; and we are thus led to conclude as almost certain that the well-known Omri, the founder of Samaria (1 Kings xvi. 16—28; Mic. vi. 16), and his son Ahab, are the kings of Israel intended in the early part of the document. Thus its date is fixed to the earlier half of the ninth century before our era;† and it may be taken as illustrating very satisfactorily the hostile relations between Israel and Moab described in Scripture as existing at this period.

The illustration, however, is general, not special; incidental, not

* Sir H. Rawlinson was the first to point out this probability, and to suggest that the name Omri immediately preceded *Melek Israel* in this place. (See the *Athenæum* of February 26, p. 296.) This conjecture has now been accepted by M. Ganneau, the Count de Vogué, and others. M. Ganneau even states that on the fragment which he places at the close of line 4, where he originally read ע, the true reading may be עמ, so that only one letter would be wanting at the end of line 4 to complete the name of Omri (עמרי). See the *Revue Archéologique* for June, 1870, p. 362.

† The numbers of the present Hebrew text, calculated by the reigns of the kings of Judah, give B.C. 897 as the last year of Ahab; calculated by the reigns of the kings of Israel, they give B.C. 877. The chronology of the Assyrian canon would bring down the date to about B.C. 857.

express or direct. The campaigns recorded by Mesha are not those on which the Biblical writers lay stress (2 Kings iii. 4—27; 2 Chron. xx. 1—25), but certain previous campaigns, which are either wholly omitted in the Scriptural narrative, or are there touched with the utmost brevity (see 2 Kings i. 1). The case thus rather resembles that of the Assyrian inscriptions of the same date, which mention casually Ahab, Hazael, and Benhadad, than that of the more important inscriptions of later Assyria and of Egypt, containing the heathen account of wars which the sacred writers have made the direct subject of their narrative. Considered, therefore, as an evidence confirming the truth of the Hebrew Scriptures, the value of the inscription is slight, though it is not altogether nugatory. Some years back it might properly enough have been hailed with acclamations, as a testimony to the plain historic truth of a narrative which many were seeking to resolve into mere myth and fable. Now that the great inscriptions of Sheshonk and Sennacherib have been deciphered and published, it has only a minor value, since those documents directly confirm and illustrate the Biblical narrative, while this throws light on it only indirectly.

Considered as a fresh contribution to history, the interest of the document is also slight, though here, too, it is not without a certain value. We learn from it several facts not contained in the Scriptural narrative—as that Omri and Ahab were regarded as cruel oppressors of Moab; that the Moabite cities were destroyed or fell into decay under their rule, and required to be rebuilt; that hostilities between the two kingdoms began as early as Ahab's time; and that Mesha, having established his independence, restored the towns throughout his dominions,* and fixed his capital at Dibon,† where he set up the recently-discovered monument. Further, we have evidence that the Moabites regarded themselves, not only as under the special protection, but as under the actual direction, of their god, Chemosh, who was thought to signify his will that this or that city should be attacked, and was obeyed implicitly. It is probable that, when the whole inscription has been put finally into shape, some other facts, similar in their general character to these, may be made out; but it is tolerably clear that nothing is likely to be recovered of any deeper or wider interest.

On the whole, therefore, we must pronounce the historic importance of the "Moabite Stone" to be not very great—at any rate, not to be comparable with that of numerous Assyrian, Babylonian,

* The restoration of the towns is the principal subject of fragment B.

† Dibon is mentioned in Scripture as a Moabite town (Num. xxi. 30, Isa. xv. 2, Jer. xlviii. 18—24), though not as the capital, which seems generally to have been Kir-Heres, called sometimes Kir-Moab. (Compare Isa. xv. 1, xvi. 7, 11, Jer. xlviii. 31 and 36.)

Egyptian, and Persian monuments recovered during the last twenty years without any great stir being made about them. It is not as an historic document that we have wished to call attention to the "Stone," or as such that we should have considered it a fitting subject for an article. To us its predominant interest seems to lie altogether on its linguistic side—to consist in the light which is thrown by it on Semitic grammar and on Palæography. It is in connection with the latter subject that the document seems to us of paramount importance; and we propose, in the remaining space at our disposal, to confine ourselves to this aspect of the recent discovery.

We have said that the moment a copy of a small portion of the inscription was obtained by M. Klein, it was seen at once that the writing was "Phœnician."* This is palpable to any one in the least acquainted with the Phœnician character; and a glance at the alphabets represented on the accompanying plate † (of which Nos. 2, 3, and 4 are undoubtedly Phœnician) will probably be enough to satisfy upon the point even the most sceptical inquirer. Now Phœnician writing is that from which the Greek, the Roman, and the other European alphabets were derived, so that all inquiries on

* The term "Phœnician," which has been applied generally to this class of writing, is not altogether a happy one, since there is no reason to believe that the character in question was at all peculiar to the Phœnician people. Rather the evidence goes to show that it was common to all the races of Western Asia from Egypt to the foot of the Taurus, and from the Mediterranean to Nineveh. The character is found to have been in use at Nineveh itself, in Phœnicia, at Jerusalem and Samaria, in the Moabite country, in Cilicia, and in Cyprus. M. Deutsch has proposed to substitute for "Phœnician," as the designation of this mode of writing, the term "Cadmean."

† A few words of explanation as to the plate itself, and the authorities upon which it rests, appear to be desirable. The plate represents, in its first four lines, the Phœnician or Cadmean alphabet, in four stages, arranged chronologically. Line 1 gives the characters as they exist upon the Moabite Stone. The forms have been traced over photographs of the paper casts sent to England by Captain Warren, or else copied from plaster casts (now in Oxford) of certain small fragments of the actual Stone. Line 2 gives the characters as they appear upon certain Assyrian tablets and gems, which are assigned by Sir H. Rawlinson to the period between Tiglath-pileser II. and Asshur-banipal, or to about B.C. 745—650. These characters have not been copied from the tablets themselves, but are taken from the *fac-similes* published by Sir H. Rawlinson in the *Journal of the Asiatic Society* for the year 1865. Line 3 represents the characters as they are believed to exist on the sarcophagus of Eshmunazar (supposed date about B.C. 600), which is now at Paris. It reproduces the forms from the copy of them published by Dietrich in the year 1855. Line 4 gives the ordinary Phœnician alphabet of Persian, Greek, and Roman times. It is taken mainly from the *Scripturæ linguæque Phœniciæ monumenta* of Gesenius, but with some corrections from other sources. The remainder of the plate exhibits the forms of the most archaic Greek writing. These forms are exhibited solely as they occur when the writing is from right to left, for the sake of comparison with the Phœnician forms, though even in the most ancient inscriptions of Greece the writing is often either *βουστροφηδὸν* or from left to right, and the letters thus often face the other way. The authorities followed for the forms are chiefly Böckh and Rose, though sometimes inedited inscriptions existing in the British Museum have been made use of.

NO
TETH
NO
TETH

the subject are inquiries into the origin of the letters which we ourselves use. They are also, in point of fact, inquiries into the origin of alphabetic writing; for the other ancient modes of writing, independent of the Phœnician, were in no case really alphabetic, since in them characters represented, for the most part, either ideas, words, or, at any rate, syllables.

The special interest, then, that attaches to the "Moabite Stone" is this—that it is the most ancient specimen which we possess of that alphabetic writing which, in common with the other nations of Europe, we ourselves employ at the present day. It takes us nearer to the fount and origin of our written characters than any other document or monument that has as yet been found. We have in its inscribed forms, not perhaps the original characters themselves, but the earliest known representations of them. If we wish to know what the characters were at first, we must study especially these most ancient specimens.

It has been stated by a writer on the subject of the Moabite Stone—the only writer who has as yet called much attention to the palæographical value of the discovery*—that one of the things which "become clear" from a consideration of the inscription is, that "the more primitive the characters, the simpler they become, not (as often supposed) the more complicated, as more in accordance with some pictorial prototype." We do not think that this criticism is borne out by the actual facts. Of the twenty-two letters which constitute the later Phœnician and the Hebrew alphabet, twenty-one are represented upon the Stone.† Six of these—*alef*, *gimel*, *hê*, *nun*, *ain*, and *rêsh*—are identical in shape, or nearly so, with the predominant forms of later times. Two others—*béth* and *pé*—are so slightly changed that no argument can be founded upon them. Of the remaining thirteen, while a certain number are "simpler," in the sense of their presenting to the eye fewer lines, others (as particularly *mem* and *heth*) are, in the same sense, more complicated. To judge, however, by the number of lines, is a mistake. The true simplification of writing is produced by economizing the number of strokes. In this respect it will be found, by a reference to the plate, that the later forms are almost always "simpler" than the earlier. In *samech*, for instance, apparently the most complicated of the later

* See a letter to the Editor of the *Times*, by M. E. Deutsch, published in the *Times* of March 3, 1870.

† The *teth* is the letter omitted. It was rare in Phœnician (Gesenius, *Script. linguæque Phœn. mon.*, p. 30), and not very common in Hebrew. There is no specimen of it on the Assyrian tablets or gems, and, if I remember right, only one in the inscription of Eshmunazar. A recent conjecture of M. Ganneau's would make the *teth* have occurred in one passage of the inscription of Mesha (*Revue Archéologique*, Juin, p. 336); but the form is unfortunately irrecoverable.

letters, a gradual diminution in the number of strokes may be traced from first to last. Originally the letter was written like an early Greek *xi*—thus, ⋕, with four distinct strokes; then the four were reduced to two by changing the three horizontal bars into a zigzag, which could be written without taking the hand from the paper, and adding a vertical bar beneath it; finally, the vertical bar was attached to one end of the zigzag, and thus made a continuation of it, so that a single continuous stroke sufficed for the whole letter. Similarly with the *koph*, which was a circle with a vertical bar attached below (Ϙ), the circle itself being formed probably by two semicircular strokes,* and the whole letter thus requiring three distinct efforts of the will to form it, the ultimate form, complicated as it seems, is a real simplification of the earlier one, the object being to produce the character by one stroke instead of three. This was done by commencing with the vertical line, and then representing the circle by two loops, one on either side of the line, the whole character being thus formed by a single continuous stroke. In like manner the original *zain* required three distinct strokes, two horizontal and one oblique (Ⅰ), which were subsequently represented by the form still in use (Z), a form producible by a single effort, without any removal of the pen from the paper. The same principle will be found to apply to the *vau*, the *heth*, and the *koph*, whereof the later forms require in every case fewer strokes than the earlier. It is perhaps also traceable in the *bêth* and the *daleth*.† The only exceptions to its prevalence are to be found in the *jod*, the *mem*, and the *shin*, where the commonest of the later forms require more strokes than the earlier. Here, however, there were in each case other forms in use requiring fewer strokes than the early ones, or the same number.

With respect to the interesting question of the probable derivation of the alphabet from pictorial forms of objects, and the bearing upon that question of the recent discovery, we must again venture to differ from the writer above quoted. It seems to us that the primitive shapes of the Phœnician letters, where they vary from the later ones, are more, and not less, "in accordance with the (probable) pictorial prototype." In common with most writers on the subject, we take the objects themselves to be designated by the names which the letters bore, and still bear, in Hebrew and Arabic, the antiquity of which is attested by their communication to the Greeks at a time which we believe to have been considerably anterior to the first Olympiad. Thus, *alef*, we assume, should designate an "ox," or some familiar

* This is almost the universal mode in which the head of the *koph* is formed on the Assyrian tablets and gems.

† The original pointed *bêth*, a triangle with a tail, was probably made with three strokes; the rounded *bêth* required but two. So with the pointed and the rounded *daleth*.

part of one; *gimel*, a "camel;" *ain*, an "eye," and the like. Now the letters in which something like a clear difference can be traced between the earlier and the later forms are *béth*, *daleth*, *vau*, *zain*, *heth*, *yod*, *kaph*, *lamed*, *mem*, *samech*, *tsade*, *koph*, *shin*, and *tau*. Let us see in each of these cases whether the earlier or the later form more resembles the probable "object."

The early differs from the later *béth* solely in having a pointed head, instead of a rounded one. But the object which *béth* was intended to represent was a tent, the earliest "house" of pastoral man; and this had in primitive times the simple triangular form, Δ. Thus the early *béth* more resembled the object than the later one.*

The early *daleth* is a simple triangle; the later has the right side of the triangle elongated, and the other two generally rounded into one. But *daleth*, "door," represented the opening of a tent, the form of which was like that of the tent itself, triangular. Here again the earlier form is clearly the better representation of the object.

In the *vau* the case is not so plain. In its earlier form, we now find that it had a semicircular head, from the centre of which a vertical line depended. In the later, the vertical stroke was attached to one end of the semicircle, and the semicircle became a short curve, or even an actual straight line. Now if, as many do, we regard the *vau* as intended to represent a "hook" or a "tent-peg," we must say that the later forms are the better pictures; but if we take the true original meaning of *vau* to be a "nail" or "peg" for hanging anything on, then † the early form must be pronounced most like the object. It seems to us that the latter is the sounder view.

With regard to *zain* no judgment can be given. *Zain* properly means an "arm," offensive or defensive; but what particular arm was taken as the representative of the class it is impossible to say. Neither the earlier form of the *zain*, nor the later, resembles any known weapon.

In *heth* the difference between the earlier and the later forms is not great. Both sufficiently represent the object intended, a "field," or "enclosed space." But the early form seems to us somewhat the better "picture."

None of the forms of *yod* very much resemble a "hand," which is what the word means. According to the common explanation, the four vertical, or quasi-vertical, strokes of the later character represent

* The tail of the *béth*, which can scarcely be pictorial, belongs equally to the earlier and the later forms. We regard it as a diacritic mark, intended to distinguish *béth* from *daleth*, which would otherwise only have differed in size. A similar diacritic mark is to be found in the later Greek *vau* or *digamma*, *ϝ*, where the lower vertical line was added to distinguish *vau* from *gamma*.

† Gesenius assigns *clavus* as a true meaning of *vau*, equally with *uncus* (*Script. linguaque Phœn. mon.*, p. 26), and indeed gives *clavus* the preference in his Lexicon. So Fürst.

three fingers and a thumb, while the horizontal line is the palm connecting them. If this be so, the earlier character must be pronounced less like the object than the later, since it consists of four strokes only, which, according to the explanation propounded, would be the palm, the thumb, and *two* fingers. But it may be questioned whether the original "picture" was not a hand *and wrist* in profile,* in which case the four strokes, representing the wrist, the palm, the thumb, and the index-finger, would be more correct than the five.

Kaph is properly "the hollow hand," *vola* of the Romans. In the characters, both early and late, it is placed at the end of the fore-arm. Now here the "hollow" is certainly better represented by the open head of the earlier than the closed one of the later character.

Lamed is a "prick-stick," or "ox-goad," which is well represented by the early character, where the long upper line terminates in a point, while the lower end represents a curved handle. In the later forms of the letter the point was lost, the handle became angular, and an addition to the handle was made, which had nothing corresponding to it in nature. This in the later Hebrew form, ל, became the main part of the letter.

Of *mem*, "water," represented originally by a wavy line, like that whereby the Assyrians represent water on their sculptures, the first and second forms (see the plate) retain the original idea, which is almost wholly lost in the third and fourth.

The original form of *samech* is a good representation of a "prop" supporting a trellis for vines. The later, which are tachygraphical abbreviations, furnish far less accurate pictures. Ultimately the idea became completely lost in the square-headed Hebrew ס.

If *tsade* means, as is probable, "a fish-spear," and if that had in early times the common later form of a trident, then we must pronounce the ancient *tsade* a better representation of the object than the later, though even in the most ancient form the desire to write rapidly has caused a considerable departure from the original figure.

Scholars are not agreed as to the meaning of the word *koph*. It has been translated, "the back of the head," "an ear," "an axe," "a pole," and "the eye of a needle." If the last is, as we believe it to be, the true meaning, then the earliest form must be pronounced the best, indeed the only good, representation. In this the circle is small in proportion to the length of the stroke below it, as the eye of even a rude needle would be, and the eye is not traversed by any part of the shaft. In the second form, which resembles a Greek Φ (see the plate), this departure from truthfulness takes place. In the third and fourth everything is sacrificed to the desire of forming the letter by a single stroke.

* So Bunsen, following Rödiger, "Philosophy of History," vol. iii. p. 261.

Shin, we are told, means "a tooth." The original form was probably the picture of a molar with two long fangs. Of this the early *shin*, which resembles a W, is a fair tachygraphic imitation. The later forms are, all of them, less like; the last of all being, however, less unlike than some of the intermediate ones, since the fangs are there represented. In the "square" Hebrew the fangs were once more dropped, and the letter became ש.

Finally, with respect to *tau*, which meant simply a "mark" or "badge," and which is generally explained as originally a "brand on cattle," it is clear that the simple cross of the Moabitic Stone would be more likely to be the actual mark used than the more ornate forms of later times, where first one, and then both arms of the cross have a terminal deflection.

It appears, therefore, upon the whole, that the alphabetic forms of the Moabite Stone strongly favour the view which is maintained by most critics,* and which the names of the letters suggest, that the original Phœnician writing was pictorial, resembling in this respect the writing of the Egyptians and (most probably) of the Babylonians. The letters were the pictures of familiar objects, which pictures underwent a gradual corruption, the great object being to simplify, by reducing the character to forms which could be traced without removing the hand from the paper. The similar corruption of the Egyptian hieroglyphics into the character known as *demotic* is generally admitted, and has been well illustrated by Lepsius and others.

Another interesting palæographical question, on which the Moabite Stone throws considerable light, is that of the time at which the Greeks obtained the elements of writing from the Phœnicians. It has been strongly argued by Mr. Grote, and is now believed by many, that letters were absolutely unknown to the Greeks in the time of Homer and Hesiod (about B.C. 850—776), and were first introduced into Greece about the period of the first Olympiad, or soon after. The evidence of the newly-discovered Stone favours a much earlier date for the communication. *The archaic Greek alphabet, as it exists in the earliest inscriptions, resembles far more closely the alphabet of the Moabite Stone than it does that of any subsequent period.* In proof of this, we would refer especially to the following characters: *beta, delta, zeta, iota, mu, xi, koppa,* and *tau*, which correspond respectively to the *béth, daleth, vau, zain, yod, mem, samech, koph,* and *tau*, of the Phœnicians.

The early *beta* of the Greeks is angular, not rounded, and thus resembles the earlier, rather than the later, *béth*. It differs from the

* As Gesenius, Rödiger, Baron Bunsen, E. Twistleton, Wright, and others. Wuttke, however, and Fürst maintain the opposite view.

beth by repeating in the lower limb the form of the upper one, an alteration due apparently to Greek ideas of symmetry. But in both limbs the angle is kept as the essential idea, the rounded form being a later introduction, and the open head (see plate, line 2) being absolutely unknown in Greece.

The early Greek *delta* is commonly like the *daleth* of the Stone, a simple triangle. In a very few cases the right arm descends a little below the point of junction with the base. But in no early Greek inscription is the head open (as in plate, line 2), or the left angle rounded (as in lines 3 and 4), or the right arm much produced (as in lines 2 and 3). In other words, the early Greek *delta* resembles closely that on the "Stone," while it differs considerably from those of the Assyrian tablets, the Eshmunazar sarcophagus, and the monuments of the Persian time.

The earliest form of the Greek *bau* (*βαῦ*, pronounced *vau*) was either Y or V, a form evidently derived from the *vau* of the Moabite Stone, rather than from any later Phœnician type. The later Greek *vau*, F, was a corruption of this, Y having first been changed, for expedition's sake, into Γ, and then a second horizontal stroke having been added, as a diacritic mark, to distinguish *vau* from *gamma*.

The Greek *zeta*, from the earliest times to a period later than Pericles, was always I, not Z. This form is only found in Phœnicia in the earliest period, being replaced by Z, uniformly on the Assyrian tablets, as well as in all the later inscriptions. The exclusive use of the perpendicular *zeta* by the early Greeks is an especially strong argument in favour of their having got their alphabet from the Phœnicians very considerably before the time of Tiglath-pileser II.

The most ancient form of the Greek *iota* was a *zed* placed diagonally (Z), the upper and lower arms being shorter than the line connecting them. This form will be seen by the plate closely to resemble the more ancient of the Phœnician types, only differing from them in the absence of a second line projecting towards the left below the upper arm of the letter. As, however, the Phœnicians continued to use this form as late as B.C. 650, no important argument can be drawn from this letter.

Mu, on the contrary, furnishes a strong argument in favour of the early derivation of the alphabet. It is only in the primitive Phœnician alphabet that the angular or zigzag form of this letter obtains. In the later types curved lines replace the zigzag, or forms still more remote from the primitive ones. But the early Greek *mu*, which is spread out and has the last arm short (M), is exactly the *mem* of the Moabite Stone, except that the last line of the zigzag has been omitted.

The correspondency of the Greek *xi* with the Phœnician *samech*,

whose place it occupies in the alphabet, had long been suspected; but the absolute identity of the two was first proved by our "Stone," which uses for *samech* the exact form*—a perpendicular line, crossed by three vertical bars ⋕—found to express *xi*, where it first occurs in Greek inscriptions.† As this form was superseded by a simpler one before the period of the Assyrian tablets and gems, we have here again an evidence favouring the early passage of the Phœnician letters into Greece.

A similar result ensues from a consideration of the Moabite *koph*. The Greek *koppa* (ϙ), the original of the Latin **Q**, had never previously been found in a Phœnician inscription; and its form seemed so remote from the ordinary Phœnician types, that it was difficult to regard them as having any real connection. We now find that the original Phœnician letter was identical with the Greek, or differed from it only by having the vertical line somewhat longer. By the time of Tiglath-pileser II. (B.C. 745), the vertical line had been further lengthened, being carried to the top of the circle (Φ). As this is never the form of *koppa* among the Greeks, we must conclude that they obtained this letter in the first, rather than in the second, Phœnician period.

The Greek *tau* seems to be derived from the earlier, rather than the later, *tau* of the Phœnicians, from the fact that its arms are straight, and not deflected. The Phœnician *tau* is, in every case, a cross; and the only important difference between the earliest and the later forms is in the deflection of the arms at their extremities. The Greek *tau*, which is sometimes a cross with the upper limb but slightly developed (†), sometimes a mere **T**, with that limb wholly suppressed, has in every case the arms perfectly straight, with no sign of the terminal ornamentation which we observe in the later Phœnician.

The only Greek letters whose archaic forms resemble the later Phœnician types more than they do the earlier are *lambda* and *pi*. The early *lambda*, whether it takes the form of ᒪ or ᒪ, is always angular; the *lamed* of the "Stone," and of the Assyrian tablets and gems, is rounded. Contrariwise, the early *pi* is either round or square topped, and has never the angular head which marks it on the Moabitic monument. Now this angular head was laid aside

* It was argued at first by some that the occurrence of this form upon the Stone was fatal to its pretensions to a great antiquity, since there was, it was thought, no precedent for its early use, and classical writers (Plin. *H. N.* vii. 56; Euseb. *Chron.* i. 13) ascribed its invention to Simonides, who flourished about B.C. 530. But as the Assyrian gems of the seventh or eighth century exhibit a very similar type (see the plate), and one manifestly derived from it, there appears to be no reasonable doubt that the form is really extremely ancient.

† The *xi* is rare in early Greek inscriptions; but still it occurs occasionally. (See Böckh, *Corpus Inscr. Gr.*, vol. i. pp. 53 and 55; Rose, *Inscr. Gr. Vetust.*, pl. 8, and p. 71.)

before B.C. 750, and the round head, which thenceforth continued in use, was adopted. So far, therefore, as the evidence of these two letters goes, the alphabet might have been communicated to the Greeks about B.C. 750—700. But the point in question has to be determined by the balance of evidence; and the balance of evidence is *as nine to two* in favour of the alphabet having passed into Greece in the course of the first, rather than the second, of its known stages —about B.C. 900, rather than about B.C. 750.

Such are the chief palæographical results which the Moabite Stone appears to us to have established. It favours, we think, the view that the "Cadmean" characters were originally pictorial—imitations, *i.e.*, of familiar objects; and it helps us sometimes to determine the objects which the characters represented. It also lends important support to the view that the Greeks obtained the elements of writing from the Phœnicians at an early date, either before the time of the inscription of Mesha, or, at any rate, very shortly afterwards. These results may be, and no doubt will be, disputed; but we have little doubt that palæographical science will eventually accept them as established.

It is probable that the inscription may involve other important palæographical results which have escaped our notice. Certainly it must always be, unless superseded by some more ancient document, the final court of appeal in controversies as to the original shape and power of the characters by which Western thought has expressed itself since the dawn of civilization. It is at least a century and a half earlier than any other inscription that we possess in the same species of writing; and it is three centuries earlier than any other such inscription of any considerable length. By means of it we are informed what the characters were in which a contemporary and neighbour of Ahab and Elijah was in the habit of writing. As all the evidence goes to prove that one and the same system of written characters was spread ever Western Asia, from the borders of Egypt to Assyria, we may fairly assume that the books of the earlier prophets, the correspondence between Hiram and Solomon, Solomon's Proverbs and Songs, David's Psalms, Samuel's history, were originally thus written. Further, perhaps, it may be over-bold to go; but a suspicion forces itself on us that, in the characters of which the photographic traces are before us to-day, we see the forms of the letters in which, more than three thousand years ago, the Pentateuch itself was penned, and which "the finger of God" impressed upon the Two Tables.

G. RAWLINSON.



BRITISH INDIA UNDER THE CROWN.

The Administration of India from 1859 *to* 1868. By I. T. PRICHARD. 2 vols. London: Macmillan & Co.

TO the average Briton India is still, we fear, an unknown and far from interesting country. The scholar may revere it from a safe distance as the classic home of a race that once spoke Sanskrit, that precious key to the due understanding of Greek mythology, and to the solving of many a problem in the history of Aryan races and tongues. A few art-students may revel in the feast of beauty which any good collection of Indian art-treasures will offer to their gaze. A stray traveller may bring home pleasant memories of the cities he visited, the people he met, the strange things he witnessed, and the wild places through which he shot or botanised. Not a few old Indians may retain some interest, lively or languid, in the affairs of a country where their children are haply learning a later edition of their own experiences. Here and there an erewhile President of the old Board of Control, or of its latest substitute the India Council, may devote a fraction of his time to the discussion of Indian politics; a clerical enthusiast may sometimes bear witness against the curse of caste, or the obstacles thrown by Government in the way of missionary progress; and a body of merchants may now and then repeat their stereotyped demand that India shall grow cotton and cut down her import duties for the special benefit of Manchester and Liverpool.

But, taken as a whole, the British public pays very little heed to the affairs of a dependency as large as all Europe outside Russia, and standing third in the list of our commercial customers. So long as India pays her own expenses, and carries on a steady trade with Great Britain, most of us are quite content to let her keep the noiseless tenour of her way; caring little for such mere trifles as a famine, a pestilence, or the collapse of an important industry. Nothing short of an Afghan War, a Sepoy Mutiny, or a great financial deficit, rouses us out of our chronic apathy into a passing fever-fit of bewildered eagerness to do something or get something done; the chances being that our moments of action are even less profitable than our years of indifference. When the blundering of some of Lord Gough's commanders had nearly lost him the day at Chilianwalla, nothing would satisfy his excited countrymen at home but the immediate despatch of a rival general to the seat of a war which the conqueror of Goojrat proved quite capable of bringing unaided to a glorious issue. The great Sepoy rising of 1857 scared England out of another deep sleep. It all came, said somebody, of Lord Dalhousie's policy of annexation; and forthwith the greatest of Indian viceroys fell under a cloud of ignorant detraction, while the fruits of a century's conquests were imperilled by the popular demand for a policy of absolute self-surrender.

Presently broke out the American War. Lancashire, hungering for the cotton that could no longer come across the Atlantic, cried aloud for help from the far East. Was it not India's business to supply her mills and warehouses with their proper food? This new gospel of India's duty towards her remote neighbour was preached so earnestly, to such effect, that the rulers of the country gave up trying to stem the tide of popular feeling; the growth of cotton was encouraged in various ways, until in some places it threatens to supplant the more serviceable grains; and only the other day an amended version of the Cotton Frauds Act was carried through the Bombay Legislature in the teeth of a strenuous resistance from the whole mercantile community of Western India.* But perhaps the most fatal instance of rash meddling on England's part was the insane attempt to set up a powerless puppet like Shah Sujah on the Afghan throne, as a bulwark against Russian progress towards India. How that folly was punished, Mr. Kaye's eloquent history has long since made known. Besides saddling India with a heavy debt, it paved the way, through our consequent loss of prestige, to more than one costly war, and indirectly, it may be said, to the great Sepoy Mutiny.

On the whole, then, we are inclined for the present to acquiesce, however impatiently, in that state of general apathy to which Mr.

* This measure has since been vetoed by the Viceroy.

Grant Duff made sarcastic reference a few months ago. When the House of Commons postpones the affairs of our Indian Empire to the discussion of a Park Gate, or a Chapel Marriages Bill, it obeys that natural instinct which, as Burke complained, leads people to regard their private sorrows as far more important than any public tragedy. Very few Englishmen have any direct interest in learning much about a country lying thousands of miles away, and making no demands on the British taxpayer. India, in this respect, is little worse off than Australia. Ignorant indifference has hitherto hurt her less than the misdirected energy which now and then takes its place. Enlightened criticism would, of course, be a very great boon, if the bulk of English critics in and out of Parliament were only half as enlightened as the Duke of Argyll or the present Lord Derby, or nearly as alive to broad results and manifest bearings as Mr. Bright. But pending a consummation still so far off, it is perhaps as well that British senators should forbear from constant meddling with the details of Indian administration. In the case of no other country under our rule would a little learning be fraught with so much danger. That vast peninsula contains not one country but several, each differing from the others in climate, language, manners, and institutions, almost as widely as France differs from England, or Russia from Germany. An Englishman conversant with the Punjab may know nothing whatever about Madras or Bombay. A regular Bengal civilian would find himself at sea among the wild Pathans on the north-west frontier. For those same Pathans, with their democratic lawlessness tempered only by obedience to a fanatic priesthood, quite another mode of government is required than that which serves the "political" in his dealings with the heads of Belochi clansmen in Sindh. The same half-knowledge that in 1793 handed over the land of Bengal for ever to a body of revenue-farmers mis-called Zemindars, in 1856 swept away at one blow the time-honoured rights of the Talookdars, or landed aristocracy of Oudh. It was this, and not the mere annexation of that province, which roused its people into rebellion the following year. Was it likely, indeed, that great landowners, each drawing rent from hundreds of villages, would tamely put up with the loss of princely revenues if any way of revenge were once opened to them? The legislation of 1858 had to repair the blunders of 1856, but the after-fruits of Lord Cornwallis's settlement are still to reap.

It was an ignorant disregard of native prejudice that fired the train of Sepoy disaffection in 1806. British martinets presumed too far on the Madras Sepoy's indifference to caste rules. Stripped of his earrings, forbidden to paint his forehead with the mark of his caste, and ordered to appear on parade with clean-shaven chin, he was next

told to exchange his turban for a regulation shako, made in part of unholy leather. The Mutiny of Vellore proclaimed the grossness of a blunder for which blood alone could pay. The story of the greased cartridges of 1857 points pretty much the same moral. Not a few of the false steps taken from time to time by Indian officials might have been avoided, if the traditions of one province had been less sweepingly applied to another. Lord Canning himself had the honesty to own that the knowledge gained by him in his subsequent journeys up country, would have saved him from the mistakes committed with his sanction during the first years of his rule. Lord Mayo, with all his shrewdness and ready tact, has by this time found equal cause to distrust the guidance of his Bengal secretariat in matters pertaining to Madras or Bombay.

If people on the spot are thus liable to err, what can we expect from those who, dwelling afar off, catch but the dimmest echoes, the faintest reflections, of facts which may have no direct bearing on their daily experiences? As things are, it is only natural that the average Briton should regard the people of India as a vast multitude of rice-eating barbarians, should know no difference between a Rajah and a Nawab, a *Jagheer* and its possessor,* an Anglo-Indian collector and an English tax-gatherer, and should catch at any excuse for remodelling in harmony with Western ideas the minds and manners of races that were already civilised "when wild in woods the noble Teuton ran." If he cannot plumb the depths of Irish disaffection, or gauge the force of that unsleeping hate which so many Frenchmen cherish against the dynasty of the 2nd December, or understand why the countrymen of Garibaldi hunger so fiercely after Rome, how can we expect him to have clear or accurate views on the subject of Indian land tenures, or to read aright the character of the different races that people Hindustan? His acquaintance with the inner life of a kindred people, speaking his own tongue, and sharing many of his own habits, in America and Australia, being still so vague and limited, what chance is there of his taking a livelier interest in the manners and customs of a collection of races, with none of whom he has aught in common save linguistic evidences of a common ancestry, dating very far back in the prehistoric past? And there is little enough in the way of popular literature to guide him in the search for riper knowledge. A few writers, from Macaulay down to Mr. Kaye, have done their best to reduce the limits of his ignorance, while here and there a novelist like Meadows Taylor, or an observer like Mr. Kerr, has wooed him with pleasing, yet faithful, pictures of home life in the remoter parts of rural India. But all their efforts have hitherto failed to do more than rouse a fleeting curiosity,

* See Mr. Henry Kingsley's last novel.

followed by a settled belief that such things transcend the sphere of his regular interests, or, at best, by a serene acceptance of mere broken glimmerings in the place of broad daylight and clear connected views.

If anything could tend to deepen the interest of our home public in things Indian, a review of the progress which India has made in many directions, during the first ten or eleven years of the rule which superseded that of the East India Company, ought to have such an effect. The great mutiny of 1857, followed by the transfer of the government from an old trading company to the Crown, closed one important epoch in British-Indian history. It serves to mark off with curious sharpness a whole century of outward growth from the new era of internal reconstruction. Between the India of Lord Dalhousie and the India of Lord Mayo there is much of the difference that divides the Englishman of to-day from the Englishman of a hundred years ago. As Chatham was the last of our aggressive statesmen, so with Lord Dalhousie ended a career of dominion begun by Lord Clive. The first decade of royal rule in India has stamped her destinies with a colouring at once distinct and ineffaceable. With no real solution of continuity, with none of the cataclysmal rendings that marked the first stages of the French Revolution, so great is the change already visible, that Anglo-Indians who remember the India of other days are astonished at the marvels wrought in these few years under a government which differs from that of yore in little but a name. The Secretary of State for India reproduces the President of the old India Board, much as the old Court of Directors lives again in the new India Council. In the Royal Proclamation of November, 1858, nothing was enunciated which the statesmen of Leadenhall Street had not repeatedly enjoined on their servants, or professed to practise towards their native subjects. They had always striven, in word if not in deed, to respect the rights, privileges, customs, and religious ways of the people under their charge. They, too, had repeatedly disowned all wish for further aggrandisement, all thought of invidious distinctions between the conquering and the conquered races. Not one line, in short, of the new message broached a single new doctrine. Still, to many a hearer the new message seemed to speak of a real difference, not only in the rulers, but in the policy they meant to pursue. The well-worn phrases carried all the charm of novelty, coming, as they did, from the lips of men who had just put down a formidable rising against an unpopular rule. After a storm so violent any change would seem full of unwonted promise to those who forgot the good days before the storm.

> "Jam nova progenies cœlo demittitur alto;
> Jam redit et Virgo, redeunt Saturnia regna,"

is a cry continually raised on the smallest provocation.

Happily, in the present case, fortune has thus far smiled upon the sanguine. Old or new, the pledges contained in the Royal Manifesto have, on the whole, been faithfully kept. In the natural course of events an age of conquest has been followed by an era of peaceful and philanthropic legislation. The collapse of the mutinies left India's new rulers free to build up a goodly fabric out of the materials painfully gathered by their predecessors. Forswearing the policy of conquest, because nothing remained to conquer, they could afford to treat native princes with ungrudging tenderness, to spend money liberally on public works, to carry out large schemes of popular education, and to throw open to native talent careers once reserved for men of the stronger race. For more than ten years past India has been diligently studying the arts of peace and civilized progress under the guidance of energetic masters, who have striven, however lamely, to govern her for her own especial good. In spite of the legacies bequeathed by two years of intestine warfare, in spite of famines and commercial failures, and various smaller lions in the way, ten or eleven years of well-nigh unbroken peace have borne their natural fruit. In that time much has been done towards filling in the details of the great scheme outlined by Lord Dalhousie. A few hundred miles of railway have already grown into four thousand. A network of telegraph-lines is gradually covering the whole country; and a message by the "lightning-post," as the natives happily phrase it, may now dart from Peshawar to Cape Comorin, across 26 degrees of latitude, for the sum of one rupee. New works of irrigation bid fair to rival the great achievements of Sir Proby Cautley and Sir Robert Napier, and to prevent the recurrence of famines like those of 1861 and 1866. Thousands of miles of good road have been added to the hundreds which were all that India could boast in the days before the Mutiny. Even Bengal is about to free herself from the reproach that has clung to her ever since the decay of the Mohammedan rule. Her wealth of water-carriage will no longer be wasted for want of embankments and good by-roads. The work of connecting Rajpootana with the provinces directly subject to our rule, has already begun. Year by year the Indian Post-Office has enlarged its business and improved its machinery, until it may fairly claim comparison with the postal system of any country in the world.

Popular education has advanced with mighty strides, under the propelling influence of a Government free to spend much time and money on its subjects' moral improvement. While thousands of schools and colleges, endowed or aided by the State, offer cheap instruction to the poorest, a vast number of public hospitals and dispensaries provide the sick and suffering with cheap medicine and

timely relief. New careers have been opened to the native gentry, to young men of parts and energy. New taxes have been made possible by new aids to the accumulation of private wealth. One great branch of industry was almost created by the American War. Whole multitudes of native workmen, traders, and peasants have thriven upon the profits brought within their reach by the construction of railways, canals, barracks, and other great works of the day. A new trade is springing up with Central Asia. Tea, coffee, rice, wool, jute, and one or two other staples, have won a position more and more commanding in the world's chief markets. In exchange for twenty millions' worth of English fabrics, India sends out to England and the colonies eight millions' worth of agricultural produce, besides the value of her surplus opium and of the million bales of cotton which yearly help to feed the mills of Lancashire. The customs revenue has in a few years made good the loss at first involved in the reduction of many duties, and the abolition of many more. In eleven years the value of India's foreign trade has risen from sixty to more than a hundred millions. In 1865 it touched 123 millions, and, if all goes well with Indian cotton, it will probably reach that figure again as soon as the commerce of the world recovers from the exhausting crisis of 1867. Even now it is nearly four times as much as in 1848, and more than five times what it was ten years earlier still.

In the same period the revenues of the country have increased from thirty millions to nearly fifty, out of which about five millions are absorbed in paying interest on a debt of about a hundred. To this great increase the land-revenue has contributed very little, less indeed than it might have done had its capabilities been fairly tested by the present school of statesmen. In Bengal, with its forty millions of people, its fertile soil, its commercial wealth, and its many years of civilized progress, no increase was possible under the land-settlement carried out by Lord Cornwallis. An unlucky application of modern English ideas to a country whose immemorial customs clash at every turn with our insular experiences, transferred at one stroke many millions of prospective revenue from the Government to a few thousand rent-receivers, promoted into landlords of the English type. A rack-rented peasantry, living from hand to mouth in fever-ridden villages, amid roadless swamps, hereditary bondsmen alike to bloodsucking usurers and grasping zemindars who never laid out a rupee on their education, has been the inevitable result. The Bengal Rent Act of 1859, which compelled the zemindar to grant leases at certain limited rates, and secured to a tenant of a certain standing a perpetual leasehold on condition of paying his usual rent, has done and will doubtless do something to abate the

mischief caused by the original blunder. A road cess, too, has at length been ordained, and in due time perhaps the landowners will have to pay their share towards draining pestilent districts like Hooghly and Burdwan. But Lieutenant-Governor Grey still shrinks from taxing them for the good of their tenants' children in the matter of school learning; and the fact remains, that the State at this moment can get no more than four millions sterling out of the lands of Bengal. That is no more than the sum contributed by Madras with a population and area a third smaller; and it is very little more than the land-revenue of Bombay, which, including Sindh, contains only half as many people as Madras, in an area nearly as large, but much less widely cultivated. If the four millions each now taken from Madras and the North-West Provinces would, as some think, bear doubling on the next assessment, imagine what has been lost to the Indian revenues by the permanent settlement of Bengal!

In this country, with its varied industries, manifold resources, unfettered trade, and immense political freedom, we have managed to puzzle out a scheme of taxation in which the land-tax plays an utterly insignificant part. Our revenue system is a coat of many colours, a cable woven of many different strands. If the land-tax with us counts for next to nothing, each penny taken from a pound of our private incomes adds more than another million to the national budget. Our customs and excise duties would furnish in themselves an ample revenue for a nation less burdened than ours with a public debt. But in India the fiscal conditions are entirely different. Her customs revenue counts for only two millions and a half, and it will take many years to double that figure. An Indian income-tax of one per cent. brings in about half a million, squeezed by a foreign government out of a reluctant people. On the other hand, there was never a government in India whose revenues were not mainly drawn from the land. From the days of Manu, at any rate from the first beginnings of historic India, the rulers of the country, whether homeborn or foreign, have always claimed a certain share—from one-sixth in the old Hindu period to about one-half under the Mogul rule—in the produce of the soil. Whether the impost be regarded as rent or tribute, whatever the amount taken, the mode of assessment, or the process of collection, no one ever dreamed of questioning the right thus exercised. The practice, in short, of all Indian governments has followed the old Hindu principle, which was virtually that of Feudal Europe, that the land of the country belongs ultimately, in part at least, to its rulers acting for the nation at large. Under all the changes brought about by Anglo-Indian statesmen the same principle governs still. Instead of taking a

third or more of the gross produce, they have taken from two-thirds to one-half the estimated yearly rental. Payment in money has been substituted for payment in kind. In one province the rate of assessment has been fixed for ever, in others it has been fixed for a term of years, and in some few the settlement is readjusted from year to year. Whether the State deals directly with each farmer of a few bigahs, or collects its dues from the village headman, or surrenders a part of its just claims to a landed aristocracy of its own creating, it still cleaves in effect to the doctrine taught by Manu, and helps itself to about twenty millions a year from the net rental of British India.

It is easy to see that the sources of this noble income, which even now makes up two-fifths of the whole revenue, ought not to be lightly diminished or turned aside. There is no other impost which can ever take the place of this, at once the oldest, simplest, and least vexatious of the taxes which India pays for the maintenance of an alien government. The present rate of assessment errs, if anything, on the side of excessive lightness. In the central provinces it has for the time been fixed at a mere quitrent, and it is almost certain that neither in Madras nor in the North-West Provinces does the present rate represent more than a third of the rental that now is, to say nothing of the rental that will be some ten years hence. No other sources of possible revenue can compare with the land-tax for certainty or abundance. It is idle to hope for any large increase of customs revenue in a country which can produce almost everything the great mass of its people require. An income-tax, even if it could be got to work fairly, is one of those fiscal innovations which shock and irritate the popular feeling in some of its most tender places. The opium revenue, just now worth about seven millions, has probably touched its highest figure, while the growth of poppy-culture in China, and the increased duty levied there on the imported drug, may at any moment doom it to a rapid decline. Very little more can be got out of the stamp duties. A tobacco-tax would oppress the millions who already contribute handsomely to the returns from salt. The consumption of salt, which now yields about six millions a year, can never increase beyond a certain limit, were the duties lowered to the utmost verge of productiveness. Manchester, of course, will never hear of a return to higher duties on imported goods, and a trifling addition to the export dues on raw produce has well-nigh killed the saltpetre industry of Oudh, and is already killing the rice-trade of British Burmah. The Abkári, or spirit revenue, can only be much enlarged by means of a thorough, but hardly desirable, change in the feeding habits of the people of India. In the course of many years a handsome revenue may doubtless accrue to Government from irrigation-tolls and railway-

profits; but how much of that will go to meet previous outlay and new requirements?

What remains, then, for Indian financiers but to set all possible store by that one source of revenue which has been the mainstay of successive dynasties from the earliest days of Aryan India, if not before, which best suits the genius of the people themselves, and breeds least ill-will to their foreign masters; which costs comparatively little to collect,* interferes least with the productive powers of the country, brings the governing class into habitual contact with the governed, varies little from year to year, and under right management would expand from time to time in exact proportion to the wealth and requirements of the people at large? And yet it is but the other day that the North-West Provinces were hanging over the gulf of a perpetual settlement, and the system which history has linked with the name of Lord Cornwallis still finds, we are told, some eager advocates in the Council of the present Viceroy.†

If the average Bengal ryot has hitherto reaped small profit either from the legislation of 1859 or the new developments of India's productive wealth, almost every other part of the country has a different tale to tell. In Oudh, the granary of Upper India; in the Punjab, Dalhousie's model province; in the North-West Provinces, the old seat of Mogul rule; in British Burmah, moulded by the gentle wisdom of Sir Arthur Phayre; and in the Central Provinces, reorganised by the active-minded Sir Richard Temple, the course of general improvement has been neither slow nor fitful. Blest with a fertile soil, a climate generally dry and wholesome, a people hardy, brave, and enterprising, and a Government which, anyhow, studies the common weal of its subjects, Oudh has had little cause to yearn for the brave days of Mohammedan misrule, or to repent the change of system for which Lord Canning's misunderstood proclamation paved the way. The viceregal Durbar of 1859 restored to the great landowners of Oudh the rights so blindly overridden three years before. Two years later some eight hundred of them were invested with magisterial powers on their own estates. What causes of difference still lay simmering between the Talookdars and the tenant-farmers of a certain standing were dispelled or abated by the legislation of 1866. In the levying of taxes, the repression of infanticide, and the carrying out

* About ten per cent., or less than half the cost of collecting the opium revenue.

† For a clear popular exposition of the land revenues of India, the inquiring reader may be referred to Mr. Kaye's "Administration of the East India Company," or to a District Officer's "Notes on the North-West Provinces." Mr. Keene's "Letters on Indian Administration," and the *Indian Economist* for December, 1869, give some curious examples of the land system as it works in Bengal. Mr. G. Campbell's essay in the Cobden Club volume, on "Systems of Land Tenure," goes thoroughly into the whole subject.

of social reforms, the Government has found a willing and enlightened helpmate in the Talookdars' Association. The people at large are prosperous, and fairly contented with a rule which gives free scope to all forms of industry and largely employs natives in governing natives. New schools are springing up in all directions. Railways and canals are flinging abroad the seeds of golden harvests, and the fruitful soil grows grain enough to supply North-Western India with the food for lack of which millions of its people might last year have else hungered in vain.

Of the Punjab it is enough to say that the province so long administered by Sir John Lawrence has been thriving steadily under Sir Robert Montgomery and Sir Donald Macleod; the growing wealth of its people being amply certified by the steadily-increasing revenue derived from the municipal funds, and by the yearly additions to the number of civil suits, while probably no other part of British India can vie with this in the readiness of its people to pluck the fruits of Western civilization. Taken as a whole, "the Punjab has become more Anglicized in the short time since its annexation than any portion of the older provinces." So says Mr. Prichard,* and all the evidence confirms the justice of his remark. How much of that progress lies on the surface, the temporary fruit of English conquest and of special zeal on the part of English administrators, it would be hard to say; but there is no doubt that much of it may also be explained by the force of circumstances aiding the natural aptitude of the Punjabie to profit by the lessons which men of kindred character have thus implanted in his mind.

If the Punjab has been happy in a succession of able administrators, chosen as it were from among the best men in the civil and military services, two other of our youngest provinces have almost surpassed it in respect of material progress within a corresponding period. Under our rule British Burmah has doubled its population in twelve years, owing partly to the immigration from the worse-governed provinces of Burmah proper. In the same time the land-revenue rose fifty-four per cent.; the proceeds of the capitation-tax, a kind of graduated poll-tax suited to the traditions of the people, rose seventy-eight per cent.; the customs and excise duties about one hundred and forty per cent. In short, the imperial revenues of the province have already doubled themselves; and so has the value of its foreign trade, which now equals ten millions a year, thanks in part to the abolition of frontier dues in 1863. Its population, of less than two millions and a half, already yields an aggregate revenue of nearly a million and a quarter sterling; a high proportion, compared with the six millions raised from thirty millions of people in the North-West Provinces, or even with the seventeen millions furnished

* "Administration of India," vol. i. p. 189.

by forty millions of Bengallies. And yet, in spite of endemic cattle-plague and other drawbacks, the taxation in British Burmah presses lightly on the mass of the people, who have grown visibly in wealth under our rule; the small landowners being prosperous and independent, the cities filled with busy merchants and thriving artisans, while the poorest labourers earn from ninepence to a shilling a day. The State grant for education now equals less than half the amount raised from local fees and private charity. For very much of the progress thus made, British Burmah has cause to thank the mild, beneficent sway of Sir Arthur Phayre, and the fruits of his teaching on those who worked under him. To the Imperial Government it owes little enough in the way of expenditure on public works, but Nature has endowed it with the noblest waterway in all India, the Irrawaddy; with vast forests of teak, with hill-sides fit for growing any amount of tea and coffee, with a rich variety of fruit-trees and fish, with tin-mines and petroleum-springs, with valleys and uplands fruitful in rice, cotton, sugar, tobacco, and with a people of quiet, industrious habits, and cheerful temperament, thoroughly contented with their new masters, and quick to profit by the commercial freedom assured them under British rule. So heartily indeed had that rule been welcomed by the Peguers, that it was found safe to leave them without a European regiment in the darkest days of 1857. During the past year their export trade in rice, the great staple of the country, has been somewhat checked by the enhanced duty, which puts them at a disadvantage against their rivals in Siam and Cochin; but there is still a hope that the Indian Government will repair this blunder before it is too late.

Another young province which has taken a great start towards a prosperous future is the Central Provinces, first consolidated in 1861 out of old Bengal districts and recent annexations. Less thinly peopled than British Burmah, where only a thirtieth part of the land has yet been cultivated, its nine millions of inhabitants are spread over an area nearly twice as large as England and Wales. Nagpore and the fruitful valleys of the Wurdah, the Weingunga, and the Nerbudda, are the most populous parts of this great province. Belaspore especially is known as "the land of plenty."* It is a land of hill and forest, interspersed among broad tracts of well-watered plain, fit for the growth of corn, rice, and cotton. Its mineral resources admit of endless development. Its population, mainly agricultural, contains a large admixture of Gonds, Bheels, and other primeval races, whose presence there dates from far beyond the dawn of Hindu immigration. Ruined cities and temples hid in the jungle attest the forgotten glories of its earlier civilization. Its

* *Indian Economist*, for December 10, 1869.

future progress under our rule is foreshadowed in the rapid growth of its internal resources since the day when Sir R. Temple took over the government of the province in 1862. Evidence of its growing prosperity may be gathered from the fact that in five years the number of civil suits rose from nineteen thousand to forty-five thousand, an aggregate still increasing at the rate of six per cent. yearly; while in three years the foreign trade of the province rose from two millions and a half to nearly nine millions,* which by 1868 became thirteen millions. So great is the popular taste for education even among the rude dwellers in Sumbulpore, that in six years the ninety-five scholars, distributed among four schools, have increased to thirteen thousand two hundred and seventy-six scholars, taught in two hundred and forty-nine schools. The thriving city of Nagpore is linked with Bombay by a line of railway that taps the cotton-fields of Berar, while the yet more conspicuous station of Jubbulpore, the meeting-point of two trunk railways, is already becoming the great central reservoir for the main streams of traffic from North-Eastern, Central, and Western India. Local ambition, not without reason, would even claim for Jubbulpore the right to supplant Calcutta as the seat of British-Indian rule.

The North-West Provinces were fast recovering the ground lost during the Mutiny, when the famine of 1860 again for the moment hindered their advance. But that storm soon blew over, and the lessons taught by it have never since been quite forgotten. When drought once more visited these provinces in 1868, its worst horrors were entirely averted by the progress meanwhile made in the construction of railways and works of irrigation. Distress, of course, there was in some places; but the great Ganges Canal, with its six hundred and fifty miles of main stream and three thousand miles of branch channels, saved nearly a million acres from drying up. A like service on a smaller scale was rendered by the Eastern Jumna Canal, and the channels that irrigate the Dhoon and Rohilkund; while Oudh sent the balance of her own rich harvests by rail to districts where the drought was sorest. The revenue of the province rises steadily from year to year in spite of fluctuating seasons and a stationary land-rent. The great growth of trade, the mighty impulse given to labour by a lavish outlay on public works, and the influence of irrigation in doubling and even quadrupling the produce of a naturally fruitful soil, at once account and compensate for the recent increase in the price of wheat, the staple food of the North-West Provinces. So much has the land risen in value of late years † that,

* Prichard's "Administration of India," vol. i.

† A comparison of the average yield per acre, and the selling price of wheat for some years past, shows that the value of the crops must exceed £100,000,000 a year—little less than that of England and Wales.

according to some authorities, the land assessment might easily be doubled without taking from the cultivator more than a fifth of his net rental. The same thing has been said of Madras, where the market value of rice, the staple food of its people, has doubled in the last five years alone.

Every one has heard of the great burst of general prosperity which the American war developed in the cities and cotton-marts of Bombay and Central India. For several years the golden stream kept flooding those fortunate regions and fertilizing the poorest places within its reach. Everybody, rich or poor, bathed in its waters and waxed fat. Prices rose apace, but the new source of wealth seemed inexhaustible. Cotton and railways brought untold plenty to millions who had hitherto been vegetating on three or four rupees a month. In four years the people of Western India had earned thirty-five millions sterling in hard cash. Much of this was squandered in wild extravagance or wilder speculations, but a large balance remained after all in the hands of the poorer classes. The sudden prosperity of course made many a spendthrift out of the beggars of a day before. Here and there might be seen a ryot offering hundreds of rupees for bullocks of a favourite colour, or advertising his newly-gotten wealth in silver plough-shares and silver tires round his cart wheels. Immense sums of money were often lavished on marriage ceremonies. Silver bangles were replaced by golden. The wives and daughters of the peasantry decked themselves out in jewels of price. It was a glorious time for the priests and the money-lenders, who levied a rich percentage on the profits of the credulous and the careless. Bombay itself went mad about new schemes for making more money, but the ruin that fell upon the western capital did not extend far into the country. After all deductions, a large proportion of the new wealth must have permanently enriched the peasantry of Western and Central India. The level of general comfort has perceptibly risen, and the breadth of land brought under tillage has widened very much indeed. Groves of mangoe and other trees have been planted everywhere, wells dug, and waste lands reclaimed. The looms of Nagpore have reaped large profits from the new demand for the finer sorts of clothing. "Every coolie," said one old native to Mr. Rivett Carnac,* "took to dressing himself like a Brahmin." Earthenware pots and pans gave way to vessels of brass, copper, and even silver. Large importations of farm bullocks have improved the native breed, and the old mud huts of the country have frequently been replaced by roomier dwellings of brick and stone.

* The Cotton Commissioner for Central and Western India, from whose last Report most of the particulars here brought together have been gleaned.

Old sumptuary rules and caste-distinctions have also in great measure succumbed before the growing independence that comes of a general advance in private wealth. If the poor Koonbie, or cultivator, now apes his betters in the splendour of his marriage-feasts and the richness of his holiday costume, a like spirit of self-assertion has led people of yet lower castes to insist on breaking through many a barrier of time-honoured etiquette. The poor Chumars, or leather-dressers, could no longer see why they alone should be forbidden to use real flowers at their wedding-feasts. If the Mallees, or gardeners, would not supply them with real flowers, they, for their part, would make no more shoes or leather buckets for the Mallees. For a Mallee the making of such buckets involves loss of caste, and without those buckets his crops would wither. Proof as they were to all bribes, the gardeners eventually had to save their crops by furnishing the needful flowers to the Chumars. In the same way the barbers of Berar fought the carpenters for "some wooden distinction" hitherto denied to bridegrooms of their class. Not a carpenter was shaven until the barbers had gained their point.

Lower yet in the social scale came the Dhers and Mhangs of Central India. The former do all the village drudgery—spin, clean cotton, and work in the fields. The Mhangs are a wandering tribe of rogues and minstrels. Both alike were forbidden by the custom of the country to use ponies in their marriage processions; a seat on a bullock's back being reckoned good enough for such as they. One Dher, however, who had made some money, was bent on bringing out a pair of ponies at his daughter's wedding. The people of the place were resolved to chastise the bold offender, and a riot was imminent, when an appeal to the magistrate settled the question in the Dher's favour. The bride and bridegroom rode forth on ponies instead of bullocks. Next year the Mhangs also brought out their ponies. This was too much for the new-blown dignity of the Dhers. Rather than let those low creatures, the Mhangs, share the privilege just conceded to themselves, they attacked the first marriage party that appeared on ponies, and the bride and bridegroom got very roughly treated. And yet it was only a few years before, that the Dhers of Guzerat never dared appear in public places without trailing a bramble-bush behind them, in order to wipe out the marks of their hateful footsteps. In those days there was no place for either Dher or Mhang inside the village walls. In some parts of India, a Dher who had to give evidence before a native magistrate was compelled to stand outside the court-house, and shout out from a distance what he had to say. In the central provinces it is still customary, says Mr. Carnac, for one of these poor outcasts to rub his

nose on the ground, and stand on one leg with his shoes in his hand, whenever he meets an English officer or a native of rank.

Bombay, with a population of less than thirteen millions, spread over an area of one hundred and forty-three thousand square miles, yields a land revenue of more than three millions and a half, and a total revenue of nearly nine millions. The golden prime of her cotton industry passed away with the great crash of 1865, but her cotton exports still amount to more than a million and a quarter bales. Her foreign trade is worth at this moment about forty millions a-year, or about two millions over that of Bengal. In plain truth, the commercial sceptre is already falling away from the capital on the Hooghly to the crowded marts and spacious harbour of Bombay City. The opening of the Suez Canal, the completion of the railway lines that link Bombay with Central and Northern India, the recent discovery of great coal-beds in the valley of the Wurdah, and the possession of a convenient harbour—one of the finest in the world—all tend to assure the future pre-eminence of a city long renowned for the wealth, intelligence, and public spirit of its merchant princes, the Sassoons, the Jeejeebhoys, and the Roychunds. The rivalry of Kurrachee is still to come, and, as a natural outlet for the trade of the Punjab and Sindh, that still neglected port may yet reckon upon a future answering to its great deserts. But nothing, apparently, can dethrone Bombay from its commercial leadership, even if the seat of Government were still assured to its old rival on the Hooghly. The great bulk of India's trade with Europe must inevitably pass through Bombay, whereas Calcutta will some day encounter, in Rangoon and Maulmain, two formidable rivals for the trade of China and Japan. Nor can any other Indian city quite come up to the Western capital in the zeal of its citizens for mental culture, in their readiness to profit by the thought, the learning, and the science of the West. Benares may still be the sacred stronghold of Brahmin philosophy; Calcutta may have its Baboos, who lead or uphold the march of free thought and modern culture in Bengal; Madras can boast of one nobleman, the Maharajah of Vizianagram, whose high breeding is wedded to the tastes and habits of an accomplished English gentleman; and all over India may be found nobles, statesmen, landowners, merchants, scholars, whose lives attest, in one way or another, the moulding influence of European ideas. Bombay alone combines with other elements of native progress a large infusion of Parsee energy and Parsee enlightenment. Descended from those Persian Ghebirs who fled, like the Huguenots of modern France, from the flames of religious persecution, the Parsees are the very salt of Western India. In commercial enterprise, in political capacity, in philanthropic zeal, in openness to new ideas, and in breadth of

general culture, they seem to take the lead of their fellow-citizens—come nearer, in short, to our European standards of character and accomplishments than any other of what may be called the native races of India.

The spread of popular education during the last ten or twelve years has been very remarkable. During that time the public outlay on schools and colleges has risen from a hundred thousand to more than eight hundred thousand a year, the number of pupils from forty thousand to seven hundred thousand, and the number of schools and colleges supported wholly or in part by State funds from a few hundred to nearly nineteen thousand. Bombay, the Punjab, and the Central Provinces contribute the largest number of pupils in proportion to population, the North-West Provinces the largest number of pupils in any province. Madras, which ranks low in the comparison of numbers, takes the first place in respect of outlay from private funds. Bengal shows only about three pupils for every seven educated in Bombay. In these State-aided schools the low-caste Chamar and the high-caste Brahmin learn their lessons side by side. Mission and private schools add their thousands of scholars to the general sum. In many parts of the country natives of rank and wealth have come forward with large subscriptions for the diffusion of knowledge among their countrymen. Allahabad and Lahore will soon have universities of their own, in which the learning and literature of the East will find the encouragement elsewhere mainly devoted to English and other kindred tongues. In some of the native states English example, aided by the good sense of their own rulers, has already done great things for the education of the people. If all our native feudatories were as enlightened as the sovereigns of Jeypore, Kolapore, and Travancore, there would be little reason to wish for a more high-handed policy than that which now marks the relations of the Indian Government with the princes outside the British pale.

The old demand for instruction in English still finds a willing echo in the minds of natives of every class. English will always continue to form a leading element in the higher education of the country, and no one who remembers how very few, if any, of the former pupils in our government schools took part against us during the mutiny, would wish to see any wide departure from the principles applied by Lord William Bentinck under the inspiration of Messrs. Trevelyan and Macaulay. But for some time past Anglo-Indian statesmanship has followed the track once vainly indicated by Mr. Adam, and afterwards successfully trodden by Mr. Thomason and Lord Dalhousie.* In 1854 the Court of

* See some interesting letters from General Briggs, in *Allen's Indian Mail* for 1869, Nos. 889, &c.; also Mr. Howell's "Note" on Education, in 1866—7.

Directors formally accepted Mr. Adam's principle of teaching the many rather than the few, and of using the vernacular tongues as the first and chief means of imbuing the people with English principles and English ideas. Thenceforth the teaching of English was limited to the higher schools and colleges, except in places where the popular feeling ran in favour of English schools. A scheme of education "far wider and more comprehensive than the local or the supreme Governments could ever have ventured to suggest," was already bearing good fruit when Lord Dalhousie thus described it in his farewell Minute. Since then it has steadily made its way into all parts of British India. Every province has now its staff of paid teachers, from the chief director down to the humblest of village schoolmasters. Every district has its due gradation of vernacular, middle, and high schools, linked together by means of scholarships which enable the best pupils to work their way up from the village school to the local college. To each class of schools the Government awards a share of the public money in return for the payment of school-fees. Normal schools are training the youth of one generation to become the teachers of the next. For the higher education India will soon have five universities at full work, besides about forty government colleges. Two thousand girls' schools already contain an aggregate of nearly fifty-four thousand pupils. Normal schools for the training of women-teachers have lately been established here and there, thanks to the persevering zeal of our brave countrywoman, Miss Carpenter, acting on the newly-awakened patriotism of enlightened natives in Bombay and Calcutta. Through the development of these, and what are called Zenana schools, we may look to see the mental growth of Indian women ere long keeping pace with that of their husbands, sons, and brothers. It would of course be foolish to expect miracles of good from the most perfect scheme of education, and unfair to talk as if village schools had not existed in India from all time. But the Indian Government is entitled to the praise of having in this, as in many other fields, laboured of late years with an honest zeal to advance the welfare and stimulate the just ambition of its subjects.*

In the sphere of morals also there is real progress to report. Ever since the mutiny, partly, no doubt, in consequence of its prompt and utter suppression, the tide of social and religious change has risen higher and higher against the strongholds of ancient creeds and customs. In Southern India, and among the rude aboriginal races elsewhere, the Christianity of the missions has made an increasing number of converts; and two princes of some repute, Dhuleep Singh

* It now proposes gradually to reduce its grants to the higher and increase them to the vernacular schools, which are still far too few for the popular need.

and the Rajah of Kapurthalla, who died the other day on his way to England, as well as a princess or two, have been added to the roll of professing Christians. In many parts of the country people willingly send their children to mission-schools, and not a few of the leading gentry have learned to look with favour on those missionaries who think more of practising their Master's precepts than of preaching dogmas which He never sanctioned. But it would be false to say that doctrinal Christianity has hitherto gained much ground among the most civilised races of India. Western example has seldom been found in perfect harmony with Western creeds, and the very rebound from an old and intricate Polytheism would preclude a ready hearing for the mysteries of the popular Christianity. Hence it happens that among educated Hindoos the current of religious reform has long set towards some kind of eclectic Theism, branching off at one end into the rarefied scepticism of the old English freethinkers, at the other into the warmer aspirations of Theodore Parker and Mr. James Martineau. For some years past the latter movement seems to have made most way, under the leadership of the young and gifted Baboo, Keshub Chunder Sen, fit heir to the mantle worn forty years ago by Rammohun Roy. Step by step the original revolt against the corrupt Brahmanism of the Puranas has led up to a religious system in which the Christ of the Gospels and the ethics of St. Paul play a prominent part. The last rag of old use and wont was flung aside by Keshub Chunder's followers when a few years ago they forswore all observance of caste rules. His lectures in India and his recent utterances in this country show how thoroughly he has steeped himself in the spirit of the Christian Scriptures, while steadily rejecting the main dogmas of Christian theology.

The Brahmoists of both sections may already be numbered by thousands. At least as many more conform only in outward seeming to the faith of their Brahman forefathers. A spirit of inquiry, of growing deference to modern needs, has begun to reign among the priests themselves of the old religion. Reverend pundits have lately discovered that a Hindoo may cross the seas without losing caste, that Hindoo widows may marry again without deadly sin, and that the eating of flesh is not forbidden by the Vedas. Leading Hindoos have thrown themselves into the movement against polygamy. In these and other directions the tyranny of caste, a tyranny which has had and may still have its uses, is gradually yielding to the demands of common sense and general expediency. In many parts of India the march of new ideas has shewn itself in the readiness of natives to form societies and hold public meetings for the discussion of social and political questions. All this, of course, may count for little beside the dense array of

ignorance, bigotry, and superstition that still challenges attack and defies suppression. But the new leaven has begun to work, and in the course of years that work, for good or evil, will surely be accomplished. Hinduism, in the words of Max Müller, "is a decrepit religion, and has not many years to live;" but to hasten its downfall, as a religion, by other than moral means, would be a gross offence against sound statesmanship and Christian morality.

In reviewing India's recent progress, no candid observer can help seeing what a debt she owes to the greatest and nearly the worst abused of our Indian viceroys. The name of Lord Dalhousie is inseparably linked with the whole history of that progress. "To his genius," as Mr. Marshman has rightly declared, "is to be ascribed the grateful fact that the India of 1867 presents so pre-eminent a contrast to the India of 1847." It was his strong, bold, forecasting statesmanship that set India's feet firmly on the path she has since pursued. He it was who gave her a cheap uniform postage, and four thousand miles of cheaply-worked telegraph; who planned and started the railway system that now joins Bombay to Madras, Calcutta, and Lahore; who helped on to an early completion the works of that unrivalled achievement and immeasurable blessing, the Ganges Canal. To him, also, is India indebted for her present system of popular instruction, for important reforms in prison-discipline, for a special department of public works, for the removal of old clogs on trade and industry, for the useful reports now yearly forwarded from every province on all things connected with its administration, for almost everything, in short, which has lent new force and larger purpose to the national life of India in these latter days. It was Dalhousie who cleared the way for the milder policy of his successors; it was he who made them strong enough to employ their strength in new directions, to substitute right for might, justice for expediency, in their dealings with the subject peoples, to make large concessions to native feeling without risk of being charged with conscious weakness; to devote all their time, in short, to bettering the physical conditions and quickening the moral energies of the millions committed to their charge. If the people of India are in any way better off than they were twelve years ago, the difference is mainly owing to the work done or prepared by Lord Dalhousie during the eight years of his strong but beneficent rule.

L. J. Trotter.



THE ATHANASIAN CREED.

THERE are certain documents in ecclesiastical literature which have a living history of their own, interesting and instructive, even irrespectively of their contents. One such is the confession of faith variously known as the Hymn *Quicunque Vult*, the "Confession of the Catholic Faith," or "the Creed of St. Athanasius." It has in this year reached, as regards the Church of England, what must be regarded by all as a critical moment in its existence. It has been the subject of innumerable letters of attack and defence in public journals. It is well known to have been discussed in a Commission appointed by the Crown for considering the Rubrics of the Church. It has been the subject of elaborate criticism and suggestion, as well from those who admire it, as from those who depreciate it.

Under these circumstances a short review of its main characteristics may be desirable.

I. Its first reception and actual use in Christendom is one of the most remarkable instances of those literary mistakes* which have exercised so great an influence over the history of the Church. It is to be classed in this respect with the works of Dionysius the Areo-

* There is no reason to suppose that the assumption of the name of Athanasius was in the first instance a deliberate forgery, in the vulgar sense of the word. But it already bore its present title in the eighth century; and the inference that he was the author was natural, and from the ninth century spread rapidly.

pagite, which formed the basis of the popular notions of the Celestial Hierarchy; with the false Decretals of the early Popes, or early Emperors, which formed the basis of the Pontifical power. Under the shadow of a great name it crept, like those other documents, into general acceptance; and then, when that shadow was exorcised by the spell of critical inquiry, still retained the place which it had won under false pretences. Through the Middle Ages it was always quoted as his work. At the time of the Reformation, the name of the champion of Christian orthodoxy still dazzled the vision of the Reformers. In the Augsburg Confession, and in the Thirty-nine Articles, in the Belgic and in the Bohemian Confessions, in the "Ecclesiastical Polity" of Hooker, it is unhesitatingly received as the "Creed of St. Athanasius." No one at that time entertained any doubt of its authorship. The very year of its composition was fixed; the very hole in the Abbey of S. Maximin, near the Black Gate at Treves, was pointed out as the spot where Athanasius had written it in the concealment of his western exile. Yet it is now known with absolute certainty not only that Athanasius never did write it, but never could have written it. The language in which it is composed was probably unknown to him. We shall see, as we proceed, that the terminology which it employs was condemned by him. It contains at least one doctrine which he would have repudiated. But just as some of the writings of Pelagius have been preserved in consequence of their having been confounded with the writings of his great contemporary, St. Jerome, so the treatise of the unknown author who composed this, in some important respects, anti-Athanasian Creed, has been embalmed for posterity by its early ascription to the Father of orthodoxy. The memory of that mighty champion of the faith whose romantic adventures, as has been often remarked, make even the cold pages of Gibbon to glow, the fame of whose incantations still lingers in the Dragon of St. George, and in the Beelzebub of the mummers of the northern peasantry, has achieved this yet more important triumph. By the magic of his name this confession, of unknown origin and ambiguous character, found its way into the Western Church, and has been kept alive and retained a charmed existence even after its real character had been discovered. This curious tale has a double moral. On the one hand, it shows the marvellous power which the mere name of a great man can exercise long after the contests in which he was engaged are dead and buried—long after the church, of which he was the head and chief ornament, has been separated from the Churches which make it their boast to claim his work as their own. On the other hand, this circumstance may reconcile its stanchest adherents more easily to dealing freely with it; for, as it is evident that but for the belief in its Athanasian

origin, it would never have been accepted either by the Roman or by the English Church, so now that its un-Athanasian origin is proved, the special ground of its acceptance ceases. It was urged by Burnet in 1689, and has been often urged since, that the introduction of the Athanasian Creed into the public services of the Church was in direct contravention of the decrees of the Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon, which forbade, under severe penalties, the composition or publication of any other Creed than the Nicene. So long as the Athanasian Creed was believed to be by Athanasius himself, it might possibly have been supposed that, having been written before those decrees, it escaped their condemnation. That can no longer be maintained, since its later authorship has been acknowledged, and to those who attach any importance to the decrees of General Councils, the argument of Burnet is unanswerable. But even without regard to the prohibitions of Ephesus and Chalcedon, the removal of the prestige of Athanasius's name throws us back entirely on its internal value. A book may be anonymous and yet be true, sacred, even inspired. But then the proofs of its truth and inspiration must be very strong. An institution may have been founded on error, and yet be worth preserving for its general beneficence. But that beneficence must then be its sole recommendation. The history of the reception of the Creed of St. Athanasius is like the parallel history of the reception of the Pope's Infallibility—"gangrened with imposture;" not wilful imposture it may be, not conscious fraud, but still leaving it so destitute of historical foundation as to render doubly imperative the duty of testing its claims to authority by its own intrinsic merits.

Before we proceed to these, a few words must be spent on its probable date and authorship. The doubt of its Athanasian authorship was first expressed by Gerard Voss in 1642, in his work on "The Three Creeds," and from this it spread with such rapidity, that in 1647 Jeremy Taylor adopted it in his "Liberty of Prophesying;" and in 1662 the Revisers of the Prayer-book went out of their way to inject into the Rubrics* an expression of dissatisfaction which they could not venture to insert in the Articles. From that time scholars, whilst unanimous in disavowing its Athanasian authorship, have been engaged in the hitherto fruitless search after its unknown composer. Quesnel conjectured that it was the work of the African Bishop, Vigilius, of Thapsus, A.D. 484, chiefly from his reputation for passing off his own works under fictitious names. Waterland, led by the

* To the words, "this confession of our Christian faith," they added, "*commonly* called The Creed of St. Athanasius." For the development of this, as well as of much else relating to the history of the Creed, the reader is referred to a very able and learned article in *Macmillan's Magazine* for November, 1867, by "Presbyter Academicus." In many points this essay merely summarises the results of his arguments.

apparent absence of allusion to Nestorius, and yet distinct reference to Apollinarius, and also thinking that it was founded on Augustine's treatise on the Trinity, ascribed it to Hilary of Arles, A.D. 429. Mr. Harvey, believing that it was written prior to Augustine's treatise,* and judging, not unwarrantably, from its denunciation of everything approaching to Apollinarianism, that it was composed by some one who was accused of that heresy, and took this ungenerous mode of expurgation (to which we shall hereafter recur), refers it to Victricius, Bishop of Rouen, A.D. 401, and thinks that the title of "Athanasian" came by mistake from the name of Anastasius, the Pope before whom Victricius defended himself. A grave question has recently been started by Mr. Ffoulkes, whether, in the absence of any certain indications of an earlier date, it is not of the time of Charlemagne. It is then that we have the first positive proof of its appearance in any manuscript authorities, and unquestionably it bears a striking resemblance to the style of the theological expositions put forth by that energetic Prince. "This is the Catholic Faith," says Charlemagne, in his own paraphrase of the Apostles' Creed, "which every one keeping whole and undefiled shall have everlasting life."

II. We now pass to its internal characteristics. There are four points, all of singular interest, both in themselves and in the subsequent developments through which they have passed.

1. Its form (as is implied in what was probably its original title) is not like that of the other creeds, a series of historical or dogmatical statements, but a metrical arrangement of propositions artificially and elaborately strung together. It was a kind of combination of the Nicene Creed and of the *Te Deum*. It was not only "the Confession of the Catholic faith," but "the Psalm *Quicunque Vult*." Every sentence is a verse, and the whole is a triumphant pæan. It is this which contains the secret (morally speaking) of its chief attractions, and (dogmatically speaking) of some of its chief defects. On the one hand, it is thus connected with a good side of the ancient creeds—namely, their poetic character as thankful expressions of gratitude for the mercies of God to man. It may be worth while to quote a striking passage from Arnold's Sermons, in which this is well set forth with regard to the public use of the earlier creeds:—

* That it was not founded simply or exclusively on St. Augustine's Treatise on the Trinity, may be concluded from the following reasons:—

1. There is in that treatise (as will be noticed hereafter) but a very slight approach to the damnatory clauses.

2. The arguments on the Incarnation are differently put.

3. The bulk of the treatise abounds in speculations about mystical numbers, and metaphysical analyses of human nature, of which there is no trace in the Creed.

"In the Catechism, the Creed, as we all know, is made a sort of text for instruction in Christian truth; in the Baptismal Service, and in that for the Sick, it is made a touchstone, to know whether a man is fit to enter, or whether he may be considered as remaining to the end in the society of Christians. But in our daily service it partakes much more of the nature of a triumphant hymn; and accordingly, not only is it left to the choice of the congregation whether it shall be said or sung, but it might be imagined that the Church esteemed the latter the preferable method: for whereas the Rubric directs that the psalms and other hymns shall be either *said or sung*, of the Creeds it is directed, in a contrary order, that they shall be either *sung or said*. This, indeed, may only be accident, though, if it be, it is a curious coincidence; but whether it be accident or design, it certainly affords a very good illustration of the light in which the Creeds should be regarded; not as reviving the memory of old disputes, and a sort of declaration of war against those who may not agree with us in them, but as principally a free and triumphant confession of thanksgiving to God for all the mighty works which He has done for us."

In accordance with this feeling, the great theologian whose words have just been cited, at a time when it was unusual even in larger churches, had the Nicene Creed sung, not said, in Rugby Chapel.* It is due to this peculiarity that many of the objections to the Athanasian Creed, which occur when we hear it baldly recited, as in our parish churches, are softened as we hear it chanted in our great cathedrals. The grand crash of music drowns the dissonance of the jarring words, and the burning vehemence, the antithetical swing of the sentences is carried along on the wings of choir and organ till the sense of their particular meaning is lost in the spirit and energy of their sound. If, as has been before intimated, it derived its first start into general acceptance at the time of the triumph of Clovis over the Arian Visigoths, or of Charlemagne over the Byzantine power, it may in this aspect be regarded as the war-song of the orthodox King or Emperor, as the hymn of victory over the defeated heretics. Wherever it is still read or sung, this is probably the best aspect under which it can be considered—as a theological Song of Deborah, rejoicing over the fall of the enemies, as it was once thought, of God and of the Franks, as Deborah and Jael rejoiced over the fall of the enemies of God and of Israel. But there is another side to this poetical aspect of the Creed. If it, indeed, be a hymn, and if its expressions are mere effusions of devout gratitude, then in that exact proportion its dogmatic and polemic value ceases. As Arnold well observed in that same sermon:—

"It seems, then, that that minute dwelling upon every word of the Creeds, which has been the practice of expositors; that careful recording

* Except, it is instructive to add,—both as an instance of his own humility and as an illustration of the contrast between the characters of the two distinguished men,—when his friend Archbishop Whately, who regarded it simply as a logical formula, happened to be staying with him.

what particular sect or opinion every clause may be considered as combatting, so far from being necessary, in order to our using the Creeds aright in our daily service, would actually injure our use of them, by mixing up other thoughts and feelings by no means akin to those of devotion."

We cannot, to use a homely proverb, both have our cake and eat it. Poetry, no doubt, is the highest form of truth; hymns are the purest expressions of religious feeling: but poetry is, of itself, no more theology than it is science. Hymns, in proportion as they are polemical, cease to be hymns. The antithetical, rhythmical flow of the Athanasian Creed, so far as it goes, is an injury to the exact prosaic statement of the truth which it is intended to convey. Words are introduced, phrases are set in opposition to each other, for the sake of the antithesis; just as in some poems the sense is sacrificed to the metre or the rhyme. Thus, the constant opposition between "Three" and "One" which is evidently suggested by the necessity of the counterbalancing clauses, has no parallel in the Apostles' or Nicene Creed, or in any part of Scripture, except the spurious verse of 1 John v. 7, and turns on the different sense in which the two words are used in the two parts of the clause. It is this which not unnaturally produces the impression of an apparent wrangle and contradiction in the alternate repetition of the opposing sentences.* So again it is hardly conceivable that the verses—

> "So there is one Father, not three Fathers;
> "One Son, not three Sons;
> "One Holy Ghost, not three Holy Ghosts"—

seriously contemplate either a heresy to be contradicted, or a truth to be affirmed; they are merely, as it were, the overflowing of a style so caught with its own manner that it could not stop even when it had reached the limit which was laid down by the sense.† There is a poetic fire in its vitals; there are the elements of strophe and antistrophe, chorus and counter-chorus; but in that case we must forego its claims to be considered as a rigid rule of faith, a literal and formal statement of dogmatic propositions.

Fortunately or unfortunately (as different parties may view it), the polemic substance has been too strong for the poetic form. The Creed is, in spite of its harmonious rhythm, intensely and (as we shall see

* It is this impression which its public recital often leaves on half-educated or uneducated people, namely, that it is a Creed where "the clerk immediately contradicts what has been said by the clergyman," or where "the clergyman and the people quarrel all the way through." In musical services this disagreeable effect is in a great degree obviated.

† Some similar expressions, it is true, occur in St. Augustine's Treatise on the Trinity, and a fantastic formula of Phrygian baptism containing a like confusion of thought existed in the third century (Bingham, xi. cap. 3, sect. 4); but the prominence of this doctrine in the Athanasian Creed must be due to some such cause as that above indicated.

in speaking of the damnatory clauses) bitterly controversial. If it be a "*war-song,*" * the war is more evident in it than the song. It is a "symbol" in the sense of a military watchword more than in the sense of a Christian pass-word. In comparison with the Apostles', or with the Nicene, Creed, it is evident that every sentence has been put together with the view of combining the utmost amount of purely abstract matter with the least amount of infusion from history or morals. When at the close of the Creed we drop from its own statements into those simple clauses which are borrowed from the earlier confessions, we seem to have passed from the vortex of a whirlpool into the back-water of a still lake.

2. In these polemical statements there are two peculiarities—one of form or general intention, one of the particular expressions used. The peculiarity of form or intention has been well described by Dr. Newman in his "Grammar of Assent." "The dogma of the Trinity," he says, "is not called a mystery in the Athanasian Creed. It implies a glorying in the mystery, but it is not simply a statement of the mystery for the sake of its mysteriousness." This is perfectly true. The author of the Creed does not appear to have had a moment's perplexity as to any difficulty in the propositions which he was announcing. To modern readers they appear like the designed statement of an inextricable enigma, but that is the modern, not the ancient thought concerning it. In this respect the Creed is a striking contrast even to the treatise of St. Augustine, from which it is sometimes supposed to have been borrowed. Although even in that work there is but a very slight indication of the more purely modern element of awe, yet there is a profound sense of humility and hesitancy. "Verius cogitatur Deus quam dicitur, verius est quam cogitatur," is a sentence which softens much in the thorny statements of the African bishop. There is nothing of this diffidence in the Creed of the unknown Frenchman or Spaniard. One only word, as it appears in the English translation, might seem to lean in this direction, and has much encouraged this erroneous notion of its purpose—the word "incomprehensible."† It is probably one of the phrases which most dwells in the mind in connection with the Creed of St. Athanasius; and it has fallen to our lot within this year to have seen a severe attack on the Creed fo rcontaining a phrase alleged to be so contrary

* Dr. Newman's "Grammar of Assent."

† It has been conjectured that this mistranslation arose from the circumstance that the English version was made not from the Latin original, but from a Greek translation, and thus "incomprehensible" is the literal reading of ἀκαταλήπτος. It is another proof of the evil arising from its entering the services of the Church under a false name. The Reformers, no doubt, accepted the Greek translation as believing it to be the original work of Athanasius.

to the simplicity and openness of the Gospel, and on the other hand to have heard a powerful sermon from an eloquent preacher, defending by this same phrase the unintelligibility of the doctrine of the Trinity. But in the original Latin there is no such thought. It represents another truth altogether. It is simply "*immensus*" — "unmeasured," "not confined to any particular place," a condensation of the text "not on this mountain nor at Jerusalem." * The difference of conception between "*immensus*" and "incomprehensible" indicates the difference between the perfectly comprehensible and intelligible notion of the doctrine of the Trinity, as conceived by the author of the Athanasian Creed, and its inscrutable and unfathomable mystery, as conceived, perhaps more justly, by modern theologians. It indicates also the extent to which the public recital of the Creed with this misleading word deceives the congregations who hear and the ministers who read it.

3. There are, however, other parts of its language to which this remark applies more deeply. The argument of the Creed chiefly turns on the distinction between two words, translated in the English "substance" and "person." It becomes necessary to dwell for a few moments on the meaning of these phrases in the original, whether Greek or Latin. The word "substance" is the Anglicised form of the Latin word "*substantia*," which is the rendering of the Greek word *usia* (*οὐσία*). It might have been thought that the more obvious Latin word for this would have been *essentia*; as certainly, at the present day, the natural English word would have been "essence." At one time † the Western churches even preferred to retain the original Greek word *usia* untranslated. But the fact, however explained, that "substance" was the word chosen as the rendering of *usia*, has materially coloured the whole aspect of the Creed. Of the meaning of "essence," in modern times, we seem to know something; but of the meaning of the word "substance" we know hardly anything, except in the totally different sense of "matter," "stuff;" in which sense it is undoubtedly used most frequently. How widely even well-instructed minds can go astray on this very word, is evident from the almost universal mistake into which most Protestants and most Roman Catholics fall in speaking of "Transubstantiation." The former in attacking, the latter in defending, the miracle which is supposed to take place in the transformation of the bread and wine, imagine that the visible forms of bread and wine are really, though invisibly, changed into the actual, though invisible, body and blood of Christ. It is well known to any one who has studied the meaning of the words, that according to the

* See Ambrose on Luc. ii. 13. † St. Basil. Ep. 349.

true scholastic doctrine nothing of the kind is intended. The outward forms of bread and wine are supposed to remain entirely unchanged; the outward forms of the body and blood of Christ are not supposed to be there either visibly or invisibly. What (it is alleged) does happen is that the invisible ideal or essence (*substance*) of the bread and wine, which never is present to the bodily eye, is changed, not into the visible flesh and blood, but into the invisible ideal or essence (*substance*) of that flesh and blood. But what most Protestants and most Roman Catholics mean by "the substance" which is supposed to undergo this transformation, is in true scholastic language not "the substance" but "the accidents;" and the transformation which popular Protestantism and popular Catholicism believe to take place, would by true scholastic divines be called not "transubstantiation," but "transaccidentation." We have digressed thus far in order to show how on a kindred subject the imagination and the intellect of men and of churches may be hopelessly led astray by the misconception of one of the two chief words used in the Athanasian Creed. What may have been the meaning attached to "substance" as applied to the nature of God, by the author of the Creed, it is difficult to say. All that can be safely affirmed is that, judging by the parallel instance of "Transubstantiation," it is in the highest degree improbable that the uneducated—it is in a high degree improbable that even many educated persons—grasp the metaphysical idea either of the Latin "*substantia*," or of the still more remote Greek "*usia*." Dr. Newman (than whom no one can be a better judge on such a subject) has said, "What do I know about substance or matter? just as much as the greatest philosopher, and that is nothing at all."* To most persons, if they think at all on the subject, the word suggests the same idea that it suggested to Tertullian—of corporeal matter. This is the sense in which we most commonly use it, and the extremely subtle character of the scholastic meaning rather encourages the ordinary mind to adopt the more obvious signification.

But this difficulty, whatever it be, is complicated still more by the context in which the words occur. The words "*substantia*" and "substance" would, if taken in their obvious, literal, etymological sense, be the equivalents of the Greek word *hypostasis*. *Hypostasis* is, in Greek, exactly that *standing under*, that *substratum*, which *substantia* is in Latin. And, in fact, its ordinary Greek use, in classical, in ecclesiastical, and even in modern times, is almost, if not entirely, equivalent to *usia*, or *essence*. So we are told by St. Jerome that it was used in his time in the schools of philosophers.† So it is used in

* Apologia, p. 375. Compare a like train of thought in Dr. Pusey's "Eirenicon," part iii. p. 80—83.

† "In secular schools *hypostasis* is only another word for *usia*." (St. Jerome's Epistles, 57.)

modern Greek* philosophical discussions. And so (which is still more important, as bearing on the present discussion) it was used in the time of the Nicene Council, and of Athanasius himself, when at the close of the Council the Church anathematized those who said that the Son was "of a different Person" (*hypostasis*) "or Substance" (*usia*) from the Father. It is true that a divergent sense very soon began to form itself. At the Council of Alexandria, A.D. 362, there was an attempt to define the phrase as meaning something different. But Athanasius resisted the attempt, and insisted on leaving the matter in its original vagueness.† It is true that St. Basil and St. Gregory of Nyssa shortly after resumed the controversy, and St. Basil‡ undertook the difficult task of explaining away the identity of the two words as used in the Nicene Council; and a Synodical letter after the Council of Constantinople contains the word *hypostasis* as signifying the three distinctions in the Godhead. But still no Council has ever reversed the decision of the Council of Nicæa, which declares, under an anathema, that Person and Substance—*hypostasis* and *usia*—are the same. It is a remark of Dr. Newman, on this Nicene decision, that "its language is so obscure that even theologians differ about its meaning." It is, however, obscure not in itself, but because the words employed in it are so variable that with each age they have changed their meaning; and the propositions which they communicate become more obscure in proportion as their meanings are multiplied.

There is yet one further confusion which should be noticed. Even after the Greeks had, in contravention of the Nicene decision, separated the word *hypostasis* from the word *usia*, the Latins could not avoid seeing that the natural Latin translation of it was *substantia;* insomuch that St. Hilary actually thus rendered it, and that in the very treatise on which the Athanasian Creed is founded, St. Augustine says that the Greeks recognised in the Godhead "*tres substantias, unum essentiam.*"

This word, then, which in the original Greek is so deeply identified with *substance* and with *essence*—which was prohibited, under the anathema of the Nicene Council, to be separated from it—which in the Council of Sardica § was repeatedly and solemnly asserted to be its equivalent,—is the very word which in the Athanasian Creed is made to be its exact antithesis. On the distinction between the two, as on two opposite poles, the whole controversy of the Creed rolls.

* Thus, in a learned and able article "On the Unity of Science," in modern Greek, by our present accomplished Greek minister, Sir Peter Brailas, *hypostasis* is constantly used in the sense of *substance* or *substratum*.

† It is well known that Athanasius in his own writings avoided even his own phrase *homoïusion*.

‡ Ep. 349.

§ Theodoret, H. E. ii. 8.

Whereas in the early days of Athanasius it would have been heresy to divide the *hypostasis*, in the Athanasian Creed it is heresy not to divide it. Whereas in the time of Athanasius it was heresy to say that Person (*hypostasis*) and Substance (*usia*) were different, in the Athanasian Creed it is heresy to say that they are the same.

It is impossible not to sympathise—no one need fear to sympathise on such a matter—with the perplexities of St. Jerome. "They insist on my recognising three *hypostases*. I ask what these words signify. They answer that it means 'Three subsisting persons.' I reply that this is my belief. They insist that this is not enough, and that I must say '*hypostasis*.' I reply that I fear '*hypostasis*' is the same as Substance." His difficulty was great then; it would have been greater, had he lived now, under the additional complications which fifteen more centuries have added to the confusion. Quintilian and Seneca had protested in vain against the introduction of the word "*substantia*" into philosophy.* But its apparition in theology was more perplexing still. And Bacon has well placed it in the list of notions "unsound," "not clear," fantastical, and "ill-defined."

There is, however, within all this coil a yet more intricate entanglement. Not only had the word *hypostasis* in Greek changed its meaning beween the time of the Nicene Council and the time of the composition of this Creed, but the Latin word, "*persona*," which was used to translate the Greek word *hypostasis*, meant something different even from the newly-acquired meaning of *hypostasis* itself; and yet further, the English word "*person*" now means something different both from the Latin word *persona* and from the Greek word *hypostasis*. A few words must be devoted to both of these remarks. "*Persona*" is "a mask—a character;" just as the Greek word which most nearly corresponds to it, πρόσωπον, is "a face." Only by degrees has the word been transformed into its modern but now almost universal meaning of a separate individual. In earlier English, even as late as Shakspeare, the old meaning of "character" still lingered ("I then did use the *person* of your father"). Even the form in which it first became fixed as the name of a single individual, "a parson," meant to describe him, not in his individual capacity, but in the character or office which he bore. But Locke's definition of it is substantially that which has now taken the place of the ancient meaning: "A person is a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself—the same thinking being in different times and places." This is the first passage quoted by Johnson in explanation of his own definition of the word: "Individual, or particular man or woman."

* See Dean Liddell's admirable Sermon on the Eucharist, p. 17.

How entirely remote this is either from the Greek *hypostasis* or the Latin *persona*, it is needless to point out. Yet it is unquestionably the only idea formed of the word as used in the Athanasian Creed, not only by the uneducated, but even by many of the well-instructed. "The term 'Person,'" says a well-known modern advocate of the use of the Creed,* "cannot be employed to denote the distinctions in the Godhead without considerable intellectual caution." The warning is well needed. Even a deeply learned theologian has been known to make it a serious charge against another theologian equally learned, that he did not believe the third "Person" of the Trinity to be "a separate Being." To believe any one of the "Persons" to be "a separate being," as far as the Godhead is concerned, it is obvious, is in direct contravention to the ancient meaning of the word; but it is undoubtedly the natural inference from the fact that "separate being" is the modern sense of the word "person," which (as has been seen) in the original language, and even in older English, meant, it may almost be said, the very reverse.†

This change of the meaning of sacred terminology is in itself exceedingly interesting, and the study of it one of the most fruitful fields of theological investigation. But as regards the public use of the Creed, it cannot be concealed that such a fact materially affects its value as a dogmatic guide at the present time. It may be that the change of the meaning of the words is of no practical importance. But to assert this would be to surrender the importance of any

* Liddon's "Bampton Lectures," 49.

† In an ardent defence of the Athanasian Creed lately published, it is maintained that the word can be strictly used only of our Lord Jesus Christ, and that it is so to be understood throughout the Creed:—

"The Athanasian Creed and Modern Thought," by the Rev. T. M. Gorman, pp. 134, 135, 136:—"The term '*Person*' is one of the most equivocal in all Theology; and the evils arising from the misconception and abuse of it, have proved most disastrous to the cause of Divine Truth. It may be said, in general, to have two distinct senses. The one is technical; and as employed by theologians ancient and modern, is most ambiguous. Its exact signification has never yet been clearly stated. The other is the proper, true, rational, and intelligible meaning. In the first or technical sense, it has been used as equivalent to—hypostasis, *suppositum*, substance, subsistence, 'somewhat.' In the second sense it means simply—a human being, A MAN. In this its well-known acceptation it cannot, in strictness of speech, be predicated of the Father or of the Holy Spirit, but only of the Lord Jesus Christ. He alone is God *and man*, that is to say, GOD-MAN, or a DIVINE-HUMAN PERSON. . . .

"Bearing in mind then the simple facts, that the term 'Person' in its *technical* sense is equivalent—as used in the Creed—to the term *Essential*, as above explained; and that the same term 'Person,' according to its ordinary and well-understood acceptation, can with strict propriety of language be predicated only of the Lord Jesus Christ—and even of Him, in its transcendent and *Divine* sense, only in reference to His Glorified Humanity, as THE DIVINE MAN—the comprehension of the Athanasian Creed is possible, and even easy, to any mind of ordinary education and intelligence" [*i.e., by taking it in a sense in which no interpreter of the Creed has ever taken it before*].

distinct technical phraseology on these subjects. If it is of no great moment whether the ministers who use, and the congregations who hear, these antithetical contrasts between "person" and "substance," attach any idea to them, or attach ideas wholly different from that which they represented in the mind of their author; if the chief words employed can only be used "with considerable intellectual caution"—then the use of public dogmatic statements on these subjects must be estimated accordingly. No doubt there are many statements which are, or must be, misunderstood, or understood in various senses by a mixed congregation; and this is one of the many proofs of the infinite variations of the expression of theological truth. But if there is a supreme importance in using these words, and no others, for the truths in question (and we shall see as we proceed that the author of the Creed certainly was of that opinion), then there is a manifest anomaly—it might almost be said absurdity—in putting into the mouths of ordinary people expressions which they are not only sure to understand amiss, but which are actually so misunderstood by hundreds every time they are spoken. Perhaps these words usually suggest no ideas at all; but (to use the language of an able writer on the subject)—

> "If an ordinary Englishman does attempt to fathom their meaning, he probably understands 'substance' in the sense of matter, and 'person' in the sense of individual, and thus is led by the very Creed, which is to preserve him from error, into the two gravest of all heresies with respect to the Godhead, that the Divine Nature is corporeal, and that there are three Gods."

If the same truth can be conveyed through totally different phrases, then the terror which is often expressed at the slightest variation from particular forms of theological expression is rendered needless and futile. It is not denied that underneath these various forms there may be discerned one or more great truths. But these truths may be, and in fact have been, expressed by forms of words, exactly inverting the order and meaning of those used in the Creed of St. Athanasius. If, on the other hand, as Dr. Newman says of the same words used in another sense in the original Creed of Nicæa, "peasants are bound to believe them as well as controversialists,"* it would seem that unless the peasant has some chance of knowing what it is that they intend to teach, it is hardly right to enforce them upon his belief under a threat of the most dreadful penalties; at any rate such a threat becomes absolutely useless, if he does not know to what precise crime they are intended to apply.

4. This brings us to the parts of the Creed which are even more peculiarly characteristic of it than its poetic rhythm, or its dogmatic statements, although, doubtless, they cannot be altogether

* "Grammar of Assent," p. 142.

separated from either. We refer, of course, to its condemning, or, as they have been for many years called, its "damnatory clauses." They are peculiar to this Creed, in more senses than one. It is true that anathemas were appended to the original Nicene Creed, and are still appended to every dogma issued by the Roman Catholic Church; but these anathemas have been gradually left more and more in the background. The Nicene anathemas appear, indeed, if ever the Nicene Creed is recited in its original form. In the orthodox Greek Church they were, as far as appears, repeated for the last time at the Council of Chalcedon, and they are probably still to be found in the heretical Churches of Kurdistan and of Egypt. But inasmuch as the Chalcedonian Fathers adopted in its place the Creed (as it is generally believed) of the Council of Constantinople, and inasmuch as in the orthodox East and the whole Western Church that Creed took the place, and usurped the name, of the Nicene Creed, the anathemas silently dropped. The reason, perhaps, why they had never been appended to that enlarged form was, that it was not really the work of the General Council, but rather of some individual theologian—whether Epiphanius or Gregory of Nyssa, who, influenced by milder temperament or by the feeling that he had not adequate authority, declined to insert them. The Apostles' Creed—perhaps for a similar reason—viz., that it never was confirmed by a Council—has never had the anathemas at all. The Athanasian Creed, therefore (if we except the confessions of the Coptic and Nestorian Churches, which, as has been already noticed, are believed still to use the anathemas of the Nicene Creed), is the only public confession of faith to which such curses are now attached.*

But the peculiarity of the Athanasian anathemas is more remarkable yet. They are not, as in the case of the old Nicene Creed, appended as a mere separable adjunct, but are firmly incorporated at the beginning, the middle, and the end of the Creed, so as to form its most prominent features, both to the eye and to the ear. Its very title is taken, not from the truths which it proclaims, but from the miseries which it invokes on those who deny them. It is not the "*Credo*," but the "*Quicunque Vult*." And further, these denunciations, unlike the anathemas of the Nicene Creed or of modern dogmas (which are contained in a single word, and that

* It may be observed as a proof of the gradual extermination of these anathemas by a more Christian feeling, that in the Greek Church the service of Orthodoxy Sunday, in which all the heretics were anathematized by name, is now generally discontinued. One of the earlier forms of the Roman dogma of the Pope's infallibility had also, by a momentary concession to Christian truth and charity, dropped the anathema. It is, however, reinstated in that which was actually adopted by the Vatican Council on July 18.

an exceedingly general one), are stated with the utmost particularity, and applied with the utmost universality. Instead of the vague expression, "the Church anathematizes," which might, perhaps, mean no more than a temporal and temporary excommunication, is the awful phrase, "He *shall without doubt perish everlastingly.*" Instead of the indefinite expression, "Let him be anathema," is the extreme and penetrating individualization, "*Whosoever* will be saved," "*Every one* shall perish." Instead of the reference to the Creed generally, is the particularization of every part of it: "Which unless a man do keep *whole and undefiled;*" "*in all* things, as is aforesaid," "*necessary* to everlasting salvation that he believe rightly;" and the repetition of the corresponding phrases at each turn of the Creed,* as has been well said, clenches and nails every single part together into one indissoluble whole.†

So remarkable a variation from the usual form of creeds must have had some peculiar origin. It may be that the author of the Creed—Victricius, or some one like Victricius—accused of heresy himself, took this fearful mode of clearing his reputation. "Many a man," says a Spanish proverb, "has won for himself the name of a saint by calling others necromancers;" and it may well be that a person of suspected orthodoxy may have thought this tremendous repudiation of heresy his only safety. At the Council of Nicæa, the severest humiliation to which the Arian bishops were subjected was signing even the brief anathemas then in use to condemn their brethren: how much more efficacious would be the terrible asseverations of the "*Quicunque Vult?*" Or it may be that they express

* This is well put in Mr. Lyttelton's excellent letter to the *Guardian* newspaper, Feb. 14, 1870. He adds an instance which shows that this terrific penalty is even in our day practically applied to every part. "I once heard a distinguished clergyman make the little children in the village school repeat the damnatory clauses at each sentence in the Creed, and I could not deny that logically he was justified in so doing."

† One remedy proposed for the better understanding of these clauses is, that they should be re-translated. It is maintained that "*quicunque vult*" should be rendered, "whosoever wishes to be in a *state of salvation;*" that "*ita sentiat*" should be not "*must* thus think," but "*let* him thus think." The proposal of such a remedy suggests three inevitable remarks. 1. The difference of meaning, whatever it be, is but slight, and there still remain the no less terrible clauses, "he shall without doubt perish everlastingly," and "he cannot be saved." 2. If the difference were important, it is an acknowledgment that the Creed as now retained and recited conveys a meaning essentially false on a subject of infinite gravity. 3. Whatever may be the obscurity of the damnatory clauses in English, it is not to be compared to the obscurities of the English rendering of the dogmatic parts of the Creed in the words "incomprehensible," "Person" and "substance." If the Creed is to be re-translated in the portions which are the most intelligible, much more it must be re-translated in those which are the most obscure. And such a total re-translation would probably be acceptable to no one.

It would surely be a better plan, as was proposed in a letter addressed to the *Guardian*, that the Creed should always be recited in the original language. If unintelligible, it would then, at any rate, not be misleading.

some peculiar outburst of triumph over a theological enemy—such, as if Waterland's date of the reception of the Creed be correct, would have been the victory of Clovis over the Visigoths; or, if Mr. Ffoulkes's conjecture be accepted, the assertion of Western orthodoxy over Eastern heresy, at the time of Charlemagne.

Whatever be the explanation, the fact imparts to the Creed a unique historical interest. It serves the purpose of one of those landmarks left in levelling ground to show the site of a former entrenchment. It is invaluable as a relic or fragment of ancient times, the more because out of keeping with the surrounding objects. But the more curious as an historical monument, the less suitable does it become for general and perpetual use. And this is to be observed, in proportion as the policy which the anathemas represent is not only antiquated, but is now almost universally regarded as one which we should least desire to revive. Athanasius himself, as we have seen, could not by any possibility have attached these anathemas to forms of expression which he deprecated. Even the peremptory statements with which the Creed opens and closes—"The Catholic Faith is this," "This is the Catholic Faith"—would have even in his eyes a certain mark of Cataphrygian heresy.* Augustine, as we have seen, spoke with a hesitation and diffidence the very reverse of the positiveness of the pseudo-Athanasian anathemas. But the passion for punishing erroneous opinions with the most frightful pains both in this world and the next grew rapidly. Undoubtedly and unhappily, whether the Creed was composed in the fifth century or the eighth, these clauses equally expressed the feeling of many of the ablest theologians of the time—that formal orthodoxy was the indispensable passport to salvation, formal heresy the inevitable forerunner of everlasting destruction. The particular shape of the Athanasian anathemas was, as we have seen, exceptional, but the temper which they express belonged to the age. They awakened, they could awaken, no horror, no distrust, in those who had not the slightest scruple in slaughtering and burning alive the very persons whom these clauses were supposed to condemn. The modern qualifications forced by the charity and justice of later days upon these curses would no more occur to the framers or the recipients of this Creed from the fifth to the sixteenth century, than they did in withholding St. Louis, or Isabella the Catholic, or Cranmer, from committing heretics to the flames; or in withholding even Augustine from consigning to endless torments the souls of unbaptized children; or Dante from enumerating, name by name, every

* "Speaking of the Arians," Athanasius says, "they have not written, 'so we believe,' but in this form, '*This Catholic Faith is published.*' By adding the word '*Catholic*,' they fall into the transgression of the Cataphrygians, so as to say with them, 'The Christian Faith was first revealed to, and begins from us.'"

illustrious heathen, except Trajan and Statius, and every heretic, as lodged for ever in the circles of the *Inferno.*

But as they were probably the parts of the Creed which most commended them to the Church, so long as this sentiment lasted, so they were the parts which were the first to rouse difficulties respecting its acceptance, in proportion as a better and more Christian sentiment sprang up.

There is some faint sign of hesitation respecting them in earlier times. In some manuscripts the most offensive parts are omitted,* and Wycliffe seems to have had a momentary doubt as to their lawfulness. But these compunctions were long in making themselves felt. The cruel necessity under which the Reformers felt themselves of vindicating their orthodoxy whenever they could, and the savage temper against heretics even in the first Protestant Churches, stifled many questionings which might otherwise have arisen in the earlier days of the Reformation. It was not till a wider and a more critical spirit had affected the English clergy in the middle of the seventeenth century, that the protests of the best and wisest ecclesiastics began to be raised against the damnatory clauses. From that time they have been either considered as sufficient reason for laying aside the use of the Creed itself, or else have been subjected to explanations which have entirely changed their meaning. "It seems very hard," says Bishop Jeremy Taylor, "to put uncharitableness into the Creed, and so to make it become an article of faith." "The damning clauses in St. Athanasius' Creed," says Chillingworth, "are most false, and also in a high degree schismatical and presumptuous." (Letter to Sheldon, Sept. 21, 1635.) Baxter, in signing the Articles, expressly excepted "assent to the damnatory clauses of the Athanasian Creed." (Orme's Life, i. 489.) "The account given of Athanasius' Creed appear to me in no wise satisfactory," says Archbishop Tillotson; "I wish we were well rid of it." (Life of Burnet.) "The most eminent men of the English Church," says Bishop Burnet (on Article viii.), "as far back as the memory of all that I know can go up, confine them to such as stifled their own convictions." Archbishop Secker "thought it a pity they had not been originally omitted" (vi. 220). Bishop Marsh, "though he argued against the inference deduced from the anathemas, did not mean to defend them." Professor Burton regarded them "as essentially different and unconnected with the Creed;" and thought "that Christian charity and humility would wish that they were not retained and read publicly." (Sermon

* In the manuscript copies of the exposition ascribed to Venantius Fortunatus, the two damnatory clauses in the middle, and one at the beginning, are omitted. The rest are retained. The English translation omits the word "firmiter," possibly from a reluctance to multiply the stringency of these clauses.

on Mark xvi. 16). Professor Hey, besides various other modifications, proposes to substitute for them, "He that hath ears to hear let him hear" (iii. 118). Dr. Arnold said, "I do not believe the damnatory clauses of the Athanasian Creed under any justification given of them, except such as substitutes for them propositions of a wholly different character." (Life, p. 749). Bishop Lonsdale openly condemned them, and was emphatically silent during their repetition in the public service. (Denison's "Life of Bishop Lonsdale," p. 113.)

Coleridge (to take one example of an eminent lay theologian) says, "This Creed, if not persecuting, which I will not discuss, certainly contains harsh and ill-conceived language." (Table Talk, p. 45.)

III. Such are the peculiarities of this famous Creed. Each one of them, whilst it enhances its historical value, diminishes its permanent theological value, and yet more its practical devotional value, as a public formulary. It might be questionable whether it was worth while to retain in the services of the Church, in the teeth of the decrees of two General Councils, a Creed which obtained admittance there under the name of Athanasius, when it is now known not to be Athanasius'; at least, nothing short of extraordinary intrinsic merit would justify such a procedure. It might be questionable whether it was worth while to retain as a public formulary a Creed, of which the chief words are understood by the common people in a sense perfectly different from their original intention, and of which the chief champions of the Creed have said that they "ought not to be employed without considerable intellectual caution," or that "nothing at all is known" about their meaning. It becomes most of all questionable when these words, thus ambiguous in themselves, are enforced under anathemas the most terrible and plain that human language admits, and which have now universally ceased in their obvious sense to be believed.

1. There are, however, still further anomalies consequent on its use in the Church of England. Here, again, there is an historical peculiarity which, considered in an antiquarian point of view, may be worth preserving. The Church of England is the only Church in Christendom where it is ordered to be recited publicly in mixed congregations. This is probably derived from the time before the Reformation. But whatever may have been the case formerly, at the present time this practice is confined to the English Church. In the Roman Church, which limits its recitation, as a general rule, to conventual and monastic worship, it is never, or hardly ever, recited in public. It is never recited in the Eastern Churches, which, so far as they receive it at all, only receive it with one of its chief Articles omitted, and as a private act of devotion. It is never, or hardly ever,

recited* in the Lutheran, Belgic, or Bohemian Churches, which retain it in their confessions of faith, nor in the Reformed Churches of France, Switzerland, or Germany, which have not received it in any sense; nor in the Presbyterian Churches of Scotland, nor even in the most highly orthodox of the Nonconformist Churches in England. Further, it was formally rejected both from the Thirty-nine Articles and from the English Liturgy by the Protestant Episcopal Church of the United States. This rejection assumes the most significant aspect when considered in its relations to the law of the English Church. It had been first proposed in the American Convention to reject both the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds. The English archbishops, to whom application had been made for the consecration of the American bishops, demurred, and announced that their course "must depend on the answer they would receive to what they had written." † On the Nicene Creed the American Convention gave way, but it insisted on excluding the Athanasian Creed, and the English archbishops accordingly, under a special statute passed for the occasion, and with the full authority of the English Church and State, gave the Episcopal succession to a Church which had deliberately given notice to them of its rejection of this Creed. In our own time, in spite of this objection, the bond of union has been drawn closer still; and any clergyman ordained by an American bishop, without subscribing or adhering in any sense to the Athanasian Creed, and with a determination not to use it, may yet minister and preach in the Church of England.

2. Yet further, in the English Church itself its general recitation is comparatively of modern growth. What may have been the case before the seventeenth century, before its true authorship was known, and before the scruples had arisen against its anathemas, cannot be known; but from the time of the Restoration it has been frequently omitted in the Church Service. Its unfitness for such use was so generally felt, that (according to Tillotson's famous expression of "charity being above rubrics") the rubric was neglected and charity prevailed. Excellent laymen have been frequently known to shut the Prayer-book the moment that the Creed began. King George III., on one occasion in the Chapel Royal, is said to have closed the book with such emphasis that for many years the Creed was omitted. The late Bishop Blomfield on coming to the parish of Bishopsgate, finding that it had not been used there within the memory of man, did not revive the use; and it thus happened that he passed through his

* Professor Hey says that it is recited twice a year in the Swedish Church. (Lectures, iii. 117.)

† See the whole story carefully given by "Presbyter Academicus" in *Macmillan's Magazine*, November, 1869.

clerical life without having publicly read it. It was not till the movement of the Oxford school in 1834, for putting in force all the obsolete rubrics of the Church, that the rubric enjoining the frequent use of the Athanasian Creed revived amongst the rest. Doubtless it was peculiarly acceptable to the "fierce thoughts"* which at that time animated the leaders of the High Church party against all tolerant and liberal views. But its revival remains one of the chief monuments of the movement which in later days has issued in what is called "Ritualism;" and as such it comes before the public not simply as an offensive usage, which for the first time seeks to be relaxed, but as an obsolete usage which, having been relaxed, has for the last thirty years begun to be re-enforced.

Nor has the revival of a Creed which had thus become virtually dead been accompanied by a general acquiescence, such as alone could render it desirable. It may be that there are more who sympathise, or think they sympathise with it, than in former times. Of these we will speak presently. But of those who loudly complain or silently protest the number has increased in proportion. There are devout Christians who shrink from attending the great festivals of the Church, because they know that on these days they will have their most sacred thoughts of peace and reverence disturbed by expressions which they only hear "with repugnance and horror." There are parish Churches, such as have been graphically described by an eminent pastor, as of his own experience—"As soon as the recital of the Creed begins the most thoughtful and devout of the parishioners make it the signal for sitting down in silence. The rest of the congregation soon follow their example; the responses quaver and fail, and at last no one is left to carry them on but the children of the choir; and so out of the mouths of babes and sucklings proceed those terrible denunciations which they are not expected to believe, against opinions which they do not understand, nor were intended to understand." The evil is aggravated by the fact that even when the Creed is read, not sung, it is not the clergyman but the congregation to whose lot falls the duty of repeating these withering declarations; and when it is sung, the whole Creed ordinarily devolves on the choir, that is usually on laymen, who are for the most part unaccustomed to the explanations by which the more educated clergy deprive the anathemas of their point.

3. We have noticed incidentally the anomalous position in which the use of the Creed places the English Church in regard to the American Episcopal Church. There is another Communion in regard to which the recitation of the Athanasian anathemas in the Church of England is still more difficult to maintain.

* Newman's "Apologia," pp. 97, 120, 131.

When the Creed was discussed in 1689, Burnet urged "that it condemned the Greek Church, which yet we defend." This was an argument which at that time was likely to have but little practical weight even with the High Churchmen, to whom it was addressed. The Greek Church was then so remote from English view (only brought to sight for a moment, now and then, by the communication of Cyril with Laud, or of Peter the Great with Burnet himself) that no lively impression could be made by pointing out that the anathemas were directed against a body of Christians with which practically the English Church had no intercourse. But now the case is materially altered. Not only has the English Church, and the High Church school in particular, turned with unusual ardour towards friendly communication with the Eastern Churches, but within the last year a Greek prelate has received the most flattering attentions from ecclesiastics of various shades of opinion, but especially of the type of those who profess the warmest attachment to the "Creed of St. Athanasius." Now, if there be one thing more than another certain of this Creed, it is that it alone, of all the older confessions of faith, contains, and did from the first contain, as an integral part of itself, the clause respecting the Double Procession of the Holy Ghost, which formed the main doctrinal point of rupture between the Eastern and Western Churches; and that, consequently, the anathemas which condemn those who do not hold its statement of the Catholic faith "whole and undefiled," strike at every individual of the Eastern Church who still continues to deny that doctrine.

That this is so appears from the appeals to the Athanasian Creed, which first bring it prominently within the view of ecclesiastical history. The first notices of it—perhaps in the fifth and sixth centuries, certainly in the ninth, twelfth, thirteenth, and fifteenth*—are such as prove incontestably that it was for its assertion of this particular dogma that it was chiefly valued, and that its anathemas were then specially directed against the Greek Church, with which at those periods the Latin Church was engaged in deadly war. It was, as Mr. Harvey well remarks, "the master-word in the dark contests between the East and West." The clause regarding the Double Procession was so completely considered to be the stumbling-block in the way of the Greeks, that they, when taunted with its being the work of Athanasius, retorted that he could only have written it when he was drunk.† This also appears from the fact that in the Greek translation of the Creed, which, as above noticed, is occasionally inserted in Eastern books of devotion, this clause

* Waterland, iv., 259, 221, 150, 152, 156, 158, 161.

† Gibbon (c. 37) has not quite correctly stated this. He puts this remark into the mouth of Gennadius, the Patriarch of Constantinople. It is not the remark of Genna-

is studiously omitted, although leaving the context maimed and meaningless without it. The fact is, that the controversy respecting the Double Procession is almost the only one which now survives—if even it may be said to survive—out of the technical phraseology which forms the basis of the Athanasian Creed. Any one who reads Dr. Donaldson's defence of this in his "Christian Orthodoxy," will see that in his view, which has been recently adopted by those who wish to retain its use, modern thought of all kind on this question, whether philosophical or theological, whether what is denounced as Rationalist or as Unitarian, is altogether outside and beyond the propositions contained in the Creed, or, if within them at all, rather favoured than otherwise. All the various forms of modern speculation on the Trinity spring from an atmosphere of thought, and form a vocabulary of theology altogether subsequent and alien to that which gives to the Athanasian Creed its meaning and its intention.* It is reported that the eminent Nonconformist minister, Dr. Price, used to say of the Athanasian Creed, that it was but "Socinianism disguised." It seems a paradox, but, from his point of view, there is some ground for the remark. The truths concerning the Unity of God which Unitarianism teaches are taught by the Creed with a force and clearness which cannot be mistaken. The truths concerning the distinctions in the Godhead which Trinitarianism teaches are taught by the Creed in words which, as we have seen, have changed their meaning with each succeeding age, and which by those who defend them are accepted only "with considerable intellectual caution," or with a reservation that "nothing at all is known" of their true meaning. And so it has come to pass that whilst the Athanasian anathema fails to hit those whom its admirers desire it to hit, it strikes with its whole severity those whom they wish to except. The Arian controversy, properly so called, expired with the fall of the Visigothic kingdoms. The Monophysite and Monothelite controversies had either not come into existence (if we take Waterland's view) when the Creed was first composed, or (if we take Mr. Ffoulkes's view) were too remote to be within its vision. Nestorianism, against which one of its

dius, but his description (apparently depreciatory, as might be expected from his partiality to the Latin Church) of what the Greeks, his countrymen, said of the clause in question. "They are not ashamed to say that the holy Athanasius was drunk, and, when he was writing this, full of wine." (As quoted by Petavius, Theol. Dogm., vii. c. 8.)

* In a charge of the late lamented Bishop of Calcutta, he observes on the peculiarly Oriental character of the heresies against which the Athanasian Creed protests. This is an additional proof of its irrelevance to the more recent speculations of the West. It may be added in passing that the repugnance of this excellent Prelate to the enforced use of the Athanasian Creed (however much he was anxious to allay the scruples provoked by it) continued unchanged to the end of his life.

clauses seems to be aimed, no doubt still exists in the mountains of Kurdistan. This, however, is too far away to be worth taking into practical consideration. But the controversy on the Double Procession, if exciting but a faint interest in the West, still agitates the minds of the ecclesiastics of Constantinople, of Athens, and of Moscow; and whether as a point of honour, or as a point of doctrine, they will die but never surrender this ancient bone of contention. Against this, therefore, the anathemas continue fresh and green as ever; and, whilst it is perfectly reasonable that we in the English Church might forbear to press the interpolated clause, as it exists unguarded by anathemas, in the Creed of Constantinople, we cannot, without manifest inconsistency, forbear to press it, when enforced under such terrific penalties as those laid down in the Creed of St. Athanasius, at least so long as those anathemas are actively defended or publicly rehearsed in English churches. The plaintive remark of Bishop Lonsdale was therefore only too well founded: "That the Athanasian Creed was intended to exclude the Greek Church, I admit with sorrow." (Life, p. 113.) And the accompanying extract from a perplexed clergyman of the Church of England, extracted from the *Church Times*, proves how practical is the Greek difficulty in the eyes of some of those who would be the warmest adherents of the Athanasian Creed:—

"It is not easy to come from our stirring Whitsuntide services without —shall I dare to say it?—a hearty zeal for the co-equality of the Spirit with the Father and the Son, and, I must add, a righteous indignation towards those professed members of the Anglican Church who, by the excision of the *Filioque*, would not only cut her off from the whole Communion of the West, from the eighth century forward, but commit her to the essentially erroneous position of the inferiority of the Son and the Spirit to the Father. The echo of the magnificent sentences of the Athanasian Creed, that thunder music of theology, is still pealing in our ears, 'Such as the Father is, such is the Son, and such is the Holy Ghost,' and yet we are to be told that the Father is not only Fountain of Deity in the sense of being First in order, as all Catholics maintain, but is the exclusive Source from which alone both the Son and the Holy Ghost derive existence. And priests of the Church of England, who stand committed by every tie of faith and honour to the Procession from the Father and the Son, venture to denounce wrath and woe upon the Anglican Communion, if she does not stultify herself (I cannot speak less plainly) by cutting herself off from the Ante-Reformation Church, from the Faith of a thousand years, and so openly proclaim what in popular apprehension cannot fall short of practical Sabellianism. The Eastern Church has never accepted a certain logical and inevitable consequence of the belief in the Triune Godhead. Nor had the Apostolic, nor had the Church of the fourth and fifth centuries. Granted. That does not affect the Eastern Church's life, though that, and the non-use of the Athanasian Creed, does probably greatly impair her spiritual energies. But to go back from, to put away, practically to condemn this logical deduction, after having accepted it for a thousand years together,

would be indeed to depart from the Faith once delivered to the Saints. For that implies essential co-equality.

"The plain truth is that the Greek hypothesis is essentially semi-Arian, though I am as far from imputing semi-Arianism to the Eastern as to the Ancient Church. The notion at the bottom of this hypothesis is, that if not in time, at least in eternity, the Father was first alone, and then developed, so to speak, the Son and the Holy Ghost. But this is not so, this is utterly irreconcilable with the Catholic Faith. For the Trinity in Unity was complete from all eternity, the Son ever begotten, the Holy Ghost ever proceeding. The cry of Arians and semi-Arians was always for antiquity! and this naturally so, because the early Fathers had expressed themselves (as Petavius has shown) illogically and incorrectly. This could not well be otherwise. And since the decrees of Councils are appealed to as forbidding all further development, we must needs ask, how should the Faith of the Church have been crystallised either at Nicæa or Constantinople? What legitimate power could any Council have so to bind future ages as to say to the rising tide of Catholic discernment, 'Thus far, and no further?'

"Our forefathers could not and would not accept a Creed which, logically interpreted, struck at the root of the Essential Deity both of the Son and of the Spirit. It was Catholic instinct which protested, and righteous zeal for the honour of God the Son, and of God the Holy Ghost, and these would be satisfied with nothing short of the distinct proclamation of the mighty truth. Eternal honour then to Charlemagne, one of the greatest, if not the greatest, of earthly rulers, for his faithful service in this matter, as in his warfare against image-worship also.

"But that Anglicans should suffer themselves to argue against the binding Creeds of their own Church, this appears to me to be quite insufferable. 'The Father is made of none, neither created nor begotten. The Son is of the Father alone, not made, nor created, but begotten. The Holy Ghost is of the Father and of the Son, neither made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding.'"

Such a strong expression of opinion, whether right or wrong, shows that whatever language of alarm is used concerning Sabellians, or Apollinarians, or Arians, can be used, and has been used, respecting the Greeks. But of late years, whenever any approximation has been made towards the Eastern Churches, it has always been publicly pointed out, and in fact hailed, as an indication that by such friendly overtures the anathemas of the Athanasian Creed are, as regards the English Church, virtually repealed. In this, the most signal instance of their application, they have been, by these kindly acts, declared to be false and irrelevant. And therefore, as the Greek Church itself has wisely abandoned its ancient practice of solemnly anathematizing the Churches of the West, so it is not too much to be expected that the Church of England at least—whatever may be done by the Church of Rome—shall abandon the practice of launching its anathemas fourteen times a year against the Churches of the East. Vain endeavours are from time to time made to prove that Eastern Christendom is excepted from their operation, because, as is alleged, the Double Procession of the Athanasian Creed may be interpreted to mean the

Single Procession of the Greeks; or because, as it is also alleged, the anathemas leap over this particular clause, and leave it intact. But such arguments are tantamount to giving up the Creed altogether, inasmuch as they simply assert that the Creed cannot express its own dogma correctly, and that any particular opinions denounced in it may, at the discretion of individuals, be exempted from its anathemas.

IV. It may be well, before we reach the conclusion, to sum up some of the arguments that have been used in favour of a Creed which, whatever else may be said for or against it, unquestionably occupies a singular and exceptional position.

Its historical value has been sufficiently set forth. Its use is a relic of the age of Charlemagne, perhaps of Clovis, perhaps even of Odoacer; not certainly a "creed of the saints, and anthem of the blest," but a war-song of an unknown author—an interesting and unique example at once of the endeavour of Latin Theology to grasp Byzantine metaphysics, and of Christian speculation to fortify itself with barbarian curses. Nothing else exists like it in the English Prayer-book. If it disappears, we shall have lost, for good or evil, a familiar memorial of the old days of fierce haters and plain speakers.

It is also a relic of times before the modern controversies which distract the Church had sprung up. It defines carefully what is and, therefore, what is not the Catholic faith. It declares that heresy consists in denying or modifying certain expressions which it states to be absolutely essential respecting the Three Hypostases and the One Substance of the Divine Being. According to the Athanasian Creed, Pelagianism is not contrary to the Catholic Faith, nor any of the numerous theories that have sprung up, on one side or the other, respecting Justification. Nor, again, is any theory respecting Biblical Inspiration, or respecting the Atonement, or respecting Baptismal Regeneration, or respecting the Real Presence, or respecting the Sacraments at all, reckoned by the Athanasian Creed as parts "of the Catholic Faith." If, on one side, this venerable confession may be harsh and severe, and, on another side, meagre and defective, yet, on another, it is (when viewed from a liberal point of view) more tolerant and comprehensive than many modern confessions.

It may be asked, then, if it has these advantages, and if its most offensive features are constantly explained away even by those who profess to admire them, why it should cease to occupy its present conspicuous place in our public services? The answer has already been in part given. It is a creed without authority—constantly and necessarily misunderstood—and involving the Church which continues to enforce it in endless anomalies and contradictions. It may be added, further, that in the damnatory clauses, which are almost the only parts peculiar to this Creed which are commonly

understood in their original sense, it tends to keep alive two evil passions of the old theological Adam, which it has been one of the chief aims of our Divine Redeemer to subdue and extirpate.

One is the tendency to exalt correct belief into the first of virtues, and to consider erroneous belief as the worst of crimes. A creed which asserts, in the most emphatic language, that, in order to be "saved" (whatever sense we attach to that word), it is "before all things necessary to hold the Catholic Faith," can hardly be said to be of the spirit of Him who declared, "Not every one that saith unto me Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven, but he that doeth the will of my Father which is in heaven;" or of His Apostles, who declared, "In every land he that feareth God and doeth righteousness is accepted of Him;" or, "Circumcision availeth nothing, nor uncircumcision, but the keeping of the commandments of God;" or, "He that doeth righteousness is righteous." It may fairly be doubted by readers of the Bible whether "before" the statements respecting "Substance" and "Person" it may not be more "necessary, before all things," to believe that God is Love, that Charity is the greatest of human virtues, that there are Two Great Commandments, and that to fulfil these is more important even than holding the Catholic Faith. Other expressions of another kind may doubtless be found in other parts of the Bible. Let them be fairly considered. But they are not its key-note, or its general tone. They belong to modes of feeling, on their face more or less transitory, more or less exceptional. The text which is most commonly adduced in support of the damnatory clauses is Mark xvi. 16:—"He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be damned." But this is an exception which proves the rule. For first, the belief here spoken of is not the belief in a series of intricate antithetical propositions respecting the abstract nature of the Deity; it is not even (as is sometimes supposed by a confusion between this and the parallel place in St. Matthew) a belief in the Threefold Name of God, but simply a belief in "the Gospel" ("Go preach the Gospel"), in its largest and widest acceptation, which would include every shade of Christian, orthodox or heretical. Secondly, the word "*damned*," when taken (as in this argument it always is taken) in the well-known sense in which it is used in the coarse colloquialism of modern English, is not a proper representation of the old English word, which once meant no more than "condemned," and thus falls altogether short of the unqualified and extreme severity of the Athanasian denunciations. And thirdly, if even with these limitations it be acknowledged that the passage has a harsh sound, unlike the usual utterances of Him who came not to condemn but to save, the discoveries of later times have shown,

almost beyond doubt, that it is not a part of St. Mark's Gospel, but an addition by another hand, of which the weakness in the external evidence coincides with the internal evidence in proving its later origin. When,* therefore, this passage is cited by theologians as "the statement of our Lord Himself," "our Lord's own anathema," in defence of the Athanasian curses, they in fact surrender their cause: for they rest their position on a text which is, first, inapplicable; secondly, mistranslated; thirdly (in all probability), not genuine.

The other evil is the tendency to apply warnings which, if true at all, can be taken only in the most general, and in the most qualified terms, to particular classes and particular persons to whom we may happen to entertain a peculiar distaste. It is sometimes said that there is no more harm in using these clauses against certain opinions, than in using general denunciations, whether in Biblical or in common language, against certain vices. But it is obvious that the parallel fails in almost every particular. Even with regard to warnings against sin, it is certain that neither Scripture nor experience justifies us in using language so positive, so individual, so unqualified, as that which is contained in the Athanasian anathemas. There are many severe sentences in Scripture. But there is none which says even of murderers or of hypocrites, "*Whosoever* is a murderer, *whosoever* is a hypocrite, *shall without doubt perish everlastingly*"—or, "This and this is the exact scheme of Christian morality, which, *unless any one do keep whole and undefiled he cannot be saved.*" Qualifications, hopes, reservations not only come in, of necessity, from the nature of the subject-matter, but in fact prevent the utterance of such universal and misleading statements. But, in regard to opinions, declarations of this kind cannot fail to assume a more precise and direct meaning, because if they have any force at all, they attack the opinions as in themselves fatal. It is quite true that persons may think that they hold this or that opinion, when they are in fact holding its opposite; and that opinions are more or less valuable, more or less culpable, according to the amount of thought and care with which they are formed. But this is merely to state that these anathemas cannot be aimed against the holders of opinions, as such, but only against certain other qualities, such as negligence or idleness, which are not mentioned in the Creed at all, and that they can only be applied against opinions "with considerable intellectual caution"—with "intellectual caution" so "considerable" as to render their public use more than questionable. To speak of them as applying only to those "who wilfully reject the truth" is either sup-

* See the case well put in "A Few More Words on the Athanasian Creed," by "Presbyter Academicus," in *Macmillan's Magazine*, November, 1869, p. 40.

posing a case which never occurs, of a man disbelieving what he knows to be true, or is directing them against cases for which they would be universally felt to be far too strong. The nearest approach to such a state of mind that can be conceived is that of persons who, believing a certain statement to be true or false, afterwards, on the authority of some imaginary oracle (as of the Pope, or the like), or from some worldly motive, renounce their former convictions. Yet even here the severest critic would not say of every one who having announced a certain dogma to be false yet afterwards accepts it, that he "shall without doubt perish everlastingly." In point of fact, no one ever does venture so to speak even of these extreme cases. No one would venture to say it of Cranmer after his recantations, nor of those unfortunate Roman Catholics who, after having asserted the Pope's fallibility, are now by weight of influence or authority constrained to assert the reverse. By the growth of this more Christian feeling the damnatory clauses have, therefore, been removed as much as possible into the innocuous sphere of general statements, as unlike as possible to the stringency and force with which they were intended to attack "whosoever does not hold the Catholic Faith whole and undefiled." And wherever a strong reason exists to exclude any particular class from their operation, as is the case at present in regard to the feeling of English High Churchmen towards the Eastern Church, every nerve is strained to evacuate their significance. So, again, no one thinks of applying them to those vast numbers of innocent English men, women, and children who, by the misapprehension of the terms themselves of the Athanasian Creed, fall into the very errors which it denounces. But although this reservation implies a general disbelief in the damnatory clauses, they do, nevertheless, not only retain by the very force and plainness of their language, their own hard, fast line, but, in fact, are still kept, "like sleeping lions to be rattled up" when there is occasion to bring them into play against particular classes or individuals to whom a special animosity may be felt. The modern Unitarian may have but little really in common with the old Alexandrian Arius. The modern philosophic theologian may have but little in common with the old African Sabellius. But the names of Arian and Sabellian still linger, and whoever is connected by party warfare with one or other of those ill-fated titles, is in such party warfare brought within the condemnation of the Creed. Therefore it has been thought a matter for "deep lamentation" that one who holds the opinions of Milton, of Sir Isaac Newton, and of Channing, should join in any good work or word with his Christian brethren. Therefore it was that an eminent preacher has recently declared that Sabellians, in his judgment,

would in the other world "be in quite a different condition from those who are not Sabellians." Therefore it was expected, almost wished, that a frightful, sudden death, such as that which befell Arius in the streets of Constantinople, would be inflicted on an eminent scholar who had come to take his part in making better understood the Holy Scriptures, and in kneeling with his brethren round the table of their common Lord.

Sentiments like these are certainly not like the spirit of Him who honoured the good Samaritan, and the heathen soldier, and the Canaanite woman, and the man who cast out devils without following with His disciples. But they are the natural fruits of the ancient damnatory clauses, and of the damnatory spirit of the age whence those clauses originated. The meaning of the clauses is now reduced, by "considerable intellectual caution" to something much more like the spirit of the Gospel. But, to any one who accepts them in their full sense, or who is influenced by their intention, it is only natural that the persons against whom they are believed to be directed should be viewed with unspeakable horror. A man, of whom we are unhesitatingly able to say that, "*he shall, without doubt, perish everlastingly,*" must be the most miserable of human beings—to be avoided, not only in sacred, but in common intercourse, as something too awful to be approached or spoken of.

It is unquestionable, therefore, that, with all the advantages which this Creed may possess, it has been a burden and a scandal far beyond any use which even its most devoted admirers can claim for it. Without going back to the earlier days of Chillingworth, Baxter, or Tillotson, when the conscience of the English Church and nation was first roused against it, there is hardly a young man who has entered Holy Orders in these later days that has not at some time or other been exercised concerning its public use. It is certain that many of its most ardent defenders have as little belief in its damnatory clauses as its most serious opponents. However much they may apply them to this or that obnoxious individual, they have ceased to apply them generally. No English clergyman will apply them to the Greek Church or to the American; some even refuse to call them "damnatory;" some call them "warning clauses;" some even go so far as to call them "salvation" clauses.

There is, therefore, no single school in which a relaxation of its use could fairly be regarded as a grievance. All are alike pledged to allay the scandal which all feel, though they may differ as to the means of removing it. All alike deny its obvious meaning. None wish to retain its general use, except under interpretations far more strained than they apply to any other part of public worship. The objection to it may have assumed an exaggerated importance in the minds of some,

but it has certainly been, of all the stumbling-blocks in the services of the English Church, the first and foremost.

In the long struggle to remedy this now universally acknowledged evil, sometimes silent, sometimes open, there are two names which may be selected, partly to render them due honour, partly because, by reason of their very simplicity, and, so to speak, obscurity, they may stand for many more. One, of whom we will only say a few words, because he is still alive, is that of a venerable layman, now between his eightieth and ninetieth year, the gallant, chivalrous friend of Arnold, whose letters to him outnumber those contained in the correspondence of any other one of his most intimate friends. Few perhaps have read, fewer still now read, that series of pamphlets of Mr. W. Winstanley Hull, on the Disuse of the Athanasian Creed, remarkable equally for their studied moderation of tone, and for their determined seriousness of purpose. But the persevering efforts which he has waged are a proof of the depth of the feeling which this early scruple engendered. It was the remark of a most devout and earnest pastor, long ago called to his reward, when once discussing the Athanasian Creed, "Whatever good it may have done can hardly equal the evil it has inflicted on the Church by having kept Mr. Hull out of its ministry."

The other name being that of one who, having just passed away, may be treated more at length, the more so as it may slightly enliven and diversify the somewhat gloomy character of this discussion.*

"There are some characters which, without having exercised any commanding influence, or filled any conspicuous position, yet recall to those who knew them a whole world of sacred recollections, and leave behind them a lesson as distinctly and permanently cut in the marble of the memory as any that ever was carved by soldier's sword or poet's pen.

"Many still live who retain a fond remembrance of that low, picturesque, irregular, prebendal house that once nestled under the west end of Norwich Cathedral, now totally swept out of existence, in which dwelt the gentle genial spirit, who for years was the soul of the Norwich Close. One honoured member of that old extinct community still lives—the venerable Professor Sedgwick, whose youthful fire burns unquenched beneath the burden of his octogenarian labours. He, at the time of which we speak, came but as a flashing meteor to and fro, enlightening, cheering, harmonizing all around him, and then retiring from the cloisters, which he made so happy, to the yet more congenial shades of his beloved Cambridge. But he will remember, as will others now long dissevered from East Anglia, how, in all these comings and goings, there always was to be found a steady friend and neighbour in that monastic corner, ever ready with the best advice, with the liveliest sympathy, with the kindliest offer of assistance, with the most opportune suggestion of new occasions for usefulness. This was Charles Wodehouse, who held for many years a canonry of Norwich, and the livings first of Morningthorpe and then of St. Margaret's at Lynn, after which he retired into private life, where he was overtaken

* From the *Norwich Mercury* of March 26th, 1870.

by lingering illness, and gradually faded away, till, on March 17th, 1870, in his 80th year, he died at Lowestoft.

"We will not dwell on his personal history. . . . . .

"Our object in these few lines is to draw out from his comparatively obscure career, two or three points which give it a public and permanent significance.

"(1.) Our experience has brought us into contact with many clergymen more able, more learned, more active, than Mr. Wodehouse; but we can truly say that we have rarely known one, who, without brilliant or powerful qualities, more completely represented the best characteristic type of an English clergyman. He was, first, a thorough gentleman, inside and outside to the heart's core, and to the fingers' ends, combining much of the old-fashioned courtesy of other days, with the easier, freer movement of our own time. With this was united a deep, tranquil, religious fervour, coloured visibly, though not exclusively, by the Evangelical revival of his earlier days at Cambridge, not uninfluenced by the burning zeal of the great Quaker family, whose chief pontiff—Joseph John Gurney—resided close to Norwich, and with whom Mr. Wodehouse lived on terms of affectionate intimacy. But beyond this he possessed, in an eminent degree, that firm hold on the old principles of English Church and State which gave to all his teachings and his actions a manly, upright tone, peculiarly grateful to English tastes and English hearts, and which kept alive in him the ennobling, invigorating, humanizing consciousness at once of the citizen of a free country, and of a large-minded Protestant Christian. These are characteristics on which we dwell with more emphasis, because we fear that they have of late years become rare. But in his case they gave to his whole manner, doctrine, and conversation a peculiar flavour, which none could mistake, through which his week-days and his Sundays, his politics and his religion, were

'Bound each to each by natural piety.'

"It is remarkable to see, on glancing over the list of his published sermons and pamphlets, how large a proportion bore on questions of social and national concern. One, we observe, was an impressive address to the rural population, preached in 1834, the day after the execution of some well-known criminals—an event which always awakened in his mind a deep and general interest. We remember well the pathetic tones in which, passing over the Castle Hill, of Norwich, during the trial of the murderer Rush, he quoted the famous lines of Scott—

'And thou, O sad and fatal mound,
That oft hast heard the death axe sound.'

It was no weak or maudlin sentiment in him; it was the full appreciation of the seriousness of those moments when society is called to vindicate the laws of God and man against their transgressors; and to consider how far it is itself responsible for the misdeeds of those whom it condemns.

"Another sermon, which we call to mind, is a fearless protest delivered against the party spirit and corruption, which, even more than in other parts of England, disgraced the elections in the capital of East Anglia. When we call to mind the frenzy with which, in those days, even the children in the streets fought over again the political battles of their parents, the stern satisfaction with which a reprobate vagabond would, on his death-bed, murmur to his minister as his ground for hope in another world—'At least I have been true to my party'—when we remember the

stories of the vast sums of money said to be expended between the top and bottom of London Lane during one of the great elections, it is clear that it required no common courage to preach, as it certainly was no common need to have called forth such protests. Surely we may trust that they have not been altogether delivered in vain.

"Other sermons we might quote, containing, in the simplest and most unpretending language, the most enlarged views of the relations of the Church to the Nonconformists in the great common work given to both —of purifying and elevating the masses of their countrymen; views the more remarkable when it is remembered that he sprung from the great Conservative family of the Wodehouses, and was presented to his first preferment by the pillar of the Conservative cause, Lord Eldon. Politically speaking, indeed, he never entirely severed his connection with them. But his sympathies, instead of being narrowed by his Churchmanship, were enlarged by it. 'The fact is,' we remember him once saying to us, 'it is 'impossible to read the New Testament and not perceive that whatever 'Christianity has since become, it was in its first start a large liberal scheme 'for the good of the world, comprehending all that it could possibly touch, 'and asking the help of all who could possibly co-operate with it.'

"(2.) It may be inferred from this, and it may be positively stated from our general recollections, that if ever there was a clergyman who could have pursued at ease the blameless, even tenor of his way, beloved as he was alike by the higher and humbler classes, it was Charles Wodehouse. It is this which gives so instructive, we may almost say, so tragical an interest to the other side of his ministerial career, to which we now turn.

"Soon after his promotion to his Norwich canonry, which took place while he was very young, he was forcibly struck by the stringency of the forms then in use for a clergyman's subscription to the Articles and Formularies of the Church of England. Three points in particular seemed to him especially indefensible—the Form of Absolution in the Visitation Service, the Address to Priests in the Ordination Service, and above all, the damnatory clauses of the Athanasian Creed. The more he studied these passages, the more he became convinced, not only of their unsoundness if taken in their obvious and literal sense, but of their unwarrantable intrusion into the Liturgy—the two first not having been introduced into the Church before the thirteenth century, and the last being the work of an unknown author, and condemned by many of the most eminent divines of the English Church. From a very early period in his clerical life he set himself to obtain some redress from this grievance. Pamphlet after pamphlet was published by him on the topic of Subscription; interview after interview took place with eminent prelates, asking for an authorized sanction of his deviation from the literal sense of these passages. Petition after petition was laid before the House of Lords entreating for the relaxation of the burden of the obligation either of subscription or of use. To these appeals the bishops, though sometimes expressing kindly sympathy, for the most part, lent a deaf ear. They refused to stir in the matter themselves. When the matter was stirred by others, they did their best to suppress the movement. One prelate there was—happily for Mr. Wodehouse his own diocesan—who threw himself with ardour into his cause, and steadily supported him in his trying position. Bishop Stanley well knew the value of Mr. Wodehouse as a man and a clergyman, and he was determined not to see him sacrificed for the holding of opinions which he well knew were consciously or unconsciously held by hundreds of clergymen, who had not the clearness of head or the uprightness of conscience to acknowledge them. On one occasion on the Bishop's appointment of Mr. Wodehouse

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It is sometimes said that the scruples of individuals cannot be taken into account in large societies, and that individual protests are of no avail against a powerful majority. In the present case it is not without importance to observe that the scruples of individuals have come to represent the feeling of the nation, and that the small minority has become an overwhelming majority. What may be the ultimate issue of the question remains to be seen. The Creed itself may be long retained as a singular and interesting monument of feelings long gone by, and of an endeavour to state great Biblical truths in the logical forms of an earlier age. But the admissions of its defenders have inflicted on its authority and on its enforced public use a blow which it can never recover; and it is not too much to hope that, whilst every care is taken not rudely to shock the associations of those who cling to it as a venerable relic of former times, and who believe it to be a bulwark of doctrines, dear to Christian hearts, the conscience of the English Church will by some means be relieved of what has long been felt to be a heavy burden, and the aspirations of Jeremy Taylor and Tillotson, of Baxter and of Arnold, will be at last fulfilled.

A. P. STANLEY.



THE POLITICS OF THE WAR: BISMARCK AND LOUIS NAPOLEON.

NAPOLEON III. has at length in plain truth "crowned the edifice" reared by his own hands. Whether that visit of the Emperor to Rheims—the city of French coronations—from the panic-stricken camp at Châlons, which was so confidently and repeatedly reported a few days ago, were due to any dim, melancholy association with this sad crowning of his work, which will to all moral certainty discrown himself, it may seem something of a conceit to suggest; but that he himself and all his very few honest supporters must see a vital connexion between his *régime* of power, his policy throughout his twenty-one years of government and his eighteen years of empire, and the sudden ruin which has now fallen upon his plans, can hardly be doubted at all. That ruin is indeed so great, and has enveloped with such awful abruptness the most restless and brilliant of the States of Europe, that it is hardly yet possible for the imagination to grasp the full significance of the events which are already all but accomplished. However stout the defence which France may still make, and however successful its results, there is no manner of doubt that if she extricates herself from this invasion without the loss of territory, even though she consents to pay an enormous fine, she will achieve much more than it is reasonable at the present juncture to expect. In any case, the result of the war

must be, for a considerable term of years, to reduce France to insignificance, to compel her to acquiesce in a situation which leaves one mighty nation on her frontier strong enough to dictate its wishes, and another—which France herself raised out of the dust—her equal, if not, for a time, her superior in military strength. Such a result—and it is a very moderate computation of the effects of events now impending—will as much revolutionize the internal relations of Europe, and introduce as marvellous changes into the theory of foreign politics, as it would revolutionize the relations of the international commerce of the world if England were suddenly sunk beneath the ocean, or the maxims of our modern military tactics, if gunpowder and all its constituents and equivalents were to be instantaneously annihilated. Yet this great ruin, enormous as it is, is strictly speaking the natural fruit of Napoleonic policy. A tragic end generally springs from a tragic beginning, and betrayal is generally the end of conspiracy. The broken armies and desolated plains of France, the spasmodic rage of Paris, the ingratitude shown to the Emperor even by his swarm of personal adherents, by whom his name is now as much as possible suppressed even in the ordinary forms of public business, are all directly chargeable on the first principle of the reconstituted empire—the deliberate destruction of all real intermediate links between the Cæsar and the mob, the manipulation of the blind favour of the ignorant masses to counteract all the historical checks and limits on the ruling power. It was this principle which made Louis Napoleon's military subordinates and war ministers so independent of everything except their master's favour, that they have been able to neglect their duty to the army, and allow corruption and incapacity to creep into every branch of the service. It was this which deprived him so completely of political supporters of worth and dignity, that in his hour of adversity there is hardly one who identifies his cause with his own, and that in the day when he seemed at least to favour constitutional government, he could find no better adviser than the adroit and supple Ollivier. It was this fundamental principle, too, which made him so anxious to court the favour of a wide-spread, but ignorant, popular feeling, that he undertook this ruinous war against his own great axiom of the right of great races to find a full satisfaction for their national feelings in the organization of their political life. It was this necessity for the favour of the plebs, finally, which rendered him so chary of applying his own law of conscription, that his great army for the invasion of Prussia turned out to be considerably less than half that which has been brought against him, and hardly much more than half what he had persuaded himself, by paper returns, that it ought to be. The Cæsarist principle of obtaining support for an individual ruler by

playing the favour of a "residuum" against the opinions of better educated classes, could not but breed, and has bred, unscrupulous negligence and corruption in the depositories of this personal power, while it has also driven the lonely ruler, thus surrounded not by advisers but by creatures, into a policy which was contrary to the dictates of his own highest intelligence, and which needed the ablest possible assistance to give it even a chance of success. The initial violence and treachery which laid waste, as it were, the whole political world between the throne and the peasantry, leaving the Emperor to interpret or guess their wishes as he could, and to attempt to carry them out at a risk far greater than that of any ordinary leap in the dark, have inevitably led, first to the groping, blind-man's-buff character of the policy of the last ten years, and then to the steady deterioration in the administrative organization by which any policy must be carried out. It was the Emperor's necessity to play at hazard for a stroke which might win the affections of the French people, and his still harder necessity to follow up his chance when he supposed he had found it, by the help of men bound to him only by selfish interests, the richest veins of which they had already completely worked out. And now the end of the tragedy seems likely to be as awful and abrupt as its beginning; and to those who can feel for the genius of France, even while they are thoroughly repelled by the vanity and selfishness of the popular French foreign policy, the day of reckoning is not the less painful, that it is the natural issue of an empire guaranteed by ignorance and founded in blood.

In some very real sense we must also admit that Prussia, leading and founding the great German empire of the future, has also in the great events of the last month been "crowning the edifice," the foundation of which was laid, as Mr. Carlyle (who may sing his *nunc dimittis* whenever the treaty of peace is concluded) long ago pointed out, in the drill-sergeant policy of the great house of Hohenzollern; and the key-stone of which was put in by the pertinacity, energy, intelligence, loyalty, and craft of the great Prussian minister, Count Bismarck. William I. is now reaping what he and those of his forefathers, from whom he inherited his indomitable purpose of building up a great Prussian army, even against the will of his people, had sown; and Count Bismarck is reaping what he too sowed when he declared at the very beginning of his public life that German individualism and liberalism needed compression under the iron sway of Prussia, before it could become anything but a rarefied and elastic gas; and that "Germany" ought not to be substituted, in any patriotic heart, for "Prussia," till Prussia had obtained so decisive an ascendency for her specific institutions and character, that Germany should have fairly recognised in her the guiding head and the

protecting arm of the German Fatherland. King William and Count Bismarck are both crowning their edifice. King William may soon be gathering in all that an army of splendid material, more splendid organization, and most splendid achievements, can bring him—and an army, we may observe, may easily bring dangerous gifts to an ambitious ruler and people. Count Bismarck, again, may soon be gathering in all that a policy of far-sighted determination to Prussianize Germany, in order that Germany might become a Power and not a thought, and tolerably unscrupulous in its choice of means, might fairly expect—namely, a mighty and united empire, partly controlling, but more controlled by, a powerful military caste, and led by a great and daring but narrow-thoughted administration, which has postponed a wise home policy to a dazzling foreign policy, and is by no means on a general level with the intelligence of the nation.

For the purpose of forming any estimate of the political relations of France and Germany, especially as they affect the policy of the ascendant power, it may be well to take a brief review of the history which led to this great conflict, and which must more or less determine the form of the issue. The public influence of Count Bismarck dates pretty nearly from his diplomatic mission to the Frankfort Bund, where he first acquired that reputation for a certain Napoleonic element in his conservatism, which he has since developed till it seems likely to devour the parent from which it sprang. And, in fact, Count Bismarck has always been thus far Napoleonic, that he has always disbelieved in popular government, and has always held with the French Emperor, that a brilliant foreign policy is the best means to cover a rather stern and unpopular policy at home. His ministry of education is, up to this day, the disgrace of Prussia. The inequalities in the penal code, reforms in which are urgently needed, would lash the Liberals of an English Parliament into wrathful agitation. To these matters the great foreign minister does not feel any inclination to give much attention. When a political adversary points out the grievous offences of the Law against justice and Christian principle, Count Bismarck replies that, to draw elaborate public attention to such shortcomings in the Law, is more "clever than beneficial."* His earliest and his latest speeches alike show that he is bent on building up the external power of Prussia—or rather, of a Prussianized Germany; and that Liberalism, with its cries for internal reforms, is odious to him, less on account of its specific complaints than of the effect they necessarily have in weakening the central Government—the organ of the nation. Accordingly, at Frankfort his first great demand was for such a union between Austria and Prussia as should make the Bund a power in Europe, and

* See his speech on the Jew Question, 15th June, 1847.

overrule the cavils of the smaller German States. Failing that—for Austria, in her jealousy of Prussia, always counteracted instead of strengthening Prussia's hands,—he became definitely anti-Austrian, and openly declared against the policy then dominant in Prussia, which sought to sustain Austria against the French and Italian arms in 1859. This was the cause of his recall from Frankfort, whence he was sent to St. Petersburg. Of course Count Bismarck was also (incidentally) in favour of the development of Italian unity and nationality; but this was to him a very secondary point indeed. It was that irrevocable determination of his, that as Germany could never be united under Prussian lead till the Austrian influence in the Bund was annihilated, Austria should either follow Prussia's lead or its "centre of gravity be pushed back towards Pesth," which, from the time he became First Minister in 1862, really determined the whole drift of his policy. He even did his best to gain Liberal support for that policy; but as the one condition of that support was believed by the King and by the colleagues whom he himself most trusted, to involve a blow at the strength of the army, and the Prussian army was the backbone of the Prussian and therefore of the German foreign policy, Bismarck was compelled to withdraw budget after budget—contenting himself, however, with deprecating a "too tragical" interpretation of the conflict, and always assuring his opponents that, if they would give up their opposition to the army organization, he was only too willing, on other matters, to meet them half-way. He did not exactly hate Liberalism for its own sake; he hardly cared about many of its creeds at all. What he did hate was any waste of central power, any loss of national strength, for the erection of a great German polity under Prussia's guidance. He could never dwell too much on the Napoleonic principle, that Liberalism cannot itself govern but at most only suggest to Governments what to avoid. "The God of battles," he said in 1849, "must before long decide between the two principles" (of mob-government and the right of the powers that be), "by casting the iron dice;" and, for his part, he was for the strong, the settled Government, *because* it was strong and settled. In a letter written in 1859, again, he declares, "I see in our relations to the Bund a short-coming of Prussia's, which, sooner or later, we must heal, *ferro et igni*" (by steel and fire). And again, in 1862, when deprecating too tragical a view of the conflict between the Chamber of Deputies and the Government, he said in the House, "Germany does not rest upon Prussia's Liberalism, but on her Might. Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden may treat themselves to Liberalism, but on that very account no one will advise them to play Prussia's part. Prussia must hold her power in reserve for the favourable moment, which more than once has

been allowed to pass. Prussia's present boundaries are not favourable to the health of the body politic. *Not through speeches and votes of the majority are the great questions of the time decided—that was the blunder of* 1848 *and* 1849—*but by steel and blood.*" Through the whole of Count Bismarck's life and administration there runs this one great idea of subordinating everything to the creation of a German State of which Prussia should be the brain and arm, and which should take a grand part in the politics of Europe. For this end he brought on the Danish war in 1864, without caring much for the grievances of individual Germans in Schleswig—grievances at which he was disposed in private rather to laugh. "The Duchies," he wrote in May, 1864, "have hitherto accustomed themselves to the part of the spoiled child of the German family, and to the notion that we ought gladly to offer ourselves up on the altar of their Particularism, and stake the existence of Prussia on behalf of every individual German in the North of Schleswig . . . . *Were but our nation seized by so strong a fit of Prussian ambition that the Government need no longer stimulate, but rather restrain, their zeal, I, for my part, should not at all regret it.*" Certainly not; and there has been no sign of any desire at all on the part of Count Bismarck to give back to Denmark even that admittedly Danish strip of Schleswig, which Prussia undertook provisionally to surrender. What Prussia took she keeps. The Prime Minister wishes to stimulate rather than to restrain her ambition. The Danish war of 1864 not only gained much new strength for the then unpopular Bismarck Administration, but proved to Germany how much better fitted was Prussia to represent North Germany than Austria; showed her, moreover, as the real moving power in the war, and enabled her to measure herself accurately against Austria in military power. When Austria still continued to be the dividing principle in the Bund, and showed Prussia that by dint of playing on the jealousy felt by the minor States for the growing power of the North, she could always outvote Prussia, the moment for war came; and Prussia proved the immense strength of the military system which Count Bismarck had incurred so much enmity to defend, by the short but decisive campaign of 1866.

And with that war came, naturally enough, the first great breach with Napoleon, who saw, to his dismay, that the principle he had applied to the affairs of Italy, and which even in Italy had proved itself too strong for the limits which his self-interest wished to impose, was winning its way under a student of his method, a student in many respects the superior of the master, on another and more exposed border of France. He knew thoroughly the petty French jealousy of the new Italy which had already won for his successful

and original foreign policy so great an unpopularity at home. He knew that a Prussian Germany was capable of becoming much more than a rival to France in power. He knew that his own popularity depended on his satisfying France that she remained the first power in Western Europe, and that, failing such popularity, there would be no spontaneous rallying of the French nation round his throne; and so began those secret negotiations between Count Bismarck and Napoleon of which we have recently had such contradictory accounts. In such a labyrinth of diplomatic falsehood it is not very easy to pick one's way. But it is fair to assume, what Count Bismarck has never denied,—what indeed, implicitly, he may be said to have conceded,—that, without acceding of course officially to the French assumption that France must have territorial compensation for the increased power of Prussia, he did express his own *personal* inclination to assist or connive at the aggrandisement of France so far as it could be accomplished at the expense of French-speaking countries alone. Count Bismarck himself says, "For the sake of peace I kept the secret, and *treated the propositions in a dilatory manner;*" that is, we suppose, hesitated, half approved, and asked time to consider. Again, he says, "The different phases of French discontentment and warlike inclinations which we experienced from 1866 up to the Belgian Railway question, *coincided with the inclination or reluctance the French agents expected to meet with on my part regarding these negotiations.*" How could they, on Count Bismarck's own admission, have "expected to meet with inclination" on his part to these propositions, if he had not, from time to time, freely expressed private inclinations in their favour, as the French agents so uniformly assert? I confess that the following statement of M. de Béhaine, the French Minister, respecting a suggestion of Count Bismarck's, made at Brunn, immediately after Sadowa,—a statement never denied by Count Bismarck,—carries with it to my mind complete internal evidence of truth:—

"Count Bismarck told him [M. de Béhaine] that the course of France was clear: the French Government should go to the King of Belgium and explain, that the inevitable increase of Prussian territory and influence was most disquieting to their security, and that the sole means of avoiding these dangerous issues would be to unite the destinies of Belgium and France, by bonds so close that the Belgian monarchy,—whose autonomy would, however, be respected,—would become, in the north, a real bulwark of safety for France."

When we consider that this was precisely Count Bismarck's own method of treating the South German States, Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden, after Sadowa, the suggestion seems to have every sign of authenticity. We feel, no doubt, that what Count

Bismarck really did during the four years of secret negotiation was to encourage *personally* every aggrandisement that France could make at the expense of French-speaking populations, but to hang back, either pleading his master's reluctance, or his own unwillingness to incur, on behalf of Prussia, great military obligations, whenever an alliance was pressed upon him. Count Bismarck speaks of the French diplomatists never having ceased "to lead him into temptation." As no offers favourable to Prussia are ever reported, and all the negotiations which he treated so dilatorily seem to have had for their object the appeasing of the French national envy, we should rather infer that the tenor of the negotiations would be better described by saying that he himself had never ceased, not exactly to lead France into temptation, but to prevent her "deliverance from evil."

As to the immediate occasion rather than the cause of the war, the Hohenzollern candidature in Spain, it is difficult not to believe that Count Bismarck found his war preparations to be complete, was eager for some further impulse towards the unification of North Germany, thought the time ripe, and counting on the vanity of France, and the dependence of the Emperor on the popular opinion, believed that he could force a declaration of war on the Emperor's part, by allowing the king to sanction a candidature for the throne of Spain, which, according to the French diplomatists, he had more than a year before declared his intention to disallow. That as far as regards the attitudes of the two nations, Germany was acting on the defensive and simply defending her threatened soil and honour, while France was committing an act of gross aggression, it is utterly impossible to deny. But no one who studies Count Bismarck's career, and observes the little scruple he has ever displayed in using a brilliant foreign policy to help him out with his difficulties at home, will doubt that he would not have hesitated to precipitate a war (which he may have thought sooner or later inevitable), and which, in its relation to German internal divisions, he must have known to be opportune. The same international etiquette which induced England to refuse the Greek throne for Prince Alfred, certainly should have induced Prussia to refuse the Spanish throne for the Prince of Hohenzollern, and at all events Count Bismarck well knew that the result of permitting that candidature would be, however idle the vanity of the French nation which so willed it, the precipitation of the contest. France was nationally guilty of the war, for it was her jealousy, her vehement resolve to be the first power in Europe, which made the Emperor think a war on such an issue—and a war, the express object of which was in direct contradiction of the foreign policy he had initiated—necessary to his

dynasty and even to the stability of his throne. Still it is hardly possible to doubt that Count Bismarck pulled the strings which brought back the imperial challenge, and that in doing so, he well knew the true superiority of Germany in the field, for nothing has been more remarkable than the admirable secret information of Prussia, and the negligence shown by France to all such precautions. While then, nationally, Germany, in this great war, has simply accepted a contest forced upon her by the jealousy of France, diplomatically Count Bismarck seems only *less* responsible for the appeal to arms than the Emperor himself. He knew the enthusiasm with which Germany would respond to the challenge; he knew how the common struggle would erase the small jealousies of the petty States and create a common pride in each other such as would fuse them into one; he knew how Prussia would justify her great position as leader, and how her king and her generals and her statesmen would become in a few days the common property and glory of those very States of which they had so recently been held the worst enemies; and he was not willing to run the risk that the hesitating Emperor might after all shrink from the dangers before him; and so he forced his hand. And assuredly he has had his reward. Germany has responded to the challenge of France with a noble forgetfulness of all the political jealousies and animosities which divided German from German, and a burst of patriotic feeling, hardly paralleled in history. Prussia has ceased to be, or rather has merged herself in Germany, under the very conditions which the great Prussian statesman, who has brought all this about, ventured to hope for, eleven years ago, when he wrote, "*I would not wish to see the word 'German' inscribed on our standards in the place of the word 'Prussian,' until we are bound in a closer and a better-considered union with our other countrymen than we are at present.*" And yet surely the political finesse which first amused the Emperor for so many years with hopes of an unworthy alliance, and then precipitated the strife without incurring any nominal responsibility, falls far short of the worth of the great nation on behalf of which it was exercised, and derogates greatly from the grandeur of the political victory. Had Count Bismarck from the first told the Emperor simply that Germany would not cede a single square mile of German territory, and that he at least could be no party to any scheme for disturbing the quiet of other countries in order to obtain reprisals for France, and so tranquilly awaited the threatened declaration of war, without intrigue and without evasion, his attitude would have been wholly worthy of the great people whom he represents, and his victory would have been no less complete. As it is, the part played by Count Bismarck in this, as in the Danish quarrel, gives reason to

fear that just as a dangerous indirectness of purpose has been displayed in *evoking* this grand outburst of German patriotism, a still more dangerous indirectness of purpose may be displayed in turning it presently to political account.

One sees at once why Count Bismarck's semi-Napoleonism has worked to so much better a result, and even shown glimpses of so much nobler an aim than the doctrines of the clever ruler who has just flung the die only to lose the game. In the first place Bismarck never worked for *himself*, but for a master with whom, whether in days of political popularity or the reverse, the Prussian people have always felt themselves identified by long traditions and a thoroughly national attachment. Louis Napoleon worked for himself alone, and even in his appeal to the national pride taken in the name distinguished by his uncle's great achievements, he was well aware that he appealed far less to the affections of the French nation than to its vanity. Bismarck expressed admirably his own sense of the real power of the Prussian throne when he said in 1866, "No sovereign, no minister, no government can gain the favour of the Prussian individualists; but they cry from their very hearts, 'Long live the king!' and they obey when the king commands." Bismarck, then, in his semi-absolutism, has always been holding fast by a real Prussian loyalty, which no political logic has rooted out of the Prussian heart. Napoleon has nothing of the kind to appeal to in the French heart. There hung around his name associations of national grandeur, of gratified vanity, of safety against revolution, and that was all. Again, Bismarck in developing the Prussian army, and building up the external influence of Prussia and of a Prussianized Germany, was solving a very real and important problem, for the solution of which every German, however much he may have hated Bismarck's recipe of "steel and blood," yearned almost as much as he. Napoleon, on the contrary, had nothing to aim at but the gratification to French pride which resulted from his "tearing up" the treaties of 1814 intended to humiliate France. Even that was already accomplished as soon as a Buonaparte became the acknowledged ruler of France; and those little ornamental illustrations of his power which he gave in the annexation of Savoy and Nice could never rank for a moment as great forward steps in the progress of a great people. Consequently while what France urgently *wanted* was the development of orderly freedom at home—and this the Napoleonic theory denied her—what Germany urgently wanted was the development of an organized political unity binding together her various parts, and this Bismarck's Napoleonism gave her. The Napoleonic foreign policy which, in relation to France, had it even been successful, would have been a mere display

of fireworks, gratifying to French *amour propre*, was, in relation to Germany, a condition of united existence. Then, again, Germany had already, even in excess, that individual and intellectual freedom to which Bismarck's policy was incidentally hostile. France has never had, and needs more than she needs any other gift, that sense of individual and intellectual freedom which of all things Napoleonism most deprecated for her. Once more Louis Napoleon, even in choosing the *instruments* of his policy, had to choose *adventurers*, had no sort of aid from either aristocracy or caste. Bismarck, in choosing the instruments of his policy, had all the aid that a hard-working royal family and an aristocracy trained to military thoroughness under it, could give him—and it was no trifling help. Finally, the new Napoleonic *régime* in France began in an act which excited the most bitter feelings of political revenge in all those from whose aid Napoleon could have gained most; Bismarck's rough *régime* began without tragedy, and never incurred any worse reproach than that of a cynical consistency in depreciating freedom and exalting force. We need not wonder then that the German pupil has beaten the French master. In Germany there was a certain amount of legitimate field for a doctrine magnifying centralized power at home, and a foreign policy soothing to the national pride; while in France the application of that doctrine was the application of a subtle poison.

And now, what are the dangers in store for Europe, when the event which seems only too probable has come, and Germany finds it in her power, except so far as she is limited by the feeling of Europe, to dictate the terms of peace to France? It is no matter of surprise that after fighting a noble defensive battle for German unity, and finding themselves so unexpectedly powerful that France is, within a month from the declaration of war, convulsed by invasion and the fear of revolution from end to end, the Germans should everywhere be crying out that peace should not be made without tearing from France the old German possessions of Alsace and Lorraine, as well as demanding indemnity for the war. Of course there is an obvious moral paradox in a people who have asked so long for national unity, now asking as a result of their greatest struggle to have incorporated with them provinces utterly alien in feeling, genius, and national aspirations, on the ground of sheer conquest; for that they belonged to Germany from two hundred to three hundred years ago has practically no bearing at all on the disposition of their present inhabitants, which is, indeed, but too well known to be even savagely hostile to the proposed incorporation. But a great people, which has made a vast sacrifice for the sake of unity and independence, will naturally ask first, not "what is most just?" but "what is most

glorious, and what will secure us best from the necessity for such stern work in future?" Nor can any one wonder that in such a moment of excitement the German press, never over wise in a political sense, always a little tending to light-headedness and an effervescent enthusiasm, should cry aloud for most drastic measures for the humiliation of France. The real matter for consideration is, what will the rulers and the statesmen say in this probable emergency? Will they stimulate or will they restrain the passionate popular ambition? Will they tell the Germans that their great self-sacrifices will make them twice as strong if they add to the heroism of battle the heroism of self-restraint?—that a united Germany which has achieved such deeds will be far more invulnerable and terrible in future, if it does *not* weaken itself with the self-imposed task of subjugating a hostile people? Or will the great leaders of Germany, the princes and the statesmen who have prepared this great victory, stimulate instead of restraining its ambition, as Count Bismarck admitted that he would willingly have stimulated rather than restrained the ambition of Prussia for the acquisition of the Danish Duchies? It is only fair to the great Prussian statesman to admit that it was he who moderated the demands of Prussia after the defeat of Austria in 1866, and who fought *not* for, but against the *exalté* ideas even of his royal master. By his own admission, however, his motives for moderation then were the hostile attitude of France, which he did not desire to irritate into immediate action, and the pestilence which threatened his victorious army in a Bohemian or Hungarian August; and there was, too, in that case, perhaps, no great room for higher motives. At least, the annexations in dispute were matters rather of policy than principle—annexations which, had they taken place, would not have injured any *national* feeling, though they would have excited the fiercest external jealousies. *Now*, however, that Count Bismarck has met and conquered the great foe whom then he most feared, there is no equally good guarantee for his moderation. In his treatment of the Schleswig question he openly professed that he took far more account of the effect on the position of Germany as a great European State, than of the grievances which gave him the excuse or opportunity for war, the grievances of the Germans in the Duchies. Of that matter he seems to have taken no very different view on his side from that of Denmark on hers. She asked, what policy will most add to the strength of Denmark? He asked, what policy will most add to the strength of Prussia? And all the rest was *pretext*. So, we suspect, it will be again. The great German statesman will not ask himself many questions about the justice of annexing French provinces to Germany, when he has the power. But he will ask himself many questions as to its expediency; as to

its effect on the France of the future; as to its effect on the neutral States of Europe; as to its effect on the development of German unity; as to its effect on the individualism of German liberty. As he said after Sadowa, "One must remember that one has neighbours, and not look only at the little speck of country under one's nose." At the same time the "neighbours" are likely to be much less formidable now than then. Bismarck will not be insensible to the too evidently rising cry for annexations in Germany. He will not be insensible to the sobering effect of insubordinate and hostile dependencies on the democratic spirit—both as requiring a more efficient military organization to keep them down, and as involving the logical sacrifice of many of the theoretic principles of liberty on the part of those who would justify the conquest. He will not feel the moral grandeur of dealing out to France a measure of popular justice so infinitely larger than she had intended to deal out to Prussia. He will be guided by large views of policy, and by the almost physical instinct of Teutonism which is so deep in him. Napoleonism, even in its less unwholesome Bismarckian form, can ill resist the glitter of a policy of annexation.

Both for the sake of the great nation which, after twenty years of petting and degradation, is suffering as much for the sins of her ruler as for her own, and for the sake of the still greater nation which is at one and the same time emerging into political unity, and assuming the place of honour in Europe, I cannot but wish that it were a less Napoleonic politician who has struck Napoleon from his place, and earned the right to determine in a great degree the destinies of Europe. The signal defeat of the wicked and ostentatious French invasion of Germany has been a great act. "The proud are robbed; they have slept their sleep; and all the men whose hands were mighty have found nothing." I wish I could see in the statesman who has effected this, the temper "to restrain the spirit of princes," and rebuke the fierceness of that patriotism to whose courage he has not appealed in vain.

R. H. HUTTON.

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE DISESTABLISHED CHURCH OF IRELAND.

THE constitution of the disestablished "Church of Ireland"* should possess all the interest which can be derived from fellow-feeling in the hearts of English Churchmen. The same measure which has been meted out to Ireland will doubtless be extended to England also in due time: the Irish Church Act, the most important passed since the Revolution, will not fail of its logical consequences. A high dignitary of the English Church, whilst expressing gratitude for health partially restored, is said to have wished that the boon were so far completed that he might survive to see how the sister-communion, liberated from State control, would deal with the Prayer-Book. That the Book of Common Prayer must be revised and remodelled in many points is clear to all who do not shut their eyes to avoid perceiving. Its illogical comprehensiveness renders it unfit for a communion which will have to depend on internal coherence, instead of on external pressure: its very excellences, as the expression of the wider national, must be considered defects when it comes to be the expression of the narrower sectarian, mind. Let no one be offended at this statement. The Church of the nation must narrow itself and its standards when it ceases to be that, and

* So called by Act of Parliament.

becomes the choice of only part of the nation. The Articles, too, will hardly be retained in their present shape, for the sake of a protest against Romish error, so loosely and inaccurately worded that it utterly fails in excluding Romish errors from the English Church. The compromise between mediæval divinity and modern thought which characterises our formularies, will cease to satisfy when external pressure is withdrawn; and the example of the Irish Church must be useful, whether as a guide or as a warning, to the English Church in the approaching revolution. The constitution, too, of a Church not gradually formed by inward growth, but suddenly called into existence by the wrench which separated the State from a definite profession of Christianity; the terms of membership, no longer coinciding with the extent of the nation; the form of government, nominally episcopal in times past, and hardly likely to be more than nominally episcopal in times to come; in a word, the whole of doctrine, discipline, and worship, besides the vital question of maintenance, all are brought up for resettlement in Ireland, and the solution there arrived at will be fraught with instruction or with warning.

For these or similar reasons the conductors of this journal have thought that a paper, giving a brief account of what has actually been done up to this date in Ireland to reorganize the Church might not be without use and interest; and for giving such an account the present writer is so far qualified as membership of the different bodies which have been at work on the constitution of the Irish Church—the Provincial Synods of last autumn, the Organizing Committee, and the General Convention—can make him.

It might have seemed that no time should have been lost, after the passing of the Irish Church Act in July, 1869, in taking the steps necessitated by that measure. Eighteen months were no long period in which to re-create a Church, to give internal cohesion to its disunited elements, to settle its constitution, and to provide for its wants. But the authorities of the Church seemed paralyzed by the blow. More than six weeks elapsed before anything was done; and what was then done was done in a way the least adapted to the times. Every Churchman in England is alive to the demerits of Convocation, to its inadequate representation of the working clergy, and its absolute exclusion of the laity. So long as the English Church is established, the latter defect is supplied after a fashion by Parliament; but in Ireland the disruption from the State, which was virtually consummated, made this defect intolerable. The Irish Convocation had not even the merit of antiquity; it originated in the wish of the pedantic James I. to model the Irish Church upon the fashion of the English. Yet this

was the engine with which the two Irish archbishops deemed it best to begin the work. The two Provincial Synods of Armagh and Dublin, answering to the Convocations of York and Canterbury, met on the summons of the archbishops in the chapter-room of St. Patrick's, Dublin, on the 14th of September, 1869. Clumsy and inefficient as was this assembly, its first act ought to have dispelled all laic jealousy. A preamble moved by Dr. Lee, Archdeacon of Dublin, in which he attempted to limit considerations of doctrine and discipline to the clergy in the future Synods of the Church, was negatived without a division; indeed, it was not even taken into consideration. The next step was equally important. All *ex-officio* membership was excluded from the future Synod or Convention. No dean or archdeacon was to sit in it, unless he were elected like any other clergyman; whilst every priest of five years' standing was allowed the franchise, and the proportion to be elected was fixed at one in ten—a proportion too large for convenience.

The proceedings of the Convocation, of which I have specified the chief, were throughout embarrassed by the unclearness of mind of some of its highest dignitaries. Was Convocation simply remodelling itself? or was it providing for something else? Was the future Convention merely an improved Convocation with a lay element admitted into it by favour, or was it something radically different? To the present writer the latter of these alternatives seemed the true one; the authorities evidently tried hard to believe, and to make others believe, the former. Probably their idea was to settle for the laity the terms on which they were to be admitted; to prescribe to them their numbers and the subjects on which they should be allowed a voice and vote. But the great bulk of the assembly thought differently, and declined attempting what they felt to be beyond their powers. The very attempt, however, though that attempt were rather hinted than expressed, left a rankling jealousy in the bosoms of many laymen, which ought to have melted away before the generous determination with which the immense majority of the assembly refused even to entertain any such proposition. The fixing of all matters connected with the laic part of the future Convention was left absolutely to a Lay Conference, to be convened for the purpose of making the requisite arrangements.

But here, again, delay wrought mischief. The Lay Conference might have been at once convened, before the impression produced by the liberality of the clergy had evaporated. Instead of this, six weeks more were allowed to elapse before it met. This Conference was elected as follows: each parish sent up one or more representatives to a Diocesan Conference, and each Diocesan Conference elected a certain number of their body to represent them in the

General Conference. As the clergy had chosen to be represented by one in ten, the laity determined to be represented by one in five; resolving, however, that the mixed assembly, when it met, should vote by orders, the clergy apart from the laity, on the requisition of any three members of either order, so as to prevent the clergy from being swamped by mere numbers. Thus the very force in which the laity chose to appear, not merely made the assembly unwieldy and unfit for business, but introduced an element of disunion and separation. The laity overreached themselves, and lost power by the very means by which they aimed at gaining it in the Convention.

Four months had been sacrificed to these preliminaries before the election to the General Convention at length took place: four precious months, during which questions had arisen and jealousies had been engendered which might never have existed had the authorities acted on the precedent afforded by the Conference convened in the spring of 1869, to utter an ineffectual protest against the passing of the Irish Church Act. That assemblage had consisted of clergy and laity in equal parts; no discord had then existed; no suspicion had been felt; the whole Church would have at once acquiesced in this arrangement had the archbishops dispensed with the pedantry of a separate Clerical Convocation: but the separate meeting of the clergy and laity, and that too at distant intervals, produced a tension of mind between them which is often observable when parties interested in each other's movements are kept asunder. And this feeling was unfortunately intensified by another circumstance.

Between the meeting of the Clerical Convocation in September, and the Lay Conference in October, the bishops assembled at the Primate's lodgings in Dublin, and resolved that no act of the General Convention should be deemed valid without their concurrence. This assertion of their right to an absolute veto, though they themselves deemed it only the natural development of their right to a separate vote, without which their part in its proceedings would have been merely that of advisers, roused the most violent indignation in many of the laity. The Irish Church Act provides that any body to represent the Church and receive incorporation for the purpose of holding funds and administering trusts on her behalf, must be appointed "by the bishops, and the clergy and laity in communion with them." Without the concurrence of the bishops nothing can be done. They are "masters of the situation." The formulated claim of an absolute veto thus became unnecessary and ungenerous: unnecessary, because the Church Act secured their powers; ungenerous, because the claim seemed made in reliance on that detested Act. The previous conduct of the bishops made their present self-assertion still more odious. Whilst the existence of the Establishment was being threatened in

1868, they had done nothing to obviate the danger; even in February, 1869, just before the introduction of the fatal Bill, they had issued a manifesto in which they expressly abdicated the leadership, professing that it was not for them even to suggest what steps the laity should take. But now that their position was secured by the very Act they had shown so little energy in opposing, they were the first to assert the powers it conferred on them as against the laity, and to show that though incapable of leading, they were not incapable of obstructing. Let it be understood that the present writer does not endorse these sentiments. But to mention their existence is necessary for historic truth and for the comprehension of what follows.

Before the General Convention should meet, it was determined that a committee, composed of all the bishops and of two clerical and two lay representatives from every united diocese, forty-eight in all, should draw up the draft of a constitution, to be laid before the general body as a Bill is laid before Parliament. This "Organizing Committee" met on January 5, 1870. Its first act was to associate with itself, for advising, not for voting, certain eminent lawyers, distinguished for their attachment to the Church; the opinions of these persons exercised, as was natural, great influence. Without any regular decision to that effect, the bishops sat and voted on equal terms with the other members; and some of the most respected of them were often in the minority. Yet they must have been satisfied with the extent to which they influenced the deliberations of the Committee on the whole; and might have learned that the separate vote or veto of the episcopal bench in the Convention had more theoretical than practical importance. The proceedings of the Committee were confidential; and the secret was so religiously preserved that nothing leaked out till the draft constitution was published, two weeks before the Convention met. Perhaps this secrecy contributed to throw suspicion on its doings; perhaps, by emancipating them from the direct influence of the press, it made them less conformable to public feeling. Yet it is hard to conceive how deliberations embracing such a sweep of subjects could have been carried on in a few weeks to such a symmetrical and masterly result, had they been disturbed by the comments of writers whose exclusion from the Committee predisposed them to criticize with jealousy.

Having given this sketch of the method of procedure up to the meeting of the Convention, on February 15, we shall now state the chief points, first, in the constitution and working of the General Convention; and afterwards in the constitution of the Irish Church, as settled by that body.

The Organizing Committee had intended that the three orders—

bishops, clergy, and laity—should usually sit and deliberate together in the Convention. But they had made provision for the bishops transacting business as a separate House; and had arranged that the representatives might also break up into separate bodies, lay and clerical, for occasional deliberation. This provision was forthwith swept away by the Convention; the only approach to it left being that the bishops retained the designation of a separate House, and a separate vote, when they chose to vote, subsequent to the declaration of the votes of the representatives; and were even allowed to reserve this vote to the next day's sitting, so as to gain time for calm consideration apart from the pressure and excitement of a crowd. But no business could be transacted in their absence: joint deliberation was to be the rule. If the bishops declined to vote, their approbation was assumed. This was intended to relieve them from the possibly painful necessity of recording an explicit approval in every case in which they might only think it imprudent to dissent from the general wish. This tacit approbation became the rule; during seven weeks the bishops never once recorded an explicit vote.

The votes of the representatives were to be taken conjointly, unless ten members of either order furnished a written requisition, signed with their names, for a separate vote, in which case a majority of each order was of course required to pass a measure. It is remarkable that, though the "vote by orders" was conceded by the laity to protect the clergy, who are only half their number in the Convention, it was first demanded not by the clergy but by the laity; and that of sixteen divisions by orders only five were called for by the clergy.

The quorum of the Convention had been fixed by the Organizing Committee at two bishops, twenty clerical and forty lay delegates. This provision was absurd, so far as regards the episcopal quorum; inasmuch as it would have made the bishop who happened to be in the chair, when only two were present, absolute master by his casting vote. It was at once altered to three bishops, fifty clerical and a hundred lay delegates. A quorum too large; for when the first interest evaporated, it was difficult to secure the attendance of a hundred laymen; and the Convention was sometimes counted out. A clerical quorum was never wanting.

Another significant change was made in the powers of the President. The Organizing Committee had decreed that the Primate, or other presiding bishop, might take part in the discussions without leaving the chair. This provision was found so objectionable, that it was at once reversed by the Convention without a division.

The episcopal veto had been accepted by the Committee in all its stringency; so that, as we have seen, a single bishop, two being a

quorum, might negative the unanimous wishes of all the representatives. But on the suggestion of the Duke of Abercorn, a compromise was adopted, whereby a majority, not of the bishops present only, even though there might be a quorum, but of the whole episcopal bench, that majority being present and voting, is requisite to invalidate the votes of the representatives.

After thus settling its own constitution and mode of acting, the Convention proceeded to adopt a preamble and declaration to head the constitution of the Church. It runs in the name of "the archbishops and bishops of this the ancient Catholic and Apostolic Church of Ireland, together with the representatives of the clergy and laity of the same, in General Convention assembled," and embraces the following points:—

1. Belief in all Canonical Scripture, not only as containing all things necessary to salvation, but also as inspired, thus going beyond the Sixth Article.

2. Maintenance of the three orders in the ministry, who are described as "bishops, *priests or presbyters*, and deacons."

3. Reaffirmation of the principles and protests of the Reformation.

4. Acceptance of the Thirty-nine Articles and Book of Common Prayer, subject to such alterations as may be made in them by the lawful authority of the Church. An important definition, setting the Church in its true place, above its formularies, in contradistinction to the acts of some colonial churches, which have debarred themselves this privilege of independence.

5. A profession of communion with the Church of England and all other churches agreeing in the fore-mentioned principles; and finally—

6. A declaration that the supreme power in the Church vests not in the Episcopate, but in a General Synod, consisting of the bishops and of representatives of the clergy and laity. This Synod to be the legislature, and to have besides all such administrative powers as may be necessary, and may be compatible with Episcopacy. A sweeping declaration this, and obviously capable of being very variously interpreted by different minds.

The Convention next settled the mode of election, the powers and the numbers of the General Synod, and its times of meeting. Its three orders, bishops, clergy, and laity, are divided into two "Houses:" the House of Bishops, and the House of Representatives; the latter House consisting of 208 clergymen and 416 laymen. The Draft Constitution had suggested the more manageable and business-like number of 100 clerical and 150 lay delegates; but the passion of the laity for taking part in Church government from which they had been so long excluded, carried all before it. As in the Conven-

tion, the two Houses of the General Synod are to sit and deliberate together, except when the bishops retire for private conference, which suspends the sitting. This, again, is an important change from the Draft Constitution, according to which separate deliberation was to be the rule and joint deliberation the exception; it really reduces the House of Bishops to a mere name. All clergymen in priest's orders are eligible, and all laymen twenty-one years of age and upwards, who sign a declaration that they are communicant members of the Church. None but persons in full communion, it was reasonably thought, should have the power of legislating for the Church; but, as some persons are in the habit of attending the Communion in the Church while they belong to other denominations, it was necessary to add the word "members" to the description. It might have seemed reasonable that none should have the privilege of legislating for the Church except those who were willing to tax themselves to contribute to its funds; but the Church of Ireland is hardly yet awake to a consciousness that it cannot be carried on without money; and all proposals for a pecuniary test were scouted. At present there is nothing to prevent a man becoming a member of the Supreme Legislature of the Church who has not given, nor ever intends to give, one sixpence to her support.

When elected, the representatives hold office for three years; but the Synod meets every year, the time for such meeting, and the time for holding the election, being fixed by the Synod itself. On this principle it follows that the General Convention will have to determine these particulars for the first General Synod before it is dissolved.

Three bishops, forty clergymen, and eighty laymen, constitute the quorum; but not less than five bishops are required to make a House of Bishops. The Synod, in other words, can transact business when only three bishops are present, but the bishops will in that case have no separate vote.

The original draft differed on both these points: twenty clergymen and forty laymen were to be the quorum, and the Synod was to meet only once in three years.

A very similar compromise to that which limits the episcopal vote in the Convention was adopted for the Synod. If any measure passed by a majority of the representatives be negatived by a majority of the bishops, which cannot be less than three, five being necessary to make a house, such measure, if reaffirmed at the next ordinary annual meeting of the Synod by not less than two-thirds of the representatives present, becomes law unless two-thirds of the whole bench of bishops vote against it, the said two-thirds being present and giving the reasons for their vote in writing. As at the

Convention, a refusal on the part of the bishops to vote at all is tantamount to their accepting the measure.

By the original draft, judicial powers were expressly denied to the General Synod. This important limitation was at once struck out by the Convention. The General Synod thus becomes the highest court of appeal.

In regard to legislation, the General Synod is to have full power to "alter, amend, or abrogate any act of the Convention, and any canon of the Church." But no modification is to be made in the "articles, doctrines, rites, rubrics, or formularies of the Church," except in so far as may be necessitated by the Irish Church Act, unless such modification be voted by majorities of two-thirds of each order at two successive annual sittings, the said two-thirds being present and voting, and the proposed modification or alteration having meanwhile been communicated to every Diocesan Synod in Ireland. The only exception is made in favour of alterations suggested by the "Ritual Commission," and adopted in the Church of England. Such alterations require only one decisive vote instead of two.

The General Synod is further to have the power of regulating the patronage of the Church; of controlling the Diocesan Synods; of separating or uniting provinces or dioceses with the consent of the archbishop or bishop whose jurisdiction may be involved; and, lastly, of deciding on appeals from the Diocesan Synods, as will be hereafter specified.

Finally, besides the annual ordinary meetings of the Synod, a special meeting must be summoned for the consideration of any special subject (but nothing else) on the written requisition of one-third of the members of any order in it.

It is obvious that this scheme of Church government gives the laity more power, and comes altogether much nearer to democracy, than that of any other Church or denomination in modern times.

We now come to the Diocesan Synods, which, besides electing the representatives of the Church in the General Synod, have functions of their own, standing to each diocese much in the same relation which the General Synod occupies to the whole Church.

Each Diocesan Synod consists of all the beneficed and licensed clergy of the diocese, and of not less than one nor more than two lay synodsmen for each such clergyman. The lay members must possess exactly the same qualification as in the case of the General Synod. The Synod cannot meet except on the summons and under the presidency of the bishop or his commissary; nor are its acts valid without his assent. But any act of the majority of his Synod of which he does not quite approve, and which he may nevertheless not

like to veto, the bishop is allowed to refer to the next ordinary meeting of the General Synod; and any act passed by a majority of two-thirds, and yet vetoed by the bishop, must be referred to the General Synod. Thus the General Synod becomes a court of arbitration as well as a court of appeal. The same appeal to the General Synod lies in the case of any individual who may fancy himself aggrieved by any act of the Diocesan Synod. The Diocesan Synod has the control of the temporalities of the diocese, subject to the general laws of the Church, or to the specifications of individual trusts; and it possesses also the entire power, with the consent of the Representative Body, of readjusting from time to time the boundaries of parishes and incumbencies, subject only to the life-interests and approval of those incumbents who may have been inducted before January 1, 1871. This is no doubt a most important step in the right direction. The Church has been paralyzed by the want of elasticity of the parochial system, arising from the legal doctrine concerning the nature and rights of freehold tenure. The varying exigencies of a varying population have been sacrificed to the freehold rights of incumbents. These obstacles will disappear as the present incumbents die out. It is only a pity that the readjustment of dioceses should not have been equally facilitated. No valid reason can be given why the interests of future bishops should be more jealously guarded than those of the future clergy. If the consent of incumbents inducted after January 1, 1871, be not required when the interests of the whole diocese are in question, neither ought the consent of the bishops who may be consecrated after the same date to be required when the interests of the whole Church are in question.

As the Diocesan Synods will be somewhat unwieldy bodies, in consequence of all the clergy and twice as many laymen being in them, they are allowed to delegate their functions and powers to any extent they please to Diocesan Councils, yearly to be chosen, and consisting of the bishop and of such clergy and synodsmen as each Synod shall determine. One most important function of these Councils is defined by the statutes. They are to decide what churches and glebe-houses are necessary for the Church, and therefore must be claimed by the Church Body according to the Church Act. In many places the churches have been left high and dry by the exodus of the population. In very many others the building is not conveniently situated for the wants of the parish. It is almost incredible what follies have been committed in this last respect in times past. A select body of the ablest men of each diocese is obviously better qualified to deal with such difficulties than either the Synod of the diocese, or the General Synod of the Church.*

* An attempt lately made at the Meath Diocesan Synod to limit the discretion of the Council in this matter failed.

Proceeding now to parishes and parochial organization, it is provided that in each parish there shall be a vestry, consisting of all males twenty-one years of age and upwards who are either (*a*) owners of property in the parish, though they do not live in it, or (*b*) residents in the parish, or (*c*) accustomed attendants at its church, and who shall sign a declaration that they are members (not communicants) of the Church of Ireland. Here again, no pecuniary test is required, but the Diocesan Synod may, if it likes, impose one. This will perhaps be done when experience points out its necessity. The powers of this General Vestry, which in many cases would be too cumbrous for action, are wielded by a Select Vestry, consisting of the clergy of the parish and the two churchwardens, and of not more than twelve other persons elected by the General Vestry annually. This Select Vestry has the control and charge of all parochial charity and church funds not exempted from this clause by special trusts; it has the duty of providing the requisites for Divine worship, and of keeping in repair the church and other parochial buildings. As the glebe-houses will become "parochial buildings" after the death of the present incumbents, or when by commuting they have divested themselves of their life-tenure of them, this clause is of great consequence to the comfort of the future clergy, whom it exempts from dilapidations.

The last function of the General Vestry is to elect parochial nominators, of whom more anon, and synodsmen to the Diocesan Synod, in such number and proportion as it may order.

The "Church Body," or "Representative Body of the Church," must now be explained.

The creation of this body is due to the Irish Church Act, s. 22: its constitution is likewise determined by that clause to some extent. Its chief use is to hold and administer Church property. By the terms of the Act, it must be appointed "by the bishops and the clergy and laity in communion with them." The bishops insisted on the whole bench being on it; and as the laity were determined, here as elsewhere, to have two laymen for each clergyman, the Church Body was made to consist first, of the twelve bishops, twelve clergymen, and twenty-four laymen: these last being elected severally by the clerical and lay representatives of each Diocese in the General Synod. But as it was felt that a body the election to which was thus distributed amongst the several dioceses might not adequately represent the collective financial ability of the Church, it was further provided that, when thus appointed and elected, its forty-eight members should, further, themselves coopt twelve other individuals into their number, to be chosen indifferently from clergy or laity without limitation of diocese, on the ground of special fitness

for finance. The Representative Body thus consists of a permanent and of a varying element: the permanent element being the bishops; the varying element the elected and coopted members, one-third of whom retire each year, with the privilege of being re-elected. This Body, when incorporated by the Queen, will be capable of holding property under the provisions of the Act; but this property is to be held by it subject to the full control of the General Synod, before which, on the first day of each annual meeting, it must lay a full statement of its accounts and proceedings during the previous year; and it may be further used by the Synod as a standing committee in such way as the Synod shall determine.

It was thought by many persons that a smaller body would have served the purpose better; and that four bishops, four clergymen, and four laymen, chosen one of each from each of the four ancient provinces of the Irish Church, and assisted by four coopted financiers, would have acted with a less diluted responsibility, and with greater continuity. A body of sixty cannot be expected to meet in full numbers every week; and the real power thus gets into the hands of the small quorum who regularly attend. But the bishops made the consideration of any such scheme impossible by insisting on their right to seats in the Church Body; and the jealousy of the laity helped to swell its numbers. Experience will probably set this, like other things, to rights; but experience has always to be bought.

In one most important respect the Church Body takes part in the administration of the Church. No redistribution of benefices or dioceses can take place without its consent. The reason of this is obvious. Such alterations always involve monetary transactions.

The last particular as yet determined by the General Convention is the method of appointing to benefices and bishoprics, which shall now be briefly sketched.

a. Benefices.

In each diocese a Board of Nominators is to be formed by triennial election, composed of one layman and two clergymen. In each parish the General Vestry triennially elects three parochial nominators, who must either be laymen, or if clergymen, without cure of souls. When a vacancy occurs in any benefice the Nominators of the vacant parish are to meet the Diocesan Board of Nominators, under the presidency of the bishop; and this Board of seven persons is to make the appointment. The bishop has an ordinary and a casting vote. But his ordinary vote, it is obvious, will be useless if all attend; for, if there be a division among the six nominators, it must be either three against three, four against two, or five against one; and in the first case alone will the addition of the bishop's vote have

any influence. This plan was devised for the purpose of giving the diocese and the parish equal weight in an appointment in which both have equal interest; whilst, by delegating the powers of the diocese and of the parish to a small number of persons, elected not for each occasion on which they are to act, but at once for a period of three years, the drawbacks of canvassing will be minimized. Not the least valuable part of the plan, as it seems to the present writer, is that the Board thus composed, when called into action, meets under the bishop's presidency. The great defect of the Church in Ireland, as well as England, is that the bishops are too seldom brought face to face with the wants and wishes of the people: disastrous appointments have been often made, most conscientiously, in the seclusion of the episcopal study. The new arrangement secures the Church against this evil; and, while ostensibly depriving the bishop of all patronage, it really leaves him an amount of influence which may well compensate for a power more absolute.

Here the plan adopted by the Convention is simpler and better than that of the Draft Constitution. This last settled that the nominators should be nine—six chosen by the diocese, three by the parish; and this Board of nine was to send up three names to the bishop on every vacancy of a parish, from which he was to select the future incumbent. This plan reduced the influence of the parish in each appointment to one-ninth of the whole appointing power; whilst the framers of it seem to have forgotten that in many cases it might be anything but easy to find three persons able and willing to accept the vacant post. Yet no part of the legislation of the Convention met with a more determined opposition than this; and it needed the acquiescent voice of not less than three bishops to overcome in some measure the violent expression of the Primate's dislike.

β. Bishoprics.

In arranging the method of appointing to bishoprics, the Convention reverted almost entirely to the ancient canons. From henceforth each bishop is to be elected by the Synod of his diocese. It is only when the Synod cannot fix on any one name by a decisive majority, that two names are to be sent up to the Episcopal College, one of which they must select. The single exception to this rule was made, after long debate, in the case of the primatial See of Armagh. It was thought inexpedient that the highest dignitary of the Irish Church should be appointed absolutely by the Synod of one—and that not the largest or most important—of its dioceses, and that a mere presbyter should be capable of being at once elevated to the primacy. Some of the greatest archbishops the Christian world has ever seen, *e.g.*, Athanasius, Ambrose, Chrysostom, Theodore of Canterbury, Anselm, Lanfranc, Tillotson, were simple presbyters, or even deacons, or laymen, till the

moment they were called to ascend the primatial throne of Alexandria, Milan, Constantinople, Canterbury. But the jealousy of the Bench could not recognise the facts of history, nor see that genius is often better than experience; and it was, therefore, at length determined that the Synod of Armagh should only have the choice of four of the then existing bishops, out of whom the bishops themselves should select their Primate; the vacancy thus made being filled up by one or other of two presbyters, one nominated by the Synod of Armagh, one by the Synod of the diocese from which the new Primate was promoted. Here, too, experience will decide as to the merits of a scheme which, though ingenious, is complex and uncanonical; and rests on a foundation such as one would not wish to lay.

The consideration of the Canons and Ecclesiastical Courts of the Future Church is deferred till the October session.

Before the Convention broke up, after seven weeks of the most unintermitting toil—carried on, not in a luxuriously-furnished, heated, lighted, and ventilated apartment, with every convenience for refreshment and withdrawal; but in a cold, half-underground cellar, badly lighted, and with no ventilation except that caused by draughts, the effect of which on the health of numbers of its more assiduous members was disastrous—it adopted certain resolutions on that subject which will form the touchstone of Irish Protestantism—the future maintenance of the Church. The formation of a sustentation fund was recommended, and also the formation of a separate guarantee fund, to enable the clergy, with safety to themselves, to commute their life incomes on the terms offered by the Church Act. This capitalizing of existing life interests has come to be regarded by many persons as a perpetual endowment for the future Church. This it never could be, unless either the clergy were prepared to live on half their present incomes, so as to preserve the capital intact; or the laity were prepared to guarantee to the clergy the difference. For this pupose a yearly contribution of £230,000 would be required for the next fourteen years; and of the raising of anything approaching to such a sum annually there seems not the smallest probability. Irish Protestants are indeed wealthy, they own nearly three-fourths of the land of Ireland; but they are generally either landlords or farmers, and neither of these classes is proverbial for liberality. The present writer sees no prospect of any permanent endowment. Every one thinks that others should be liberal; the laity, especially, are quite convinced in many instances that the clergy ought to make sacrifices which they themselves would under no circumstances dream of making; the writer has even heard wealthy laymen state that in their opinion it was the mere duty of the clergy

to endow the future Church of Ireland out of their own incomes, the average of those incomes being far under £300 a year. Meanwhile every one suspends his judgment with regard to what he ought to give till he sees what the Church is likely to become; and since the Convention broke up a "wretched pamphlet," to use the words of the Bishop of Killaloe, unfortunately put into the hands of a few persons in a Dublin parish, has been very successfully used for the purpose of exciting a tempest of suspicion. Men who had used the Prayer-Book all their lives before without question now find out that it will be requisite to alter it in order to exclude "Ritualism," before it will be safe to give anything to endow the Church, and the dislike to parting with money thus becomes consecrated by the name of zeal for purity of doctrine. The Sustentation Fund has not yet reached £250,000, and the largest givers to it, with three exceptions, have been some of the bishops. All this is not encouraging. Probably nothing but the stern logic of facts, as one clergyman after another dies, leaving no funds to provide for a successor, except in the hitherto unexercised liberality of the parish, will teach men that it is God's law that the Church shall be maintained, not by the clergy but by the people, or disabuse the public mind of the strange delusion that the Irish Church has been left two-thirds of its endowments, simply because the Irish Church Act respects the vested interests of its present clergy.

C. P. Reichel.

PROFESSOR HUXLEY'S LAY SERMONS.

Lay Sermons, Addresses, and Reviews. By THOMAS HENRY HUXLEY, LL.D., F.R.S. London: Macmillan & Co.

IN this volume Professor Huxley enables us to form a general judgment of the character of the teaching which he has been most solicitous to press upon public attention. Of the fourteen papers included in the volume, the greater number are pretty familiar to general readers, having for the most part appeared in one or other of the magazines or reviews. The general effect of a reperusal of them is a sufficient justification of Professor Huxley's republication. Of this one feels quite certain before beginning. But our remark points rather to what could not have been so certainly recognised, except by their simultaneous perusal, that they discover a progression of thought as to the great scientific problems of the day. The lecture to the Cambridge Young Men's Christian Association, on the philosophy of Descartes, which only a few weeks ago came under the eye of the public, and which is the last paper in the present volume, must have awakened very general interest, as showing that Professor Huxley had come now to deal, in his usual fair and manly spirit, with the conflict between mental philosophy and science. Starting with "natural knowledge," and continuing for a long time to regard this as almost exclusively knowledge of physical science, or at the most, giving only occasional side glances at purely intellectual

problems, the volume comes at the close to a broad, vigorous acknowledgment that philosophy and science must be harmonized. This only means that all the facts of human experience must be interpreted by us in any system of knowledge; that in so far as the facts of human life are similar to those of lower forms of life, this similarity is to be scientifically established and maintained; and that in so far as it is alleged that certain facts in human experience are distinct from the facts which have been scientifically established as regards other forms of life, the professed philosophy of these special facts must meet science on a border territory, to consider quietly and fairly the harmony of their teaching. Those whose main line of study is restricted to mental philosophy must hail from such a quarter the summons to confer as to the relative claims of two departments of study which have been kept too far apart. And, entering upon such a conference, mental philosophers will join with scientific men, in the common understanding that results are to be accepted only as scientifically established. As this proposed reconciliation seems to us the outstanding feature of the book, and of obvious present importance, we shall direct the main part of the present notice to the last of the articles in the volume, premising only a very few general considerations.

The volume opens with an introductory letter to Professor Tyndall, intended to serve the part of a preface. In this letter there are candid statements as to modifications of opinion, and acknowledgments which may be due for severity of language, as well as explanations which are of much value in forming a judgment of the papers as a whole. This prefatory letter is very admirable of its kind.

In so far as the discussions here republished bear upon questions of education, we believe their great importance and their inherent value will now be generally admitted. Professor Huxley and other coadjutors have had to insist frequently and loudly on the necessity for a better position being given to physical sciences in the educational arrangements of the country. And if it be only remembered by what rapid strides these sciences have risen to their present position, it will not seem wonderful that the great educational institutions of the country have found it difficult to make room at once for all the departments of scientific research which could present a fair claim for the honour. We trust, however, that not much more time will be required to secure in all the national universities a thorough representation of science. We hope the time is nearly past when there shall be occasion to repeat these words of Professor Huxley in 1868, as to the disciples of science when passing through university training:—

"Our universities not only do not encourage such men; do not offer

them positions in which it should be their highest duty to do thoroughly that which they are most capable of doing; but, as far as possible, university training shuts out of the minds of those among them, who are subjected to it, the prospect that there is anything in the world for which they are specially fitted."

Throughout this volume there is repeated evidence that Professor Huxley has been often sensible of injustice in the criticism to which he has been subjected. We incline to think there has been ample occasion for this feeling on his part; and yet it must be allowed in fairness, that his words seemed at times almost to court the criticism they awakened. He has not been very sparing in his own handling of opponents; nor was there any reason he should be; and he is, we doubt not, quite prepared to take blows at least as severe as those which are given. But every allowance being made, Professor Huxley has had anything but justice at certain turns in the current of criticism. When dealing merely with scientific truth, and stating his convictions in a reasonable manner, motives have been unfairly attributed; and, under the first hasty impressions, he has been dealt with as if his object had been to injure the foundations of our faith. It is deeply to be regretted that this has been done in the supposed interest of religion. Taking the stand-point of the critics, we can understand the earnestness they show in the matter; but it is extremely to be lamented that, in presence of scientific research, religious men so often show themselves concerned for the foundation of their belief. An unworthy sense of fear leads to an outbreak of the spirit of intolerance, as unworthy as the fear from which it springs. Whatever diversity of opinion there may be on fundamental questions, the great proportion of thoughtful religious men must join with Professor Huxley in holding that it devolves on us to do "what lies within our power to prevent the Christianity of the nineteenth century from repeating the scandal" arising from intolerance of free inquiry shown in former centuries. And, in the same spirit, it is fair to ask the leaders of scientific inquiry to exercise some restraint in the denunciation of opponents. Professor Huxley may even himself allow that it is not the most happy mode of describing the anxiety of many whom he classes with "the best minds of these days," to represent them as looking on "in such fear and powerless anger as a savage feels" during an eclipse. In this matter he may admit, what he afterwards allows as between the students of philosophy and of science, that there have been errors on both sides.

The "lay sermon," which of all his recent productions most brought down the storm of condemnation, was that on "Protoplasm, or the Physical Basis of Life." And in reference to this some interesting statements are here given. In the prefatory letter he

says, "The essay 'On the Physical Basis of Life' was intended to contain a plain and untechnical statement of one of the great tendencies of modern biological thought, accompanied by a protest from the philosophical side, against what is commonly called Materialism." This will be at once credited. It must be borne in mind that in the discourse itself, he described the materialistic position as that maintaining "that there is nothing in the world but matter, force, and necessity," and denounced it as utterly "devoid of justification." And yet, to those contemplating the discourse from the point of view afforded by mental philosophy, there seemed several statements very imperfectly guarded, if not decidedly awkward in their form. To give an example of what is meant we refer to such passages as these:—

"That *all* the multifarious and complicated activities of men are comprehensible under three categories. Either they are immediately directed towards the maintenance and development of the body, or they effect transitory changes in the relative positions of parts of the body, or they tend towards the continuance of the species. Even those *manifestations of intellect, of feeling, and of will*, which we rightly name the higher faculties, are not excluded from this classification, *inasmuch* as to every one but the subject of them, they are known only as transitory changes in the relative positions of parts of the body."

Either the term "manifestations" has a physical reference here, or the "inasmuch as" introduces a *non sequitur*. But mainly it is to be remarked, that to judge of intelligence, feeling, and will as known "to every one but the subject of them," is to shut out from consideration the only satisfactory knowledge, we might say the only real knowledge, the only knowledge which can afford scientific certainty—in order to accept an inferior type of knowledge, that is, knowledge at second hand.

This question of personal knowledge of our own intellectual operations, leads us to the ground on which we must seek the solution of the great problem to which science is clearly pressing us. Granting that all physical science is leading us to the conclusion that we have no knowledge of causes in nature; granting the correlation of forces; and admitting that the structural character of the highest animal is analogous to that of the lower animals; have we in the knowledge of our own intellectual operations, knowledge of a higher order of action than anything found in physical life? Professor Huxley recognises and plainly declares that mental philosophy must now meet science on this ground. Other scientific observers seem to be reaching the same conclusion as to the necessity for calling in mental philosophy to their aid. An example of this we have in the closing chapters of Mr. Wallace's "Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection," specially in that on the "Limits of Natural Selection as

applied to Man." Evidence of the same conviction as to the necessity for calling in the testimony of mental philosophy, is also coming from metaphysicians who are in full harmony with the scientific spirit of the times. An example of this was given in a recent number of this Review (vol. xiv. p. 636) in the able article from the pen of Mr. Martineau, in support of the position that "it is under the form of Will that we are introduced to Causality," closing with these well-timed words: "the necessity may be disguised, but can never be escaped, of interpreting the universe by man." This is a very old doctrine, calling for a modern application, under the demands of physical science.

We have experienced peculiar pleasure in the perusal of Professor Huxley's most recent paper, directly bearing on this question. No better basis for discussion could be found, than that which he has selected—Descartes' "Discourse on Method." In the whole range of philosophical literature, Professor Huxley could not have chosen a more suitable work as the basis of our reasoning. All students of mental science may not quite agree indeed as to this; and some complexity may arise from diversity of opinion between opposing schools of philosophy; but at least it will be allowed that the question to be dealt with is very thoroughly brought before us by the great father of modern philosophy.

Waiving discussion as to whether it is quite accurate to affirm that Idealism is the landing-place of modern philosophy, and Materialism that of modern physiology, we quite agree with Professor Huxley when he says that the differences of philosophy and physiology "are complementary, not antagonistic." And though some reservation may be needful, importance must be attached to the following definite statement:

> "The reconciliation of physics and metaphysics lies in the acknowledgment of faults upon both sides; in the confession by physics that all the phenomena of nature are, in their ultimate analysis, known to us as facts of consciousness; in the admission by metaphysics, that the facts of consciousness are practically interpretable only by the methods and the formulæ of physics; and, finally, in the observance by both metaphysical and physical thinkers of Descartes' maxim, assent to no proposition the matter of which is not so clear and distinct that it cannot be doubted."

Such a statement as this is of great value, specially as advanced by a distinguished representative of physical science. To the first and last of these four statements we readily assent; as to the second and third, some further consideration may be necessary, before we can pass them as being so clear and distinct that they cannot be doubted. We shall speak more particularly of what is said as to metaphysics, making no claim to be heard in exposition of physical science.

Professor Huxley, after having very clearly indicated the character of the Cartesian doubt, which was accounted by the author as the first requisite for attaining philosophic certainty, proceeds to give an outline of the earlier results reached by Descartes in the application of his chosen method. Turning to the celebrated *cogito, ergo sum*, he shows that Descartes found certainty in consciousness alone. When, however, Professor Huxley proceeds to trace "the ultimate issue of Descartes' argument," it is open to question whether he is successful. To make Descartes responsible for the doctrine that thought is existence, and existence is thought (p. 356), can hardly be allowed as legitimate by any one who remembers the Cartesian distinction between mind and matter, which, however, Professor Huxley owns to be rather a difficulty in his way (p. 370). To represent the Cartesian system as Idealism, is open to question on the same grounds.

These points may, however, be waived as of secondary importance for the present purpose. We would concentrate attention upon the doctrines of Descartes as to self-knowledge of the mind, or thinking power. This is the essential point, and the fundamental position in the Cartesian system. Professor Huxley objects that, even with his exercise of doubt, Descartes did not lay aside "self." Now, Descartes held the recognition of self to be so clear and distinct, that it could not be doubted. This is abundantly clear from passages in the Method, in the Second Meditation, and in the Responsio. Professor Veitch, in the valuable introduction to his translation of Descartes' "Discourse on Method" (p. 23), has very clearly shown this. We cannot allow, therefore, that Descartes either accounted "self" a "gossamer shirt," or "forgot" to take account of it when applying doubt as the philosophical instrument. Descartes' doubt was thorough-going; for, after having arranged for provisional self-direction, the French philosopher started with a temporary denial of everything, and, as a first step, asserted his own existence as a thinker, only because he recognised it as an indisputable fact, without the acknowledgment of which he could not proceed. If, therefore, a reconciliation of physics and metaphysics is to be sought, and if Descartes' "Discourse on Method" is to afford a basis for the attempt, it becomes needful to observe, that, according to Descartes, the first requisite for a beginning is the recognition of self-existence or personality as essential to all thought. But, awkwardly enough, considering the end in view, Professor Huxley's contribution involves a denial of what Descartes accepted as self-evident. Professor Huxley places the necessary or self-evident truth of the "Discourse on Method" in the category of "hypothetical assumptions." He even makes this contradiction of Descartes' first truth, "the ultimate

issue of Descartes' argument,"—giving to his readers, however, this warning of the fact: "It is proper for me to point out that we have left Descartes himself some way behind us." Here, then, is the first point of difficulty at which the facts to be reconciled need to be ascertained. What Descartes, as we interpret his words, accounted of unquestionable and immediate certainty, Professor Huxley regards as a certainty which we cannot "by any possibility have." In this matter, the experiential school of metaphysics will agree with Professor Huxley; and as the first difficulty in the way of reconciliation must come from the understanding which the intuitional school has of the facts to be reconciled, we venture upon the responsibility of some words of explanation. In doing so we shall regard the matter of historical accuracy in representing the views of Descartes as subordinate, as well as the classification of mental philosophers of the opposing schools, and we shall deal simply with the question whether, in point of fact, the recognition of our own existence is matter of inference or of certain knowledge.

As our end will be best served by considering Professor Huxley's view of the fact, we shall quote his statement of the case. The following extracts may suffice:—

"Neither of the existence of 'self,' nor that of 'not-self,' have we, or can we by any possibility have, any such unquestionable and immediate certainty as we have of the states of consciousness, which we consider to be their effects. They are not immediately observed facts, but results of the application of the law of causation to these facts. Strictly speaking, the existence of a 'self' and of a 'not-self' are hypotheses by which we account for the facts of consciousness. They stand on the same footing as the belief in the general trustworthiness of memory, and in the general constancy of the order of nature—as hypothetical assumptions which cannot be proved, or known with that highest degree of certainty which is given by immediate consciousness. . . . . Descartes stopped at the famous formula, 'I think, therefore I am.' But a little consideration will show this formula to be full of snares and verbal entanglements. In the first place, the 'therefore' has no business there. The 'I am' is assumed in the 'I think,' which is simply another way of saying, 'I am thinking.' And in the second place, 'I think' is not one simple proposition, but three distinct assertions rolled into one. The first of these is, 'something called I exists,' the second is, 'something called thought exists;' and the third is, 'the thought is the result of the action of the I.' Now it will be obvious to you, that the only one of these three propositions which can stand the Cartesian test of certainty is the second. It cannot be doubted, for the very doubt is an existent thought. But the first and third, whether true or not, may be doubted, and have been doubted." (Pp. 359, 360.)

From our remarks on these extracts we exclude any reference to the "not-self," as belonging to an ulterior question which cannot be discussed within the limits of the present paper. We confine attention, meanwhile, to the knowledge of "self," as dealt with in the very clear statement of Professor Huxley.

With the breaking up of Descartes' formula into three propositions we are entirely satisfied, as being logically clear and competent. When Descartes said, "I think, *therefore*, I am," we do not understand that he intended his *therefore* to have any illative force. We understand merely that in his view the one assertion involved the other—that in point of fact, we can have no knowledge of thought except with the knowledge of "self." Whether this was really Descartes' position or not, is a secondary question, as we have said; but this is the position which we wish to defend—that the knowledge of self is knowledge of certainty, and is not a hypothesis, inference, or consequent, flowing from an application of the law of causality. That this is one of the facts to be carefully considered in any attempt at reconciliation between physics and metaphysics is what we desire to show. And in endeavouring to do so, we shall deal with the three propositions involved in Descartes' formula as Professor Huxley has stated them. The formula is, "I think, therefore I am." We consent to throw out the "therefore," and we agree with Professor Huxley that the "I am" is involved in the former assertion, "I think," which is equivalent to "I am thinking." We are thus agreed that the simple fact of consciousness may be thus expressed, "I am thinking." Now this declaration, as Professor Huxley states, involves these three assertions—something called I exists; something called thought exists; and the thought is the result of the action of the I. Of these three Professor Huxley regards the second as the only certain proposition. The other two are only hypotheses, or, at the best, inferences, which have not the same certainty as the second. Let us see whether this be really the case. "I am thinking." This is the fact of consciousness. Clearly the fact cannot be expressed more briefly. The fact of which I am conscious is not merely that there is a thinking process, but that I am engaged in an exercise of thinking. Let us test it in every possible way, and this will become increasingly apparent. First, let us try it irrespective of personality. We find it impossible to express the fact of which we are conscious without some term which stands for our personality. To say simply there is a process of thinking, is not to describe the reality, but to omit a very essential feature of the fact. We have no consciousness of thought in the abstract. If we affirm that "something called thought exists," we must tell where it exists, and how we know of its existence. Pressed in this way, we must admit that the thought which we speak of is known in consciousness. And whenever you speak of consciousness, personality is once more present—I am conscious of thinking. If this thought is known to me with a certainty which cannot be doubted, it is with the same certainty known as my thought. Indeed,

if our business were to push the analysis to the furthest, and thereby attempt a complete view of the matter, we should remark that there is even a double aspect of our personality attendant on this single exercise of thought; for in being conscious of thinking, one must say, it is I who thinks, and I who am conscious of my thought. But there is no need to complicate the discussion by an exhaustive treatment of the wide question as to consciousness. Without insisting upon this double grasp which personality has over all thought,—or perhaps we should rather say, the double dependence of thought upon personality, in order that it may exist, and that it may be known as existing,—we simply urge that the thought which is known is known as my thought with exactly the same certainty as its existence is known. In fact, certainty of its existence there is none, except in so far as it is known as my thought.

Further, to test the fact, let us attempt to bring it into comparison with the thoughts of other men, which they communicate to us. It then appears that the only thought of which I am conscious, in the same way as that of which we are now speaking, is my thought. If my thinking be not a singularity—if it be not the only process which we so designate, if there be other thinking, concerning which we are informed in another way—that is, by the utterance of their thoughts on the part of other thinkers, that thinking which is described in the formula, "I am thinking," is distinguished from other forms of thought by this very thing, that it is known to me as mine. We all admit that we have the greatest amount of certainty as to our own thoughts, simply because we know them as our own. And this uniform acknowledgment is again a confirmation of what has been asserted—that the thought spoken of in the formula, is known as our own thought.

But let us carry out this comparison a little further, and we shall reach another fact of some moment. There is not merely a distinction in the manner of knowing, and consequently in the degree of certainty pertaining to the knowledge, but a distinction between one form of thinking known in one way, and another form of thinking known in a different way. This is the distinction between thinking which is produced, and thinking which is merely received —a very wide distinction in the world of literature. It is the distinction between mine and thine. It is that which is pointed to in the third proposition involved in the Cartesian formula, as expressed by Professor Huxley in these words: "The thought is the result of the action of the I." Such thinking is spoken of as *mine*, in contrast to *thine*. Here also it will appear that in the knowledge which consciousness affords, there is knowledge that the thought is mine, not only as being possessed by me, but specially as being produced by me.

The two aspects of the matter we must represent in some such way as this. If a man tell me what he is thinking, he must give expression to his thought, and according as I interpret his utterance there is secured the representation or transference of his thought to me. The thought is his because he produced it, and conveyed it to me; it is both his and mine, in so far as it is present in consciousness to us both, if I have interpreted his words aright. If, then, it is both his and mine, inasmuch as it is present in the consciousness of us both, it is clear that the distinction of which we speak when I separate between his thinking and my thinking, is not found in the mere presence of a thought in consciousness. In that sense it may be both his and mine at the same moment, being present in his consciousness, while it is at the same time present in mine. If, then, the mere presence in consciousness do not explain the distinction between his thought and mine, the explanation must lie in the relation of the thought to the thinker. Something distinctive there is in consciousness, in addition to what we have already discovered. Not only am I conscious—not only am I conscious of the presence of thought, but I am conscious of thinking—that is, exercising thinking power—or, in other words, producing thought. This is involved in the formula, "I am thinking." Otherwise stated, it is an assertion that "I am conscious of exercising power of thought." Can the shorter formula be interpreted to mean less than this? If so, it must mean "I am conscious of the presence of a thought." That this is not a full statement of the fact can be shown by every available test. A thought is one thing; the knowledge of a thought is another thing; and the fact recorded in the two words, "I think," is different from both. A thought may belong to a hundred men at the same time; if so, it must be equally present in the consciousness of each, as matter of knowledge; but when each man of the hundred says "I think," he describes what is peculiar to himself. Though the thought of all may be described in a single expression, the exercise of each is quite distinct; and this exercise is matter of consciousness, conspicuously recorded in the formula, "I am thinking." With another man's thoughts I may be familiar; of the act of thinking on his part I can never know anything. That is one thing known only in personal experience. It belongs peculiarly to the exercise of consciousness, and in this way it is a knowledge of the exercise of thinking power, by which the thought is produced. The exact character of the thought is not in the least indicated in the formula—that may vary endlessly; but this is quite essential to the fact, that I am exercising thinking power. I do not merely say, "I have a thought," or "I am conscious of a thought," but "I am thinking." To represent such thinking as a fact which is not

connected with me in any other way than that it is known to me, as the facts of the outer world are known, is impossible. To represent such thinking in any other way than as a fact consciously produced by me in the exercise of power at my command, is to misrepresent the testimony of consciousness, which cannot be recorded in language, without the record affording evidence of the incompleteness of the representation. When I am conscious of thinking, I not only know my thought, but I know myself as actively engaged in the exercise of thinking power. And, in being conscious of this, I know myself as a thinker, as I cannot know any other thinker. That other men are thinkers is known to a man only by inference, not by immediate knowledge of their thinking. But that he himself is a thinker is known to each man in the exercise of his thinking power; and this is known to him not only in the same direct or immediate manner as his thoughts are known, but in the very same act of knowledge. For it is a single act of knowledge which a man records in the formula, "I am thinking," in the utterance of which he declares that he knows himself as a thinker, just as he knows his thoughts.

In these few pages we have presented, rather imperfectly, we fear, an account of the analysis of consciousness which seems, to a considerable number of the students of mental science, to put it beyond dispute that we have an immediate knowledge of our own personality, and exercise of causal energy. We have stated what we believe to have been the doctrine of Descartes propounded more than two hundred years ago, when he published the "Discourse on Method," and which to him then, as to many now, is the record of the one fundamental certainty in human knowledge. We do not claim to speak as the representative of those who hold personality to be a fact of immediate knowledge. We shrink from such responsibility. But, as an adherent of this school of thought, we have endeavoured to set forth the grounds on which we regard it as evident that our own personality is not a matter of inference or hypothesis, but a matter of immediate knowledge, distinguished, therefore, by the highest degree of certainty. Logically, we think it plain, that there could be nothing more inconsistent than that a man should attempt to prove to himself that he exists, for he must always begin by assuming what he seeks to prove. As matter of fact, we have endeavoured to show, that he has in every act of consciousness immediate knowledge of his personality. The outline of evidence in support of this view, we have attempted to present in a plain, concise form, that readers may judge as to the grounds on which a certain number of those devoted to the study of mental philosophy hold that "self," or personality is known as fact, and must be acknowledged as such in any attempt at the reconcilia-

tion of physics and metaphysics. We again express the highest admiration of the manner in which Professor Huxley has made a beginning, with the avowed purpose of seeking such a reconciliation. These few observations, involving some qualification of the view he has taken as to the testimony of consciousness, are offered in the desire to see the effort at reconciliation deliberately prosecuted. As to the view given in Professor Huxley's paper of the manner in which we obtain our knowledge of the outer world, we should also have something to say, but meanwhile it seems better to restrict attention to the single point.

The question before us is really this. If the doctrine as to the correlation of forces is now a generally received truth, and if modern physiology gives prominence to "the doctrine that we have no knowledge of thinking substance apart from extended substance," and seems even to point towards Materialism, how are we to harmonize physical science with a philosophy which proclaims an immediate knowledge of personality, as a fact *sui generis*, and really the grandest fact in the history of known life? This question we must treat in the spirit of the Cartesian maxim, so prominently set forth by Professor Huxley, "Assent to no proposition, the matter of which is not so clear and distinct that it cannot be doubted." We submit that the knowledge of our own personality satisfies the demand of the maxim. We think Professor Huxley lends his testimony in support of this view, when, describing the experience of the child, he says, "The child becomes aware of itself as a source of action, and a subject of passion and of thought" (p. 176). The whole passage from which this sentence is taken, is confirmatory of the view we have defended. And we venture to plead for some earnest consideration of the question, whether it be not in the knowledge of our own personality that we reach the ground upon which the harmony of science and philosophy is to be verified.

H. Calderwood.



ASPECTS OF REVISION—SEPTEMBER, 1870.

On the Revision of the English Version of the New Testament. By the BISHOP OF GLOUCESTER AND BRISTOL. London: Longmans.

The New Testament, Authorized Version, newly compared with the Original Greek and revised by HENRY ALFORD, D.D., Dean of Canterbury. London: Strahan and Co.

Biblical Revision, its Duties and Conditions. By HENRY ALFORD, D.D., Dean of Canterbury. London: Strahan and Co.

"Nun . . . . zeige dich dass man ernstlich will, lege die axt an die Wurzeln des lange genug grossgezogenen Baumes schädlichen unprotestantischen Vorurtheile." — *Die Bibel nach der deutschen Uebersetzung des Dr. Martin Luther. Theologische Studien u. Kritiken*, 1849.

SOME fifteen years ago the *Edinburgh Review*, after alluding at some length to the many errors and inaccuracies of the English Bible, asked the question what intelligible reason could be alleged for the perpetuation of these evils. "It were surely high time for another Revision—two hundred and fifty years had passed since the last was made, during that long period neither the researches of the clergy nor the intelligence of the laity had remained stationary." Since these words were written the cry for revision from the more intelligent portion of the clergy and laity has become every year louder and more imperative, while the vast increase of materials for Biblical criticism and translation, owing to the ceaseless exertion of our Biblical scholars, has every year made the work of revision more practicable.

This increase of materials includes the collation of many trust-

worthy MSS. by scholars such as Tischendorf and Scrivener; the formation of independent texts by Tregelles, Ellicott, Tischendorf, Alford, Lightfoot, &c.; the discovery and publication of the Sinaitic MS.; the improved knowledge of the leading Cursive manuscripts; to which we may add a deeper and more thorough knowledge of the ancient versions.

Among the most recent and trustworthy contributions to English Revision may be cited the New Testament (in which he includes the well-known labours of the Five Clergymen) revised by the Dean of Canterbury, according to a recension of the text constructed by himself; the translations of ten of the Pauline Epistles by Bishop Ellicott; the translations, with commentaries, of Professor Lightfoot of certain of St. Paul's Epistles; the paraphrastic translations of the Pauline Epistles in the work of Conybeare and Howson on the Travels of St. Paul; Trench's treatise on the Authorized Version; the Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol's work on the Revision of the English Version of the New Testament; and for the Old Testament, Perowne's new translation of the Psalms, and Dr. Pusey's emendations in his still incomplete Commentary on the Minor Prophets.* There never seems to have been a period more admirably fitted than the present for the commencement of the great work of a cautious Revision. We are possessed of materials amply sufficient, and now easily available for such a task. We have scholars who have devoted themselves for long years to the questions of grammar, translation, exegesis, collation. And lastly, the apparent willingness of Nonconformists to take part in the work will secure a reception of the labours of the Revisers, if conducted in a spirit of moderation and caution, such as no separate and independent action of the Church of England could have hoped for under any circumstances.

But a few years ago such a union of scholars, drawn indifferently from the Church of England and Nonconformist bodies, appeared impossible; and able and devoted men like Marsh have spoken and written respecting the apparent utter hopelessness of any united action on the part of the Church of England and the leading Dissenting communities.

Surely the scholar companies now assembled round the Revision table of the Jerusalem Chamber give promise of a closer union than has ever yet been dreamed of between Church and Dissent, and seem to speak of a time yet to come, when past feuds and animosities shall be forgotten, and Churchman and Nonconformist only remember that they are brother-soldiers in the ranks of Protestantism.†

* Among the German translations of this century, some accompanied with commentary, may be enumerated De Wette, Brand, v. Meyer, v. Bunsen, and the Roman Catholic Allioli, van Ess. Jach.—(Dr. Mezger, "Studien u. Kritiken," 1849.)

† "Das wäre ein Bindemittel für die einzelnen Schattirungen, und Secten der Protes-

The Dean of Canterbury, whose incessant labours in New Testament criticism, translation, and exegesis have won him a foremost place among the scholars of Europe, in an able sermon on the subject of Biblical Revision, lately preached in St. Paul's Cathedral, after alluding to the English Bible as a version of the Holy Scriptures which might challenge comparison for faithfulness, for simplicity, and for majesty, with any that the world has ever seen, proceeded to speak of the weight of responsibility which pressed on the Church if it disregarded the mass of available sources for correcting the sacred text discovered in late years.

"Nor," continued Dean Alford, "was the correction of the text the only work which lay before the Church—our version, though a faithful and majestic translation, still is disfigured by numerous blemishes far too important to be put by or condoned. The gravest of these are due to manifest errors in rendering; errors about which there could be but one opinion among Biblical scholars of all religious views. Others have arisen from principles adopted and avowed by the translators themselves, as, for instance, from the unfortunate one of allowing a number of apparently equivalent English words an equal right to represent one and the same word in the original, whereby very important passages have been disguised and confused. Others, again, owe their source to causes which have come into operation since the version was made. Certain words have, as time has gone on, passed into new meanings. Others, which could formerly be read without offence, have now, by their very occurrence, become stumbling-blocks, and tend to remove all solemnity, and even all chance of fair audience from the passages where they occur. Some few blemishes may also be due (and it is hardly possible to put by this source) to doctrinal or ecclesiastical bias on the part of the translator."

Now, while agreeing in the main with the Dean of Canterbury's remarks, we would mention two great principles upon which any Revision of the English Bible should be conducted; they will surely commend themselves to every Englishman of good sense.

The first of these principles is—that any Revision which would win its way and "find" the English people, must be a *Revised* and not an *Improved* Version. Such a Revision, while correcting manifest errors, both in the text and in the translation, must never lose sight of what has been lately well termed the deep Conservatism of the English mind in regard of the one book. The Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol in his lately published work on Revision, we are glad to see, insists on this point with great earnestness.

No one would suspect Bishop Ellicott, so many years of whose

tantischen Kirche, etwas gemeinsames für die in verschiedene Lager getheilten."—("Studien u. Kritiken. Die Bibel," &c., 1849.)

On Luther's Translation the learned writer in the "Studien u. Kritiken" above referred to observes, "Luther's Uebersetzung vielfach undeutlich unverständlich ja verfehlt ist,"—and further remarks that in the study of it there is "viel Selbsttäuschung und Unwahrheit." This same scholar expresses a hope that he day might come when even the Roman Catholic Church in Germany would join hands with the Protestant communions in the great work of a common Revised Translation.

life have been spent in deep study of the sacred volume, for one instant of giving way to popular feeling on this matter, and yet he bids us not forget—

"That to countless thousands the English Bible is the Book of Life—to them it is as though God had vouchsafed thus to communicate with man from the first; it is a positive effort to them to feel and believe that the familiar words, as they meet the eye or fall on the ear, did not thus for the first time issue from the lips of patriarch or prophet, nay, that the touching cadences of the Gospels were not originally so modulated by the tender and sympathising voice of our own adorable Master. We have heard even of sermons in which such thoughts have unconsciously betrayed themselves, and believe that at this moment there are numbers of earnest people who could easily be carried away by their deeper feelings, almost at any moment, into a thorough sympathy with appeals to the familiar language of their cherished English Testament, and who, when reminded of the actual facts, would with a sigh awaken from the happy illusion, and avow their reluctance to part with their *mentis gratissimus error*." "Are we," goes on the bishop to say, "to have no sympathy for this large class? Is there not something in the heart-affection for the 'dear old English Bible' that deserves the respect even of the scholar and the theologian?"

The second principle that we would urge is, that it must constantly be borne in mind that any revision of the English Bible must be a version to be read publicly, not merely to be studied privately. All care should be taken to preserve in each sentence the old well-loved "ring" so familiar to us all from our child-days. To quote again from the Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol:—

"In the revision the choice of words used in correction must be limited to the vocabulary of the present version, combined with that of the versions which preceded it; and, in alterations, as far as possible the rhythm and cadence of the Authorized Version must be preserved—this principle cannot be too strongly insisted upon. It is in the choice of words and the juxtaposition of words when chosen that the success of any revision will be found in a great degree to depend. And for these three reasons the Revised Version must be a popular version, it must be also a version which reads well, and can be heard with the old and familiar pleasure with which our present version is always listened to. It must, thirdly, be such that no consciousness of novelty of turn or expression is awakened in the mind of hearer or reader—in a word, we must never be reminded that we are not hearing the old version, and must only be brought to perceive the revision when we read it over thoughtfully in private. Such a result can only be obtained by making the correction in words chosen out of—so to speak—a strictly Biblical vocabulary."

To give an example of this: in St. Matthew ii. 7, for ἠκρίβωσε, the best translation would probably be "ascertained;" but "learned diligently" would, while correcting the Greek, be the nearest to the "enquired diligently" of the Authorized Version. The Dean of Canterbury, in his careful and valuable Revision, occasionally departs from these two rules. We cannot help thinking the substitution of "Holy Spirit" for "Holy Ghost" unfortunate, and one which will perpetually remind the hearer and reader that the New Testament of

their early days has been subjected to changes, while we fear the rendering of ἀγάπη by "love," however accurate, will never in England take the place of the old familiar "charity." Dean Alford, however, has done good service in his revised translation by correcting the Authorized Version in parallel passages where, though the Greek words are absolutely identical, the English renderings in the parallel passages are diverse. We would instance such parallel passages as that of the blind man at Jericho, where the well-known expression of our Lord, ἡ πίστις σου σέσωκέ σε, in St. Mark x. 52, is rendered, "Thy faith hath made thee whole;" while in the parallel passage, St. Luke xviii. 42, the same Greek words are translated, "Thy faith hath saved thee." In Dean Alford's revised Testament we find in both passages, "Thy faith hath saved thee." Thus, while our version is made consistent with itself, the old familiar "ring" is preserved. It would be easy to adduce many such instances of inconsistency; such as St. Matthew iv. 19, where Δεῦτε ὀπίσω μου is rendered by "Follow me," while the same words in St. Mark i. 17, by "Come ye after me." The Dean of Canterbury in both places has "Come ye after me." The renderings in the Authorized Version, St. Mark xii. 38-40, and St. Luke xx. 46, 47, "Love to go in long clothing," "desire to walk in long robes;" "Salutations in the market-places," "greetings in the markets;" "the chief seats in the synagogues" and "the uppermost rooms at feasts," "the highest seats in the synagogues" and "the chief rooms at feasts;" "for a pretence," and "for a shew," represent the same Greek words. In these and similar passages, without any sacrifice of the old familiar rhythm—exactly preserving the old ring of the sentences, making use of the New Testament vocabulary—Dr. Alford carries out a canon he suggested some two years ago, "that in a faithful version of concurrent Gospels, when the same Greek words are in any two or in all used of the same thing, they should scrupulously be rendered by the same English words."

In some passages the difficulties of the argument are materially increased by the use on the translator's part of different words where in the original the same are used. We would instance the fourth chapter of the Romans, where λογίζομαι occurs eleven times. It seems the key-word to St. Paul's argument throughout. Our translators, having no fixed rule of rendering it, have translated it twice "count," six times "impute," and three times "reckon;" in Gal. iii. 6, they introduce a fourth rendering, "account." In Rev. iv. 4, the translators, fearful of bringing the throne of God and the throne of the elders together, make the elders sit on "seats," and God only on a "throne"—though in the original for both we find θρόνου and the twenty-four θρόνοι. In other passages the point of a sentence lies in the recurrence and repetition of the same word, as

in 1 Cor. iii. 17, "If any man defile (φθείρει) the temple of God, him shall God destroy (φθερεῖ)." The inconsistency of our English translation frequently destroys the striking coincidences in language between one epistle and the other; for example, in Eph. i. 19, ἐνέργεια is "working;" in Col. ii. 12, it is "operation." In Eph. iv. 2, ταπεινοφροσύνη is "lowliness;" in Col. iii. 12, it is "humbleness of mind." In Eph. iv. 16, συμβιβαζόμενον is "compacted;" in Col. ii. 19, it is "knit together."*

To instance a few more selected by Archbishop Trench, but, as he says, by no means the most remarkable instances of their kind. For ἀθετέω we find in the English version "to reject," "to despise," "to bring to nothing," "to frustrate," "to disannul," "to cast off;" ἀποκάλυψις, "revelation," "manifestation," "coming," "appearing;" ἐλέγχω, "to tell of his trespass," "to reprove," "to convict," "to convince," "to rebuke;" ζόφος, "darkness," "mist," "blackness;" for καταργέω and καταργέομαι we find no less than seventeen different renderings. In passing, we would call attention to the want of consistency in rendering Hebrew, Greek, and Latin proper names. We find in some places Marcus, in others Mark; now Lucas, now Luke; now Jeremias, now Jeremy; now Apollos, now Apollo; now Noë, now Noah; now Simon son of Jonas, now Simon son of Jona; now Judas, now Juda; now Timotheus, now Timothy; we find Corinthus and Corinth; Sodoma and Sodom; Cretes and Cretians; Areopagus and Mars Hill.

Now, while such abundant instances exist where our translators have rendered the same Greek word by several English words, some unfortunate instances exist where in the original Greek two words are used each conveying their peculiar meaning, in the English Translation one word is given as the rendering of the two distinct Greek words. For example, the well-known Θηρίον and ζῶον of Revelation are both translated by the same word "beast," although the former forms part of the hellish, the late word of the heavenly symbolism. The δοῦλοι and διάκονοι of the parable of the marriage of the king's son (St. Matthew xxii. 1—14) are both confounded under the common name of "servants," though the δοῦλοι are men, the ambassadors of Christ, while the διάκονοι are angels. σοφός and φρόνιμος are both rendered "wise;" ἄφεσις ἁμαρτιῶν is always rendered "remission of sins;" St. Paul once (Rom. iii. 25) employs πάρεσις. Our translators take no notice of the substitution, but render it, as though it were the usual ἄφεσις, by "remission." In the two miracles of the feeding the multitudes, on the first occasion the four Evangelists use the word κόφινος for the baskets in which the fragments which remained are gathered up. On the occasion of the

* Cf. Abp. Trench on A. V., p. 95, and Blunt, "Duties of a Parish Priest," p. 71.

second miracle, in the two records we possess of it the word σπυρίς is used. The English basket represents both the κόφινος and the σπυρίς. Again, the English translators obliterate, for the most part, the distinction between παῖς θεοῦ and υἱὸς θεοῦ, παῖς being rendered (with the exception of one passage, St. Matthew xii. 18) by "servant." In St. John x. 16, αὐλή and ποίμνη are both translated "fold."

Many examples of this rendering of two or more Greek words by a single English word could be given. For instance καθίστημι, Tit. i. 5; ὁρίζω, Acts x. 42; ποιέω, Mark iii. 14; τάσσω, Acts xiii. 48; τίθημι, John xv. 16; χειροτονέω, Acts xiv. 23, are all rendered by "to ordain." "Conversation" represents ἀναστροφή, Gal. i. 13; τρόπος, Heb. xiii. 5; πολίτευμα, Phil. iii. 20. "Net" is the translation equally for δίκτυον, Matt. iv. 20; ἀμφίβληστρον, Matt. iv. 18; σαγήνη, Matt. xiii. 47. "Thought" represents ἐνθύμησις, διαλογισμός, διανόημα, ἐπίνοια, λογισμός, and νόημα; while "to think" translates δοκέω, Matt. iii. 9; νομίζω, Matt. v. 7; ἐνθυμέομαι, Matt. ix. 4; διαλογίζομαι, Luke xii. 17; διενθυμέομαι, Acts x. 19; ὑπονοέω, Acts xiii. 25; ἡγέομαι, Acts xxvi. 2; κρίνω, Acts xxvi. 8; φρονέω, Rom. xii. 3; λογίζομαι, 2 Cor. iii. 5; νοέω, Eph. iii 20; οἴομαι, James i. 7.

Much may be done in a revision by recasting passages in which our translators have missed the force of the article, or have needlessly and even erroneously inserted it. There are fewer instances of the latter than of the former; but Bishop Ellicott instances especially 1 Thess. iv. 17, where by the translation "in *the* clouds," where it ought to be simply "in clouds," we mar the whole wondrous picture. "The first translation would make it a being caught up to the clouds above; whereas the true translation suggests the idea of the clouds mysteriously enwreathing and bearing upward each company of the faithful and of the holy living, rising from earth as their Master rose 'when the cloud received him out of their sight.'" Such changes as these will scarcely attract the notice of the ordinary reader or listener, and will never affect the ring of the sentences; still a vivid colouring will be often given to the narrative, and a life-like picture created for the thoughtful English reader by the apparently trifling omission or addition of the definite article,—as for example: "He went up into *the* mountain," some particular well-known mountain, to which our Lord was probably in the habit of retiring. "He entered into *the* boat,"—the boat devoted to his use. In Heb. xi. 10, we read, "He looked for a city which hath foundations." The language is strangely emphatic in the original, and we lose the force and point of the expression unless we render —"He looked for *the* city which hath *the* foundations." In John iii. 10, the English version renders "Art thou a teacher in Israel and knowest not these things?" instead of "Art thou *the* teacher,"

i.e. the famed teacher of Israel, "and knowest not these things?" The famous criticism of Bentley, quoted by Archbishop Trench on the consequences of the neglect of the article at Rom. v. 15, 17 is too well known to need more than a passing reference. As an instance of the less frequent fault with our translators—the insertion of the article in English where it does not stand in the Greek—we would refer to the often-quoted passage, 1 Tim. vi. 10, where St. Paul writes that "the love of money is the root of all evil." The translation must run, "the love of money is *a* root" not *the* root, "of all evil."

Bishop Ellicott also draws attention to the translation of the prepositions, in which he says many wise changes may be made. He instances Gal. iii. 19, in which much of a doctrinal nature is involved in the translation assigned to the quasi preposition χάριν—while on the last clause of the verse he observes,—

"A really historical fact seems brought out by observing the true force of διά with the genitive. Angels were the immediate agencies by which the Law was ordained on Sinai. As Theodoret remarks, they were present and assistants of the solemn scene. Again, in 2 Peter i. 5—7, the ethical relation of the substantives to each other is quite effaced by the translation unfortunately adopted in the Authorized Version. The development of Christian graces the one from the other, is exquisitely marked in the pregnant and inclusive ἐν of the original, and is to a great degree preserved in the simple and usual translation of the prepositions as rightly preserved by Tyndale and Cranmer."

Archbishop Trench has selected some good instances where the force of the preposition has been missed by the translators of the Authorized Version:—*e. g.* Rev. xv. 2, "And I saw as it were a sea of glass mingled with fire; and them that had gotten the victory over the beast . . . stand on the sea of glass having the harps of God," thus losing the whole allusion to the triumph by the shores of the Red Sea,—typical of this the final triumph of the Church,—ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν τὴν ὑαλίνην is "by the sea of glass," as Bengel, "ad mare vitreum." In St. Luke xxiii. 42, the English translation of the preposition ἐν completely changes the sense of the passage. "And he said unto him, Lord, remember me when thou comest *into thy kingdom*,"—ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ. The passage should be translated, "Lord, remember me when thou comest *in* thy kingdom," *i. e.*, with all thy glorious kingdom about thee.

In the tenses, the cases of inaccuracy are very numerous. We find, for instance, the present often translated as a past, and the force and beauty of the passage marred by the unscholarlike rendering. Archbishop Trench calls attention to the frequent use of this present in the Apocalypse "to express the eternal Now of Him for whom there can be no past and no future." In Rev. iv. 5, the English version has "out of the throne *proceeded* lightnings, and thunderings, and voices."

In the Greek we have ἐκπορεύονται, signifying that not only at that one moment when John beheld, but evermore, out of his throne *proceed* these symbols of God's majesty and power. There are other examples even in this same chapter of this unfortunate rendering of the present of eternity by a past. We find also past tenses, without any reason, turned into presents; as, for instance, in Acts xxviii. 4, "No doubt this man is a murderer, whom, though he hath escaped the sea, yet vengeance *suffereth* not to live." The Greek has οὐκ εἴασεν. In the imperfect, again, there are several passages in which a strict translation is absolutely required by the circumstances. As, for instance, St. Luke v. 6: διερήγνυτο, for which our translators have given "brake," should be translated "was breaking," or "was beginning to break." In St. Luke xiv. 7, in the English Version, we read, "He put forth a parable to those that were bidden, when he marked how they *chose out* the chief rooms." The ἐξελέγοντο of the original should be rendered "they were choosing out." The Lord utters the parable in the midst of the events he is picturing. Aorists, again, are rendered as though they were perfects, and *vice versâ*. As in Luke i. 19, ἀπεστάλην is rendered "I am sent," instead of "I was sent." So in the aorists of the high priestly prayer, St. John xvii., compare verses 4, 6, 8, "I have glorified," "I have finished," "I have manifested," (they) "have known," "have believed," for ἐδόξασα, ἐτελείωσα, ἐφανέρωσά, ἔγνωσαν, ἐπίστευσαν. And for an example of a perfect construed as an aorist Luke xii. 2, where we read "because they suffered such things" instead of "have suffered," the Greek word being πεπόνθασιν.

The question of the change in the translation of that large class of cases where in the original Greek a genitive of *quality* is found, and where in our version an adjective is used, is discussed at length and with great care and scholarship by the Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol in his critical and grammatical commentaries on St. Paul's Epistles. Here, as it has been well observed, "tact must be the only guide of the revising body;" there is, however, no doubt but that in many passages the adjectival translation might with great advantage be removed for the "more vigorous and expressive genitive." We would instance such passages as Phil. iii. 21, where the renderings "the body of our vileness" and "the body of his glory" would be at once more truthful and more forcible than "our vile body" and "his glorious body" of the English Version. As illustrations of passages where this strong and impressive genitive of the original Greek might be introduced with advantage we would cite Romans viii. 21, "liberty of glory" for "glorious liberty;" 2 Cor. iv. 4, "gospel of glory" for "glorious gospel;" 1 Peter i. 14, "children of obedience" instead of "obedient children." It is

clear that in a revision much may be done by a careful reconsideration of the illative and argumentative particles, ἄρα, or ἀρ' οὖν, in the Pauline writings. Great caution, it has been well observed, will be found necessary in not "over-pressing" alterations in the Authorized Version in the matter of these particles. "Still, the cases *are* numerous in which a guarded change will bring out latent meanings that may have escaped the attention even of observant readers of Scripture." The curious statistic that St. John in his writings never uses the particle ἄρα, and for once that St. Paul uses ἄρα he makes use of the simpler οὖν at least four times, deserves the attentive consideration of the company of revision.

Before leaving the subject of the grammar of the Greek Testament we would call attention to that class of cases in which nouns stand under the vinculum of a single preposition, and where the interpolation in English of the second preposition may in some few great passages, like Titus ii. 13, weaken the authority of an important witness to a catholic truth. Such corrections as these may be made without at all affecting the old rhythm of the sentences. Now, in retaining as far as possible the old words, the revisers will, of course, carefully consider the case of certain words and expressions which in the lapse of time have become obsolete in the sense in which they were originally used, and have acquired another meaning.

In the case of such archaisms as tend to obscure the meaning of a passage, some revision will certainly be necessary. The canon laid down by Bishop Ellicott in his above-quoted work will doubtless be followed by both the Revising Companies; for it applies with, perhaps, even greater force to the Old Testament than to the New—archaisms being more abundant in the former than in the latter. The Bishop's rule is, that "archaisms be removed, not wherever they occur simply because they *are* archaisms, but in those cases where they leave the general English reader in doubt as to the meaning of the words or passage." Among the more prominent of the passages in which these archaisms which need correction occur are the following:—St. Matthew vi. 25, Μὴ μεριμνᾶτε τῇ ψυχῇ ὑμῶν τί φάγητε, κ.τ.λ., "Take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat," &c. When the translation was made, "take no thought" was, as Archbishop Trench observes, a perfectly correct rendering for μὴ μεριμνᾶτε. Thought was then constantly used as equivalent to anxiety, or solicitous care; and in support of his assertion he quotes, among other passages, from one of Somers' Tracts [reign of Elizabeth], "Queen Catherine Parr died rather of *thought*." The precept as it now stands in St. Matthew's Gospel inculcates carelessness of life. St. Luke xiii. 7, ἱνατί καὶ τὴν γῆν καταργεῖ; "why *cumbereth* it the ground?" "Cumbereth" is an insufficient rendering for καταργεῖ; but to cumber used to possess the

signification of to injure, to vex. We read of "cumbrous gnats" in Spenser.

A still more interesting instance of an archaism will be found in Acts xvii. 23, Διερχόμενος γὰρ καὶ ἀναθεωρῶν τὰ σεβάσματα ὑμῶν, "As I passed by and beheld your *devotions*." "Devotions" is now abstract, and means the mental offerings of the devout worshipper; it was once concrete, and meant the outward objects to which these were rendered, as temples, altars, images, shrines, and the like, "Heiligthümer," as De Wette renders it. In such a case as this the meaning which the word possessed at the time when the translation was made has quite passed out of sight. It will be necessary to substitute a new word. A similar instance occurs in Acts xix. 37, Ἠγάγετε γὰρ τοὺς ἄνδρας τούτους, οὔτε ἱεροσύλους οὔτε βλασφημοῦντας τὴν θεὰν ὑμῶν, "Ye have brought hither these men who are neither *robbers of churches* nor blasphemers of your goddess." Nothing can well be conceived more perplexing or likely to mislead the ordinary reader of the English New Testament than the rendering for ἱεροσύλους, "robbers of churches." Yet in the days when our translation was made "church" was a well-known word for heathen and Jewish temples, as in the instance quoted by Trench from Marlowe's translation of the first book of Lucan, "These troops should soon pull down the *church* of Jove;" and again, in Sir John Cheke's translation of St. Matthew's Gospel, we read, "And, lo, the veil of the *church* was torn into two parts from the top downwards." No passage perhaps is so well known as possessing a strange archaism as Acts xxi. 15, Μετὰ δὲ τὰς ἡμέρας ταύτας ἀποσκευασάμενοι (or, according to the more trustworthy MSS., ἐπισκευασάμενοι) ἀνεβαίνομεν εἰς Ἱερουσαλήμ, "After three days *we took up our carriages* and went up to Jerusalem." "We took up our carriages" is due to the last revision. Tyndale has here "*We made ourselves ready;*" the Geneva Bible, "*We trussed up our fardels.*" Either of these renderings would be better in the present day; but "carriage" in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was a constantly-used word for baggage. Trench quotes from North's "Plutarch's Lives," "took all their carriage"—τὴν ἀποσκευὴν ἅπασαν. In the Old Testament the translators have in Isaiah x. 28, "He laid up his *carriages*," for כֵּלָיו יִפְקֹד, would now be rendered baggage—"Geräth," "Heergeräth" (Knobel). Compare also 1 Sam. xvii. 22, where כְּלִים is twice rendered *carriage*. The word *carriage* also does duty in Judges xviii. 21 for כָּבוֹד, precious things—"Schwere Habe" (Ernst Bertheau). The majority of English readers would certainly be at fault if asked to explain the meaning of 1 Cor. iv. 4, where St. Paul tells the Corinthians that he knows "nothing by himself." The Greek is οὐδὲν ἐμαυτῷ σύνοιδα. The simple change of the preposition "against" for "by"

would be enough here. The old signification of "by" in the sense of "against," never very common, has long passed out of use. "By myself" is found in Tyndale and in the old versions. The "nephews" of 1 Tim. v. 4 will be probably altered to "grandchildren," or to the more inclusive "descendants." The translation of ἔκγονα by "nephews" was accurate at the time our version was made, "nephews" being the constant word for grandchildren and other lineal descendants. We will cite one more passage from 1 Peter ii. 4, 5, Πρὸς ὃν προσερχόμενοι λίθον ζωντα, ... καὶ αὐτοὶ ὡς λίθοι ζῶντες οἰκοδομεῖσθε—"To whom coming as unto a living stone . . . . . ye also as *lively* stones are built up." Here the translators are inconsistant, rendering ζῶντα by "living," and in the next verse ζῶντες by "lively." It must be remembered, though at the period of the translation being made "lively" and "living" were almost synonymous words, the word "lively" has now quite passed away from the old meaning which it possessed when the lines well quoted from Massinger by the Archbishop of Dublin were written,—

> "That his dear father might interment have,
> See, the young man entered a *lively* grave."
> *The Fatal Dowry*, Act ii. sc. 1.

On the subject of punctuation, in which probably considerable changes will be deemed desirable by the revisers, we have not space to enter in this article. It is, however, a point which claims much and careful consideration: dependent partly upon this will hang the question of some alteration in the present verse division, which has given occasion to so much error and misapprehension, even in the case of educated men, in reading before the congregation. The recent recommendations of the Ritual Commission in reference to the Lectionary will introduce considerable change in the present divisions of the Old and New Testament appointed to be read in morning and evening prayer on the Sundays and holydays throughout the year. These new Tables of Lessons may perhaps supply a general outline for a remodelling of the present division into chapters. The whole subject of the present chapter division will, of course, be carefully considered; the system of sections, as marked in some of the older MSS., especially in Codex B. (Vaticanus), will deserve careful attention when the question of recasting the present divisions comes before the Revising Companies.

It will be observed that we have abstained from making any remarks on the subject of a new Textus Receptus, which at first sight would seem to claim a foremost, if not the foremost, place in any New Testament revision. Bishop Ellicott, in his work on Revision, urges the undesirability of attempting to construct a second Textus Receptus, although he allows the existence of much

critical material, and a very fair amount of critical knowledge. He doubts the fact of any body of revisers possessing, as yet, sufficient critical judgment hopefully to undertake such a work. Three able scholars have devoted many years to the great work of constructing a new text of the New Testament. None of these works could be satisfactorily adopted as the basis of a "Received Text." The work of Lachmann was, after all, based on little more than four MSS. Death removed that great critic from among us before the discovery and publication of the Sinaitic MS. The perpetual variations of Tischendorf in the many editions of the Greek Testament he has put out would prevent any text constructed by him being adopted as the basis of a Textus Receptus. The system of Tregelles, again, is open to many of the objections urged against that of Lachmann. It is hardly probable that the text either of Tregelles or Lachmann will ever take the rank either of a popular or current text.

The present Received Text will probably be adopted as a standard by the Revising Company, but will certainly be departed from "in every case where critical evidence and the consent of the best editors point out the necessity of the change: such a text would not be, nor deserve to be, esteemed a strictly critical text; it would be often too conservative, it would also be occasionally inconsistent; but if thus formed by a body of competent scholars, it would be a critical revision of a very high and, probably, very popular character."

A proposal has, we believe, lately been mooted, that several critics should co-operate in the formation of a new text. To this, however, there are very grave objections. In the first place, such a body of selected critics would be certain to be influenced by that spirit of conservatism which, though right and proper in itself, and especially so in reference to the sacred volume, would nevertheless interfere greatly with the clear critical principles on which a formal revision of the Greek text ought certainly to proceed. In the second place, when we know that the first portion of the long-matured work of Canon Westcott and Mr. Hort is now printed, and that it is based on the most careful critical principles, it would seem far wiser to wait for the judgment of scholars and critics on these labours before attempting, with some selected body of critics, to settle what can only properly be settled after long years of experience. Far better will it be for the English reader to wait for the good text which will certainly be provided for him by the Revising Company now engaged in the work, and for the Greek reader to put himself under the able guidance of the two distinguished critics to whom we have referred. Such proposals as those above mentioned will, we trust, never be attempted to be carried out. The result would satisfy no one, as the execution of the work would, from the different minds engaged in it, be sure to be marked by fluctuation and compromise.

A steady body, not of mere professed critics, but of divines, scholars, and critics, such as that of the present Revising Company, is more likely than any other body of men to arrive at generally satisfactory results, and to them, for the present at any rate, the work may wisely be left.

Besides that class of translations to be corrected enumerated under the heads of Grammatical Error, with its various subdivisions, Inconsistencies, and Archaisms, remains a large class of passages demanding correction, reducible under no particular class, but in which there is clear and plain error recognisable by any competent scholar to whom the passages in question might be submitted. This class of cases will include many and varied instances—some of them passages of deep and real moment, others of comparatively little importance. Among those of deeper moment we would instance 1 Cor. xi. 29, where the unhappy rendering of "damnation" instead of "judgment," for κρῖμα, combined with the intrusion of the word ἀναξίως, "unworthily," not found in the more trustworthy MSS., has produced and is still producing the most unfortunate influence wherever the English version of the New Testament is read or used publicly.

Under this class of great texts materially altered by a false translation comes Acts ii. 47, where the rendering of τοὺς σωζομένους introduces a Calvinistic sense into the assertion, undreamed of by the inspired writer. The mistranslation of ἀπεκδυσάμενος in Col. ii. 15, to use the Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol's words on this solemn verse, puts wholly out of sight the mysterious connection which this passage seems to have with the closing hours of our Lord's earthly life, and the deep significance of some incidents in the awful scene on Golgotha.

Of the less important, but still manifest and definite errors in the English translation, we may instance as examples the renderings for ἴδετε in Gal. vi. 11, for πηλίκοις γράμμασιν in the same verse, for διυλίζοντες in St. Matt. xxiii. 24, for Καναναίτης in St. Matt. x. 4, for διαμεριζόμεναι in Acts ii. 3, for εἴδους in 1 Thess. v. 22, for πώρωσις in Eph. iv. 18, and φαίνεσθε in Phil. ii. 25. Such errors as these last enumerated are very numerous. The correction of the former class of mistranslations—not very numerous perhaps—must be made even at the sacrifice of long-cherished prejudices, for there is no doubt but that at least from some of these, erroneous doctrinal inferences have been drawn.

As regards the errors in the second and far more numerous class we have spoken of, and which in truth but little affect the general reader, they also must be removed; and their removal, though it will add vastly to the general faithfulness and accuracy of the English version, will hardly be observed by the general reader.

The question of the *italics* at present found in the Authorized

Version will have to be considered by the Revising Companies. "The first object of our translators," we are quoting from the monograph of Bishop Turton on the italics of the English Bible, "was to express in intelligible English what they believed to be the full signification of a sentence, and their next object appears to have been, to point out, by the mode of printing, such words as had been required, in addition to those of the original, for the complete development of the meaning." In the Text of 1611 there was no part of speech which was not frequently distinguished by the type in which it is printed from the rest of the sentences. The Text of 1611 never seems to have possessed authority with regard to italics, in which respect occasional corrections were from the first applied as mistakes happened to be detected. In 1638 the Text of 1611 underwent a systematic revision. The *italics* of 1638 were speedily adopted, and they became part of the established Text, which Text was revised for the last time in the year 1769.

Bishop Turton, while on the whole summing up in favour of the present system of italics, concedes the possibility of there being some irregularities still remaining, and points out the propriety of these irregularities being corrected, but concludes with a warning respecting the limit to which these alterations should be carried.

Recent examination, however, has discovered numberless instances in these italics in which they are utterly inconsistent one with the other; indeed, a learned reviewer some four years ago went so far as to affirm, that in the matter of italics in our Authorized Version, we could never be sure of their consistency for two verses together, and characterizes the italics of our version as a mere heap of discrepant details. Although perhaps such a judgment be on the one hand considered a little overstrained, while on the other the opinion of Dr. Turton be deemed too favourable, public confidence in the system of italics at present existing needs strengthening, and a searching examination into it will prove one of the not least important duties of the revisers.

It has been observed that the majority of readers of the English Bible are totally ignorant of the meaning of those italics they so frequently meet with—indeed, many suppose that the words so printed possess a peculiar weight and importance. This might be avoided by inclosing in brackets all words required in the translation supplementary to those of the original.*

This plan was adopted by Sebastian Munster, the first Protestant translator of the Bible into Latin, who explains his purpose in the

* There is one grave objection to this introduction of brackets into the text: the reader's eye would be constantly confused by meeting with these interrupting marks. The historical scholar needs no reminding of the distressing interruptions occasioned by the bracketed references in the brilliant History of M. Michelet.

preface to his version in the edition of 1534. He is speaking here of the Old Testament:—"Porro in Latinâ Versione hoc unum spectavimus, ut quoad fieri potuit Latina Hebraicis responderent, nisi quod aliquando quasi per parenthesin adjecimus unam aut alteram dictionem quæ ad explicationem obscurioris faceret sententiæ."

This method of dealing with supplementary words, devised by Sebastian Munster, was adopted by Beza in 1556, by Tremellius and Junius in 1575, and was followed also by authors of other Latin Versions. The idea of distinguishing supplementary words does not appear to have occurred to Luther, nor in any edition of Luther's Bible are supplementary words pointed out. The Spanish Version of Cypriano de Valera, the Italian Version of Diodati, and various early French Versions, distinguish, by means of italics, supplementary words. De Sacy, whose version is a translation from the Vulgate, employs italics. If italics were done away with, and all supplementary words were inclosed in brackets, the danger of mistaking the object of their addition to the original would be obviated; but the reader's eye would be perpetually distracted by meeting with these brackets.

Among the many passages in which the introduction of words printed in italics is called in question we would instance the following:—Acts vii. 59, Καὶ ἐλιθοβόλουν τὸν Στέφανον ἐπικαλούμενον καὶ λέγοντα, "And they stoned Stephen, calling upon *God*, and saying." The Vulgate and Beza have "invocantem et dicentem." Rom. v. 18, Ἄρα οὖν ὡς δι' ἑνὸς παραπτώματος, εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους, εἰς κατάκριμα· οὕτω καὶ δι' ἑνὸς δικαιώματος εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους εἰς δικαίωσιν ζωῆς, "Therefore as by the offence of one, *judgment came* upon all men to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one *the free gift came* upon all men unto justification of life." Here words of very great importance are introduced and placed in opposition to each other. The famous italic interpolation in Hebrews x. 38 will certainly have to be reconsidered by the Revising Company. The Greek here runs:—Ὁ δὲ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται· καὶ ἐὰν ὑποστείληται, οὐκ εὐδοκεῖ ἡ ψυχή μου ἐν αὐτῷ, "Now the just shall live by faith; but if *any man* draw back, my soul shall have no pleasure in him;" where, to use the words of a well-known commentator, quoted by Bishop Turton in his "Monograph on Italics," "the insertion of the words *any man*, if done to serve the purpose of a particular creed, is a wicked perversion of the words of God. They were evidently intended to turn away the relative from the antecedent, in order to save the doctrine of final and unconditional perseverance, which doctrine this text destroys."

The work so long desired, not only by scholars but by all intelligent readers of the English Bible, has at length been taken in hand, and the work has begun in real earnest.

Its commencement has been strangely successful, and everything seems to promise fairly. Round the tables of the Old and New Testament companies the most prominent Biblical scholars of our country, Churchmen and Nonconformists, have assembled: nor is the lay element wanting.

The Rules (appended below),* mainly drawn up, we believe, by the Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol, which will guide the long and careful deliberations, plainly show what the character of the work is intended to be. *The least possible amount of change consistent with faithfulness* may be termed the motto of the two companies. All classes of English Protestants, Churchmen and Nonconformists, will wish them "God speed" in their arduous labours; and for once in the story of England her hostile religious camps meet on common ground.

Many earnest and devoted men in both camps are looking at this union as a bright omen of future peace, if not of loving friendship. We confess ourselves, in spite of the dark forebodings of timid and inactive men, to feeling perfect confidence in the result of the work. No doubt, *at first*, the revisers will try to become improvers; and improvement, rather than correction, will be suggested, and in some instances perhaps even adopted; but as time goes on, and constant practice and discussion teach and discipline, the tendency to improve will give place in the Revising Companies to a spirit ever more and more conservative; and the number of improvements, and even of corrections, will grow fewer and fewer as the work advances. Then, in the second and final revision, the wisdom of Rule 5 will become apparent; for, disciplined by long practice and careful discussion, the revisers will carefully reconsider many words and

* The General Principles to be followed by both Companies:—

1. To introduce as few alterations as possible into the Text of the Authorised Version consistently with faithfulness.

2. To limit, as far as possible, the expression of such alterations to the language of the Authorized and earlier English versions.

3. Each Company to go twice over the portion to be revised, once provisionally, the second time finally, and on principles of voting as hereinafter is provided.

4. That the Text to be adopted be that for which the evidence is decidedly preponderating; and that when the Text so adopted differs from that from which the Authorized Version was made, the alteration be indicated in the margin.

5. To make or retain no change in the Text on the second and final revision by each Company, except *two-thirds* of those present approve of the same, but on the first revision to decide by simple majorities.

6. In every case of proposed alteration that may have given rise to discussion, to defer the voting thereupon till the next Meeting, whensoever the same shall be required by one-third of those present at the Meeting, such intended vote to be announced in the notice for the next Meeting.

7. To revise the headings of chapters, pages, paragraphs, italics, and punctuation.

8. To refer, on the part of each Company, when considered desirable, to Divines, Scholars, and Literary Men, whether at home or abroad, for their opinions.

passages altered in the earlier sittings. The loose nature of the language of the New Testament (Hellenic, not Attic) will have become fully recognised;* and, except in cases of undoubted error either in the text or in the translation, we have little doubt that many of the first alterations will be swept away, and the old words restored. The result, then, of the labours of the revisers, to which with real confidence we may venture to look forward, will be to give to the great and wide-spread English nation (we are speaking of the New Testament) a comparatively good and trustworthy text—a text based on that vast accumulated knowledge of manuscripts and versions made available by the labours of scholars during the last two hundred and fifty years—and a translation consistent with itself, free as far as the Greek scholarship of our day can secure it from grammatical error, with those inaccuracies which here and there give false tinges to deduced doctrines removed, yet still preserving in all its many details its old character, in its very alterations the old rhythm and cadence of the Authorized Version. The Revised Version will then, to adopt the words and thoughts of Bishop Ellicott, be a version that *reads* well, and will be still *heard* with the old and familiar pleasure with which our present version is always listened to; for few ordinary hearers will ever be conscious that they are listening to anything else than the old well-loved words they have listened to from their childhood.

Such a revision of the noblest version of the word of God that the world has ever known will be a good work and a blest, for it will have responded to a just and long-sustained cry from the thoughtful portion of English Protestants; and, while responding to the cry, will yet have laid no rash hands on the ark which contains England's greatest treasure, but "will have handed down to the calm judgment of the holy and wise in distant days and generations yet to come, not an improved but a revised English Testament."

HENRY DONALD MAURICE SPENCE.

* Instances of this looseness of language will occur readily to every scholar as examples of what we refer to. We would quote such passages as Rev. v. 11, *ἤκουσα φωνὴν ἀγγέλων . . . . καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς αὐτῶν . . . . μυριάδες μυριάδων . . . . λεγοντες*—where *λέγοντες* refers to "innumerable angels" suggested by the whole clause. 1 Tim. iii. 16, *τὸ τῆς εὐσεβείας μυστήριον ὃς ἐφανερώθη.* Gal. iv. 17, *ἵνα αὐτοῦς ζηλοῦτε.* 1 Cor. iv. 7, *ἵνα μὴ φυσιοῦσθε.* Phil. ii. 1, *εἴ τις σπλάγχνα. αἱ δύο ἐλαιαι καὶ αἱ δύο λυχνίαι . . . . ἑστῶτες.* Such forms as *ἔγνωκαν κατελίποσαν, εἴδαμεν, ἔφυγαν, ἀφέωνται,* and many more. Again, the force of the aorist as compared with the perfect is still a subject of controversy with New Testament scholars. It has been suggested that writers of the New Testament use perfects where classical Greek writers would have used the aorist, as in such passages as *οὐδεὶς ἀναβέβηκεν εἰς τοὺ οὐρανὸν,* and the converse, as in the words *Λάζαρος ἀπέθανε.*



DAY-SCHOOLS: THEIR ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES.

I DO not wish to write as a partisan either of day-schools or of the boarding-house, or of what, in the admirable paper which he lately published,* Mr. Bradley of Marlborough calls "the hostel system." Classing the two latter together for the purposes of this essay, I would say that each method will no doubt continue to have, as each deserves to have, a place in the educational system of the country. There are classes to whom the one, there are classes to whom the other, is a necessity. To the man of moderate means, for instance, resident in London or its suburbs, the day-school presents itself as a ready means of providing an education for his sons, for which his circumstances scarcely allow an alternative. Those, on the other hand, who live in the country, or in one of the many smaller towns which possess no school of their own, or in which the school is, from any cause, in an unsatisfactory condition, have no choice beyond either educating their sons at home—a course often impossible, very seldom indeed satisfactory—or sending them to a boarding-school. But it does not by any means follow that, because each sort of school is a necessity, it is a useless task to institute a comparison between them, and to point out the advantages and disadvantages which each possesses. There is a large class of parents whose circumstances admit of their exercising a choice in

* *Macmillan's Magazine.*

the matter, and, as there are boys who, from differences of moral temper and mental power, are likely to prosper or fail, according as they are brought under this system or that, it is well that these parents should have the case put plainly before them. Some, again, of the evils which experience enables one to point out admit of being remedied, or at least mitigated; while others may be made harmless, or at least less harmful, by counteracting influences. In any case it is well to know the truth. In this paper I shall endeavour to state, without favour or prejudice, some of the observations which I have made and of the conclusions which I have drawn in a great London day-school; and I cannot, I must be allowed to say, propose to myself a better model than that essay of Mr. Bradley's to which I have before alluded—an essay which, in respect of the candour and the calm and judicial temper in which it is written throughout, is simply perfect.

Another word of preface will suffice. It will be seen that much of what is said in the following pages applies mainly to London schools, as they are influenced by the habit of London life—a habit which of late years has become very general—of deserting the City for the suburbs. So far, then, the application of these observations must be limited. But London contains a seventh part of the whole population of England, and probably more than a seventh part of classes which avail themselves of such day-schools as I am now speaking of. And many other towns, especially, I believe, the great manufacturing towns of the North, have for some time been adopting the London habit, and, as the causes which have produced that habit operate on them even more strongly than they do on the metropolis, will probably do so more generally in the future.

1. There are to be considered the difficulties of access to the day-school, and the consequences, physical, moral, and intellectual, which come from these difficulties. These may be illustrated by a short statement of facts about the school in which my own experience has been gained. Merchant Taylors' School stands within a few hundred yards of London Bridge, and is therefore within easy reach of every metropolitan terminus, the suburban traffic of the Great Western and Great Northern being brought near to it at Moorgate Street, that of the South Western at Cannon Street. It is possible that under these circumstances the proportion of boys coming up to the school from the suburbs may be somewhat larger than would be found elsewhere, though, on the other hand, as admission is a privilege of some value in the hands of a widely-dispersed body of governors, it is probably sought for and obtained with little reference to considerations of residence. A recent inquiry showed me that out of forty-eight boys to whom the question was put (these forty-eight constituting my own forms, and probably giving a fair representation of the whole number),

not more than *three* resided sufficiently near to be able to walk to the school. A few came the whole or part of the way by omnibus, but fully four-fifths of the number were in the daily habit of travelling backwards and forwards from their homes by the railway. Some of the distances thus continually travelled over are large. Gravesend, Erith, Ewell, Sutton, even Crawley, which is thirty miles from London, are among the places from which I have known boys come daily to school. To the length of the railway journey must often be added a considerable distance that has to be passed between home and the station, and another, not long, but adding appreciably to the fatigue, between the terminus and school. It is evident that there must here be a considerable waste of time and strength. As much as two hours and a half will not uncommonly be spent in the mere process of getting to and from school—more time than would suffice either for the necessary preparation of lessons for the next day, or for the play that is not less necessary. Lessons indeed may be, and doubtless often are, learnt in the train, not without possible injury to eyesight and brain—the lightest literature is apt to weary one under these circumstances, and what must be the effect of fixing eye and mind on what are commonly unfamiliar words and an uncongenial task! As for play, it is almost out of the question. At the boarding-school the boy rushes straight from his lessons to the fives-court, to the cricket-field, or to football. His less fortunate brother at the day-school is obliged to spend the hours which might give him some real recreation in the walk tediously repeated day after day, and the no less monotonous and unprofitable railway journey. As a matter of fact, the ordinary schoolboy sports—surely the healthiest form of amusement, and one which, where the masters will not allow the real work of the school to be neglected, cannot be carried to a hurtful excess—are followed with but little zeal and indifferent success at the great day-schools with which I am acquainted. None of the City schools, for instance, could, I imagine, send out an eleven which could contend at cricket or football with any good chance of success with a country school possessing the opportunities of practice close at hand, even though this might be far inferior in numbers, and also—a most important consideration in such matters—in the average age of the players. This is not because the City boys are really inhabitants of the town,—on the contrary, as has been explained, nearly nine out of ten live in the country,—but they are obliged to waste their play-time in travelling. In default of the healthy sports of cricket, &c., from which they are thus almost shut out, they have recourse to a form of amusement certainly less healthy, and which many teachers and parents are beginning to regard with a justifiable aversion—to *athletics*. For here the opportunities of practice are at hand. Running, under various conditions, supplies more than half

of the sports which are called athletic, and the boy can easily practise running over the mile or half-mile that commonly separates his home from the railway station. The exchange is not a salutary one. My own observation has convinced me that running is injurious to the *physique* of a boy. But for full demonstration upon this point we must wait for some years, till the young athletes of to-day shall have grown up to manhood. What can, I imagine, admit of no difference of opinion is that the tone of the running-ground, where boys are daily imitating more closely the manners, the appearance, the artifices, and even the craft of the professional pedestrian, is far lower than that which comes from the honest and manly rivalries of the cricket-field. Athletics are, I know, practised in all schools; I could almost wish that they were banished from all; but they are least likely to be injurious where they have formidable rivals in the older sports; they will probably gain a share of favour more excessive than usual where these sports are discouraged by difficulties of place and time.

The waste of time is not the only evil that follows from the long daily journey to and from school. Physicians are, I believe, agreed that habitual railway travelling is injurious, not perhaps to all constitutions and temperaments, but in any case where there is weakness, susceptibility, or predisposition to disease. We have all known or heard of men who, attracted by the facilities afforded by the railway, have endeavoured to combine the occupations of the city with the pleasures of the country, and have found the advantages of pure air and rural enjoyment more than counterbalanced by the wear and tear of the daily journey. Boys do not analyze and take account of their sensations as do men, and, at the same time, it is likely that any injury done may not make itself felt till later in life; but it is not improbable that what is found to hurt the grown man may hurt the boy, especially when his brain is tired by the agitation and excitement of a competition which is continually becoming keener and more absorbing. But apart from this, of which we cannot see the full consequences at present, there is the more obvious and common evil of exposure to cold and wet. This is of course aggravated by the almost universal carelessness of boys, and, I must add, by the too common neglect of parents, who will often allow their children to set off without the most ordinary precautions against the weather. But it cannot be altogether guarded against. No protection will avail against a steady downpour of rain or a sudden storm. The consequence is, that on a very bad day, such as may happen several times in the year, a very large proportion of the boys come in such a state that the only thing to be done is to send them home again at once. The school is completely disorganized; nor do those who return, having frequently to wait for trains, &c., escape wholly

without injury. A catastrophe of this kind does not happen very frequently; sometimes a quarter or even a half year will pass without one; but the ordinary journey increases the risk of the various ailments which come from cold. The consequence is that the absence list of a day-school is, if I may speak from my own experience, formidably large. At Merchant Taylors', where the numbers average two hundred and sixty, it is about five per cent.; while at Christ's Hospital, where the conditions of life may be supposed to be not especially favourable to health, it is, I believe, little more than two per cent. There is, however, a very important consideration to be reckoned on the other side. The day-school is not subject to the attacks of epidemic sickness which frequently necessitate the dispersion of a boarding-school. Merchant Taylors' School has not, I suppose, been broken up for this cause since the Great Plague of 1662. A boy sickening of any infectious disease naturally ceases to attend before the stage is reached at which it can be communicated; and the precaution, made necessary, I may say by the way, by the inconceivable recklessness of some parents, of requiring a medical certificate on his return, is an effectual safeguard against the greater danger that attends the period of convalescence.

A third evil, which is of a far more serious kind than what have been hitherto mentioned, may sometimes attend the access to the day-school. The manners and morals of society have happily changed very much for the better since the days when in Athens or Rome the παιδαγωγός was the indispensable attendant of the young scholar as he traversed the streets between his home and his place of education. Yet those who are familiar with the aspect of the trains which bring in every morning from the suburbs the vast crowds of men and women whose daily occupation lies in the town, will acknowledge that there are here possible corrupting influences for an innocent and ingenuous boy. He may listen to, and ultimately take part in, the loose and profane talk which one hears too often from young clerks and the like on their way to business. He may make an acquaintance still more undesirable with forward young women employed in factories and shops. It is of course possible, put a boy where you will, that he should fall into bad company, but the daily opportunities of association, without any possibility of supervision or check, certainly make the danger greater. And even supposing that more serious evil is escaped, some harm comes of the habits to which the boy is thus introduced. A little fellow of nine or ten, used to travel alone, to shift for himself, to hold his own in chaff and repartee with porters and guards and older fellow-travellers, must lose something of the freshness and ingenuousness which should characterize his age. He becomes too independent, too knowing;

he acquires a knowledge and an experience which, if not positively harmful, are certainly premature; in short, he falls into what is allowed by common consent to be the general fashion—or shall we rather call it misfortune?—of the present generation, and grows old before his time. Connected with this is another evil, which I mention, not because it is inseparable from the system of day-schools, but because, as a matter of fact, it is often accidentally connected with it, and because the mention of it may help to make the authorities apply more speedily and effectually the remedy of which they have already perceived the necessity. A boy is more likely to get harm during the hour which he commonly has to dispose of between morning and afternoon school than he is during the journeyings backwards and forwards. The conversation that he will hear in eating-houses and luncheon-bars will often be far from edifying. If he spend the balance of time that remains to him in the billiard-room or in loitering about the streets, he is not likely to get much good from it. A less formidable evil, yet serious enough in its way, is the chance that he may spend the money, with which it is intended he should procure a substantial repast, in the unwholesome wares, generally so fascinating to the boy-palate, which the pastry-cook displays. I have frequently known boys whose deterioration in looks and behaviour and mental power it was impossible to account for till it was discovered that they had got into the habit of dining off puffs and toffy. To these abuses a remedy might be applied which would be almost, if not wholly, effectual. Every school should provide accommodation for the mid-day meal of its scholars—good rooms and good fare, varied, attractive, and cheap, as it easily might be if no official were allowed to make a profit out of it. If the attraction of a play-ground could be added, it might be possible to make a stringent regulation that, with the exception of a few older boys and some others to whom for special causes leave might be given, no one should leave the school between the hours of assembling in the morning and final dismissal in the afternoon. The boy's time would thus be accounted for; he would not be allowed the perilous liberty, which would certainly not be conceded to him in any well-conducted boarding-school, of spending an hour absolutely free from control amidst the temptations of a great city. Unhappily the playground is not always attainable. Merchant Taylors' will have one when it is removed to the site of the Charterhouse, unless indeed the fascination of letting land on profitable building leases make its governors appropriate all, as they have already appropriated some, of the available space. But St. Paul's, at least as long as it remains in its present situation, cannot hope to give its boys anything better than the dark cage in which they now endeavour to amuse themselves,

and the City of London School is equally hampered by the conditions of its locality.

It is not easy to suggest a remedy for what I have spoken of as the difficulties of access and the evils which these may cause. Merchant Taylors' and St. Paul's might, it is true, be removed into one of the suburbs; but this would be to deprive the other suburbs of the benefits to be derived from them; and they may be called a valuable property of the citizens of London—the one being possessed of great wealth of its own, the other having a very large interest in the endowments of the Universities. But something would be done if all the principal suburbs were provided with really efficient schools within easy reach. Such a school Dulwich, Sydenham, and Norwood have, in the renowned "Alleyn's College of God's Gift." It is proposed, again, to found five new day-schools out of the resources of Christ's Hospital: these might be advantageously set on the outskirts of London, where they might seem to be most needed. If these are not sufficient, others might be provided out of funds which it is not my business at present to specify, and of which it is sufficient to say that they are now wasted in profuse feasting and demoralizing almsgiving.

2. The discipline of a day-school is a matter of some difficulty. The means which a master has at hand for this purpose are very limited. Besides the trivial punishments, applicable only to the young, of making the offenders stand up on the form, &c., he has nothing to employ but the rod, which term I use to denote the birch and the cane, and the imposition. I do not agree with the theorists who denounce altogether the use of corporal punishment. The ancients, from Solomon downwards, had a decided opinion in its favour, and it has not yet been proved that they were wrong. But most of us are agreed in thinking that its use should be subject to limitations which our fathers did not think of imposing. We may use it for chastising uncleanness, lying, dishonesty, even obstinate idleness, not in the case of ordinary offences against discipline, or inattention to work. Yet, practically, it has to be so used, in a greater or less degree, according to circumstances and the governing capacity of the master, or its disuse must be accompanied by great loss of time and increase of toil. For, as has been said, there is no alternative but the imposition; and the imposition, unless it is employed with moderation and judgment, is the most wearisome and useless of punishments, which may be said to produce with certainty one effect only, that is, to spoil the handwriting. Practically, the average master, not being one of the rare few born rulers of men who can keep a crowd of boys in order by a nod, has to fall back upon his cane. A crowd of high-spirited boys of the upper and middle classes,

who daily, to parody M. Montalembert's phrase, take "a bath of liberty at home," cooped together for hours in a small room, without the safety-valve of a play-ground, can very seldom be effectively ruled by moral force. It would be possible, nay easy, to convince by reasoning any particular offender of the heinousness of his transgressions; but the process would take time, and where each boy cannot claim on an average more than three or four minutes of the master's attention, to demonstrate at length to the idle B. that he must not shoot peas at his neighbour would clearly be to rob the industrious A. In such cases, the *ultima ratio* of the cane, as it is the easiest, so certainly appears to be the most just. In strong contrast with this poverty of disciplinary resources is the abundance which the master of the boarding-school can command. Here it is not six hours of the boy's day, but the whole day that you command. He has no home to reward him with its indulgences for the severity of school. His whole happiness and comfort depend upon his being upon moderately good terms with his master, who can vindicate his authority and the claims of study by the stoppage or curtailment of every pleasure which he enjoys. He must, one would think, be a bungler who, with all these means at command, should be driven, except in the few cases where he may think the gross punishment needful, to the brute argument of the rod.

3. Closely connected with the question of discipline is that of the relation between the master and his scholars. Those who have taught, and, in a less degree, those who have learnt, in a day-school must have been conscious of something unsatisfactory in this relation as it there exists. Commonly, that is, as between the teacher and the great majority of those whom he teaches, it is a relation of authority alone, though tempered with something of the kindly feeling which contrives to spring up even under most uncongenial circumstances; sometimes it sinks into one of mere power, exercised without feeling, and submitted to with reluctance; at the best, it rises into the keen intellectual sympathy which binds together those who are eager to impart knowledge and those who are eager to acquire it. Even at the best, it has a certain hardness and coldness about it. Day by day the teacher and the taught assemble; for a few hours they are brought into a close connection which demands, if it is to be pleasant or even tolerable, much mutual forbearance and affection, but the gracious influences of the home, of the common life, which should produce these feelings, are wanting. One boy, indeed, will excite a special interest in the teacher by conspicuous cleverness; another, by the pathetic signs of industry striving to overcome the defect of power; a third, by some peculiar sweetness of temper or grace of manner; a fourth, in less pleasant fashion, by extraordinary indolence or turbulence; but the multitude pass before him, an ever-shifting

crowd, for whom he can feel neither affection nor dislike; whose intellectual power he can estimate, though here, too, having but a few tests at his command, he is often strangely wrong; of whose temper and disposition he catches an occasional glance; but who, seeing that more than half of their lives are wholly without his sight, must be always more than half strangers to him. Something he may do, if opportunity serve and his own tastes so incline him, by sharing in the sports of his scholars; but even in the cricket or the football field he does but slightly extend his acquaintance; nor is this resource often available, even if increasing years and the other interests and avocations of his life do not make it wearisome or impracticable. Do what he may, he cannot bring about the relation which is the result of the boarding-house in its various forms; which exists between the married master of Eton or Harrow and the boys of his house; and, of a still closer kind, between the unmarried master of Marlborough or Haileybury and those who share with him the common life of those great schools. What both masters and boys lose in this way it is not easy to say. As for the master, he must, I am sure, *live* with his boys if he would long keep fresh and unimpaired his interest in the work of teaching them; as for the boy, he loses much, especially in the case where the intellectual interests are weak, when a hard line separates the two sides of his life, when he learns in one place, and finds all that calls forth his affections, all his amusements, all his pleasures, in another. It is well that the same influence should reach to both departments. This is what the boarding-school does, or is, at least, intended to do. In the varied intercourse that takes place out of school, at table, in the play-field, in the many occasions which the common life creates, the master often discovers an accessible side of his pupil's mind which he would never have seen from his desk; the boy feels the application of a keen intellectual stimulus in the friendly contact of a superior intellect, which, when away from his form, he no longer regards as a hostile power.

4. The question of money demands a few words. Unquestionably the day-school possesses the advantage of cheapness. It is a fact that numbers of the middle class are able thus to secure for their children an education which they could not otherwise afford to give them. A few figures in reference to this matter may be found useful. The usual charge of a London day-school, of the class such as I am speaking of, may be stated at about £20 per annum. That is, I believe, about the amount paid at the schools attached to the University and King's Colleges. At Merchant Taylors' the yearly payment is £10; but there the amount derived from the school-fees is supplemented by an almost equal sum furnished by the Company, the patrons. At the City of London School the payment is less; but here again, I suppose,

deficiencies are made up out of the revenues of the Corporation. At Westminster and Charterhouse, on the other hand, the fees are considerably larger. Add twelve pounds to the twenty for the expenses of the journey and the mid-day meal, and you have the whole of the expense out of pocket. But these facts are not complete without some explanations. The £20 fee is not enough to provide a sufficient staff of masters. The classes in the great London day-schools are, almost without exception, too large—in some cases most injuriously so. At Merchant Taylors', for instance, every master, excluding the head-master and his assistant, who divide about sixty between them, teaches, or endeavours to teach, fifty or more in the morning, and not less than thirty in the afternoon. I cannot speak with equal precision about other schools; but the classes are often, I believe, at least equally numerous. It must be obvious to any one who is practically acquainted with the subject,—indeed, to any one who will take the trouble to divide the number of minutes included in school-time by the number of boys,—that under such a system the dull must be neglected, the indolent suffered to escape, and the quick kept back. *Twenty* is, I believe, the greatest number to which a teacher can do full justice, and the economy which crowds a class-room with double or more than double that number is certain to sacrifice efficiency. It is evident, however, that if this rule of a maximum number is to be maintained, a serious money-difficulty presents itself. The £400 which would come from twenty boys paying £20 apiece would not furnish adequately-remunerated instruction. Deduct from it the proportion which the head-master receives for his supervision of the establishment, the sum required for the teaching of French, drawing, &c., and the expenses of rent, repairs, and the like, and what remains will not suffice to give a proper salary to the master of the form. As a matter of fact, the under-masters of the London schools, though teaching much larger numbers than the maximum which has been mentioned, do not receive such salaries as will ordinarily command first-rate ability. At Merchant Taylors' they receive on an average about £400 a year each, and this, putting the richly-endowed St. Paul's out of the question, is, I imagine, more than they receive in the other schools of which mention has been made. Yet £400 is not a sum for which an insurance company, a bank, a merchant, or a lawyer, can get first-rate assistance. It is not a sufficient income for a gentleman obliged to live in London or the suburbs; even supplemented by such extra sums as the leisure of the teacher may enable him to earn—and it would be well for his efficiency if he had no inducement to do any work that did not bear immediately on his occupation as a teacher—it gives him no chance of realizing a competence. The truth is, that what Mr. Ayrton, with the pleasant humour which characterizes him, calls the "licensed victuallers'

system," affords a solution of the difficulty of finding proper payment for teachers. The possession of a "house"—we will not say at Eton, Harrow, or Rugby, because these are frequented by a wealthier class, but at such schools as Uppingham, where the terms are materially lower—affords an income, out of which a man can not only live comfortably, but can lay by. First-rate ability is naturally attracted by such advantages. It is also attracted, though of course not retained for so long, by what the "hostel system" of such a school as Marlborough can offer. A young man, fresh from college, and anxious to throw himself completely into school life, considers a salary of two or three hundred a year, unburdened by any expense of living, a satisfactory remuneration. Mr. Bradley, I imagine, finds no difficulty in filling his masterships with men who have attained the highest honours at Oxford and Cambridge. With the staff which he, or which Mr. Thring at Uppingham, is able to collect about him, the under-masters of the London schools can hardly be compared. Of the head-masterships I do not speak. They are, though not splendidly remunerated, for many reasons very desirable posts, and will always command the services of the best men; but the under-masterships, besides being most insufficient in number, do not, as a rule (though there are not a few exceptions), attract men of high distinction. Any estimate of the price of the education given must be modified by these considerations.

My readers may have begun to think that I have hardly been faithful to my promise of impartiality,—that I am writing against day-schools, that I content myself with pointing out their evils. If they will have the patience to read a few pages more, they will see that I fully recognise the great good—in many instances the more than counterbalancing good—which belongs to them. I cannot find this good more tersely and lucidly stated than it is by the younger Pliny in one of his letters to his friend Tacitus (Ep. iv. 13). He was, he tells his correspondent, interesting himself in the foundation of a school in his native town of Comum. He writes:—

"When I was last in my native place, there came to pay his respects to me the son—still a lad—of one of my fellow-townsmen. 'Are you at school?' I asked him. 'Yes,' he answered; 'at Milan.' 'Why not here?' The lad's father—he was present, and indeed had brought his son—replied, 'Because we have no teachers here.' 'Why no teachers? Surely it concerns you in the very highest degree, you who are fathers,—by good luck, many who were fathers heard me speak,—that your children should be taught here rather than anywhere else. *For where can they sojourn more agreeably than in their native place, or be kept in more wholesome restraint than when under the eyes of their parents, or live at less expense than at home?*'"

Of the last of the three points here made something has been already said. A good education cannot be a cheap thing, get it how you will; nothing good is cheap, one begins to find out after a few

years' experiments. But a day-school, even supplied with an ample staff of amply-paid masters, ought to be *comparatively* cheap. If, as is generally the case with the country grammar-school, it is so near to the boy's home that he can walk to it and return for all his meals, the difference of expense ought to be considerable. The expenses of travelling, and of meals purchased abroad, must, of course, reduce this difference. Where the absence of two or three boys from home renders possible a smaller establishment, the boarding-school is often found the cheaper alternative. Of the first, the comparative *pleasantness* of a boy's life at home and away from home, it is not easy for any one not a boy to speak. If one may hazard the guess, the younger boy, saved from some of the hardships which he is pretty sure to encounter at the boarding-school, is happier when he lives at home; the elder, who under his parents' roof cannot reach the independent and dignified position to which he attains in a boarding-school, is probably a happier, as he is certainly a greater, creature when he lives away. Could the suffrages of the whole race of boys be taken on the question which Pliny suggests, they would probably be found to give a majority for home. The second point, *the wholesome restraint* in matters of morality,—together with which may be considered the influence exercised on intellectual powers, a point on the supreme importance of which it is needless to enlarge,—remains to be considered.

A system which combines the home life and the school life possesses obviously a great advantage, great even after every allowance has been made for the fact that each loses something of its completeness from the combination. That a boy should mix with his equals, learn to estimate himself rightly by comparison with them, have his nerves braced by competition, acquire the manliness, independence, self-restraint, which both men and boys can scarcely acquire except among their fellows, and yet be kept all the while constantly within reach of the purifying and humanizing influences of home; should have father and mother close at hand to give him advice in his difficulties, to receive his confession of faults, to continue on through the most critical period of his moral growth the "nurture and admonition" under which his childhood has been passed; should have sisters in whom he daily learns to behave to women with the courtesy, deference, and self-forgetfulness which the noisy advocates of the sex have not yet made English gentlemen forget; that, rough as may be his manners, rude and even coarse his speech elsewhere, there are hours every day when he must practise something of self-restraint and retain something of refinement, is a blessing of which it is impossible to over-estimate the value. And what has been said before of the immunity of the day-school from overpowering attacks of epidemic sickness applies in a way to its moral health. The corrupting in-

fluence which even one bad able boy can exercise in his own boarding-house meets here with many checks and hindrances. There are no such opportunities of constant companionship and close intimacy. And, what is more important, there is the continual counter-influence of home. The moral disease is never, or rather, I fear I must say, need never be, left to increase to a formidable height. Under the eye of the most watchful master, a boy, if he has that wonderful power of dissimulation which some boys possess, may grow very bad without detection; but it is very seldom that any great moral deterioration can escape the eyes of a parent used to watch and to interpret every change of feature, every tone of voice, who observes, and draws his conclusions from observing, whether the eyes meet his as boldly and frankly as before, whether the answer comes as readily, whether the voice has the old honest ring in it, not to mention the more manifest signs of physical well-being or the reverse, which so often come as symptoms or effects of moral causes, manifest indeed, yet needing the keen and anxious look of love to note them. It is painfully true that there are some boys who go wrong in spite of all good influences working upon them; there are others, one is glad to know, whom no bad influences can corrupt; but there is a large class whom it is of supreme importance to touch with the timely word or hint, with the suggestion of a new friendship instead of that which is leading them astray, of a new interest in exchange for that which is growing hurtful. For these the watchful care at home seems the thing most needed. If you send them away, they may come back at the end of half a year utterly changed, the habit of confidence broken, with a barrier between their hearts and yours which it seems impossible to pull down, but which, you cannot but think, could not have been raised in the midst of daily intercourse.

Closely connected with the moral is the intellectual influence of home. Here, too, the watchfulness of daily observation is of the greatest use. It cannot be exercised too diligently, though, if I may be allowed to give a word of caution, it may be manifested injudiciously and hurtfully. The practice, for instance, which some parents follow of daily questioning their children as to the place which they have taken in school, is a very dangerous one; exposes the child, who knows that no number but a very high one will be a satisfactory answer to his questioner, to a sore temptation to be false. So unseasonable an anxiety may often be as mischievous as that which it closely resembles, the impatience which prompts the child to dig up the seeds which he has sown that he may see how they are growing. But a man cannot be too watchful, and if he has ordinary intelligence, and, perhaps it should be added, some little knowledge of what his son is learning, he will never be at a loss to know whether the work is being honestly and diligently done. And if he has reason

to mistrust his own observation, the master is always at hand to advise with. Anyhow it is impossible, under these circumstances, for a boy to get unobserved into confirmed habits of idleness. Nor can the most carefully-devised system elsewhere give a safeguard against this danger quite as effectual.

Besides the facility thus given by the life at home for seeing whether a boy does his work, there is the opportunity of controlling the help that he gets in doing it. There will, of course, be need of judgment in using this opportunity. I have known boys ruined by injudicious assistance; sometimes pushed by such help into places which it was beyond their strength fairly to occupy, sometimes so used to support that they stumbled hopelessly when the inevitable moment came for them to walk alone. Others again are, so to speak, crippled for life, clouded by an habitual feeling of hopelessness, through the unreasonably inflexible resolve that leaves them to struggle through all their difficulties alone. To make a boy put out his full strength, and to step in with help when the strain overpasses it; to suggest the clue of the labyrinth when the effort to find the way has been enough to answer all purposes of discipline, and is beginning to be torture; to prevent with the timely hint that useless waste of strength which follows when a boy's mind grows, as it will grow, confused with long looking at a difficulty; these are services which a father's labour of love will render more faithfully and effectually than the greatest diligence and skill that are ever to be found in a tutor. And when we come to estimate positive results our expectations will not be disappointed. Generally, in spite of all disadvantages—of which I take the commonly insufficient number of masters to be the chief—the scholars of the day-schools do hold their own against their competitors, both at the Universities and elsewhere; the counterbalancing advantage being, I take it, for the most part, found in the home. And there are branches of knowledge in which this advantage makes itself felt very decidedly. The late Mr. Chapman, a French teacher of great experience and skill, who happened to be engaged both at Christ's Hospital and at Merchant Taylors', being asked to compare his classes in respect of their proficiency in the language which he taught, attributed a decided superiority to the boys of Merchant Taylors'; a superiority for which he accounted by the fact that these derived a benefit from which the scholars at Christ's Hospital were shut out—the French scholarship of their mothers and sisters. And I imagine, that as to general culture, the boys of a day-school would compare favourably—social position, &c., being equal—with the boys of a boarding-school. Where there is culture in the home it is impossible but that the boy who lives there should be more or less touched by it. Books are read or talked about before him, political and social questions are discussed, the

multitudinous interests that go to make up the intellectual life of the day surround him. Into many of them he enters but little, if he enters at all; it is well that it should be so; but at least he hears their names, he recognises their existence, he gets, almost unconsciously, some impression from them as they pass before him. It would be too much to say that this element of culture, of intellectual interest, does not exist in the boarding-school, but it is certainly very rare. A fitful talk may be kept up on these subjects by the influence of a master's presence; here and there a studious boy is found who loves them in his heart, and would talk of them, were he so exceptionally fortunate as to find—as he can scarcely hope to find among a hundred companions—a like kindred friend to share his tastes. But the common talk is of sport, or, if ever of study, as indeed it may often be, it is of study, not in its intellectual, but in its practical aspect; not as a means of culture, but as a field of competition. I am not speaking from my own knowledge, but what I say is justified by the complaints which masters, who can so speak, are continually making—complaints which echo what Tacitus says in his "Dialogus de Oratore" of the conversation of the young men of his day, that no subjects found favour among them except "equorum et gladiatorum studia et histrionalis favor." But, on the other hand, I have often witnessed, and in not a few cases have been able to connect directly with home influence, the large information, the wide knowledge, and the keen intellectual interest displayed by boys under my own charge. There are homes of course, the νεόπλουτα δώματα of commerce especially, where no influence of the kind is exercised, the ignorance and vulgarity of which are too faithfully represented in the scholars who proceed from them; there are circles, I doubt not, in the best schools, which do know and care something about a literature which is not included in school books, sporting periodicals and cheap novels. But that what I have said is generally true, that the ordinary effect of the home life is to extend the range of a boy's intellectual interests, and that of the school life is to contract it, I have no doubt whatever.

I shall leave my readers to draw their own conclusions from what I have said. My aim has been to put facts and the results of experience before them, and leave to them the application, depending, as it must do, upon the circumstances of every particular case. Of bad schools I have not spoken. It does not matter of what kind they are. But that schools which are called, and which deserve to be called, good schools, are bad for this boy or that is a fact of which many parents seem wholly unaware, and on which—if I may hope for so much from this paper—it will have been a most useful work to enlighten them.

ALFRED CHURCH.

THE FAMILY SYSTEM FOR WORKHOUSE CHILDREN.

"THERE is nothing," we are told in the first Bridgewater Treatise, "which so sets off the superior skill of one artist as the utter failure of every other artist in his attempts to improve upon it." "And so the failure of every philanthropic or political experiment which proceeds on the distrust of nature's strong and urgent and general affections may be regarded as an impressive, while experimental, demonstration for the matchless wisdom of nature's God." In these words Dr. Chalmers epitomizes his exposition of the family system as the basis on which human society is built, and the vital principle by which it is animated, controlled, and perfected. We accept his proposition alike in its strictest and its fullest signification, and although in demonstrating it our present remarks must chiefly be limited to one class of the community—the children who fall under the tutelage of the State—its capability of universal application may usefully be glanced at.

The salient characteristics of family life are individualization, and mutual affection and responsibility. The number nature associates in each primary group of the body politic which we call a family never exceeds that which will afford to each member individual growth and action, while at the same time she creates among the little band an interdependence of love and duty which

prevents individualization from becoming isolation. Here we have a sort of centripetal and centrifugal force correcting each other, while they maintain a healthy motion. And farther, Nature, with a subtile skill all her own, associates in her family combinations ever-varying elements, moral, mental, and physical,—as of temper, disposition, capacity, sex, age, strength, and health,—that each may act favourably upon the other, supplementing deficiencies or neutralizing evil tendencies. Now, if we violate this law of subdivision, and herd our fellow-creatures together in masses; if, departing still further from Nature's ordinance, we place together, not those who differ, but those who are alike, whether it be in character, age, or sex, we cast away the very soul of beauty and life which lies in growth and variety, and find in their place stagnation and decay. There are cases, it is true, in which, with the imperfection of the means at our command inseparable from all human things, we are compelled to classify and to assemble together numbers too large to permit of their being completely individualized.

Criminals afford an illustration. It is obvious that, to secure detention, prisons are indispensable; and the cost of a prison for every offender, or for even every half-dozen offenders, would be too vast to be sustained. But all experience in the treatment of this class shows that the nearer the individualization and interdependence of the family can be approached, the greater the probability of reformation. These are the leading principles of the profoundly philosophical reformatory system of Captain Maconochie, which, reduced to practice by Sir Walter Crofton, made the Irish convict gaols a model to the world, and shows us, on the Government farm at Lusk, men who, having been trained by a discipline of reason and right feeling, can be trusted to fulfil the last stage of their sentence unconfined by walls, and almost unwatched by warders; while their fellows at Dartmoor, massed and coerced under a less enlightened system, are degraded to the position of wild beasts, as they labour in the field or on the road under aim of a loaded gun. Which of these, the Lusk or the Dartmoor men, are best prepared to lead a life of industry and self-control when the day of liberty arrives it would not be difficult to determine, even if the proportionate relapses into crime did not place this question beyond all doubt.

The beautiful village of Laforce, in France, furnishes most touching testimony to the beneficent effect of that interdependence which develops the affections and encourages mutual obligation. There are assembled in cheerful cottage homes persons very variously afflicted—idiots, cripples, epileptics, and incurable invalids. Such a catalogue of the ills that flesh is heir to might well induce avoidance

of the locality; yet it may be averred, a happier spectacle could hardly be found, with such wonderful alchemy has the benevolent founder of this asylum, John Bost, distilled good from things evil. He has taught his wards to help each other; and in this mutual aid, and the love and unselfish interests it engenders, are found at once the best alleviation of their affliction, and, where cure is possible, the most potent means for its achievement.

The insane yield another demonstration of this great truth. The more the unhealthy mind can be brought in contact with the healthy, or with one whose form of malady offers a contrast to its own, and the more the patient's natural affections and sense of responsibility can be satisfied,—as by associating the old and the young, and those likely to form attachments, and so enabling them to discharge the duties of parents, children, or friends,—the greater the chance of cure. Even their treatment under certain conditions in private families is considered desirable by some who speak with authority. And the results obtained at that wonderful refuge for the insane which the village of Gheel, in Belgium, has afforded for nearly a thousand years, appear amply to support this view. "The healthy influence of family life," says the author of the "City of the Simple," "is the prevailing element in the system adopted at Gheel; and while it constitutes the peculiarity of that system, it is the great secret of its success." Very emphatic on the importance of family life for other classes whom it has been customary to regard as better dealt with in large institutions is Dr. Howe, the American physician, widely known for his benevolent and successful treatment of the deaf and blind mute, Laura Bridgeman. Having organized the first institution for the blind in the United States, and exerted himself to procure the establishment of a dozen others in his native country, he has of late years perceived and frankly acknowledged his mistake.

"All great establishments," he says, "in the nature of boarding-schools, where the sexes must be separated; where there must be boarding in common, and sleeping in congregate dormitories; where there must be routine, and formality, and restraint, and repression of individuality; where the charms and refining influences of the true family relation cannot be had—all such institutions are unnatural, undesirable, and very liable to abuse. We should have as few of them as is possible. . . . We should be cautious about establishing artificial communities, or those approaching them in character, for any children and youth; but more especially should we avoid them for those who have any natural infirmity, or any marked peculiarity of mental organization. . . . Separation, and not congregation, should be the law of their treatment. . . . As much as may be, surround insane and excitable persons with sane people and ordinary influences; vicious children with virtuous people and virtuous influences; blind children with those who see; mute children with those who speak, and the like. . . . Beware how you sever

any of those ties of family, of friendship, of neighbourhood, *during the period of their strongest growth*, lest you make a homeless man a wanderer and a stranger. Especially beware how you cause him to neglect forming early relations of affection with those whose sympathy and friendship will be most important to him during life."

These latter words have a peculiar bearing on our present subject; namely, the training of pauper children, and more especially of those among them who, being orphans or deserted, are entirely under the guardianship of the State. From ten to fourteen years old, according to the demand for child labour, and the discretion of the guardians, these young creatures go forth into the world and begin to earn their bread. Let us try for a moment to realize such a lot for our own children, and we shall at once feel the force of Dr. Howe's exhortation to preserve family ties, and to enable the young soldier to form, before he enters on the battle of life, relations of affection, friendship, and sympathy, which shall support and shelter him in future difficulty or sorrow. Having once grasped this conviction, we cannot but anxiously inquire if in our present method of dealing with these young dependants we fulfil the conditions essential for their happiness.

It may be well to premise that of the paupers in England and Wales nearly 400,000, or 36 per cent. of the whole, are children. Of these more than 335,000 are relieved out of doors, being wholly or partially supported by the State, but residing with relations or friends. But upwards of 56,000 of them are "in-door" paupers, living within the walls of the workhouse or the school. It would, however, be a great mistake to suppose that all are permanent inmates. A large proportion, probably nearly two-thirds, are "casuals," who with their parents enter the workhouse, and depart from it many times in a year; the remainder, who are chiefly the orphans and deserted, may be roughly estimated at 20,000, and of these all but the very small number yet "boarded out" (and who are now, therefore, officially classified among the "out-door") live the year round, some of them from birth until deemed old enough for service, in what has been called, with not much exaggeration, the "monastic seclusion" of the workhouse or district school—without a break in its dull, unnatural routine. District schools, it has been maintained, afford to the children of the poor the advantages which the great public schools confer upon the wealthy. There are not many among us, we apprehend, who would discover any "advantages" in our system of public boarding-schools if applied to *girls*, and it would be hard to point out in what respect the daughters of the poor are less likely to suffer than those of the rich from being massed together by the thousand. But even as regards *boys* the two institutions do not, as Mrs. Archer has well shown, admit of comparison.

What in the district school affords the freedom and self-government, and liberty to spend within limits, which in the public school are regarded as such valuable elements in training the future citizen? Where are the long holidays, during which the "boy's mind may lie fallow, enabling him to return to school with fresh vigour?" Where the happy home, promising a bright future during months of school work? and where the parents and sisters, whose sympathy and approbation are the reward of toil, and, maybe, hardship? The letters, and hampers, and visits from home, too, how are they replaced to the inmate of the district school? Not one of these sources of enjoyment and elements of variety brightens his life.

"Let the men," says Mrs. Archer, "who have not forgotten the years of their boyhood, imagine this state of things—imagine themselves in a public school, where the 'long half year' would be succeeded, not by holidays, which had been looked forward to with so much longing, but by school time upon school time without a break, year after year, until all sense of free enjoyment had been lost, and they had been moulded into nothing more than beings, of whom, perhaps, it may be said that they could earn their own livelihood."*

We have dwelt at some length on the shortcomings of such a life for boys, because the feeling is not uncommon that evil though it be for girls, the same objections do not exist as regards the other sex.

A general impression has usually some foundation; but while we readily admit that the present case is not an exception, we urge that the difference is only of degree. The boy may suffer less from the absence of home influences; but to deny that he suffers at all is not only to falsify all experience, but to assume that what man has devised is superior to what God has ordained. On the other hand, he may gain more as regards future self-support from the kind of teaching adapted to large numbers than a girl can possibly do; but when we learn from the last Report of the Poor-Law Board that "difficulty is often experienced in obtaining a satisfactory outlet for boys brought up in the district and separate schools," and from Mr. Tufnell that "one of the best occupations to which the boys can be brought up is that of band-boys to supply the demand for musicians in the army and navy," it would appear that the success of the system even with them is not very triumphant. The Report just quoted attributes thirty-four per cent. of pauperism to the death, absence, or desertion of the husband or father. May it not be justifiable to attribute a large portion of this desertion to the lack in the pauper boy's training of any development of the sense of duty imposed by family relations? If to this cause we add that of drink, probably we shall have indicated the source of one-third of our pauperism.

* "To the Rescue." London: Simpkin and Marshall.

But, however opinions may differ as regards the appropriateness of large schools for different sexes and ages, it must be borne in mind that in them the great majority of our pauper children—boys, girls, and, to some extent, even infants—do now dwell, and that urgent efforts are being made by men of influence to bring all our pauper children under this system. Thus we read (with an aching heart indeed) that various unions in London are preparing schools for 600, and 700, and 800 children, and that Mr. Tufnell does not believe "there is any real difficulty in managing a pauper school of 1,500 children." We do not dispute his opinion as regards managing the school, but how about exorcising the evil in these 1,500 scholars, and training each one to be a self-reliant man or woman? "On fait bien manœuvrer un régiment à la parole," says Demetz, "un équipage de marins à coups de sifflet, mais cela ne saurait suffire pour les moraliser."

The very uniformity which it is a special aim in dealing with large numbers to produce is precisely the opposite condition to that essential to the complete development of the human being; he becomes, to use a capital illustration applied by a contemporary, "a mere cog in an engine of many wheels, whereas, in real life, the individual has to be in itself a many-wheeled engine."* The continued advocacy of the method of dealing with our pauper children in vast masses affects us the more painfully that the viciousness of the principle is now to some extent recognised by our Poor-Law authorities as regards the sick and infirm. The new metropolitan asylums for their reception are built in distinct "blocks," as they are called—in fact, separate houses—each to contain 160 inmates, except the blocks for the sick, which receive only sixty.

And here we would pause a moment to express our regret at the ungracious task before us. We have to show that earnest, self-devoted, and long-continued labours have been in great measure thrown away; and that evil is actually being wrought where good alone is aimed at, and even believed to be achieved. In the following pages we shall have frequent occasion to differ from Mr. Carlton Tufnell, but it is needless for us to say that, utterly as we distrust the system with which he has identified himself, his name commands the respect of all who care for the well-being of our pauper children. He was among the first to proclaim the evils to which they are exposed in workhouses, and his exertions to improve their condition have never flagged. Further, we desire at once to repudiate any imputation by us of unworthy motives or want of zeal in the discharge of their duty on the part of the officers to whom the care of these children is confided. We believe there are few among them

* "Pauper Girls,"—*Westminster Review*, April, 1870.

who content themselves with simply performing what they are paid to do; but, taking a kindly interest in the welfare of their wards, often exert themselves far beyond official limits to obtain it. But their task is sadly like that of Sisyphus; and as the value of labour is usually measured by its results, their too often bootless toil wins small acknowledgment, and not unfrequently the faults inherent in the system they have to administer are attributed to them.

The efforts, then, we have referred to for the extension of district schools are, we feel assured, inspired by the best motives; but the training of children demands the thought, experience, and intuitions of a mother, at least as much as of a father, to direct it aright; and as long as she is unrepresented among those upon whom devolves the duty of providing for the education of our juvenile paupers, it is only to be expected that even the best-intentioned efforts should be misguided, and fail miserably in attaining their object.

We are aware that our words imply a very grave charge; but we believe it to be justified, and that silence under the conviction of the disastrous consequences of the error we allege would be culpable. To us it appears that to pen up in a little creature's breast until they wither and die for want of exercise—or, worse still, become perverted and morbid—the sentiments of affection towards parents and brothers and sisters with which its Creator has endowed it; to cut it off as a plant in the shade from the fostering warmth of their love in return; to deprive it of that variety in the small circumstances of its daily life indispensable to the happiness of a child; in fine, to rob its existence of all sweetness, is an offence which could alone be pardoned on the ground that such deprivation is essential to the child's future welfare, and that this can no otherwise be secured. If, indeed, the advocates of large schools can demonstrate these two propositions, their cause is won. We dispute them both.

Here we must again direct attention to the fact that pauper children form two distinct classes—the casuals and the permanent. It is, of course, the latter—the orphans and deserted—who are robbed entirely of family influences and freedom and variety by their school life. The casuals are subjected to it only at intervals, and their intercourse with the outer world, in company with their parents, is frequent, and long enough to neutralize its stagnating effect. But we are far from meaning that such intercourse is in itself good. Their relatives are usually but evil companions, and their surroundings too often those of profligacy and crime. We shall consider this branch of our subject later.

Let us now remember that the proportion of the casual greatly exceeds that of the permanent class. It would appear to vary at different schools, but the average, we believe, is about two-

thirds of the school population. These two-thirds, however, are not represented by the same individuals. They change so rapidly that sometimes the numbers passing through the school in a year will be five times as many as it contains on any one day.* For the effect upon the moral state of the permanent inmates of close companionship in this ratio with children fresh from the purlieus of crime, we will refer our readers to Mrs. Archer's forcible description.† Moreover, the evil thus communicated is beyond the power of the teacher to check, as, where children are massed in hundreds, he cannot learn what is passing between them. As regards the permanent class, therefore, we find not only does the school system deprive them of good influences, but it *drenches* them with evil ones, our course regarding them being hardly more reasonable than it would be to send children whose health we wished to preserve to dwell in a fever hospital.

We have spoken of the deadening of the affections in large schools, and may appropriately quote, in confirmation, the following passage from the letter of a lady, whose labours in the female adult ward of a large metropolitan workhouse bring her constantly across young women who have been reared in its separate school. This, we believe, is a very good one, and as the children are sent there at an extremely early age, they must be supposed to derive from it all the benefit it is capable of bestowing.

"Recurring," says our correspondent, "to the strange want of natural affection shown by girls brought up in these schools, which exemplifies the mechanical and artificial routine to which they are necessarily subjected. In my efforts to get these girls places, and in my remonstrances against their hasty surrender of a situation, I have been startled by the frequent answer, 'Oh, there were too many children.' 'Oh, I can't suit myself with children.' Seven or eight once maintained this position in a conversation with me, and one girl, wishing to conciliate me, said she would not mind going where there were one or two, but as to more, she would not think of it. When I tried to rouse what I thought was the innate feeling in women towards children, I found absolute vacuity. When I reminded them of all they owed for their own up-bringing, the replies came as fast as hail, 'My mother left me in a ditch;' 'Mine ran off when I was three;' 'Mine was always drunk, and I don't know anything about her;' and so on through the whole party. Now this appears to me a grave and shocking want among the future mothers of the poor; and how, but by placing these poor things in families, are they ever to develop that God-implanted instinct, which, in these girls, I find totally absent?

"Miss ——'s ‡ experience is the same frequently, even when these poor

* Report upon the Education of Pauper Children. By Andrew Doyle, Esq., Poor-Law Inspector, 1862.

† Letter to the Ex-officio Guardians and the Elected Guardians of the Poor. Highworth: Ricketts, 1866.

‡ A little Home, whose existence is chiefly owing to the benevolence of this lady, though established for the purpose of rescuing domestic servants who have been led

girls are mothers themselves. They let their babies fall out of bed, and often take a dislike to them. When they show love for their children it is a sign of salvation and hope for the mother. . . . . The more my work as a workhouse visitor takes me among the classes who employ them, the more I feel convinced what a terrible mistake we have made in bringing up these girls independent of family homes to fall back upon. There is such a great gulf fixed between workhouse girls and the employers of labour, that I find it nearly as difficult to get people to take them as servants as if they were discharged prisoners."

Let us now consider the results of the school system. These are usually measured by the success of the children placed out to service after being at least two years at school, and who consist chiefly of the orphan and deserted class, though some may possess parents. The latest return on this subject, of official authority, was moved for in the House of Commons by Mr. Henley, and issued in 1862 by the Poor-Law Board, and relates to the ten years ending 1861.

During that period, 31,129 boys and girls were placed out from workhouse and district schools; and 6,154, or a proportion of 19·5 per cent.—of the same class, though, it would appear, not necessarily the same individuals—were ascertained to have returned to the workhouse; to be, in other words, failures. When it is considered how many of those who returned to workhouses during that period it must have been impossible, after the long interval during which they had been lost sight of, to identify as having been or not having been in the schools; and again, how many who had been in the schools may then have been in prisons and penitentiaries,* or otherwise castaways, we cannot but believe that the true per-centage of failures was much greater. The return was very incomplete, and has even been pronounced "worthless," which, as regards precise information, it may be. For instance, eighty-six unions give no statistics, on the ground that their children attend parish schools; and Lambeth gives the number it has sent out, but ignores those who came back. An

astray, receives also the more hopeful among that large and melancholy class of workhouse inmates—unmarried mothers—some of whom are but fifteen or sixteen years old—hardly more than children themselves. The guardians of Lambeth Union have shown their approval of the Home by paying £1 5*s.* for each case from their workhouse, and also sometimes supplying clothes. Employment is obtained for them, and out of their earnings they pay as much as they are able towards the support of their infants who are kept at the Home, but are still, as far as possible, left dependent on the mother. Notwithstanding, however, the great care taken it has been found very difficult to keep the little creatures alive, as it invariably is when babies, whom nature intends shall be brought up separately, are congregated together.

"I am about," writes the benevolent foundress, "to take a cottage home in the country for the poor infants. . . . . Former girls are collecting all they can, and giving a penny a week for the Cottage Home." Visitors to the parent institution, at 3, Cumberland Street, Pimlico, are earnestly invited, the recent horrible revelations of baby-farming making the managers desirous that their plan should be rightly understood.

* Some years ago there were at one time eleven girls from the Kirkdale Schools in the some penitentiary.

analysis, however, discloses facts in themselves ascertained, which afford valuable *data* for calculation. The female failures are in proportion to the male as about two to one; the per-centage of both sexes who returned after the expensive education of the district schools, was only one less than of those brought up in workhouse schools, while as regards the females this per-centage was even greater—viz., 27·3. But a still more important feature of this return is the very high per-centages given by certain unions of the females who had come back. None fall below 22, while many exceed 70. Are we to suppose that a difference so great in results actually existed? or would it not be more reasonable to believe that the higher per-centages indicate more carefully kept records?

We pass on to the latest information we have been able to obtain. In his last report, Mr. Tufnell states that he has "*ascertained* that not 4 per cent. of those reared in these establishments [district or separate schools] fail to become independent workpeople." The only statistics he cites in support of his statement, constitute a return for the Southall Separate School, belonging to Marylebone. This school has, we know, been an object of anxious interest with those who are responsible for its management, and private benevolence has co-operated with official zeal for the welfare of the young people it sends into the world; probably, therefore, it will bear comparison with any of the establishments under Mr. Tufnell's inspection. The return, dated December, 1869, informs us that 97 boys and 41 girls were placed out during the three years then ending, giving an average of 46 children for each year. Now, it is plain that those placed during 1867 had only been out on an average two and a half years; those in 1868, one and a half years; and those in 1869, six months—short periods on which to estimate their success. Of the 97 boys, 57, or considerably more than half, had entered regimental bands, where, being already disciplined for that kind of life by the district school, they were—like a child in leading strings—hardly able to go astray. Such a career may be a desirable one, but as the number it can provide for is of necessity limited, and as not only are the pupils of district schools, but also of workhouse and reformatory schools competing for it, it misleads to cite it as if it were permanently available for all who choose to adopt it. Of the remaining boys, one was dead, and six already occupied at least a doubtful position; one had been returned to the school, two had abandoned the employment procured for them, and were with relatives, and three had been lost sight of—so that the fact of *their* being "independent workpeople" must be beyond Mr. Tufnell's power to ascertain.

Of the 41 girls, 30 were known to be doing well; the remainder, or 25 per cent., must be spoken of as doubtful; one, indeed, was in

the workhouse, and several were "with their friends," unhappily a most ambiguous phrase. It may mean circumstances the most favourable, but it may also mean destruction.

As these young people must be regarded as the ascertained measure of success at Southall, it is right to learn what number of pupils they represent. On Lady-day, 1869, the attendance was 434. As we have seen the number annually passing through a school varies from two to five times its daily attendance, a very moderate estimate will give 900 discharges during the year, or 2,700 for the three years 1867-8-9. Of these we have seen that only 138, or 5·11, were placed out by the guardians. Of the 138, forty-one (or 1·518 of the total discharges) were girls, of whom rather less than three-quarters were returned as absolutely doing well, after a trial averaging in length only eighteen months!

Very soon after Mr. Tufnell's report appeared, his statement respecting the per-centage of district-school pupils who failed to become "independent workpeople" was impugned by a member of the City of London Board of Guardians, who send their children to Hanwell. He stated* that of 27 children from their own union, who left the district school in 1867, five returned thither, and five to the workhouse, being 36 per cent. "who failed to become independent workpeople." In 1868, 25 children were apprenticed, or provided with situations, of whom seven returned to the school, and one to the workhouse, or 33 per cent. In 1869, of 30 sent out from the school seven returned, or 23 per cent. We would here observe that, though the figures are more favourable for each succeeding year, they cannot be accepted as proof of greater success; as the shorter period, taken into account, afforded, of course, less opportunity for relapse. Were these last thirty cases to be investigated a year or two hence, we dare not hope the result for 1869 would be more satisfactory than for 1867. And should it be possible to trace these young people at the end of ten years from their leaving the district school, we very much fear the per-centage of failure would be found to be far more distressing.

Not only is it contrary to custom to maintain any intercourse with former pupils of pauper schools, after they have reached sixteen, the age at which they cease to be legally dependent (even supposing surveillance has till then been exercised, which, as regards any practical result, is rarely the case), but some unions purposely abstain from inquiry; hence an additional impediment to arriving at any satisfactory information concerning their subsequent career. Recently, however, an investigation has been made as regards children who have left the Kirkdale Separate Schools, near Liverpool, during the

* *Clerkenwell News*, July 6th, 1870.

three years ending 1866, the children who left during the subsequent three years being at the present moment the subject of inquiry. During the first period 3,591 boys and girls were discharged, of whom 616, or considerably less than one-fifth, were placed out by the managers, and are reported upon as follows:*—

	Girls.	Boys.
Doing well	194	175 14 †
In workhouse ‡	26	22
Ill-conducted	4	5
Not traced	47	46
Dead	2	1
With friends	54	26
	327	289

Of those "with friends," some are doing well, but this, unfortunately, must not, as we have already indicated, be assumed of all—"friends" being sometimes the worst of enemies.

Some years ago the Kirkdale Schools were in a very unsatisfactory state, but important reforms have since been effected, and they now claim a good position among such institutions; the return we have quoted may therefore be regarded as fairly representing the results a district school may be expected to obtain. Certainly they make no approach to the 96 per cent. "ascertained to be independent workpeople" whom Mr. Tufnell counts upon. Liverpool has just determined to supplement her schools by the boarding-out system, and has our cordial wishes for its success.

While writing, a published letter from Mr. Tufnell has reached us, stating that further inquiry has confirmed the opinion expressed in his report respecting the per-centage of district school children who become "independent workpeople," and adding, that "if the calculation refers only to those who are orphans or quite deserted, it would be an over-statement to say that 1 per cent. of failures occur." He adduces as further evidence the testimony of the Chaplain of the Central London District School as regards *boys*, and quotes the success of the Stepney School,§ again as regards *boys*. No reference is made to girls in either case; yet a return omitting them would be most fallacious: for, as we have seen, their proportion of failure is double that of the other sex. An investigation by the North Surrey District School Board is next cited to the effect

* *Liverpool Mercury*, July 27th, 1870.

† Went into the army or to sea, and may be doing well. References cannot be given.

‡ Some from bad health.

§ We would remark that this institution is comparatively small, the average number of pupils being 450; that for thirty years it has been an object of special interest to very enlightened members of the Stepney Board of Guardians; that the staff of officers is large, which renders individualization of the children to some extent practicable; and that there is a probationary ward which all the pupils must pass through, so that probably a considerable proportion of the casuals never reach the main body.

that "only about 1 per cent. of the children *who have had any lengthened training* in the school have found their way back to the workhouse, and in this number are included the imbecile in mind, who form no small portion of the whole." This latter fact will not be disputed by those acquainted with workhouse populations, but the wakening of the intellect we shall hereafter find noticed among boarded-out children cannot but raise the question, how much of this imbecility may not be attributable to the stultifying influence of masses,—or, at least, how much might not be removed by a mode of training which, on the contrary, develops to the utmost the faculties and affections? In the passage just quoted it will be observed that the successful children are particularized as having been long under training, thus strengthening testimony hereafter to be alleged to the inefficacy of district schools in dealing with the casual classes. Further, the only proof of success advanced is non-return to the workhouse. We accept it (where it can be established) for what it is worth; but there are, it must be remembered, other ways in which boys, and still more in which girls, may be found to have failed in becoming "independent workpeople" besides reappearing in the workhouse. Mr. Tufnell's concluding evidence is that of the Rev. James Tosh, who was for several years the principal of the large district school at Swinton, near Manchester. "I believe," he says, "there is yet no instance of one of these children, blessed with *mens sana in corpore sano*, who has had the advantage of the average time of instruction at Swinton, falling back into pauperism." But how does this accord with the statement of Mr. Browne, Poor-Law Inspector, who, visiting Manchester workhouse, found 78 boys and 44 girls, of whom eleven and thirteen respectively had been at Swinton, and seven young men and eight young women in the adult wards, who also had been there? And how, again, can we reconcile it with the statement of an officer connected with the school, who being asked what proportion of the girls sent forth from that establishment, as compared with the daughters of artisans, had taken to bad courses, answered—"Do not ask me; it is so painful that I can hardly tell you the extent to which evil will predominate in those proceeding from our institution."* It is true our witnesses are not of recent date; but we have no evidence that the school has since improved, and an effort lately made having failed to obtain reliable returns of the subsequent fate of the children sent out, we infer that none such exist.

District or separate schools are always admitted to exceed in cost those in workhouses, but ratepayers have been reconciled to the excess by the assurance that it was accompanied by proportionate moral superiority. There are, however, authorities on this subject

* Poor Relief Committee, July, 1861.

who tell us that a small workhouse school in the country turns out its pupils better prepared to earn an honest living than are those coming from the large establishments. We hold that all these schools fail as regards a melancholy proportion of their wards, but if the small workhouses can claim the advantage, we should be disposed to attribute it to the more individual treatment the officers are able to bestow upon the few children who fall under their care, and to the occupation of the latter approaching more nearly to the rough work they have to do in the humble service to which they are sent. Far more precise returns, however, extending over a much longer period of time than yet exist must be supplied before this point can be cleared up, or the "thick darkness" dispelled which baffles every attempt to discover with accuracy what does become of our State children. But as the multiplication of district schools is greatly urged by those in authority, it is well we should know to what expenses we are being committed. Mr. Tufnell argues that large establishments must be expensive; and, as he regards Hanwell as a model school, we might not unfairly take it as an example of cost, which a few years ago amounted there, we believe, to nearly £30 a year for each child it received; but, in the latest official return, is stated to be £24 10*s.**

Instead, however, of basing our estimate on this school alone, we will include the South Metropolitan and North Surrey, and so obtain an average cost of £21 16*s.* per child per annum. Now as there is no ground for believing that the casuals derive any benefit from the costly district school beyond what they would obtain in a workhouse school, to find the true cost of those who are placed out we must debit them with any expenditure for the casuals beyond what would accrue in the workhouse, where their support may be set down at £13 a year. There is, as we have said, reason to believe that the proportion of casuals to permanent children throughout the country is at least two-thirds; but, unfortunately, they have never been officially classified. As regards London, however, a return, issued in the last Poor-Law Board Report (p. xxiii.), shows that these proportions are reversed, and we will take Mr. Tufnell's estimate of 40 per cent. On a school attendance of 1,000, therefore, the account would stand thus:—

1000 children at £21 16*s.*	£21,800	0	0
Deduct for 400 £13 each	5,200	0	0
Divide by 600	)16,600	0	0
Cost of each permanent child per annum . .	27	13	4

If, as we are informed, 100 children are placed out yearly, it will take six years to absorb the permanent class; or, in other words, we

* Twentieth Report of the Poor Law Board.

may assume that each permanent child remains six years in the school; thus he will, when he departs, have cost £166.

If all the children placed out became "independent workpeople," our calculations might cease here; but as it is admitted on all hands that some fail, the expense of these must be added to that of the successful. Supposing 80 per cent. do well (though, alas! it is only as an illustration we venture, after the statistics we have just examined, to suppose so favourable a proportion), the cost of these to their country, with that of the twenty failures superadded, is £207 10*s.* apiece. Surely we might educate our regimental bands-men and maid-servants at a somewhat cheaper rate!

But the money part of this question is infinitely the least important. What has become of that 20 per cent. who failed? And what is becoming of the many hundreds of casuals who pass from the school gates, as idle, as vicious, as ignorant and careless of any honest mode of livelihood as they entered them?

It has been lately objected to the Boarding-out System that the expectation that foster-parents can be found willing to receive the children except to make a profit out of them is merely a poetical idea, and wholly impracticable. Evidence to the contrary may be gathered from every country where the plan has been tried. Early in the present century children taken charge of by the Irish Foundling Hospital were boarded out until they were eight years old. The investigations of the commissioners appointed to inquire into education in Ireland brought them acquainted with this institution, and, in their report to Parliament in 1826, they state:—

"The affection which the nurses almost invariably conceive for the children, and the reciprocal attachment of the children towards them, appears to be in many cases as strong as if a natural relationship really existed. . . . . The scenes of deep distress which take place when the period arrives for the ultimate separation of the nurse and foster-child, are described as most trying to the best feelings of those who witness them; and it is a well-established fact that when the critical age of seven or eight years is approaching at which the children are usually taken into the hospital, the nurses very frequently forego the remuneration to which they are entitled for the past year, and abstain ever after from producing the children, rather than incur the risk of being deprived of them."

Dr. Neilson Hancock, in a Paper from which we cite this passage, quotes also from the Commissioners' Report their opinion of the Protestant Charter Schools, which had existed for nearly a century, at a great cost to the public. As their special object was conversion, their pupils, the offspring of Roman Catholic parents, were sedulously cut off from all home influences. The Commissioners give the evidence of an inspector officially connected with the Charter Schools as with others differently conducted. The latter, he says,—

"Consist exclusively of daily and parochial schools; the children attending these are, for the most part, clothed in rags, and fed upon the scanty and homely fare afforded in the cabin of an Irish peasant. In the Charter schools, on the contrary, the children are comfortably lodged, well clad, and abundantly fed. No pains are spared to preserve their health. On the first appearance of disease, medical aid is procured, and their teachers are in all cases equal, and generally far superior, to those employed in the daily and parochial schools. Yet I was invariably struck with the vast superiority in health, in appearance, in vivacity, and in intelligence, of the half-naked, and one almost would suppose half-starved, children who live in their parents' cabins, over those so well maintained and so carefully instructed in the Charter schools. The reasons of this striking fact it might not be difficult to assign. In the Charter schools all social and family affections are dried up; children once received into them are, as it were, the children, the brothers, the sisters, the relations of—nobody! They have no vacation—they know not the feeling of home; and hence it is primarily, whatever concomitant causes there may be, that they are so frequently stunted in body, mind, and heart."

In an able and most interesting sketch of the progress of boarding-out in Ireland, the principle of which has existed in "fosterage" from very early times—in Edward III.'s reign laws were passed prohibiting the Irish from receiving English foster-children, because the mutual affection engendered was so strong as to interfere with the invader's policy of English domination and tyranny—Dr. Hancock gives full particulars of the Protestant Orphan Aid Society, founded in 1828. Its wards are invariably placed out to nurse, sometimes when very young infants, and many thousands have been thus been brought up. The cost for board and clothing is £6 per annum, to which, however, must be added the expenses of management. The moral failures are less than 5 per cent., nor do the whole of these become criminals, and the annual mortality is below 1 per cent.

So satisfactorily has this system worked among Protestants, that in 1857 the Catholics founded an Orphan Society on the same plan. They had high authority for the step—St. Vincent de Paul "boarded-out" foundlings; and their own Father Mathew had recommended the system, which would naturally approve itself to his generous and affectionate nature, and to a mind which thoroughly understood all the best points in the character of his countrymen. The present Lord Chancellor of Ireland, then Mr. O'Hagan, quoting from a diary kept at the time, says,—

"As we passed a row of orphan boys belonging to some institution, Father Mathew remarked that he never knew boys brought up in such institutions to turn out well, devoid as they are of all natural ties. Like the Miller on the Dee, they cared for nobody, and nobody cared for them; whereas he knew several instances where orphan children had been sent out to nurse, and their foster-mothers grew so fond of them, that when the children were about to be taken from them, they actually declared that the children were dead, in order to avoid parting with them. He was of opinion, then,

that there should be no such institutions at all, but that orphans and foundlings should be sent out to nurse through the country, and be there allowed to remain with their foster-parents; some small sum being allowed for their maintenance."

Commenting on these remarks, Mr. O'Hagan, with reference especially to workhouse children, observes:—

"Not only is selfishness and hardness of heart naturally generated by such an education, but, what is, perhaps, only a portion of the same thing, there will be an absence of the sense of duty to others, that habit of mind with which human beings grow up to regard themselves as having duties to discharge in the world. We often hear of the bad example which the children of the poor have constantly presented to them. In saying so, however, we are apt to overlook the fact that the example presented is, in the main, an example of virtue, and not of vice. The child of the poor man sees his father and mother go to their daily work, that they may feed and clothe him, and his brothers and sisters. He sees, in this way, the discharge for a good motive of that duty of labour which God has imposed upon mankind, and which he himself is therefore accustomed to accept, and to look forward to as his own portion. Now the very opposite to this is presented to the eyes of a poor workhouse child. The labour which he sees is not that natural labour which arises from affection to others, or from the free submission of man to the ordinances of God, but it is the sullen, servile toil, which is the fruit of an abhorred coercion. How can it then be expected that a sense of the performance of duty, or of working from any motive but selfish desire and fear, should take possession of his mind?"

Before the passage of the present Irish poor-law, parochial authorities had power to board-out in certain cases; but it appears to have been rarely exercised; and in 1856 Mr. Norwood, a guardian of North Dublin Union, moved to apply to the Poor-Law Commissioners "to allow the children under the care of the Board to be located with tenant farmers." The motion had been suggested by the frightful fact that almost all the orphan and deserted children who came into the workhouse died. It did not, however, obtain support, and was not even mentioned in the next Annual Report of the Commissioners. In 1858, however, a bill, brought into Parliament by the Chief Secretary, empowered guardians to board-out orphan or deserted children until five years old. In the following year another bill provided that no such child should be admitted into the workhouse at all before six, and should be allowed to be boarded-out until ten.* In 1860 a majority of 100 to 8 in the House of Commons voted that the period to which relief out of the workhouse may be given to such children should be extended till they had reached the age of twelve. The Poor-Law authorities approved this extension, on the ground that at that age children would have become so useful

* On the Rearing of Pauper Children out of Workhouses. By Mark S. O'Shaughnessy, Esq., Social Science Trans., 1861.

to their foster-parents that these would retain them, and thus they would never enter the workhouse at all. Unhappily a small majority of the Lords rejected the clause, and ten remains the age at which boarding-out must cease for Irish pauper children. They are still too young for self-support, so that, unless the generosity of foster-parents intervene, they are by the fiat of the peers suddenly plunged into all the evils of workhouse life. We regret to say the counterpart of this treatment may be found in the course pursued by those boards of guardians who, on the day their children attain a certain age, bring them from the separate school, and cast them into the adult wards of the union!

Boarding-out, however, notwithstanding this unfortunate limit as to age, is more and more adopted by Irish guardians. In 1869 the number of children so dealt with was 689; this year it is already upwards of 1,200. We are not aware that any system of supervision exists beyond that of the relieving officer. To the constant and kindly surveillance of volunteers residing on the spot, in combination with that of the officers of the associations, the success of the Protestant and Catholic Orphan Societies is largely attributed. If a similar benevolent agency has not already been invited to co-operate in watching over the little pauper boarders, we earnestly hope it may yet be sought.

Let us turn now to Scotland—the Belgium of boarding-out, as it is often regarded. The battle has been going on there for more than a century, and both the friends and the opponents of the cause cite the results of the struggle on their own side. It would appear to be one version more of the gold and silver shield, except that the silver side has been allowed to become rusty and defaced, so that the resemblance between the two is but that of form. If we observe the working of the system as administered in connection with the great towns, and by efficient officers, we find it successful: but in remote country places, where neither the paid superintendence is adequate nor any voluntary aid supplements it,—where, for twelve months at a time, no inspection of the children takes place,—and even in the towns where the superintendent has failed in his duty, instances of neglect and ill-usage occur, and the treatment generally is unsatisfactory. It will, however,—we think we are justified in saying,—be evident to the readers of the recently published Report by Mr. Henley (Poor-Law Inspector) that the searching inquiry he has made has left a favourable impression on his mind of the system in its integrity,—that he recognises it as sound in principle, and successful in practice when rightly administered. Those who desire its further improvement and extension cannot too warmly express their acknowledgments for the great service rendered to their

cause by the inquiry instituted by the English Poor-Law Board into the system, not only in Scotland, but also in England in the comparatively few unions where it yet obtains, and by the able manner in which that inquiry has been conducted. The mariner owes as much to the bell which informs him of the hidden rock as to the beacon which guides him to his haven; and we are indebted to the originators and authors of this valuable document,* no less for evils it warns us to avoid, than for the model it presents for imitation. We recommend its careful study to all practically concerned in our subject; for others we offer a summary of its contents.

Boarding-out was years ago a necessity in a large proportion of Scottish parishes, from the non-existence of workhouses, but in most it existed simply as out-relief, without any special supervision or other care of the children; and so in some parishes it even now remains. In 1846, however, many poor-houses (as they are called) were built, and in numerous districts the children were removed into them; but it is significant that after a trial some of these were again put out. There is a strong and increasing feeling in Scotland against the hospitals (*i.e.* large charity boarding-schools), of which, through the generosity of former citizens, Edinburgh presents so many examples; and in various instances even where reports in favour of adopting the system for pauper children have been drawn up the guardians have abandoned the idea, and abided by boarding-out.

The Scottish Poor-Law permits of out-relief to children, who could not receive it in England. Thus, those boarded-out are classified as orphans, deserted, and *separates*, the latter (estimated to exceed 1,000) being the offspring of either paupers in the house or of persons maintaining themselves outside, whose consent, however, to their being thus disposed of is required by law. Even the children variously denominated the "ins and outs," "now and agains," *Anglicé* casuals, whose treatment is in England one of our most painful and perplexing social problems, are in some parishes boarded-out if there is a probability of the parents not claiming them under several weeks. To rescue a child from their influence, when it is notoriously evil, he is sometimes despatched to a home many miles away; and, though the authorities are compelled to restore him if the parents demand it, often this is avoided, and the child grows up honest and industrious.†

Whether it is politic thus to relieve profligate persons of their off-

* Report of J. J. Henley, Esq., on the Boarding-out of Pauper Children in Scotland; and Reports of Poor-Law Inspectors on the Boarding-out of Pauper Children in certain Unions in England. Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed, April 12th, 1870.

† The want, however, of greater power in this respect is painfully illustrated by the history of a child related in No. IV. of a series of papers on "Juvenile Pauperism," now appearing in the *Edinburgh Courant*, which give valuable information on the boarding-out system.

spring is, as Mr. Henley justly says, a question open to argument—as certainly it is one pressing upon us for consideration; but, "of the advantage to the children," he adds, "there can be no question." In some parishes in Scotland relief is granted to a mother for her child, not in money, but by placing it at one of the admirable industrial feeding schools, which, originated by Sheriff Watson at Aberdeen, are now to be found in most of the large towns in that country. The pupils rarely sleep at the school, returning at night to the parent's dwelling, or, if this be unsuitable, being placed to lodge with some respectable poor person.

The Inspector, as he is called in Scotland, who unites the duties of clerk and relieving-officer, organizes and conducts boarding-out. In the larger towns there is generally an assistant-inspector, who gives his whole time to the boarded-out children, selecting homes, visiting them at uncertain intervals, ordering higher diet or any other necessary for the ailing; finding, in conjunction with the nurse, suitable places in service for them; and, of course, transferring them to a new home if he discovers them insufficiently cared for: but in the small parishes this additional help is not afforded, and unless the local inspector or parish schoolmaster be engaged to watch over them it is not to be wondered at, though much to be deplored, that the children, especially as they are often sent to a great distance from their own parishes, are very insufficiently visited, and abuses of the system arise. In 1863 this evil was pointed out by the higher authorities, and parochial boards were enjoined to adopt efficient means to prevent it; but, as Mr. Henley found it still going on in 1869, it is to be hoped that more effective steps will be taken to remove it. Now, indeed, that public attention is directed to Scotland as an example, doubtless she will feel it incumbent upon her to leave no flaw in the model. Voluntary supervision by residents (already afforded in some localities) may, for instance, be more generally combined with official surveillance, and supply a mischievous deficiency observed by Mr. Henley in remote places, where, though a paid inspector was employed, his visits being extremely rare, the children were in an unsatisfactory condition—not, however, it appeared, from intentional neglect on the part of the foster-parents. Some instances of personal ill-treatment Mr. Henley records, but adds, "the evidence generally is very strongly to the other effect." Watching narrowly for any appearance of shrinking from the nurses, he observed that—

"The younger children seemed to rush to them as their protectors. They often call the nurse 'mother,' and when school was over, the children hastened home, and entered without fear, which would not have been the case if the reception had been doubtful. They are said greatly to dread removal to the poor-house, and I can confirm this statement."

Here, as in Ireland, the foster-parent will sometimes undertake the expense of the child rather than part with it, and numerous are the anecdotes that might be related in proof of their mutual affection. An old man, when parting with a boy, was heard saying, while the tears were running down his cheeks, "Well, well, John! it's no doubt for your gude you're going to work; but it's sair parting with you." "My laddie is working at the mill," remarked an old woman to Mr. Henley, "but he never forgets to *sort* my garden for me." Many such "small though homely facts," he says, "impressed on my mind the conviction that the children had frequently found in a stranger that kindness of which misfortune or crime had in infancy deprived them."

"We have seen," observed a lady, who has visited many boarded-out children, "a foster-mother in Scotland, who for twenty-six years has constantly had poor-house children under her care, and speaks with the utmost pride of her six 'daughters' and five 'sons.' 'Maist o' them are married and settled, but I hae ae bairn,' said she, pointing to a blushing lassie of twelve, and calling upon her to show 'the ladies' the long row of prizes gained for proficiency in school. We asked another whether her child would come back to her should she be out of place. 'Aye, they all ca' it *hame*,' she made answer. The Glasgow Reports tell us how the same attention as that shown to a real father is paid by his *protégés* to an old sailor to whom many scrofulous lads had been intrusted, because a sea-side residence was considered desirable for them." "I have heard no complaints," says Mr. Dugald Cowan, Assistant-Inspector of Edinburgh City parish, "from the labouring class, that the boarded-out children are in a better position than their own. They say, 'It is a mercy that some one looks after them.'"

We have heard the same kindly feeling expressed in England; and, indeed, no one well acquainted with our respectable working-people would expect from them a less worthy sentiment.

Respecting the number of children it is well to place in one family, "doctors differ;" but most think two or three should not be exceeded, unless the circumstances of the family are peculiarly favourable, or when brothers and sisters would otherwise be divided—a course strenuously deprecated. To put them out as young as possible (even when requiring to be fed with a bottle) is most desirable; when they go out above nine, success is not to be depended upon, at least if they come from bad homes. Even the experience yet attained in England confirms this opinion, and it is melancholy to think how many are already beyond the reach of the regenerating influences of the system. The suggestion has been made, and a significant commentary it is upon the failure of district school training, that on leaving those institutions at the age of fourteen, girls should be boarded-out for six or twelve months; but we fear that the cases would be few in which at that age the power would not have been lost of winning their

way, as young children can, to the hearts of the foster-parents; while their ignorance and dulness in respect to the little circumstances and duties of every-day life in a poor man's cottage, would sorely try the patience of the mother. For young persons of this age, or even approaching it, we would advise the somewhat firmer discipline of an Industrial Home, of which many have been certified for the reception of pauper children, guardians being empowered to contribute to their maintenance.

To board children with relatives is, as a rule, considered inadvisable, lest they should be made drudges; but it is very expedient to place them where "there is the controlling influence of a man in the family." The food the children get is the ordinary diet of the class to which the foster-parents belong, and consists chiefly of porridge and broth.

The cost varies with locality, age, and state of health. For a very young infant, 5*s.* a week is paid; but for healthy children of school age, the total expense, including even that for medical attendance and supervision, ranges from 4*s.* 0½*d.* at St. Cuthbert's (Edinburgh), to 3*s.* 3½*d.* at Dundee. As a rule (disregarded, however, sometimes), children up to thirteen years old are not allowed to work for wages in school time, except during harvest, when what they earn is their own. When they begin working for their living, their wages are retained by the foster-mother, and supplemented by the parish, usually till they amount to 5*s.* a week. The Edinburgh girls have an outfit when they go to service. The foster-mothers are expected to find them places, and if they fail, do not get other children to board—for it must be understood that the demand for boarders exceeds the supply. Many of the homes, however, visited by Mr. Henley, were unsatisfactory as regards accommodation, but though seeming generally below what is desirable, he considers that as a rule the children are lodged as well as the labouring classes of the district. Usually the little boarders appear to be kindly looked upon by the neighbours, but instances have occurred of their presence being strongly objected to as morally and physically injurious to the natives, and it was even alleged in one case that the poverty of the foster-parents led to the children pilfering in their behalf. It is obvious that these homes had not been selected with due care; and an instance of rejection on the score of physical disease may be similarly explained.

"A parish," says the Inspector of Govan, "without previous inquiry or arrangement, landed in the island of Arran in one day twenty-four diseased children without extra clothing, without knowing where they were to lay their heads, and being thereby compelled to take any house that offered, they had to place them in most improper hands, and the consequence was that they were not cared for; and when they attended school, the children of the natives complained of the sickening odour arising from open sores not

properly treated; and the Duke of Hamilton (and, in my opinion, very properly) ordered that this boarding-out should not continue. Now this was an abuse of the system, because that parish ought to have made arrangements before sending their children there, and they ought also not to have sent so many into one small district of scattered houses. There is sufficient accommodation on the shores of Scotland for all children who are so diseased, and, in the interests of humanity, they should be placed where they have at least a chance of obtaining a modicum of health."

Of the numbers of the different classes of children dealt with, Mr. Henley could not obtain precise returns; but he estimates their total to exceed 40,000, of whom upwards of 30,000, we assume, are in receipt of ordinary out-relief. He calculates the number eligible for boarding-out to be 7,000, and of these he believes nearly 5,000 are so disposed of; some of them, however, being Roman Catholics, are placed in an Industrial School of that faith, for though foster-parents of their own religion are easy to obtain, they generally belong to a class it is undesirable the children should associate with.

Thus the residue in poor-houses must exceed 4,000—but not a thirteenth part of the number so shut away from ordinary life and observation in parochial buildings in England. The position of the Scottish children left in the poor-houses, however, would seem to be inferior in some respects to that of their English brethren. There is less separation of juveniles from adults, and the teaching appears to be below our standard; but this is more than compensated for as regards two-thirds of the children who go to the parish schools. In Scotland these are attended by all classes. We heard of a boarded-out lad being Dux of the school to which the squire's son also came; and Mr. Henley mentions seeing "a parochial boy between the schoolmaster's son and a farmer's, with his arms on their shoulders, using the same hymn-book." Such association must be happily destructive of caste feeling.

In some parishes the children are trained to self-support by being allowed to go out to work for themselves during the day, or perhaps for the whole summer, returning to the poor-house to sleep, or to lodge during winter. Physically, their condition seems the same as with us—below the standard in health and size, and very liable to skin disease; and Mr. Henley quotes with reference to them what he had already said of the English. "With better food and clothing than can be obtained by those of the ordinary agricultural labourer, workhouse children generally appear to me to feel the want of that liberty and space which are so essential to the healthy development of young life."

Of the boarded-out children, on the other hand, he says, "they were certainly very free from those banes of workhouse schools dependent on low vitality, sore eyes and eruption of the skin," and

though in country schools he could distinguish them by their inferior appearance, he attributes this to their type rather than to any neglect; and in suburban or town schools, on the contrary, "they looked equal, if not better than other children." This, one must suppose, was some time after they had left the poor-house, if the experience of Mrs. Ellen Kay is a fair sample. This worthy woman describes the vigorous treatment she adopted in equally vigorous terms.

"I have three girls," she told Mr. Henley, "boarded with me; they came from Dumfries poor-house; they were in the poor-house 'awhiles.' When the bairns came to me from the poor-house their heads were full of beasts and muckle scabs, a kind o' scurvy-like over their heads and bodies; I wrought on with them the whole summer with sulphur, saltpetre, and Harrogate salts, and brought them out of it."

The opponents of boarding-out express terror lest the pauper child should spread disease in his foster parent's home; but there is such virtue in dispersion that maladies absolutely invincible when concentrated in the workhouse become manageable if the cases are isolated, and a free open-air life strengthens the constitution. It is hardly necessary, however, to observe that children actually suffering from infectious disorders should not be placed where they are likely to communicate it to others. This is a point demanding great care in removing them from the workhouse, and Mr. Henley suggests that a medical certificate should be required that they are not thus affected—a precaution already adopted in England.

The mortality of the Scottish boarded-out children Mr. Henley compares with that of the pupils in English district schools; but, unless the fact is borne in mind that infants are included in the former, and that few children under four or five—*i.e.*, during the period of highest mortality—are received in district schools, the comparison becomes fallacious. Mr. Henley points out this disturbing element; but, to realize how potently it operates, it is needful to know what proportion the infant deaths bear to the rest. We have made some inquiry, and find that in the Scotch return, quoted by Mr. Henley, of the deaths reported for the two Edinburgh parishes, and for Aberdeen and Glasgow, more than *half* were of children under five years old.

With respect to the future career of young people brought up in the poor-house, and those who have been boarded-out, Mr. Henley says:—"Upon this matter of vital importance I can hardly form a correct opinion, or bring statistics to bear, though the unanimous testimony of the Inspectors must carry conviction of the superiority of boarding-out in this respect."

Statistics, however, of boarding-out, supplied from various parishes,

are quoted, and are satisfactory as far as they go; those from Paisley are especially deserving of examination, as they enter much into detail, and extend over a period of thirty years. But none are exhaustive, and we rejoice, therefore, to find them supplemented by such testimony as this from Mr. Kemp, Governor of the City Poor-house, Edinburgh, who says:—

"When I came to this workhouse, in 1857, I cannot tell you how much disappointment I felt when I found that the children were not kept in the house; I looked upon the system of boarding them out with very little favour; I have, however, long ago changed my mind on the subject, and now, after long experience, look upon it as the best plan I have yet seen for the elevation of the poor pauper child."

And of Mr. Cowan, Governor of St. Cuthbert's, who, though he knows of some brought up in the poor-house who have elevated themselves far above that position, is, "as a rule, in favour of boarding-out as opposed to the hospital or poor-house system." And of Mr. Adamson, the able Inspector for the City Parish, Glasgow, who says—"I came to Scotland with a strong feeling against the system of boarding-out children, and determined, as far as it was in my power, to break it down. I am quite converted to the system as it is now managed in this parish."

The evidence of numerous school-teachers, quoted by Mr. Henley, is almost uniformly in favour of the system; and so is that of the majority of the medical officers he cites. One of these, Mr. Walter Watson, of Midcalder, speaks in the highest terms of the care bestowed upon the children by their foster-mothers, and of the beneficial results to their health; but, on the other hand, two of his colleagues express dissatisfaction on both points, attributing want of care to insufficient payment.

The "Conclusions" in which Mr. Henley embodies his own opinion are cautiously stated, but are to the effect that generally, as conducted by the large city parochial boards, boarding-out "tends to improve the children physically and mentally, *and effectually breaks their connection with the poor-house.*" He points out the dangers to be guarded against, and the machinery which should be employed to prevent abuse, and supplies a list of the rules suggested by his investigation, which he considers necessary in applying the system to England. Many are identical with those already adopted where the plan has been systematically organized in this country. He is doubtful whether certain Scottish characteristics may not be essential to the success of the system; but the plan has now been long enough in action among us to prove that a class as well-to-do as the crofters—who, north of the Tweed, are regarded as the most desirable foster-parents—are willing here to receive the children, that English hearts

are not less open than Scottish to sympathy for the forlorn, and that though the virtues of the two races may not be identical, what may be lacking in one direction, is compensated for in another. Lukewarmness about education has been urged as a strong objection to boarding-out in this country; but if it exist among the class sought for as foster-parents, it is corrected by the *sine quâ non* that boarded-out children shall attend school—a proviso which is made (and therefore, we presume, found necessary) in Scotland, where, up to the age of thirteen, school attendance is usually required, and relief stopped in default. In one important respect England has the advantage. The house accommodation of the foster-parents here appears to be decidedly superior, so much so that whether comparing Mr. Henley's Report with those of his brother inspectors (which we are about to summarize), or recalling our personal observations of homes in the two countries, we are struck with the almost sumptuousness of the lodging enjoyed by some, at least, of the English children, compared with that of the Scottish. The dwellings of the foster-parents here not unfrequently contain four, or even five, rooms; and though this amount of space is not always attainable, nor, indeed, needful, when the boarder is the only child in the family, experience affords ground to hope that every union, excepting those in very large towns, can provide decent homes for all the children to be placed out. This will be more readily believed, when it is understood that the number needed is in the proportion only of about 1 to 100 of the dwellings of our labouring classes. If, as regards the large towns, the supply should fall short of the demand, for the reason sometimes urged against the adoption of boarding-out at all—namely, the already disgracefully overcrowded state of many of those dwellings—let us hope that when the fact becomes patent that our honest poor are compelled to herd together in habitations which guardians declare beneath the requirements of pauper children, those with whom the duty of improvement rests will be shamed into performing it.

The inspectors (Mr. Hawley, Mr. Farnall, Mr. Cane, Mr. Hedley, Mr. Henley, Colonel Ward, Mr. Longley, and Mr. Longe), whose evidence concerning boarding-out in this country we are now examining, report upon twenty-two unions, viz., Christchurch, East Preston, Highworth and Swindon, Ringwood, Warminster, Devizes, Caistor, Horncastle, Altrincham, Garstang, Chorlton, Macclesfield, Berwick-on-Tweed, Eton, Bath, Dartford, Colchester, Evesham, Leominster, Ludlow, Merthyr Tydvil, and Swansea; and upon 341 children, though these are not the whole number boarded-out, some unions where the plan is in action not being noticed. The cost varies from an average of 1*s.* 10¼*d.* a week per head at Swansea to

4*s*. 11½*d*. at Dartford. At Bath, which is now generally regarded as a model, the weekly allowances, including a proportionate share of the cost of outfit, is about 4*s*. In the above sums, however, medical expenses and those for supervision are not included. Leominster, Warminster, and Swansea have pursued the system for twenty years. At the former place the guardians exercise a kindly watchfulness over the little boarders, and Mr. Longe quotes the clerk to the effect that "the foster-parents have been carefully selected, and the whole of the children are doing remarkably well." At Warminster and Swansea, however, the course pursued differs little from ordinary out-relief; and at Garstang, where there is no workhouse, the case is probably similar. At this place the children are in a very unsatisfactory condition, illustrating the need of organized supervision, and great care in the selection of homes. Boarding-out proper, as pursued in this country, with due regulations for securing those essentials as well as school attendance, and periodical reports upon the condition of the children, may be considered to date from its commencement by Mrs. Archer at Highworth and Swindon, and by the guardians at Eton, eight or nine years ago—at each place, apparently, an original invention. On its introduction at Bath, in May, 1869, some additional rules were made, and forms drawn up and printed for the medical certificates, agreements with foster-parents, and reports of the visitors and school-teachers.* These have usually been adopted where the plan has been subsequently introduced, and, if followed, failure in attaining a very high degree of success is hardly possible. Proof of this is afforded by Colonel Ward's Report upon the Bath children. In an elaborate statement of their condition there is not an unfavourable circumstance recorded; and, in transmitting it to the Poor-Law Board, the Colonel accompanies it with these words:—"On personally inspecting the residences I found all the children in a satisfactory state as regards cleanliness, clothing, and general appearance; and the condition and character of the foster-parents appeared highly respectable." They receive in behalf of each child 3*s*. a week for food and lodging, and 6*s*. 6*d*. a quarter for clothes, besides a good outfit to begin with. The child's school fees are also paid, and medical attendance, cost of removal, and burial expenses are guaranteed. This allowance is found sufficient to secure first-rate homes, where the boarders are treated as children of the house.

Many little incidents have already occurred proving how completely they are recognised as members of the family; but to realize this

* The forms, rules, &c., will be found, together with much important information, in a "Practical Guide to the Boarding-out System," by Colonel Grant, R.E., published by Knight and Co., Fleet Street.

they should be seen in their homes, and any one interested in the subject who should visit Bath for this purpose only, would, we feel sure, find himself amply repaid. The first annual report on the children issued by the Boarding-out Committee for Bath Union should also be obtained. It is full of interesting and practical information.

Nor is Mr. Hawley's estimate of the working of the system at Highworth and Swindon less gratifying. To a very minute report on each child he appends the remark, "I may here observe that the whole scheme works remarkably well, and that the children seem very happy and comfortable in their respective homes."

Chorlton affords us an example of the system as applied to a town district. Under existing regulations of the Poor-Law Board (which are, however, shortly to be modified), children cannot practically be boarded out beyond the limits of their own union, and as that of Chorlton, unlike Bath, does not include country parishes, the plan could only be adopted upon the condition of placing the children in urban homes. Here Mr. Cane found thirty-seven little boarders who had been placed out during the year preceding his inspection. Of five of the twenty-nine homes among which they were distributed, he speaks unfavourably as regards accommodation and cleanliness, though apparently in these respects they are not below what a large portion of our working classes are contented with: with the rest he is thoroughly satisfied. The food is invariably good and abundant (four meals and meat daily, are the rule here, and are not uncommon in other districts), and we gather that the children are treated as members of the family.

The Orphan Training Committee of the Chorlton Guardians have themselves issued a most instructive Annual Report, signed by Mr. Charles J. Herford, to whose benevolent exertions the introduction of the system into that union is mainly owing. It is dated rather later than Mr. Cane's, and deals with forty-seven children. With a candour, less common than could be wished but very much to be desired, they state adverse equally with favourable circumstances. Thus we learn that "three children have been returned to the workhouse, viz., *one* being incorrigibly filthy in his habits, and *two* sent out in an unhealthy condition;" also that "one child has been removed to another home in consequence of the discovery of intemperate habits in the foster-parents; and for the same reason two others are about to be removed from another home." This statement may at first startle the inquirer and inspire distrust in the plan. Let it be remembered, however, that this or any other evil influence cannot remain long undiscovered where supervision is constant; and, being discovered, the child is speedily removed. Sup-

pose he had remained at the workhouse school until the usual age for going to service. The inquiries ordinarily made into the character of employers are far less searching than those respecting foster-parents, so that his chance of falling among the intemperate would be greater. And supposing he went to an employer of these habits, would the quarterly visit of inspection of the relieving officer (which moreover is frequently not made at all) suffice to discover the evil, and even if discovered, would it, as a matter of course, or even probably, be considered a valid reason for taking the little servant away? With the boarder, if a mistake has been made in the selection of the foster-parent, or if the habit of drinking is acquired after he received the child, the latter can suffer from it but a very short time—it is simply an incident, not a condition, of his life; and the very fact that intemperance is the cause of his being transferred to another home, will impress upon him, if he is old enough to reason, the gravity of the offence.

The payments at Chorlton are almost identical with those at Bath for the children who range in age from two to nine years old; for a few elder ones, whose services are valuable, a smaller sum is given.

"Twenty-eight of the foster-parents are married couples, and of these twenty-two of the husbands are artizans and warehousemen, three are shopkeepers, one a city missionary, one a policeman, and one a schoolmaster. There are, besides, three widows and five unmarried women, the latter of a somewhat superior class. . . . . In a great majority of cases the foster-parents have taken the children to their hearts as well as to their homes, as is shown by unmistakable signs, which only the witnesses can appreciate. . . . . In almost, if not quite every case, the foster-parents spend on the children, both for food and clothing, more than the union allowance, and they are proud to show the clothes they have provided, and the comfortable appearance of the children."

This excess of expenditure over receipts is not an unusual circumstance, and proves that in these instances, at least, the children have been taken with no view to profit. Of course this can be the case only where the foster-parents are in comfortable circumstances; but experience shows that there is a large class of persons so situated whose love for children, or willingness to take part in a benevolent action, induces them to accept the charge. Their unselfishness is illustrated by the following passage from the Chorlton Report, and the kindness in illness therein described, has found many parallels among other foster-parents:—

"The health of the children was one of the points as to which some anxiety was reasonably felt, and many of them were exceedingly delicate at the time they came out of the workhouse. Several of them have suffered from cutaneous diseases, of which the seeds were apparently brought from the workhouse; others from the ordinary diseases of children, whooping-

cough and scarlatina. We have been greatly struck with the patience with which the foster-parents have borne the annoyances—sometimes very serious—the labour, and the watching involved in these attacks. In one case, a violent attack of scarlatina, followed by hectic fever, the unwearied devoted attention of the foster-mother has been most touching; accompanied, too, by a profuse expenditure of her own means, without any application for help from the union, or from private sources; though, of course, she has since been helped freely from the special fund obtained for such occasions. In all these cases it has seemed to us that, had the children been their own, greater care and solicitude could not have been bestowed upon them."

It is remarkable that the general health of the children (after getting over the change of diet and mode of life, which often produce temporary indisposition) has improved, although they were brought from the country, where the workhouse school is situated, to dwell in the town. This improvement is attributed to the more varied and natural conditions of home-life, and reminds us of the experience obtained in Ireland by the contrast between the pupils in the Protestant Charter Schools, and those attending day-schools but dwelling in the humble homes of their parents. We have the whole philosophy of this apparent paradox, but really sound physiological principle, epitomised in the petition of the country mouse for his

"Hollow tree,
A crust, *and liberty*."

The mental improvement, or perhaps it should be called awakening, of the children is not less obvious than their physical change for the better.

"The dulness and stupidity of the children when they are first received, and the way in which they gradually brighten and their whole natures expand, have been constantly remarked on by the foster-parents. The remark of one woman, in particular, that the children when they first come out are 'a sort of half-idiots,' is certainly rather strong. But it expresses in a somewhat extreme form what seems to be a very common feeling among the foster-parents."

We have frequently heard similar remarks from other foster-parents. "Why, they were just like *wooden* children when they first came out!" one exclaimed.

"Their patience is also very frequently tried by the tendency of many of the children to pilfering, and to lying when questioned about some fault. These defects, accompanied in the older children by awkwardness and incapacity when set to do practical work (which we hope the girls' kitchen established in the workhouse may do something to remedy), although very fairly proficient in mere book-learning, bring out in a strong light the importance of the provision which is being made for the children, the older as well as the younger ones, of such a training for service as they may obtain in superior working-class homes, while they continue under the influence of the kindly consideration of foster-parents really interested in their welfare."

As more homes are constantly offering, the number of children placed out will probably increase; and the report suggests that it may become necessary to create a more special organization for administering the system, remarking that, in any case, "it is very desirable a number of the guardians should actively interest themselves in the work." Too much stress, we are persuaded, cannot be laid upon this point.

A very important feature of the boarding-out system, as now organized in this country, is the union of voluntary with official supervision; and female aid in this direction is much to be desired. In several unions ladies, either individually or as members of associations formed with this object, are giving their help, which is thus courteously acknowledged by the Chorlton Committee:—

"In conclusion, your Committee would record their strong sense of the value of the co-operation of the lady-visitors; their belief that the influence of the ladies will be found to be of the greatest value in strengthening the hands of the foster-parents, and in befriending the children in their future struggle with the world and its temptations; and their conviction that the assistance of lady-visitors is essential to the complete success of the boarding-out system, wherever established."

Of voluntary assistance Colonel Grant remarks* :—

"There is one great advantage in this arrangement—it brings into useful and appropriate action a new element of labour of a high order, although hitherto unemployed. There are numbers of men and hundreds upon hundreds of ladies throughout the country who are able, willing, and anxious to do this good work, and who are longing for opportunities of being of use to those around them. It is true the working of this system entails much labour and trouble, but we have a surplus of trouble-seekers ready at hand. This charity is emphatically doubly blessed—blessed to those who give and to those who receive; for, however much some of our philanthropic efforts may fail; however true the retort may be that our mendicity, and other similar charitable societies, only foster the evils they endeavour to assuage, we cannot err in befriending the orphan child who, by an inscrutable Providence, has been cast upon our care, whose utter helplessness appeals to us with a force that cannot be resisted. If the working of the system entails labour, it is a labour of love, and if it succeeds in rescuing these poor children from the unnatural training and atmosphere of the workhouse, and so merges them in their proper position among the labouring classes as to blot out of their memories that they were ever paupers, it surely will be a labour well bestowed, and one that those who have undertaken it will never regret. And do not think that, because there are only a comparatively few children in each union suitable for the system, a great amount of labour is asked for a trifling object; but reflect that these children in all the unions of England and Wales are computed to amount to between twenty thousand and twenty-five thousand."

It would assuredly mislead to treat this enterprise as imposing neither trouble nor difficulty: no work worth the doing, as the Colonel has elsewhere observed, is without them. But—

* Practical Guide to the Boarding-out System.

"One word more," he continues; "do not be discouraged by temporary difficulties and disappointments or failures. We cannot expect to be perfect all at once. Believe that the thing is to be done; that it is worth doing, and depend upon it that, by patience and determination, it will be done."

Before closing these remarks, we must touch again upon a topic already briefly treated—the unsatisfactory system upon which our casual pauper children are dealt with, and the difficult nature of their case. So long as their continuance at school is entirely dependent on their parents' will—a state of things which Mr. Browne in his last Report remarks "may be considered the greatest obstacle to their future welfare and good conduct"—there is little opportunity for training them aright; while the kind of training afforded by the expensive district school, even if they could be detained under its influence, is wholly unsuited to their case. In his evidence before the Committee on the Education of Destitute Children, Mr. Tufnell said:—"A pauper school is not the place for the reformation of a criminal or semi-criminal child; in order to reform children of that description," he added most truly, "you must have the *family* system."

That the casuals are of "that description," we learn also from Mr. Tufnell, who is stated to have said:*—

"Practically, the workhouse schools of the London parishes are mostly filled with the same description of abandoned children, and in visiting refuges and reformatories . . . . . I find precisely the same characteristics among the inmates, and the same difficulties and evils with which I am so familiar in respect to pauper children."

From the urgency with which, in his last Report, Mr. Tufnell advocates district schools for all pauper children, we must infer that he has altered his opinion since he gave the evidence we quote, but we are at a loss to conceive what can have wrought the change. Lest it should be supposed that the increase of reformatories and industrial schools has in the interval cleansed the district schools of such inmates, we need but insert this almost too vivid description of his pupils, by Mr. Imeson, head-master at Hanwell Schools, given in a letter from Mr. Collins, which appeared in the *Times* of Wednesday, June 8, 1870. They are, he says—

"The dregs of the population. They arrive here in various stages of squalor and disease; all of them are more or less debased; their intellectual capabilities are of the lowest order; their moral sense is stifled or inactive through suspicion and obstinacy. Many of them inherit the hoarse, indistinct utterance of the London costermonger. Whatever point is gained by our exertions, yet we have in these children to deplore the great want of aspiring sympathies. Their natural bias is to run the course of their fathers in ignorance, and, it may be, in crime. With a strangely-marked precocity, they are ignorant to a degree that can scarcely be overrated."

* Mr. Doyle's Report, 1862.

And these are the children who, in endless succession—like the buckets in a dredging-machine—discharge the moral filth they accumulate in the low lodging-houses, and other scenes of vice to which, with their parents, they resort in their intervals of absence from the district school, upon the unfortunate orphans and deserted who are its permanent occupants! Thankful are we to see in the last Poor-Law Board Report (p. xxii.) a suggestion for separating these classes; though, unless the permanent are boarded-out, all the evils of the hospital system which have gradually been making themselves more and more felt in Scotland, and were so forcibly exemplified in the Protestant Charter Schools in Ireland, will be developed among them.

Space does not permit us to deal with this branch of our subject at the length we hoped to do; but we would emphatically endorse Mr. Tufnell's assertion that by the family system alone can this class be regenerated, and point as an example to all institutions which have satisfactorily dealt with them. To this principle is the brilliant success of Mettray largely attributed; while at the Rauhe Haus are received and reclaimed the "dregs of the population" of Hamburgh, boys and girls alike. In the small houses wherein they dwell, divided into groups not exceeding in numbers those of a real family, each governed by a "father" and "mother," we find a model for the plan by which those whom we cannot board-out may yet be individualized and brought under home influences. It may be objected that such a plan would be costly. To this we would first answer that no plan can be so costly as leaving thousands of children to grow up unreclaimed in our midst. It may further be urged that the same letter which quotes Mr. Imeson's description tells us also that 10 per cent. of the Hanwell children are placed out yearly from the schools and do well; but we have shown that these are not of the casual class, and that even of the 10 per cent., not all, or nearly all, do well.

In estimating the cost of the proposed experiment we must glance at our present expenditure. In Mr. Bowyer's last Report he speaks of new separate schools at Aston, Leicester, and Stoke-upon-Trent, built at a cost, respectively, of £22 1*s.*, £22 17*s.*, and £29 5*s.* for each child, *if full.* The Aston School is not yet occupied, the Leicester School has considerably less than half its number, so that the housing of each child costs at present probably £50; and at Stoke there are 350 instead of 500 children, and therefore their accommodation must be estimated at more than £41 per head. Mr. Edwin Chadwick, we believe, has shown that a cottage containing three bed-rooms, a day-room, scullery, and all suitable conveniences for a labourer's family, may be built for £60. Suppose the price of one large enough for twelve children and the house-father and mother,

were at least twice that sum, or £10 per child, that would leave an ample surplus for the purchase of ground (including land to cultivate if in a cheap district), and for a general school-room with appropriate dwellings for the teachers, in each little colony. We recommend a general school-room, agreeing with the advocates of large schools, that, in all that relates to mere school teaching, large numbers are desirable. It is when the school is also a *home* that such numbers are fatal to success.

Some change in the law, limiting, or even for a time abrogating, the authority of parents over these children is equally essential to their well-being, as breaking them up into small groups. But this is no new principle. It is already in action as regards the inmates of Reformatory and Industrial Schools, who, as we have seen, belong to the very same class; and with safeguards to prevent the removal of his children being a relief to the parent, instead of a deprivation, this principle ought, we submit, to be extended to the offspring of the pauper. At the very least, parents who have cast the burden of their children on the State should not be free to interrupt their being made good citizens, for evil purposes of their own. Before regaining possession of them they should be bound to show they have the means to provide for them honestly, and intend to do so.

We cannot conclude this article without expressing the satisfaction we feel at the notice bestowed upon the Boarding-out System in the last Annual Report of the Poor-Law Board. It there receives a careful consideration, and is recognised as an important experiment; and no facility for its favourable trial, in the power of the department to grant, is withheld. It has indeed just been officially announced* that an Order will in a few days be issued (we conclude, before our own remarks upon it will have appeared), by which the rules of the Board will be modified to allow pauper children to be sent beyond the limits of their own unions, thus enabling the Guardians of town parishes to board them out in country homes.

This was the prayer of a Memorial signed by more than 4,000 ladies, and presented by a deputation from their number in May last to the President of the Poor-Law Board. In seeking this concession, they accepted the responsibility it involves; and whenever the little ones are sent forth, those who suggested the plan will be ready to co-operate with any official organization that may be deemed expedient to ensure the safety and well-being of these Children of the State.

FLORENCE HILL.

* Letter to Miss Preusser; *Times*, August 23rd, 1870.

DEAN STANLEY'S ESSAYS ON CHURCH AND STATE.

Essays, chiefly on Questions of Church and State from 1850 *to* 1870. By Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, D.D., Dean of Westminster. London: John Murray. 1870.

JULIUS HARE used to say, "Children always turn to the light; Oh, that grown-up men would do likewise!" If we were to attempt a description of Dean Stanley's characteristics, we should name first, and chief of all, his intense love for the light. His is not the half-despairing cry of Goethe for "more light," but the happy radiant hopefulness of the child, whose great joy is "to go out and see the sun." He hails it with incense in the morning. He basks in its rays at noonday, and he watches its departing glories at the sunset hour. He opens every door and every window to let in the light. He is all eye and all ear, quick to receive all knowledge from whatever quarter it comes. He has learned to

> "Seize upon truth where'er 'tis found,
> On Christian or on heathen ground.

His "Essays on Church and State" might be called the epic of "the Thirty Years' War" in the Church of England. The subject is the three great battles which each party in the Church has had to fight to maintain its existence. Other subjects, collateral and subsidiary, are discussed as occasion offers, coming in, as it were, "by way of episode." The lesson or moral of the whole is that the three parties are to tolerate each other, and to continue the union of Church and

State because that union softens the bitterness of party feeling, controls the fierce spirit of ecclesiasticism, and prevents the Church being cut off from the Divine progress of the world.

The first Essay in the volume is on the Gorham Controversy. It was published twenty years ago in the *Edinburgh Review*. We have not at present any intention of tracing the history of the rise of modern High Churchism.. We shall really avoid the usual platitudes about the "godless" eighteenth century. We shall not speak of the "frost" under Bishop Butler, and the "thaw" under Dr. Pusey. The complacency with which some men in our time condemn the last century is amusing. The common denunciation of the immorality of our grandfathers and great-grandfathers implies a tolerably well-satisfied opinion of our own progress. To connect the Oxford movement with the repose of the last century is to trace the Trojan War to Leda's eggs; and in both cases the amount of fable is about equal.

We start with the well-known fact, that in the fifth decade of the present century the High Church party thought they had sufficient strength to thrust the "Evangelicals" out of the Church of England. The decisive battle was fought between the Bishop of Exeter and Mr. Gorham. The subject of their difference was of significance only as it indicated the different tendencies of the two parties represented by the Bishop and the Presbyter. Dr. Philpotts said that every baptized child was "regenerated" by the act of baptism. Mr. Gorham denied that by that act a baptized child was necessarily "regenerated." The judgment was against the bishop. It declared Mr. Gorham's doctrine tenable in the Church of England, and compatible with a fair interpretation of the formularies. This judgment Dean Stanley receives as the charter of our ecclesiastical liberty, the legal authorisation of differing dogmas in the Church.

A great part of the baptismal controversy is manifestly a mere battle about a word. The most zealous advocates of baptismal regeneration differ among themselves as to what "regeneration" means. With some it is an actual sanctification of the baptized. With others it is merely fœderal, signifying nothing more than admission into the Christian covenant. The battle was fought on the question of regeneration in baptism, but the real conflict was between the theological system of Calvin and that of High Churchmen, who combine with the theology of Arminius the claims of a hierarchy. We are not sure that we agree with Dean Stanley when he quotes and endorses the words of Bishop Horsley, that on the points of difference between the followers of Calvin and their opponents "the Church of England maintains an absolute neutrality."

In one place the Dean says that no Puritan would have written the baptismal service. This is probably true, yet we have not read that the Puritans ever raised any special objection to this service. If by Puritan Dean Stanley means simply a Calvinist, we differ from him altogether. It might have been written by any of the Reformers of Calvin's school. The same mode of speaking of baptism is found in the Calvinistic Confessions of the Reformed Churches. But, on the other hand, no Arminian could have written Article XVII. We try in vain to conceive of this Article as existing in a Wesleyan Confession of faith. Moreover, the whole spirit, tone, and phraseology of the Thirty-nine Articles is Calvinistic. Calvin or his great ancestor, Augustine, turns up every where with a perversity and a pertinacity that are sometimes provoking. The only arguments ever advanced against the Calvinism of the Thirty-nine Articles are the two feeble pleas put forward by Archbishop Laurence. The first is that the Articles were compiled from the Augsburg Confession, which is simply begging the question that on these subjects the German Reformers did not agree with Calvin. The second argument is derived from the rejection of the Lambeth Articles. But any one who reads the only authentic account which we have of the Hampton Court Conference will find it plainly stated that the Lambeth Articles were not rejected because they differed from the Thirty-nine, but simply because there was no necessity for them. King James, who decided on their rejection, was himself at that time a strong Calvinist, and the compiler of the Lambeth Articles, Archbishop Whitgift, was a member of the Conference, and the chief supporter of the king. In evidence of the Calvinistic character of the Reformed Church of England we have the theological literature of three generations after the Reformation, forming a "consentient voice" of the Church for seventy years, testifying to the dominion of the theology of Calvin. It may be urged that the moderation of the Articles contrasts with the pronounced Calvinism of the Westminster Confession. But the difference is in degree, not in kind. It is easy to account for the more systematic statements of doctrine coming after the great controversy on the five points in the beginning of the reign of the first Charles.

The issue which was raised in the Gorham prosecution was not the admissibility of Calvinism in the Church of England. That had been admitted since the Reformation. Mr. Gorham had on his side the Calvinistic Reformers and their successors, who believed that baptism conveyed regeneration to elect children. But as these were known only to God, the visible Church charitably assumed that all baptized children were among the elect, and, therefore, regenerate. The only foundation which Dr. Philpotts had for his doctrine was by taking literally, in the baptismal service for children, the words

which in the service for the baptism of adults, he explained as Mr. Gorham did.

In denying the neutrality of the Church of England as to the doctrines of Calvin, we at the same time fail to discover any ground for ascribing to our Reformers the principle of compromise or comprehension. It is possible that the Dean of Westminster only means that comprehension was the result. We cannot find that it was ever seriously intended, much less openly proposed. In the time of Henry VIII. Cranmer proceeded with caution and prudence, as far as circumstances would permit him. Under Edward his action was more decided. If we reckon the Puritan party to have then existed, and to have been represented by such men as Hooper and Coverdale, there was great freedom in that direction. But this reign was short and unsettled. Between Elizabeth and her first bishops there was something like compromise. The bishops conformed to rituals and ceremonies which they would gladly have laid aside. For some years the Queen was allowed to have a crucifix in her chapel, though not without some bitter complaining. For the first five years of her reign the Puritans had great freedom as to the ceremonies. Then began subscriptions and the enforcing of uniformity. The principle of exclusion contended with the fact of comprehension. The same influences that exist to-day were at work then. A Broad Church was the result obtained, but until Dean Stanley's time it never was the end proposed.

Ten years after the Gorham prosecution and the cry of war was again raised. The Church of England, in separating from the Church of Rome appealed to the Scriptures. It retained the three creeds, for the reason assigned, that they could be proved by "most certain warrants of Holy Scripture." An appeal to the Scriptures, explain it as we may, is an appeal to reason. It throws men back at once upon questions concerning the authenticity, history, authority, and interpretation of the Scriptures. The inquiry at every step implies the supremacy of reason. There was not probably either in the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries one single theologian who carried out this principle to its ultimate and logical results. It was largely developed in Hooker; but he is confused and contradictory when he speaks of the province of reason in religion. Chillingworth went further, and was clearer; but he did not touch the goal. The exigencies of his argument did not require him to go beyond the position, that to start with an infallible Bible was as rational as to start with an infallible Church. The claims of reason were acknowledged more openly by the Cambridge Platonists and by the theologians of the eighteenth century, yet in every case with certain limits. The discoveries in science and the progress in the

study and criticism of the Scriptures that have been made in our day, demanded that a further step should be made in the direction of reason. This was done in 1860 in the famous "Essays and Reviews." The "religious world," unprepared, as it too often is, for a change in theology, gasped with horror. The seven writers were seven Antichrists of the latter day. High Churchmen and Low Churchmen stood appalled. Their hearts failed them for fear. Dr. Pusey grasped the hand of the editor of the *Record*. Each felt that a brother is born for adversity. An enemy had arisen, whose existence demanded the cessation of all former hostilities. From that day Herod and Pontius Pilate were friends.

Dean Stanley's estimate of "Essays and Reviews" is, in the main, just. It was not the best exposition either of the principles or the spirit of the Broad Church party. It took away, without always showing what was to be given in the place of what was taken away. It was not a book for the general public. Its authors, indeed, did not intend that it should be. They wrote for scholars; in fact, they wrote for the clergy, and for them it was a book seasonable, salutary, and necessary. Two of the writers were prosecuted in the Ecclesiastical Courts. Out of thirty-two charges they were condemned on five, in the Court of Arches. They appealed to the Privy Council. Of the five remaining charges, two were withdrawn by the prosecutors. The three that were left were the denial of the inspiration of the Scriptures, eternal punishment, and justification by faith. In the defence it was urged that the inspiration of the Scriptures was not denied. It was only made the same in kind with that which guides the Church and purifies the hearts of the faithful. Eternal punishment was not in strict language denied. There was simply a hope expressed, that in some way unknown to us, all men might be ultimately saved. Justification by faith was not denied, but only the "fiction of a transfer of merit," or what in technical theological language is called the "imputation of Christ's righteousness." On these three charges the two essayists were acquitted. There is no formulary of the Church of England in which inspiration is defined. There is no article which forbids us to hope for the final restoration of all men. There is an article which defines justification by faith; but there is no mention of the imputation of Christ's righteousness. On all these questions we regard it as certain that the compilers of the Articles believed the opposite of what the essayists believed, and that they would have agreed entirely with the prosecutors. But this belief is not expressed in the formularies of the Church, and so the position of the Broad Church party was legally established.

Several of the men who wrote against the essayists rapidly rose to high places in the Church. The essayists themselves were left with-

out further preferment. The sole exception was that of Mr. Pattison, who was appointed Rector of Lincoln, but against whose essay no one had anything special to say. Dr. Williams spent the remaining years of his too short life in the congenial work of a country clergyman, among his parishioners of Broad Chalke. Mr. Wilson was left in his quiet parsonage of Great Staughton—a voice, it may be, in the wilderness, but a terror to the surrounding clergy, and a beacon-light to warn all men of the danger of "free-handling" the Scriptures. Mr. Jowett, whose essay was the glory of the volume, is still Greek Professor at Oxford. In those days he taught Greek for nothing. It was proposed to endow his professorship; but that burning zeal for the "faith" which rarely fails the country clergy, brought them in such numbers to Oxford, that they outvoted the promoters of the endowment. But for the wisdom of the Lord Chancellor in connecting a canonry with the professorship, Mr. Jowett might to this hour have been teaching Greek for nothing. Ten years had nearly passed before a Prime Minister had the courage and decision to elevate one of the essayists to the Bench of Bishops. This was done amid the howlings and wailings of High Churchmen and Low Churchmen; but it was done. The fact is accomplished. The editor and prime author of "Essays and Reviews" is Bishop of Exeter.

We do not know that Dr. Temple has in any way renounced his connection with the liberal party in the Church since his elevation to the see of Exeter. He has withdrawn his essay, which in one sense we regret. Yet there is something which all men owe to the consciences of them that are weak. Dean Stanley reduces the doctrine of Bishop Temple's essay to the level of the most ordinary theological truism. He makes it simply St. Paul's doctrine that the advent took place "in the fulness of time;" in Dr. Temple's words, "at the time most fitted for the production of the effect intended." The "education of the human race" we always understood as meaning this certainly, but also more than this. In our judgment it made heathen wisdom part of the Divine teaching, thus extending the idea of inspiration beyond the circle of the Jewish nation and the Christian Church. In other words, it made the world potentially the Church, not limiting "revelation" to what was contained in the canonical Scriptures. To be in harmony with the rest of the volume, the essay on "The Education of the Human Race" required this meaning. In the current number of the *Westminster Review*, it is said that Dr. Temple never understood his own doctrine, for to the "education" he adds "revelation" as the necessary complement.* It is true that in all these questions we are ever at the mercy of words. St. Paul, speaking in the Epistle to the Romans of the

* In a review of Hunt's "Religious Thought in England."

wisdom of the Greek philosophers, distinctly says, "God *manifested* it to them." Yet, conventionally, we call that only revelation which we learn from the Scriptures; and, as Father Malebranche says, we "ungratefully" ascribe all other knowledge to our own understandings.

One of the essayists, the lamented Baden Powell, had passed into the unseen world before the "Essays and Reviews" were published. His essay, more than any of the others, required explanation. On the relations of faith and reason he is beyond measure confused, relegating revelation entirely to faith, and in words which remind us of Voltaire's sneering *persiflage* of the virtue of "believing." Yet Voltaire only repeated the words of the orthodox concerning faith; and there is every ground for believing that, in placing revelation beyond the province of reason, Baden Powell was perfectly sincere. We rather marvel at the caution with which the Dean of Westminster defends the memory of the Savilian professor. He had been denounced as a hopeless infidel and a confirmed atheist. It was publicly stated in support of these charges that he died without any ministrations of religion. Dean Stanley answers that his death was sudden, and, like all sudden deaths, it was without religious or other ministrations. But within a few days of his last illness he preached, worshipped, and communicated as usual at St. Andrew's, Well Street, the church which he usually attended. In the very year in which he died he asked permission to deliver the Bampton Lectures. So far the Dean's defence. We are disposed to go much farther. We have read with some care all that Baden Powell wrote. On many questions in theology his views were imperfect; yet in that department which was peculiarly his own, the scientific side of religion, we think that no man in this century has done more to clear, to establish, and to strengthen the argument for theism drawn from the manifestations of order and intelligence in the natural world.

The only party which has not yet made good its position in the Church of England is the High Church party. It was put on its defence in the Denison prosecution, but that broke down on some technical point. It is now on its trial in the prosecution of Mr. Bennett. When we speak of a High Church party we must again bear in mind the inadequateness of language, and especially of terms which are used to class and label religious parties. There are different kinds of High Churchmen, some of them exceedingly unlike each other. In the seventeenth century the High Churchmen were the men of culture, the scholars of the age, liberal and tolerant of everything except the scruples of Puritanism, which sorely tried their patience. After the Revolution the High Churchmen were generally the country clergy, whose great warfare was not with the flesh and

the devil, but with Latitudinarian bishops. In the beginning of the last century all liberal measures passed the Upper House of Convocation, but were condemned in the Lower House. The Wesleys, in the early stages of their career, were High Churchmen; but by High Church zeal they were pelted with brickbats and rotten eggs till the devotion which began in the Church could only find rest in the conventicle. But the old species died out. In their later days they were simply the "beefeaters" of the Church. They obeyed its laws. They defended in their own way its bulwarks. They were great pluralists, the ready servants of the State; but too loyal and too Conservative, both in religion and politics, ever to come into collision with anything the Church taught, or seemed to teach.

The High Churchism of the present day might be regarded as including all opinions—from those of some members of the "Evangelical" party, who have a vague belief in apostolical succession, up to the attitudinarians of the Ritualistic Churches. So long as High Churchmen were moderate, and merely emphasized some acknowledged principles or allowed practices of the Church, they were unmolested. The party was put on its defence when it openly taught doctrines and introduced ceremonies that had been expressly put aside at the Reformation. The one great doctrine at which, beyond all others, our Reformers stumbled was the Roman doctrine of transubstantiation in the Eucharist. Sooner than admit this they went to the stake and the scaffold. A party of High Churchmen are now confessedly teaching the same doctrine in the Church of England under the name of the "Real Presence." There is a marked difference between the history of the baptismal question and that of the Eucharist. At the Reformation no one objected to baptismal regeneration. It was received, so far as we can learn, by all the Reformers, both at home and abroad. We do not except the Puritans. We are not sure if we can even except the Zwinglians. It was never a subject of controversy between our Reformers and the Church of Rome. But the same cannot be said of the Eucharist. This was the greatest of their controversies. A few words may be gleaned here and there in the Prayer-Book which seem to savour of the rejected doctrine. But there were Articles written expressly to condemn it; and in the time of Edward a special rubric was added, declaring the impossibility of a body being in two places at the same time, in the very words of John Fryth, who was burned at Smithfield for teaching the doctrine of Zwingle. This rubric was omitted under Elizabeth, and was not reinserted till after the Savoy Conference. The Puritans asked its restoration. It was restored by the moderate party; not, however, to please Puritans, but as a barrier against the Eucharistic doctrine that had been introduced by Laud. The question, then, of the compre-

hension of the modern High Churchmen—we mean of the Ritualistic class—is not the same as in the case of the other two parties, who are not touched by the formularies. The object of the Ritualists is avowedly to override both Articles and Rubrics, to go beyond the Reformation, and, for the teaching of the Reformers, to substitute that of the Church previous to the Reformation.

Dean Stanley wishes to extend the comprehension as far as it can be extended compatible with the safety of the Church. On this ground only can we acquiesce in the recent judgment of Sir R. Phillimore in the case of Mr. Bennett. To give a legal sanction to definite errors which the Articles of the Church definitely condemn, is to disregard the last semblance of that law and order without which the Church cannot exist. The "Real Presence," which Mr. Bennett teaches, was not the "presence" held by the Reformers. They illustrate their meaning by the sun, which is in the heavens, and yet is present on earth by its light and heat. We do not think the illustration a happy one; nor do we think that Cranmer, Calvin, Bucer, and Peter Martyr were wise in speaking of a presence at all, for this reason, that they did not mean a presence in any definite sense. Still, they did speak of a "presence," and therefore Sir R. Phillimore's judgment may be vindicated on the ground of toleration and comprehension. Weak-headed men may be useful under the guidance of others. Driven from the Church, and put into the category of martyrs, they might be injurious both to themselves and others. There must, however, be a limit somewhere. Mr. Bennett could not fairly have been acquitted if the words under which the prosecution was instituted had not been withdrawn. He spoke in one of his tracts of "the real, actual, and visible presence of our Lord upon the altars of our churches,"—language too much, surely, even for a Roman Catholic, and which sounds as if it had been written by a maniac.

All these controversies issue in the practical question of a final judge or arbiter who will draw the lines of comprehension and toleration. The need of a judge whose decisions would be final has created the claims of the Bishop of Rome to infallibility. The want of such a judge among Protestants has given rise to an endless sectarianism. The appeal to Scripture has always turned out to be an appeal to reason, either to the private judgment of the individual to find out the meaning of Scripture, or to the same judgment to find out the meaning which the old Fathers put on the Scripture. Dean Stanley sees our only hope in a National Church, in which the State will allow all parties as much freedom as may be compatible with safety and unity.

On this unexpected use of the State-Church principle we have

already spoken in this Review.* The tide of public opinion, and apparently the whole stream of progress, were flowing in the other direction. At the Reformation the Church of England clung to the civil ruler as its only protector from the tyranny of Rome. The King was Christ's vicar. The Pope was Antichrist. At the Revolution this doctrine was found untenable. The divine right of kings refuted itself. The second James took the side of "Antichrist," and the Church went its own way in giving allegiance to the Prince of Orange. The principle of the old State Church of England died out with the Nonjurors. The Highest Churchmen were then the most consistent State-Churchmen. Now times have changed. It is the High Churchmen who are impatient of the government of the State. It interferes with the development of their idea of a hierarchy. The civil power, represented by the Court of Arches and the Privy Council, is the ultimate judge of the doctrine of the Church.

In discussing the Church and State connection we admit at once that it is not a conclusive argument against it to say that it has been accompanied hitherto with many and great evils. No system is perfect, and with great advantages we must expect some evils. There have been eras in our history when the whole tendency of the State connection has been apparently to drive all earnest religion out of the Church, and to uphold all manner of iniquity within. The past may, however, be full of instruction for the future, and that evils have been may be the pledge that they shall not be again. It might, indeed, be argued with some fairness that neither the Nonconformists of 1662 nor the Wesleyans of the last century were driven out by the State. They were the victims of parties stronger than themselves. The sin of the State lay in its indifference; and this, it is to be feared, ever will be its sin. We have seen the end of pluralities, and ere long we may see the end of the sale of presentations. Unfortunately we cannot say of advowsons; and so long as that remains there can be no check on illegal or secret treaties about presentations. We cannot surely be wrong in fixing on the present mode of disposing of benefices as the root-evil of the State Church. Dean Stanley has but little to say even in favour of a disinterested patronage, except that it is preferable to the tumults which accompany popular elections. To this he adds the consideration that if the clergy had the election of the bishops, men of liberal tendencies would never be elected to the episcopate. As to the evils of popular elections, they might be very few if definite laws were made by which congregations were to be guided in the choice of

* See an article on "The Churches of England," April, 1870, and a notice of Dean Stanley's Essay on "The Connection of Church and State," June, 1868.

ministers. It is here that we come upon the strength and the weakness of the argument for our freedom within the National Church. When a man gets a living,—let it be by purchase, presentation, or simony,—the power which a bishop has over him is merely in name. The bishop is compelled to institute, and he cannot suspend without an expensive process in law. But a clergyman without a benefice is completely at the mercy of either bishop or incumbent. A few weeks ago, to our knowledge, a clergyman, not unknown as a theological writer, agreed to take charge of a small parish not far from London. After an interview with the bishop, his lordship refused to sanction the agreement made with the rector, and ostensibly for no other reason but that the clergyman was a writer who advocated a theology of which the bishop did not approve. The clergyman had no redress, no court of appeal. He might have gone to the Prime Minister and complained that an arbitrary and impulsive man had been placed over a great diocese, for the duties of which he evidently wanted capacity. The Prime Minister could only have answered that the appointment was made by his predecessor, for whose acts he was not responsible. We do not find in any of Dean Stanley's arguments that he ever takes into his calculations the fact of the existence of curates. The "Parvique Cures" are Church animalcules, not to be discerned without a glass that magnifies. This would be pardonable if curates were, as the theory implies, merely apprentices to Church work. But it is different when we know that they are really the working bees of the Church, that their number is more than a third of the whole clergy, and that, on an average, a man is from twelve to fifteen years in orders before he gets a living. Here, then, is the actual price of our freedom—a benefice by purchase, or a quiet tongue in our heads for nearly twenty years of the best part of a man's life. Of course the exceptions are many. Dean Stanley, Bishop Temple, Archbishop Tait, and others whom we could name, were never either purchasers of preferment or subjected to a long and ignominious silence. They began life with the prizes of the public schools and the great Universities, which must ever be beyond the reach of the many, and from their very nature attainable only by a few.

One of the essays in this volume is on Subscription to the Articles, both in the Church and the Universities. It is not proposed to set aside the Church's formularies, but only not to enforce subscription, because that in fact no man now believes every statement of the Articles. Those who enter into the life of the Church, and receive the substance of its teaching, will cling to it voluntarily. Those who do not will drop off. And here we have the Dean's answer to the *Westminster* and *Quarterly Reviews*, when they urged the moral

obligation of the essayists to resign their preferments. There is a spirit of progress at work in all Churches. Where this progress is normal, it implies imperfection in the past. The forms in which religion expresses itself in different eras must be subject to change. The old must ever be giving place to the new. Some dogmas which we should now willingly set aside are the incarnations of the devout feelings of the saints of other days. What a figment to us, as indeed it was to Richard Baxter and John Wesley, is the doctrine of the imputation of Christ's righteousness! Yet how precious was the meaning it had to Tobias Crisp and John Saltmarsh, to James Hervey and Augustus Toplady!

The Dean of Westminster has peculiar advantages for the discussion of theological questions, from the variety and the accuracy of his knowledge. He reads all kinds of books. He is not only, as we all know, an eminent classical and Biblical scholar, but he is familiar with all the European languages which possess any literature. He has travelled much, and has had the friendship of the prelates and scholars of the Greek and Roman as well as of the Protestant Churches. To these advantages he has added an appreciative study of all the religious parties at home, and their relations to the State Church. He understands General and Particular Baptists, New Connexion and Association Methodists, New Light and Old Light Seceders, and we verily believe he could distinguish between a Burgher and an Anti-Burgher. This capacity for a wide survey enables him to compare, to analyze, to trace the working of the same principle under different forms, and to detect inconsistencies, not merely in arguments, but what is of more importance, in tendencies. At the time of the "Essay and Review" mania, the High Church zeal for everlasting punishment in a material hell was very vehement. In the essays on "The Church and the World," the representative High Church volume, Dean Stanley finds a hope expressed that there may be a limit to future punishment. A favourite dogma of the High Church party is that Christ's human nature was so unlike ours that it excluded all imperfections of knowledge. But Dean Stanley finds John Keble singing—

> "Was not our Lord a little child,
> *Taught by degrees* to pray,
> By father dear and mother mild
> *Instructed* day by day?"

After the judgment on "Essays and Reviews," when it was discovered that the Church of England taught no definite doctrines concerning inspiration or everlasting punishment, Cardinal Wiseman wished to make some capital out of this for the Church of Rome. He called mechanical inspiration and everlasting punish-

ment the "vital doctrines," the "sacred deposit," committed to his Church. Dean Stanley immediately answered that the Cardinal spoke only as a private theologian, for the Decrees of Trent have made no "definition of the extent of inspiration or of the limits of the Divine mercy." In another place, where he is dealing with the Bishop of Capetown's argument for a "concurrent testimony" of the early Church, the Dean says a "concurrent testimony" may be found in remote times for the "Immaculate Conception," certainly for the celibacy of the clergy. The Apostolical canons, on which the Bishop of Capetown grounded his judgment against Dr. Colenso, direct that a clergyman who marries after taking orders is to be deposed, and the Council of Nicea enjoins the same punishment for every bishop, presbyter, or deacon who shall be promoted to any higher place in the Church than that which he holds.

The chief significance of Dean Stanley's Essays is that they are a contribution to the new theology, or what he calls the theology of the nineteenth century. The chief objection to this theology is that it is but a stepping-stone to something beyond. We do not know what is to be the next form it will assume. This position is accepted. The old theology posited infallibility, and then reasoned downwards. The new begins with ascertained facts, and builds upon them. The doctrine of progress implies that the full truth is a goal to be reached, and not a point from which we start. The old theology assumed what the Bible ought to be; the new asks what it is. To invent ways for God is one of the failings of the human mind. We are now to begin to learn God's way. Popes, councils, and creed-makers in all ages have spoken as if their "little systems" embraced the whole of truth. Experience of their failures gives us wisdom. We begin to learn that we are but children in the school of Christ, and that our capacities are but small. We recall the forgotten words of Jesus—His parting words to His disciples, as full of meaning in our day as they were then—"I have yet many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now."

J. Hunt

CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE.

I.—THEOLOGICAL.

Present-Day Papers on Prominent Questions in Theology. Edited by the Right Rev. ALEXANDER EWING, D.C.L., Bishop of Argyll and the Isles. London: Strahan & Co.

THE Bishop of Argyll, in editing these papers, takes up a very decided position on the side of progress in theology. The names of the authors are not given, but the papers are well written, clear in argument, reverent in tone, and all aiming definitely at one object. The Bishop, in a brief preface, strikes the key-note of the volume. He tells us that for centuries the very meaning of *revelation* has been misunderstood. In its primitive aspect it meant giving of light. It was something to interpret or supplement nature. But it has come to be regarded as another mystery, to be received not because it is light illuminating darkness, but on account of the authority by which it is imposed. "So much," the Bishop says, "is this the case, that one of the most illustrious of the apologists of revelation grounds his arguments for its credibility on the fact of its containing mysteries *analogous* to those of nature." We never understood Butler to mean that the difficulties in revelation were in themselves arguments in its favour. The object of the Analogy was to obviate objections. If we find some things in revelation which we do not understand, we are not to be surprised, for there are things in nature beyond our comprehension. Butler's argument has a meaning. He does not always use the word revelation in the same sense in which it is used by the Bishop of Argyll, but Bishop Butler, in the main, was on the same side as Bishop Ewing. He would have agreed to the definition of revelation, that it is "no additional mystery, but the explanation of mystery—an explanation commending itself to our conscience and reason, and operating by them;" but he would have added, that connected with these things explained, there were others unexplained and hard to be understood.

The first paper in this volume is a reprint from William Law's "Spirit of Love." The subject is the "Atonement," which is explained not as a reconciling of God to man, but of man to God. All the popular ideas of substitution satisfying Divine justice, and meriting redemption for man, are renounced. To be *at one* with God is to be restored to our original rectitude, to be put right in our relations to God. It is not a work done for us externally, but a work done

within us. William Law began life as a Nonjuror, and as such, probably a High Churchman. In his later years he became a follower of Jacob Böhme, from whom he learned a more rational, though sometimes a more mystical, theology. But William Law was as clear as Jacob Böhme was obscure. He took a part in the great Deistical controversy. He found the strong arguments of the Deists lay against the popular representations of God as an angry Being, who sacrificed His Son to satisfy His justice. William Law answered by stating the doctrine of the Atonement as he found it in the Scriptures.

The second paper is a very valuable one on the Eucharist. The writer enters thoroughly into the Bishop's view of Revelation, and contends that the High Church mystifying and materializing of this sacrament raises the question, Whether we have any Revelation at all in the sense of making God known, "or whether we are merely in the presence of an instrumentality which indeed connects us with God, but in no sense by way of a *Revelation*." The Eucharist is called a "mystery," not because of something concealed, but of something revealed. It is not a hiding, but a "showing forth." The third paper is on the "Rule of Faith." It is an able vindication of the "verifying faculty" in man. Revelation could not come to us but through the channel of reason and conscience. As a matter of fact, in this way the Christian Revelation has come. But, instead of light, we have introduced darkness; instead of allowing that which was revealed to appear, we have laboured to obscure it by rules of faith, infallible churches, and supernatural Scriptures. In the original order the character of God explained and commended itself by itself; now it had to be explained and commended by other things, and, after all, was left uncertain and obscure. In the fourth paper, on "The Present Unbelief," the author considers the question, Whether "this infidelity exists as to the Revelation truly, or as to that which has been set forth as Revelation." He answers, "We think the latter, and that, generally speaking, Revelation has not been rightly set forth." He recommends a more reverent and sympathetic mode of treating doubt. We ought fairly to weigh the difficulties that beset men, and when their relative worth is known, the danger of exaggerating them will be avoided. In the fifth paper, a letter to a curate on "Words for Things," the writer denies that God inflicted death on man as the penalty of sin. The meaning of this is that death followed as the natural result of wrong-doing. The definition of justification by faith, in the Eleventh Article, is said not to be "a happy one, in view of the case of Abraham." The words in the Catechism concerning the body of Christ are regretted, as giving a *locus standi* to "those who substitute the participation of an ordinance for that faith which apprehends the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ." The Johannean or Neo-Platonic meaning of the word eternal is defended —"eternal and endless are not one and the same thing." The last paper consists of "Meditations and Prayers concerning the Church and Mankind." It is preceded by a brief preface, written by Professor Maurice. The whole volume is pervaded by the spirit of Mr. Maurice. It adopts his arguments, his definitions, his stand-point, and his devout reverence.

Religious Thought in Germany. Reprinted, by permission, from the *Times*. London: Tinsley Brothers.

There is a great deal that is interesting in this volume. It is readable, and full of information. If it is not deep, that is, perhaps, due to the circumstance that it was first written as letters to a newspaper. We say perhaps, yet there are traces here and there of the author's incompetency to enter into the higher regions of German theology. Schleiermacher's great work, "Reden über die Religion," is spoken of as his "first pamphlet," a sure sign that the author of this volume never saw Schleiermacher's book even second-hand at a German book-stall. There are passages concerning the narrow orthodoxy of some of the Protestant clergy which do not deserve the prominence here given to them. The same principles and the same spirit are plentiful in England. It is difficult to know for what object the author of this book mentions them. His own theology does not appear to be either very liberal or very enlightened. Judging from some feeble remarks which he makes on a passage quoted from Dr. Schwartz, we should say that his knowledge of theology was just enough for superficial correspondence in a daily journal, certainly not more. The pub-

lication of the letters in the *Times* called forth a correspondence which the author, with commendable fairness, has reprinted at the end of this volume. Ernest de Bunsen denied that the educated Germans had departed from Christianity. They had given up many dogmas that had been retained by Luther, but that was not rejecting Christianity. M. Lehmann, pastor of a Baptist congregation in Berlin, wished to confirm the evidence of the irreligious character of the Germans, excepting those who were orthodox, and denied that these were so few as M. de Bunsen made them. Mr. Wright, formerly British chaplain at Dresden, maintained that Rationalism was widely spread among the people, but that the clergy and the universities were returning to faith. Mr. Anketell, rector of the American Church at Dresden, confirmed the original charges of German defection from evangelical religion, and pronounced Mr. Wright's statements "strikingly inaccurate." All the correspondents, with the exception of Bunsen, were outsiders. They measured the Christianity of the German people by their own estimate of Christianity. We have already said that the book is interesting; and if the author is not profound, he is in this respect on a level with his clerical friends, Messrs. Wright, Lehmann, and Anketell.

The Testimony of the Catacombs and of other Monuments of Christian Art, from the Second to the Eighteenth Century, concerning Questions of Doctrine now disputed in the Church. By the Rev. W. B. MARRIOTT, B.D., F.S.A. London: Hatchards.

THE first part of Mr. Marriott's book appeared as an article in the *Christian Observer*. It was as a review of "Roma Sotterranea," edited by Dr. Northcote and Mr. Brownlow. It has a curious and instructive history. The book reviewed was a compendium of what had been written on the subject by Cavalière De Rossi. The exactness and impartiality of the Italian antiquary were commended, but the same praise was not bestowed on the compilers of the English work. As Roman Catholics, having to propagate their faith in this land of heretics, they wished to draw some arguments from the catacombs for the antiquity of Roman Catholic doctrines and worship. In a representation of the ascent of Elias into heaven, Dr. Northcote found, of course, the prophet's mantle, which "reminded Roman Christians of the pallium, the symbol of jurisdiction worn by bishops of Rome." In pictures of the Magi Dr. Northcote found the presence of the Virgin, a proof of the Mary worship of the early Christians. Among the "Oranti" he found the figure of a woman, which from many considerations he concluded to be "the Mother of our Lord." Mr. Marriott had previously taken special notice of this female figure accompanying "the Good Shepherd," and from the presence of an instrument of torture, "a scourge loaded with lead or iron, which is painted on a large scale beside her," he concluded that she was a Christian martyr. But in the plate in Dr. Northcote's book this instrument was wanting. Mr. Marriott spoke with some severity of this apparent deception to support an argument. Dr. Northcote immediately wrote to the editor of the *Christian Observer* that the plates had been prepared in Rome by De Rossi, and that in order to get four subjects into one plate the artist had omitted the very "attribute" which determined that the female "Oranto" was not the Virgin Mary. Dr. Northcote was at once freed from the burden of his argument and from any intention to be dishonest with his plates. Mr. Marriott traces in this chapter from these monuments the progress of Mary worship. In the first four centuries, that is, in the era of the catacombs, there is no representation of Mary which is not within the limits of what is found in Scripture. To this correspond the more public monuments of Rome and Ravenna from the fifth to the seventh centuries. In the seventh and eighth centuries pictures of saints and of the Virgin Mary are introduced into those portions of the ancient churches which had hitherto been exclusively devoted to the glory of the ascended Christ. In the ninth and later centuries "there appear upon the walls of churches at Capua and at Rome representations of the Virgin Mary enthroned, and in all the splendour of regal estate in dress of purple and gold, a golden crown upon her head, and scarlet shoes upon her feet."

The two other papers which make up Mr. Marriott's book were written as exercises to be read in the Divinity School at Oxford. The subject of one is

"The Supremacy claimed for the See of Rome;" the other is "The Antum Inscription," having reference to the sacraments of Baptism and of the Holy Communion, and to the state of the faithful after death. Among the frescoes of the catacombs, the only figure of an apostle which is represented separately from the rest of the twelve is that of St. Paul, described as that of Paulus Pastor Apostolus, side by side with a figure of "The Good Shepherd." In none of the catacombs is St. Peter specially designated by name or attribute. "One very remarkable peculiarity," says Mr. Marriott, "of the Roman monuments is that in the numberless instances in which St. Peter and St. Paul are represented on either hand of our Lord, no definite and unvarying rule of precedence is observed. The prevailing rule is that St. Paul is placed at the right hand of our Lord, St. Peter on the left. The "Antum Inscription," which is neither very legible nor very intelligible, has been made of great importance in witnessing for Roman Catholic doctrines. Bishop Wordsworth, of Lincoln, with equal ingenuity, has made it speak genuine Anglicanism. We need scarcely add that Mr. Marriott's book is one of great value.

The Church of England and the Church of Rome. By the Rev. J. LLEWELYN DAVIES, M.A., Rector of Christ Church, Marylebone. London: James Martin.

SERMONS by Mr. Llewelyn Davies are sure to be well written, and if the subjects require argument, well reasoned. This little volume treats of the main questions at issue between the Church of England and the Church of Rome. We do not expect, and the author does not expect, that it will be read by Roman Catholics. Its chief value is for members of the Church of England. Mr. Davies, writing from the Broad Church stand-point, says that the Church of England places—

"Its absolute dependence on no authority lower than that of the Word of the living God. It appeals, not to the Bible only, nor to the consciences of the Church Catholic in any age, nor to the opinion of the British nation or of English Churchmen, but to the teaching and government of God Himself, given supremely in Jesus Christ, and manifesting themselves from age to age through the two main influences of spiritual awakening and historical development."

This is something like a fair view of the actual standing-ground of the Church of England. But we cannot suppose that Mr. Davies attributes to our Reformers the intention of establishing the Church on this foundation. Such a conception did not belong to their age. Chillingworth expressed their leading idea when he said, "The Bible, and the Bible alone, is the religion of Protestants;" but even Chillingworth did not see how much the principle involved. An appeal to the Bible was an appeal to reason and conscience, or, in Mr. Davies' words, "to the teaching and government of God Himself."

Christ satisfying the Instincts of Humanity. Eight Lectures, delivered in the Temple Church. By C. J. VAUGHAN, D.D., Master of the Temple. London: Macmillan & Co.

THERE is a peculiar vigour, added to a singular earnestness, in all which Dr. Vaughan writes. He gives indications of mental strength and great resources of learning, but they are all subservient to a certain religious fervour. He offers his gifts on the alter of sacrifice a religious burnt-offering. These eight sermons are marked by the author's usual zeal and ability. The subjects are not new, nor is there any particular novelty in the mode of treating them. Christ satisfies the instincts for truth, reverence, perfection, liberty, courage, sacrifice, sympathy, and unity. It is shown that these instincts do exist in imperfect and sinful men. They are satisfied in Christ, who was perfect and sinless. In the sermon on Unity Dr. Vaughan refers to the ecclesiastical movements of our day in these words:—

"What is union? What is unity? How natural to answer, it is the presence of one polity, one worship—at least, one creed. Some minds have found a satisfaction in the idea of an Œcumenical Anglicanism; have shed sympathetic tears in the gathering of a hundred Anglican Bishops in little Lambeth, when great Rome could have easily assembled her thousand Bishops, as uniform in their utterances as the others were discordant. And yet, my brethren, neither here nor there was that unity of which Christ spoke; Church government does not make it. The triple organization of Bishops, Priests,

and Deacons—that magic sound which to many is so musical—may leave us to the end in all the confusions of Ritualisms and Rationalisms, which are the plague of our hearts in this seventieth year of our troublesome nineteenth century."

It will be new even to some scholars that the favourite Catholic text for unity, "There shall be one fold," is a mistranslation. It ought to be "one flock,"—that is the kind of unity which Christ promised.

Sermons Preached in the Temple Church. By the Rev. ALFRED AINGER, M.A., Reader at the Temple. London: Macmillan & Co.

THIS is a volume of very thoughtful and elegantly-written sermons. They never rise to eloquence, and they are not profuse in images or illustration, but they have a chastened tone which bespeaks a highly cultivated and devout mind. Mr. Ainger is to be numbered with that increasing class of preachers in the Church of England who are preaching Christianity in the form in which it ought to be preached in this century. He clothes his own ideas with his own words, giving the old truth an air of freshness. Some of the sermons are of considerable theological interest, as the one on the "Atonement," another on "Sin and Disease," and one on the "Mood and Function of the Prophet."

Life Problems Answered in Christ. Six Sermons. By LEIGH MANN. With a Preface by ALEXANDER MACLAREN, B.A. London: Hoddder and Stoughton.

MR. MANN'S sermons are nearly the counterpart of Dr. Vaughan's, which we have noticed above. They speak of Christ in His relations to human suffering and death, to law, faith, and destiny. In vigour of thought and language, and in depth of earnestness, they are quite worthy to be put alongside the discourses of the eminent Master of the Temple. In Mr. Maclaren's words, they are the "work of a mind and heart singularly tender and strong, pure and true, touched with imaginative beauty, and penetrated by loyal attachment to our dear Lord."

The Church of God and the Bishops. By HENRY ST. A. VON LIANO. London: Rivingtons.

THE translator says that the author of this little work is a Spanish Catholic, of a noble family, now resident at Munich, where he is well known for his devout and ascetic life, his deep religious convictions, and his zealous attachment to the Roman Catholic Church. Like many other earnest Roman Catholics, he regards the new dogma of Papal infallibility as a heresy, and destructive of Catholicism. His words are evidently those of a deeply-pious man and a devout Catholic, who believes that Christianity and Roman Catholicism are identical. After quoting Möhler, hitherto reckoned the great German authority on Catholicism, Von Liaño says, "We see Möhler, as was to be expected of him, maintains the same principle as the whole body of the Fathers, without a single exception, and all great and authoritative Catholic theologians of all ages." The book was written while the Council was sitting. Now that Papal infallibility is a dogma of the Church we wonder where such devout men as Von Liaño will find rest. To them it must appear that the infallible Church has fallen.

The Ministry of the Word. Sermons by WALTER MACGILVRAY, D.D., Gilcomston Free Church, Aberdeen. London: Hamilton, Adams, & Co.

A VOLUME of sermons by a minister of the Free Kirk of Scotland is likely to have some peculiarities of its own that will interest the English reader. The Free Church is the most orthodox not only of the sects, but of the Presbyterian sects. It has least sympathy with the Church of England, and least capacity to understand its spirit. Itself a rival claimant with the High Church party for spiritual authority, though under another form, it is equally appalled with the claims of High Churchmen and with their subjection to the State. Dr. MacGilvray says that the deadliest errors are taught in the Church of England, and with no means of checking them; yea, that "persons of the most scandalous character press forward to the communion table, and they cannot interfere to prevent them"! A Scotch poet says:—

"E'en ministers, they hae been kenn'd
In holy rapture,
A rousing whid at times to vend
And nail't wi' Scripture."

From the case of the eccentric High Church vicar who last autumn had a pig's face among the adornings of his harvest festival, Dr. Macgilvray finds evidence of a judicial blindness coming over the party. They are bringing "sacrifices of swine's flesh" into the Christian sanctuary. "This is the finger of God." We mention these as some of the odd things of this book. In other respects it is a volume of good, readable, and well-written sermons.

The Authenticity of John's Gospel, deduced from Internal Evidence. By JAMES ORR. London: Williams and Norgate.

MR. ORR'S book has grown out of some letters which he wrote to the *Inquirer*, the organ of the Unitarians, in answer to the late Mr. Tayler's work on John's Gospel. We cannot at present enter upon the question in discussion, but we think that Mr. Orr manages his arguments with great ability, that he makes out a good case for the Johannine authorship of the fourth Gospel, and its essential agreement with the three Synoptics.

Complete Triumph of Moral Good over Evil. London: Longmans, Green, & Co.

FROM internal evidence, we should say that the author of this work is not a man of great learning; and, on the same authority, we should say that he is a Dissenter. He has, however, read a great deal, and he takes his stand on the side of the liberal theology. He uses much of the old doctrinal language, but he has departed from all that is distinctly orthodox as that word used to be understood. He writes clearly, and discusses in an interesting way several questions in theology, but the great object of his book, as the title-page implies, is to advocate the final triumph of good, or the ultimate deliverance of all men from sin, and consequently from punishment. He makes the same complaint as the authors of the Bishop of Argyll's Papers, that Christianity is not preached simply as what it is, and hence the prevailing unbelief.

New Theories and the Old Faith. By the Rev. J. ALLANSON PICTON, M.A. London: Williams and Norgate.

MR. PICTON is minister of a congregation of Dissenters in Hackney. This volume is a course of lectures on religious topics of the day. The preacher has forsaken the "old faith," and is now finding his way among the "new theories." The book belongs to a class which is becoming common; a class which distinctly marks the present transition era of theology. The subjects are, "The Soul's Longing after a Final Cause," "The God-consciousness of Humanity," "Inspiration," "Infallibility," and "The Use and Abuse of the Bible." The discourses are thoroughly theistic and Christian, without the doctrines which we generally suppose to be the essence of Christianity. They manifest more than ordinary ability, and will be useful to those who are interested in these subjects.

John; or, the Apocalypse of the New Testament. By PHILIP S. DESPREZ, B.D., Vicar of Alvediston, Wilts. London: Longmans, Green, & Co.

IT appears that Mr. Desprez had some time ago written a work on the Revelation of St. John. We have not seen it, but he tells us in the preface to this volume that he then believed the Bible to be an infallible book, and that its visions of the Apocalypse were capable of a real fulfilment. In agreement with this belief, he interpreted the great city to be destroyed as Jerusalem, and this destruction as the Son of Man coming to judgment. He is now convinced that the Apocalypse is not a prophetic record of literal facts, but a sincere, though visionary delineation of events which St. John, in common with many of his countrymen, believed to be impending. They thought that the world was on the eve of a terrible crisis, and that the very time of the long-expected advent had arrived. The Revelation was the text-book of the primitive Church, which for the first two or three centuries was essentially chiliastic. After these statements, Mr. Desprez proceeds to discuss such questions as the date and authorship of the book, the seals, the two witnesses, Antichrist and the eschatology in general, of the first Christians. We abstain from criticizing the author's theological views. He seems to have studied his subject sincerely and honestly. It is some satisfaction to see these visions rescued from the hands of those who make them material for sectarian controversy, or prophetic almanacs of things to come. We own, however, that it is not without regret that we seem com-

pelled to part with the long-cherished belief that the last of the apostles had real visions of things which were to be hereafter. We must grant to Mr. Desprez that as yet no tenable interpretation of the visions has been furnished by history; and if we once admit that the apostles were mistaken as to the time of the end, we have at least opened the door for such an interpretation as Mr. Desprez gives. J. H.

II.—HISTORICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL.

A History of the Sepoy War in India, 1857—58. By J. W. KAYE, F.R.S. Vol. II. London: W. H. Allen & Co.

SIX years have elapsed since the first instalment of this eventful history was given to the world. Of that large volume, meant to be one of three, the greater part was introductory, tracing back to its apparent causes the great explosion of 1857. The scale of the work thus begun gave small encouragement to the hope of its completion in three volumes. In a later edition the hope was acknowledged by Mr. Kaye himself to have proved a delusion. Any doubt on that score is cleared up by the present volume, which brings the narrative of the siege of Delhi down to the last days of August, when Nicholson's success at Nujjufghur removed the last hindrance to the safe arrival of the siege train in Wilson's camp. We have still to hear all that happened before the 20th September, when our war-worn countrymen won their way into the Palace, which four months before had been stained with innocent British blood. The defence of Lucknow, the march thither of Havelock's and Outram's heroes, the subsequent campaigns in Oudh, Rohilkund, and the North-West Provinces, the progress of events in other parts of India, Sir Hugh Rose's masterly campaign in Central India, and the final hunting down of Tantia Topee, have yet to be told by a writer whose wealth of materials encourages in his case a congenial largeness of treatment.

In the last pages of the first volume we left Lord Canning taking his measures to meet the storm which had just burst upon the heads of our countrymen in Meerut and Delhi. Curiously enough, the author says not a word about Lord Canning's refusal of Lord Elphinstone's offer to despatch an express steamer from Bombay on the 17th May, which would have overtaken the last English, or the next French, steamer from Alexandria, so as to antedate by a fortnight the receipt in England of news concerning the Delhi massacres.* And very lightly does he pass over the order given to the 84th Foot to be ready for an immediate voyage from Calcutta back to Rangoon, at the very moment when the cantonments of Meerut were being given to the flames. Not till May 14th was that order countermanded. In the second volume Lord Canning's "calm, still face" continually rises before us; but, with all deference to Mr. Kaye, the needful evidence of ready forecast, of the power that keeps other men calm, yet ready for action, is still wanting. If the people of Calcutta fell into unseemly panics, whose fault was it that Lord Canning's rejection of all the earlier proposals to arm Calcutta, disarm Barrackpore, and so set another regiment free for service up the country, disheartened his countrymen in the great commercial capital, and encouraged rebellion elsewhere? The mistake he made is not to be explained away by a reference to his alleged mistrust in the courage and self-devotion of his unwarlike countrymen. The fact remains that a few weeks later the Viceroy did accept the offers he had once rejected. But the change of purpose came too late. Precious weeks had been lost, for which no happy afterthought could quite atone. Cawnpore was sacrificed, Lucknow placed in cruel peril, partly, at any rate, because the Indian Government delayed in doing promptly what it was glad enough to do afterwards. With all respect for the nobleman whose firm bearing throughout was surpassed by the grandeur of his clemency at a later period,

* See the Red Pamphlet, and Trotter's "British Empire in India," vol. ii. p. 112.

we cannot acquit him of almost stolid slowness to grasp the true dimensions of a terrible crisis.

Among other sparks that helped to fire the explosion of 1857 was the course of events reviewed in the first chapter of the present volume. Disaffection in the Mogul's palace had, no doubt, been sown by successive inroads of English Viceroys on the powers and privileges once reserved for the family of blind old Shah Alum. At last, in 1856, it was decreed that no successor should sit upon the throne of Mohammed Bahadoor Shah, the old man who was still reigning in 1857. His eldest son would be recognised as a prince only, and the palace, the Mohammedan Alsatia, was to be cleared of its numerous occupants. Great was the wrath of Zeenat Mahal, the favourite wife, whose own son would thus be excluded from the prize her ambition had always reserved for him. She and her husband intrigued with our then antagonist, the Shah of Persia, and with the Mohammedans in various parts of India. Early in 1857 Delhi was full of plots, and seething with seditious language. Our countrymen, for the most part, gave heed to neither, in spite of concurrent warnings from every side. Not till the mutineers from Meerut streamed into Delhi, and surged around the Imperial Palace, did they realize, too late, the tokens of impending doom. Happily for some of them, the sudden rising at Meerut seems to have forestalled the more general rising planned for a later day. Had the Meerut troopers not been stung by the treatment of their comrades, and the talk of prostitutes in the bazaars, to premature revolt—according to Mr. Kaye and the general belief—a yet more fearful disaster might have swept away every Englishman in Upper India—at least, on this side the Sutlej.

The explosion at Meerut, however, was bad enough. Mr. Kaye's account of it brings out the horror of a tragedy which paralyzed our commanders, turned the finest of our cantonments into a havoc-strewn blazing wreck, and placed Delhi itself in the hands of ruffians reeking with the blood of English men, women, and children. How vainly the survivors on the ridge before the city looked out towards Meerut for the help that never came, we are once more reminded in a narrative which leaves no telling incident untold. Once more we see what disasters might have been averted had a Gillespie commanded at Meerut, instead of an old general who would neither make an example of the ruffians in his own bazaar, nor send a few troops to rescue Delhi, if possible, from a fate worse than that which had overtaken Meerut. If a squadron of carbiniers and a few light guns had followed up the flying mutineers on the road to Delhi, in all likelihood that city would not have risen, the Palace would not have dared to make common cause with the Mohammedan mob, and the massacres which startled all England would never have taken place.

The mischief was done, however, and more was certainly brewing elsewhere. What was to be done? Delhi, for one thing, must be retaken. On this point Lord Canning agreed with Sir John Lawrence; and General Anson, of whom Mr. Kaye thinks favourably, fell in with their views. Lord Canning was particularly urgent on the last-named to make short work of Delhi—of a city seven miles round, begirt with strong walls, well supplied with guns and warlike stores, in spite of Willoughby's noble self-devotion, and defended by increasing thousands of desperate mutineers. For an attack on this stronghold Anson could muster only about three thousand English soldiers, with two native regiments, a few sappers and miners, twenty field-pieces, and a few light siege-guns, chiefly manned by volunteers. With this small force his successor, Sir Henry Barnard, began in June the farce of besieging Delhi. He and those around him knew well what a farce it must be under such conditions; but people at a distance made sure that Delhi would fall an easy prey to his arms, after which, said Lord Canning, he might send some horse and foot southwards to deal with the rebels elsewhere. Three months had to elapse, as we know, before the farce transmuted itself into victorious earnest. Through all that time our little army held on to their perilous post, fighting manfully day after day against enemies continually strengthened by fresh troops. It was a tremendous task they had undertaken, and history records no achievement more glorious than their ultimate success. The detailed account given by Mr. Kaye of all they did and suffered, and of all that Sir John Lawrence and his able coadjutors did to help them, will be read with interest by all who take any pride in their country's greatness, or have any sympathy with brave

men battling against fearful odds. For more than two months the besiegers were themselves, in fact, besieged. What with the dry heats of an Indian June, the steamy heats of July, the almost daily attacks of the enemy on their front and flanks, their own counter-movements, the unceasing toil, the occasional surprises, it seems a marvel that troops so weak should have held their ground so long, even with the help of reinforcements, which served only to fill up the gaps left in their ranks by death, wounds, and sickness. But the hearts of our men never quailed. British, Sikhs, Pathans, and Ghoorkas, all fought like Paladins put upon their mettle, with a whole world for spectators, with India itself as the stake at issue. The story of the siege, as here told in pages glowing with sympathetic ardour, and judiciously pruned of mere technicalities, gives room for detailing feats of individual prowess and self-devotion, which serve to illustrate the general temper of all engaged. Happily for the cause, Sir John Lawrence and his worthy subalterns in the Punjab were the very men for such a need, men who did full honour to the school in which they had been trained under Lord Dalhousie. With hardly an exception, the first approaches of danger in the Punjab were met with a boldness and a wise promptitude such as always merits, and in this case commanded, success. Sepoy regiments were disarmed at the first opportunity, strong places were quietly filled with sure troops, overt mutiny was checked by swift precautions and terrible punishments, the Ameer of Kabul stood our friend, the wild border tribes took service under our colours, or hunted down our foes, the great Sikh chiefs made noble answer to our call for aid, and their troops were sent to guard the road from Umballa to the British camp. As time wore on, Lawrence, whose heart and soul were bound up with the maintenance of the siege of Delhi as the great central aim of the moment, on whose issue all else depended, found himself free to send more and more succours to his hard-pressed countrymen. Rather than Delhi should not be taken, he was even willing, if things came to the worst, to retire to this side the Indus, and leave Dost Mohammed in temporary possession of the Peshawar Valley. At last, towards the end of July, Nicholson himself, fresh from his rout of the Seealkote mutineers, was leading the last column of reinforcements from the Punjab to Delhi, while a strong siege-train was also moving towards the same goal. To the troops before Delhi, Nicholson's coming marked a new era in the siege. His presence alone was worth a whole brigade, for it gave some promise that no time would now be lost in striking the one blow for which all had so long been yearning. His first exploit after reaching Delhi gave new heart to Wilson's force. The rout of the rebels at Nujjufghur, on the 25th August, disabled them once for all from any further attempts to stay the march of our heavy guns into the camp before Delhi. For the last act of that eventful drama, to which Nicholson's own death was to lend a mournful lustre, we have still to await another volume from Mr. Kaye's pen.

While the Delhi and Punjab heroes were thus acquitting themselves, events of less, but only less, importance were going on between Calcutta and Lucknow. In all the intervening distance, our English garrisons consisted of one infantry regiment at Dinapore, a few artillerymen at Benares and Cawnpore, a few invalids at Allahabad. Sir H. Lawrence, at Lucknow, could ill spare a fraction of his small English garrison for the defence of Cawnpore. It was clear that no time should have been lost in disarming the Sepoys at Dinapore and Barrackpore, and in sending up men from Bengal to Benares, Allahabad, Cawnpore, and even Lucknow. But in spite of Mr. Kaye's pleadings, the fact remains that, with all Lord Canning's resources and efforts, only eighty soldiers had been pushed up to Cawnpore by the 1st June; that the offers of the English in Calcutta to form volunteer corps were not accepted before the 12th June, that the Sepoys at Barrackpore were only disarmed on the 14th, that those at Dinapore had time to mutiny with arms in their hands, and that Allahabad was all but lost to us for want of timely succours and due precautions. It is pleasanter to read of Neill's successful boldness at Benares, where he had stout allies in Lind and Gubbins, and at Allahabad, where he had almost everything to do himself. Neill and his Fusileers nobly paved the way for Havelock's subsequent march upon Cawnpore. But all their efforts to save Sir Hugh Wheeler were made too late. For a full and moving narrative of the sad tale which reached Havelock's ears on the eve of his departure from Allahabad, the

reader will do well to consult Mr. Kaye's pages. The story has been told more than once before, by none, perhaps, more touchingly than by Major Mowbray Thompson. But it will bear repeating at Mr. Kaye's hands, although here and there the effect is marred by a redundant and circuitous style. His account of what happened at Cawnpore just before the siege of that doomed intrenchment, reveals more clearly than any other the fatal consequences of half-precautions against a suspected foe. Days before the Sepoys there had risen upon our countrymen, panic reigned among the latter to an extent which inspired the former with a contempt not likely to be lessened by the wretched defensive works which Wheeler was throwing up in expectation of early relief from Allahabad. It was a sad misreckoning, for which the poor old general was not all to blame, since proper management in Bengal might have averted the disasters at Allahabad, and so hastened by several weeks the despatch of succours for Cawnpore. But he can hardly be acquitted of wilful rashness in trusting the smooth assurances of the Nana Doondoo Punt, against whose treachery he had been strongly warned both by Sir H. Lawrence and Mr. Martin Gubbins. His infatuation, however, was shared, if not engendered, by Mr. Hillersden, the collector, whom the Nana had seemed to honour with his particular friendship.

In this volume Havelock's advance towards Lucknow stops short with his arrival at Cawnpore. The author, we observe, holds out the promise of a third volume before very long. We hope he will not be very long about it, and that he may live to bring out the remainder of his work. It may, however, be allowed us to regret the scale on which it is written, and the absence of that *limæ labor* which becomes the historian as well as the poet. In trying to do justice to the wealth of his materials, and to the crowded incidents of an eventful time, Mr. Kaye appears to have forgotten that the half is sometimes better worth than the whole. If he had taken nearly as much pains to write simply and concisely, as he has taken to ascertain the truth, his work would have gained in excellence what it lost in bulk. He can express himself clearly and graphically enough at need, and his style here and there rises to the occasion. But it never seems quite natural, and its wordiness lacks the humour and the polish which half atone for the defects of Mr. Kinglake's tedious narrative. That it lacks the bitterness also, is no matter for regret. Mr. Kaye's failings always "lean to virtue's side," but we would beg him to remember that goodness carried through seven hundred pages, if it pleases women, certainly wearies men. Moreover, his ample materials seem to have furnished him with very few, if any, new facts worth the mentioning, nor even with much of new light for reading the old facts. At the same time, all praise may fairly be awarded him for the pains he has evidently taken to sift out the truth on every doubtful particular, to pronounce judgment on men and things according to the evidence before him, without respect of persons, dead or living. The very richness of his materials increases immensely the difficulties and dangers of such a task. From his own conclusions we may sometimes differ, but on all questions of hard fact his authority remains, on the whole, indisputable.

L. J. T.

The Cromwellian Settlement of Ireland. By J. P. PRENDERGAST. Second Edition, enlarged. London: Longmans.

Lectures on the History of Ireland. Second Series. By A. G. RICHEY. London: Longmans. Dublin: E. Ponsonby.

THE second series of Mr. Richey's lectures on Irish history bears out the pleasing promise of the first. It is something for the youth of Trinity College, Dublin, to be guided by a mind at once so well informed and so impartial in their readings of a history so full of stumbling-blocks and hidden fires. Nothing can be better than the calm spirit in which the lecturer unfolds his stores of special knowledge, whose value is generally enhanced by the clearness of his insight into the causes and the meaning of the events described. Mr. Richey does equal justice to the good intentions of Henry VIII. towards Ireland, and to the circumstances which drove one Irish chief after another into revolt against their English oppressors. From 1534 to the flight of Hugh O'Neill, which paved the way for the plantation of Ulster, the history of Ireland is written in blood and ashes. For two centuries the Irish outside the Pale had enjoyed a certain

wild independence of the feeble English rule at Dublin. Fighting frequently among themselves, their chiefs were left on the whole to their own devices. The children of the old Norman settlers retained few traces either of their English loyalty or their English habits. The people within the Pale were a wretched, rack-rented race, "cessed by their immediate lords for their private benefit; cessed by the viceroy for his private benefit; cessed for the maintenance of soldiers who did not protect them." They were "called out to the hostings; they paid black mail to the adjoining Irish chiefs, and were plundered notwithstanding." In 1534 Lord Thomas Fitzgerald rose against the royal authority on the plea of danger to his Church from the reforming policy of Henry VIII. Most likely he was afraid of yet worse encroachments on his power and freedom. After his final capture, and the utter defeat of his allies, the O'Neills, Lord Gray was free to develop his master's policy of reconquering Ireland and making a clean sweep of all her old laws, manners, and institutions. English statesmen of the time agreed in thinking that one sure way to keep Ireland quiet was to dress her up in England's clothes. "Peace, religion, loyalty, or civility could not exist in Ireland until the whole religious and social state of the country had been completely changed from the Celtic into the English mode." The English common law, the English land tenure, the English language and costume, were to be enforced by means of an English viceroy at Dublin, a sham and subservient parliament, and an army of law officers, chosen for anything but their independence. From the yet stronger remedy advocated by most of his counsellors, Henry has the credit of having steadily withheld his countenance. Instead of trying to plant all Ireland with English settlers, or even to drive the poor Irishry beyond the Shannon, he contented himself with confiscating the lands of the Geraldines, suppressing monasteries, proclaiming himself head of the Irish Church, and recommending "sober ways, politic drifts, and amiable persuasions founded in law and reason," rather than recourse to threats and downright violence.

One of these "amiable persuasions" consisted in offering the Irish chiefs, in eturn for their vows of fealty to the king, hereditary grants of the lands whose real ownership they shared with their respective tribes. It is easy to see how fatally such a process might be made to work in aid of preconcerted schemes for robbing the Irish of their land. Henry, or his deputy, deemed it a "politic drift" to proscribe the use among Irishmen of their own language, dress, and customs, just as the Poles of a later time were forbidden to send their children to Polish schools. The men of Galway were ordered to shave the upper lip, saffron shirts were strictly forbidden, Irish minstrels were liable to be put in the stocks and forfeit all their goods, and any one convicted of listening twice to them was doomed to lose both his ears. During the next three reigns the plan of Anglicising Ireland went briskly forward. When this or that chief was goaded into rebellion, the more popular process of planting Ireland with English settlers was sure to be repeated. The King's and Queen's counties were formed by Mary out of the domains wrested under her brother from the O'Moores and the O'Connors. Under Elizabeth the forfeit estates of the Earl of Desmond in Munster were given over to companies of planters from the western and south-western counties of England. "Each new plantation," says Mr. Prendergast, "produced fresh rebellions, from the pride and insolence of the new planters, the cupidity of standers-by, and the fears and resistance of the neighbouring Irish." It mattered little whether the new sovereign was Protestant or Catholic; Ireland suffered all the same from a feeling which, even in its mildest phases, aimed at blotting out the last remnants of Irish freedom and Irish usage in the name of English order and civilization. "Catholic sovereigns," says Mr. Richey, "thought it was necessary to enforce order in Ireland by the strong hand, as Protestant sovereigns had done before them; Catholic deputies thought themselves justified in burning villages, raiding upon native tribes, and shooting down rebels, as much as Protestant deputies had done." It was no question of religion in those days. The old Irish chiefs, the descendants of Anglo-Norman and later English settlers, all were alike included in the term "Irish enemy" by the representatives of English rule in Dublin. Bribery, threats, intrigues, open force, were employed in turn against men whose real fault was the possession of rich lands held under a tenure obnoxious to feudal Englishmen—of lands which the English coveted as eagerly as their countrymen have

since coveted those of the Red Indian and the Maori. To make a solitude and call it peace, to treat the Irishry as mere savages who had no rights or customs worth considering, to rob the last Irishman of his ancestral share in the tribal lands in order that landlords of the English pattern might rule despotically over a race of virtual serfs or powerless tenants at will, such was, in fact, the civilizing policy which deputy after deputy was led by his own instincts, the advice of his counsellors, or the popular cry at home, to enforce. If the people of Ireland could not be extirpated, the next best thing, it seemed, was to crush them down by every possible means into dull obedience to a foreign yoke upheld by foreign masters of the soil. With every allowance for possible provocations, for the possible misdeeds of men like Shane O'Neill (in whose defence against Mr. Froude's headlong invective Mr. Richey, as a writer, has even surpassed himself), for the Englishman's innate want of sympathy with other races, it is only too clear that few pages of our history should be read by us with deeper shame than those which record the progress of Ireland's subjection to English rule.

We cannot follow Mr. Richey through the blood-stained narrative of Queen Elizabeth's reign, with its wars, massacres, and spoliations, leading to that great feat of wholesale robbery, the planting of Ulster by James I. The next instalment of these well-written and instructive lectures will appear, we trust, after no long interval.

Meanwhile we are glad to see that Mr. Prendergast's racy volume on the Cromwellian Settlement has reached a second edition. Among the new matter cited in these pages are the petitions sent up to Lord Ormond by dispossessed landowners, recounting their former services and sufferings, and imploring leave, after seven years of exile in Connaught or beyond sea, to behold once more the smoke of their own chimneys, and to sit again by their own hearths. The Carte Papers in the Bodleian have also enabled him to give full particulars of the way in which the English Commissioners cleared out the towns, such as Kilkenny, Waterford, and Galway, which had offered most resistance to English arms, or might offer most advantages to English settlers. He has also succeeded in procuring a copy—a facsimile of which adorns the present volume—of one of those debentures which Cromwell's soldiers held in acknowledgment of arrears payable out of the conquered lands. Mr. Prendergast writes with the passion of an Irishman smarting under his country's wrongs; but one cannot help feeling that he does well to be angry who has so much evidence to bear him up. A sentence of confiscation against a whole people condemns itself, and the Cromwellian Settlement was such a sentence. The Parliament of 1652 confiscated the whole of Ireland; but, as an act of politic mercy, allowed the Irish throughout the four provinces to transplant themselves to Connaught, at that time "the most wasted province in the kingdom." With much fasting and praying, the Commissioners for Ireland began in the autumn of the following year to execute the terrible decree. In the midst of winter the nobles, including many of English origin, the gentry, the commons, with their wives and little children, their young maidens and old men, their cattle and their household goods, were called upon to make their dreary journey across the Shannon. It was more than human nature could well do, and leave was afterwards given for the women, children, sick, and a few servants to stay behind until the next spring. To some few a still further delay was allowed. Again and yet again the term was extended. Among the doomed was the grandson of the poet Spencer. Ordered to transplant as an "Irish Papist," he appealed to Cromwell, and the Protector tried in vain to save for him the lands his grandfather had gained in forfeiture from the Fitzgeralds. In his case Nemesis marched swift and sure. Still the work of transplanting lingered on. "The Irish"—according to a letter of July, 1665—"chuse death rather than remove from their wonted habitations." And ere long death or transportation was the doom inflicted on those who tarried on. Even when the exiles reached Connaught their sufferings were not over. The land assigned to them was largely appropriated by the agents of the Government, or after settling down they had again to make way for new claimants, while some of them were followed by the enmity of the old occupiers who had had to make way for the exiles themselves.

On this side the Shannon there were to be two divisions. The line of the

Barrow and the Boyne was reserved for pure English, while the country between the Barrow and the Shannon was made over to settlers of mixed race, who were to speak English, follow English customs, drop their Irish surnames, listen to Protestant preachers, and bring up their children in Protestant schools. Of course the cruel experiment did not wholly succeed. The new English settlers were often glad to retain as tenants the dispossessed Irish. After the Restoration many of the exiles returned to their former homes, and a good many Irish were from the first excepted from the barbarous decree. But the amount of misery and disaster involved even in its partial execution can hardly be overrated. And yet we wonder why Irishmen have so little love to spare for England! L. J. T.

The History and Conquest of the Saracens. By E. FREEMAN, M.A. Cheap Edition. London: J. Palmer & Co.

THIS little volume is a cheap reprint of the Lectures which the learned author delivered many years ago before the Philosophical Institution at Edinburgh. They are the very model of what such lectures should be—clear, pithy, suggestive, entertaining, the racy quintessence of a well-stored and thoughtful mind. Full of learning, yet as free from pedantry as from dulness, they cover a wide extent of ground, and yet fill no more than 248 small pages of middling-sized print. That the historian of the Norman Conquest could write pure and nervous English, every one knows; but here is even stronger evidence of the fact, coupled with the compressed fruits of past researches in wider fields. Mr. Freeman's power of seizing and expressing the main traits of any historical epoch is equalled by the manly shrewdness of his judgments on particular men—Mahomet, for example, or the great Indian, Akbar—and the wholesome moral tone that pervades his lectures. For a sample of his clear insight, the reader would do well to turn to his remarks on the inherent intolerance of true Mohammedans. L. J. T.

Religious Life in Germany during the Wars of Independence. By WILLIAM BAUR. London: Strahan & Co.

THIS is a series of most attractive and suggestive sketches. They are something more than biographies; but the writer has shown tact in not attempting to make them more than biographies in form. His main object seems to be a protest against the idea that true national life can maintain itself apart from deep personal convictions as to religious truth. Declension into scepticism and dilettante indifference sapped the foundations of national life, and directly prepared for the humiliation Germany underwent at the hands of Napoleon the Great. Germany once more rose strong and powerful when the root of personal life was quickened under the sense of degradation; and when personal interests really began to be regarded as subordinate to the united interest of the *people*. An outpouring of religious enthusiasm watered the root of patriotism, and caused it to shoot up fresh and beautiful from the black stump that only a short while before seemed dead. Personal greatness only becomes truly enduring through its sanctions in common and united aspirations. Such seems Baur's view. Each of the various characters he presents to us regarded himself as called by God to do a work for *the German people*; and a work to be done in the thoroughest spirit of the Reformation—a personal work, which would be utterly valueless unless the conscience was quickened to a perception of Divine purpose. Blücher felt the call, and recognised it in his own proper way; Fichte in his; and Arndt, again, in his. Hence more value was laid on the spirit that approved itself by heroic deeds, than on dogmatic attachments: that was felt to be the best in religion which gave strength and tenseness to the personal qualities available in patriotic action. Schleiermacher, with his inwardness, was a potent force in quickening conscience in a time when all individuality was either crushed in the hard shells of dogma, or evaporated in the misty heats of abstract thinking; and he therefore has his place here. Julia Krudener witnesses to the uprising of religious life against the hard, polished wall of fashion and self-indulgence; and she therefore has her place here. Baur seems to feel deeply that when God raises men up for a great national work, he must weight them to some extent with faults, to prevent them, on the one hand, from falling into the pride that is the preying worm on

patriotism, and, on the other, from becoming the objects of that sentimental hero-worship which more than aught else causes the energies to waste themselves in a ceaseless pretty fountain-playing. In relation to the nation, all gifts are of equal account, if but religiously consecrated to it. How touching it is to read how the rough Blücher experienced marked accessions of gentleness and consideration for his men as things seemed to wax most desperate! No words could well be more characteristic, or more religious, than those which occur in this paragraph:—

"On the 18th June, 1815, he was hastening to the assistance of Wellington. Delay would have been most dangerous, but progress was difficult, owing to the state of the roads, which were heavy with mire. In the greatest anxiety to keep his word, Blücher was constantly encouraging his troops with words and gestures. 'Forward, *children*, forward!' 'It can't be done; it is impossible,' was the answer. With energy and emotion he persisted: 'Children, we *must* get on; you may well say it can't be done, but it *must* be done. I have promised my brother Wellington; *promised*, do you hear? You wouldn't have me break my word?' And it was done. But after such feats as this, he was so humble, that he once said to some one who was lauding his deed, 'What was it, after all, that you are extolling? It was *my* boldness, Gneisonau's discretion, and *the great mercy of God*."

God was felt to be in the war; that was the main fact for Germans, and Blücher only *reflected* back a great movement of faith.

What is pretty certain to sound to English ears like a somewhat high-flown tone of German sentiment in the book, will not be properly understood or appreciated till this element is generously taken into account. We cordially recommend the book; it is graphic, sympathetic, and full of pictures, and may be confidently recommended to all, but especially to the younger generation.

H. A. P.

Ignatius Loyola, and the Early Jesuits. By STEWART ROSE. London: Longmans.

AFTER many ups and downs in the world of politics, the Society of Jesus once more seems to hold the reins of priestly dominion, under a Pope who has made with it common cause against liberal ideas, whether from without or within the Roman pale. The Pope's Prætorian Guards are once again defending the citadel whose outer defences they were long suspected of betraying. Less formidable, perhaps, than ever, they seem for the moment to have gained a new lease of their former power, by forswearing the very weapons which once made them as powerful abroad as they were feared at home. The leaders of the great Catholic revival which gave Rome new strength against the Protestant Reformation, have discarded their old policy of intellectual progress for one of spiritual reaction and mental darkness, more akin to the spirit of their first founder than to the shrewder genius of his immediate successors. At such a moment a new life of Ignatius Loyola, written from a thoroughly Romish stand-point, has a certain interest apart from its intrinsic merits. The latter, however, are not small, after all deductions for hero-worship and religious prejudices. We are not sure, indeed, that the prejudices will not add a kind of philosophic charm to the writer's narrative in the eyes of heretical readers who would combine a more intimate knowledge of Loyola himself with some insight into the mind of a modern English Catholic. Mr. Rose writes like an educated English gentleman, not a mere fanatic of the Ultramontane type. He tells his story in simple, yet well-chosen, words. His style is clear, easy, and picturesque; his faith in manifest fables not very obtrusive; and the whole work gives evidence of due pains in digesting materials, old and new. It seems to be really what he hopes it is, "less deficient than any yet published" on the same theme. If he had only added references here and there, or indicated the sources of his new information, there would have been little left to desire.

L. J. T.

Saint Anselm. By R. W. CHURCH, Rector of Whately. London: Macmillan & Co.

THIS is a very graphic picture in short compass of a remarkable character. Mr. Church has not erred on the side of being too learned, and has taken care to arrange all his topics as much as may be pictorially. Yet sometimes his style is a little long drawn out, in spite of his evident desire to avoid heaviness.

But this is amply compensated by large readiness of sympathy. Whether Anselm is monk at Aosta, nestling under the cold shadow of the Alps, or at the Norman abbey of *Le Bec*, seeking knowledge with that supreme thirst which possesses rare spirits of our race; or is struggling as prior against such opposition as that of Osbern: or is charged with the grave responsibilities of the See of Canterbury—Mr. Church's sympathies flow out freely, bringing light around his theme. Now and then he gives us more than usually piquant pictures, and for some of these we wish we could make room; whilst he occasionally falls into reflections which are full of value. That anecdote of Anselm's prudent protest against that discipline of force in the teaching of the young which the abbot upheld, shows how far Anselm was ahead of his age in pedagogy as in some other things.

"'You try by blows and stripes alone to fashion these young creatures to good,' says Anselm: 'did you ever see a craftsman fashion a fair image out of a plate of gold or silver by blows alone? Does he not with his tools, now gently press and strike it, now with wise art still more gently raise and shape it? So, if you would mould your boys to good, you must, along with the stripes which are to bow them down, lift them up and assist them by fatherly kindness and gentleness.' . . . . 'But,' the abbot insisted, 'what we try to do is to force them into seriousness and sturdiness of character; what are we to do?' 'You do well,' said Anselm; 'but if you give an infant solid food, you will choke it. For every soul its proportionate food. The strong soul delights in strong meat, in patience and tribulations, not to wish for what is another's, to offer the other cheek, to pray for enemies, to love those that hate. The weak and tender in God's service need milk; gentleness from others, kindness, mercy, cheerful encouragement, charitable forbearance. If you will thus suit yourselves, both to your weak and your strong ones, by God's grace you shall, as far as lies in you, win them all for God.' 'Alas!' sighed the abbot, 'and we have been all wrong. We have wandered from the way of truth, and the light of discretion hath not shone on us.' And falling at Anselm's feet he confessed his sin, asked pardon for the past, and promised amendment for what was to come."

We wish much we could also extract the account of Anselm's wise and touching behaviour towards Osbern, which is effectively given here. H. A. P.

Memoir of the Right Rev. John Strachan, D.D., LL.D., First Bishop of Toronto. By A. N. Bethune, D.D., D.C.L., his successor in the See. London: Rivingtons.

Bishop Strachan was a man of strong character, full of energy and resource, yet with shrewd sense and tact and caution sufficient to balance these qualities. He was a Scotchman, and had for backbone of mental endowment the genuine reserve and self-sufficience of the Scotch. He was never divided in his mind on anything, so far as we can see; but at the same time he was never forward to rush into any position likely to turn out the least dangerous, although, once being in, he held to his position with almost stolid tenacity. The son of respectable but rather poor parents in Aberdeenshire, he was educated, or rather for most part educated himself, with an eye to the ministry of the Scotch Church, but, seeing that through lack of connection or interest, he was not likely to get preferment, he gave up the idea, after attending the divinity hall for some time, and became a schoolmaster. The burden of his mother's maintenance devolving wholly upon him, he found that he must look out for something more lucrative than parish teaching, and getting a rather tempting offer of a mastership of a new academy which was to be founded in Upper Canada, he went out there. To his dismay, he found that, while he had been enduring the tedious imprisonment of the passage on a slow craft, things had taken an adverse turn; the prospects of the new academy having darkened. But he was in Canada, and must make the best of it. He did make the best of it. He soon got friends, who learned to respect and trust him for his honesty and tact and knowledge, and, joining the Church of England, he rose from one position to another till finally he became first Bishop of Toronto. He did more perhaps than any other man to extend and consolidate the Episcopal Church in Canada. He had many of the qualities of an administrator, and had great influence over the minds of younger men. He took a prominent place in founding King's College, Toronto, and has left his impression widely on the educational institutions of Canada, no less than on its political history; for it is inevitable that a bishop in a new country should be active in politics.

His name is associated with most of the public movements in Canada during the last fifty years. He was strong on the question of the Clergy Reserves, and, strange to say, fought with more than his usual energy against the ministers of the Church of Scotland coming in to share as being included under the term "Protestant clergy"—the term of the Act. Dr. Strachan was one of those who held this could only apply to one institution, not to two or to many—a view which was finally overturned. Dr. Strachan had many friends and correspondents in Scotland, among others Thomas Chalmers; and during his visits to this country, which were undertaken solely for the sake of Canada, or its Church, he came into contact with many distinguished men. Thus he speaks of two men famous in their day:—

"I met Lockhart, the editor of the *Quarterly*, at William Horton's. We had much conversation, and on a variety of subjects; particularly emigration and the rapidity of the increase of population. I do not find so much acuteness or originality of remark as I expected. Mr. Malthus is *rather an ugly man*, and speaks very thick and through his nose. I found no difficulty in taking a reasonable share in the conversation."

The memoir is written in a simple, straightforward, dignified manner, being wanting just a little in the colouring that might now and then have been given to it. But it is readable, and there is much to interest and profit in the busy, fruitful life of a man like Dr. Strachan. We are astonished to notice so many misprints. Sir Peregrime Maitland is not the worst, nor Mr. Toche for Mr. Tooke either. H. A. P.

III.—PHILOSOPHICAL AND SCIENTIFIC.

The Theory of Practice: an Ethical Enquiry, in Two Books. By SHADWORTH H. HODGSON. Two Vols. 8vo. London: Longmans.

SOME time ago, when reviewing Mr. Hodgson's former work, we took occasion to express the hope that the author would continue his philosophical labours. The goodly volumes before us show that Mr. Hodgson had no intention to stay his hand. The judgment we had formed of "Space and Time," led us to open these volumes with high expectation, and we have not been disappointed, even though often unable to agree with the theory unfolded. Mr. Hodgson is not only gifted with metaphysical ability and attainment, which he uses with independence, but he has high moral power, fitting him for the task of developing a system of ethics.

Before entering on criticism, we notice the brief touching dedication of these volumes—*Mortuis Meis*—telling of the shadows which have passed over the author. We cannot withhold a word of sympathy with the sorrows discovered, but not disclosed. The realities of life ever embrace a share of its sorrows. We congratulate the author on a life of resolute work under the shadows.

In this present treatise, Mr. Hodgson passes from the intellectual to the ethical side of mental philosophy. The book is modestly designated "an Ethical Enquiry," at the same time it is a very definite "theory of practice," and very resolutely maintained. In structure, the work is in two books, the one analytic, the other systematic. The former is described as an "analysis of feeling, action, and character," the latter, as "the logic of practice." The distinction between analytic and systematic is not sufficiently rigid, for analysis must be systematic; as the author says, it must be "analysis and classification." The actual distinction of the two books is, that the one is concerned with a theory of morals, and the other with the practical application of the theory.

In our notice of Mr. Hodgson's former work, "Space and Time," we indicated some material points of objection, which now apply in a certain measure to this later work. Psychology is used too much as if it had to do exclusively with physiology; and metaphysics, as if it were only psychology. Our main objection, however, was taken to the doctrine that "consciousness is the exact equivalent of the term 'existence,'" and existence the equivalent of consciousness. As the influence of this doctrine is here everywhere apparent, our dissent must be considerable, even while expressing a very high admiration of

the work as a contribution to ethical philosophy. In the former work, an undue prominence seemed to be given to Kant; here that prominence has not only disappeared, but the influence of Kant is, we regret to find, almost gone. Instead of the high intellectualism of Kant, we have not only acknowledgment of obligation to Comte, which might well be, but a marked bias in favour of the empirical school, though not accepting its ethical theory. While studying the book, we have been reminded of Cousin's remark of admiration as to the noble inconsistency of Kant in rectifying his theory when treating of morals, and we have felt the wish that more of the Kantian practical reason had found a place in Mr. Hodgson's later efforts.

To the first book—the analytic—we must direct chief attention, as the basis of the whole. In this book, the first chapter is introductory, explaining the method; the second, in five parts, is concerned with the analysis and classification of feelings; the third, with the analysis of action, or the movement of feeling; and the last with the combination of feelings and formation of character.

The introductory chapter deals with the province of ethic, and the subjective or introspective method. Mr. Hodgson puts very well the two aspects of moral philosophy, the one concerned with "actions and habits," the other "conversant with judgments about actions and habits." In connection with this distinction, certain premature statements of opinion are open to question, which we pass meanwhile. The vindication of the subjective method is admirable, and to this method Mr. Hodgson keeps—though not always successfully as we think—very faithfully, except when he comes to deal with physiology, when there is some convenient guessing, a circumstance not uncommon in the attempts to interpret physiological action.

Having indicated the structure of the introductory chapter, the first thing we remark, looking at the work as a whole, is, the predominance of the term FEELING. Our readers will see this by a glance at the contents given above. The larger part is the analysis and classifications of *feelings;* then, action is the movement of feeling; and lastly, we have the combination of feelings and formation of character. What Mr. Hodgson describes as "an analysis of the whole material furniture of consciousness," is brought out under headings which not only make feeling the most prominent feature in the furniture, but the only feature in it. This is the characteristic of the book; this Mr. Hodgson regards as the crowning excellence of a true theory of ethics. Our conclusion is exactly the reverse. This is the weakness of the book. Most admirable results are produced at many turns of the analysis; general conclusions are reached towards the close, which are in our view true and powerfully stated; but their vindication on a theory which makes emotion supreme, seems to us hopeless. Of course, every one familiar with the subject, will at once see that to carry through an analysis, and discover nothing but feeling in the material of consciousness, is simply impossible. And, accordingly, while emotion is everywhere in the ascendant, like the uniform of an army, perceptions and judgments, and reasonings, like different arms of the service, are mixed in confusion most perplexing. The critic who believes that intellect and emotion are essentially distinct, has a serious task before him. Navigation in the Baltic with the buoys up, may give an illustration of the perplexity. It is all straight and safe, if you are satisfied there is nothing but ocean, but very different if you are convinced that there are rocks as well. In attempting to set forth the grounds of our judgment, our readers may gather some acquaintance with the book, which is really one of a very high order. Let it be kept in mind that Mr. Hodgson's theory is that "the whole world of phenomena, in the widest sense of the term," exists only in consciousness, and that each phenomenon may be contemplated in the double light of a mode of consciousness, and of a thing existing. This idealistic theory we deny at the outset, but we must proceed upon the author's basis. The next thing to be done towards understanding the theory is, to take feeling or emotion as the leading characteristic of the material of consciousness. In the whole mass there is nothing but different kinds of feeling. To distinguish each mode of consciousness, we must observe with what the particular feeling is concerned. This is called the "framework" of the feeling. This word "framework," plays a part so conspicuous, that it is second only to "feeling." And, like a rolling snow-ball, it appropri-

ates so easily a large amount of material which it rolls over, that as we get further and further from the starting-point, we are ready to own that it would be needful to go back over the whole ground, and translate this word in each case of its occurrence, to make sure of the general result. Sometimes it is used as identical with "groundwork," sometimes with "representation," sometimes with "object," and sometimes it is "cognitive framework." This last expression starts a course of reflection, which throws us back on the main theory, that all forms of consciousness may be classified under feeling. If feeling needs a "framework," how can it get it? Will not the "framework" still be feeling, and thus will not feeling be without anything you can call a framework. But a "*cognitive* framework!" Ah, yes! but that is something different from feeling. Allow it to be so, and a "framework" is secured, but the method of classification adopted by Mr. Hodgson is thereby made out faulty in part, and some of the doctrines maintained must be abandoned.

Again, let us glance at the manner in which our author designates the mass of facts with which he has to deal. This is best done by turning to the beginning of the work, where the enumeration is given before the requirements of the theory are strongly felt. What is proposed in the first sentence is to examine "the *feelings* and actions of man, his *judgments* on them, and the moral and legal *conceptions* which he deduces from or builds upon them." These three—feelings, judgments, and conceptions—are naturally mentioned in order, and yet no such position is assigned to the two last in the classification of results in the analytic. After having distinguished between the formal and the material in consciousness, he proposes to attempt "the analysis and classification of the different modes of feeling, whether sensations, emotions, desires, pleasures, pains, efforts, volitions, or actions." Without raising the question as to the presence of volitions and actions here, it is to be observed that from the enumeration the judgments and conceptions first referred to are practically excluded. And yet it is admitted a few pages on that ethic is not only "conversant with actions and habits," and the springs of these, but also "with judgments about actions," which in that case ought to have a place, and, as we think, a very conspicuous place, in the analysis of the matter of consciousness undertaken as a requisite for ethical science.

From these introductory statements we must be content to pass to the view given of the moral faculty. In doing so we would remark the ability of the criticism directed against the so-called psychological theory of the origin of the emotions, as maintained by Professor Bain and others. With complete success, as we think, Mr. Hodgson maintains that the sensations cannot of themselves be the source of emotions. Passing a large portion of interesting investigation, we come to the more testing point of an ethical theory, when we touch the question as to the existence of a moral faculty. As follows from the structure of the analytic, Mr. Hodgson's view of the faculty is that it is emotional, not intellectual, in its nature. At the same time the theory is far removed from the view of Professor Bain, who makes conscience a threefold fear. With Mr. Hodgson it is supreme love, in union with supreme justice, in a way now to be explained. After a classification of simpler emotions, our author treats of "emotions *arising from comparison*," and then of what are called "*emotions of reflection*," chief amongst these last is justice. The consideration of this *emotion* is introduced with these words:—"Hitherto we have not met with the sense of justice, or with the sense of right and wrong, among the emotions." (i. 221.) Then he criticizes Mr. J. S. Mill's view of justice, and says, "I must confess that neither this explanation, nor one founded on a supposed 'innate idea,' or special moral sense 'given' for the purpose, appears to me satisfactory. The latter is not a real explanation, the former is not a sufficiently searching one." (i. 224.) What, then, is Mr. Hodgson's theory? The emotion of justice or injustice accompanies the recognition of equality or inequality in a comparison; justice has its own pleasure, injustice its own pain; "this pleasure and pain is the *constraining force* in the *perception* of justice, the *motive* which makes men love it, and the *charm* which makes it irresistible when appealed to, and beyond this I believe it is impossible to go;" "justice is ultimate Law, because it consists in those equations which are ultimate Form." "Justice is the perception of congruities and incongruities in objects; the *moral sense* is the perception of the moral character of those objects as wholes, the perception of justice in the con-

crete." (249.) If it be asked in what does its validity consist? the answer is this:—"Validity is derived solely from the formal element in consciousness, and the perception of right or moral goodness in any object, the emotional aspect of which framework is the moral sense, is a judgment passed upon the total object in virtue of the congruity which it contains or includes. The moral sense thus takes into account the two elements formal and material; its objects consist of both, and in this respect it differs from the emotion of justice, which is indifferent to the material element, the emotion, in which the congruity is displayed. This gives the difference of character between justice and the moral sense, although the validity of the latter is derived solely from, or is a repetition of, the former." The moral sense is "not merely a judgment of right and wrong, but a qualitative emotion as well. It is a love of right." (251.)

In the attempt at condensation a critic has always difficulty in making certain of rigid justice to an author. But we believe the above representation is nearly such as the author would present. At first there may be some perplexity in embracing its meaning; but if regard be given to the general cast of the theory, it may be seen clearly enough. Briefly and popularly it is this—the moral faculty is a sense, the basis of its validity is justice, and its functions are to pronounce approval of certain actions on this basis, and to delight in them. Thus stated, the theory contains much to commend. But as a philosophical theory it wants consistency and cohesion. Each feature apart might be accepted as having some equivalent in mind; but when all are united to form a single and sovereign power, it is doubtful if such a theory can endure criticism.

As to its nature, it is a moral sense, an emotion, and yet in describing its operations, perceptions, judgments, and feelings are all heaped together. How can we describe that as an emotion which exercises power of perception, and forms judgments? This is the result of an analytic which embraces all forms of consciousness under feeling. Again, observe the contrast between justice and the moral sense. The one takes account of the form, the other of both the form and the matter. A man receives goods to the amount of £5, and on demand he pays the sum due. Justice takes account only of the form, that there is congruity or equality in the comparison. Moral sense takes account of the congruity and of the specific act of payment which extinguishes the debt. If there be a distinction here, consequent upon adding to the harmony the concrete manifestation of it, how is this expressed? The moral sense "differs from the *emotion* of justice, which is indifferent to the material element, the *emotion*." The *emotion* of justice is indifferent to the emotion. To what emotion? It is described as that "in which the congruity is displayed," and that is the *action*. But Mr. Hodgson is an idealist, and in his love of unity he maintains that things have no existence save in consciousness; and so it must be affirmed philosophically that moral sense approves of the emotion, when in ordinary language it is said to approve of a man's conduct who pays his debt. This is the penalty of idealism.

Then to come a little closer. Is justice an emotion? My emotions may be just, but this quality may also belong to my actions. A man who is in debt may have what emotions he pleases, but the payment of his debt is essential to justice in his case. Justice, then, is a quality both of emotions and of actions; and this would be quite clear, but for the confusion introduced by the theory which makes all things forms of consciousness. Mr. Hodgson allows this distinction at times, as when he says: "Justice or right is inherent in certain actions" (i. 229). But again, "Justice is the perception of congruities and incongruities in objects." We see congruities of form and of colour in the flowers, the perception of which awakens in us the sense of the beautiful. The sense of the beautiful, then, depends upon the perception of congruities in objects, just as the sense of justice does. And if this be the case, the authority of the moral faculty is not drawn, as Mr. Hodgson maintains, "from the formal element in consciousness," which is concerned with congruity alone. If, then, the authority of the moral faculty is not accounted for by simple recognition of congruity, may we find its explanation in the character or strength of the emotion? To this Mr. Hodgson seems to turn. He says: "All command is emotional, that is, belongs to the emotional element, not to its framework" (i. 256). We are at a loss to understand this; and no evidence, so far as we

see, has been given in support of it. Subsequent statements seem only to complicate matters. "The source of all morally valid command is the emotion *and* its framework of justice; the command consists in the combination of this emotion with others, which can only be when their frameworks are just. All such concrete cases of commanded emotions are parts of the moral sense, which, in virtue of the command or combination, is not only a sense but a law" (256). Emotion sometimes urges, sometimes restrains, but that emotion has authoritative right of command, we are unable to see. A command may be stated as a proposition. But how can an emotion take shape in an authoritative proposition? This resembles Mackintosh's position, that the emotions are nearest the will for its control; but, when right of command is lodged in the emotions, the whole position is endangered by reference to envy and malice, which on this footing would have the same right of command as justice and love. But, as Mr. Hodgson says, there is a distinction as to a "morally valid command;" and, in order to make this distinction, you introduce comparison, and allow that emotion is not in itself competent to decide, for in these circumstances it is hopeless to speak of justice as simply a companion emotion—"the second half of the moral sense."

We extremely regret that our limits prevent more extended notice. We greatly desire that it had been possible to extend our examination, specially to embrace such points as these—emotions in their relation to the will, and the relation of the *summum bonum* and the criterion. Space forbids. We consider this an exceedingly able treatise, involving an important contribution on the emotional side of ethics, though weakened by the neglect of the real place of the intellect in morals. Knowledge, perception, comparison, and judgment Mr. Hodgson continually allows, and yet no proper place is assigned to them. The analytic goes on as if passing references to them were sufficient. We fully appreciate the desire to be done with the construction of a mere dialectic; but this is avoided by the opposite extreme, turning all the contents of consciousness into emotion. We hold that the basis of all ethic is in knowledge—that all the comparisons we institute must rest upon intelligible principles which carry the evidence of their own validity—that emotions as well as actions are to be judged by these, and that such emotions as are themselves approved take place as efficient powers of our moral nature. In attempting to present the grounds on which we deny the sufficiency of a theory which makes emotion supreme, we have been prevented from indicating the very large extent to which we can express the highest admiration of courses of thought which Mr. Hodgson pursues. But we conclude, with the assurance to all who delight in mental philosophy, that this work is worthy of study, and will afford the reader much gratification, to whatever school of philosophy he may belong.

H. C.

The Laws of Discursive Thought: being a Text Book of Formal Logic. By JAMES M'COSH, LL.D., President of New Jersey College, Princeton, U.S. London: Macmillan & Co.

As a system of Logic, this is at the opposite extreme from that noticed lately as having been published by Professor Bain, both as to the sphere of the science, and as to the psychology on which it is founded. As its title proclaims, it is a text book of formal logic, and does not roam over all the sciences, professing to give a logic of each. Even if there be logic in all the sciences, as there must be, the science of logic itself must be capable of separate development. Formal logic is, we think, the only logic properly so called. As to the designation of the nature of thought with which logic is conversant, we question the wisdom of Dr. M'Cosh's use of the term *discursive*. It is intended to distinguish between perceptions on the one side, and intuitions on the other. But neither perceptions nor the higher intuitions are commonly described as thought. Psychological terms are sufficiently distinguished to guard against risk of misunderstanding among students of mental philosophy. The term "thought" is all but universally applied to the exercise of the logical faculty, while "discursive" has the unhappiness of signifying desultory, as well as consecutive.

The system of logic here developed is in its main outlines the Aristotelian, accepting in large measure the Hamiltonian analytic, but rejecting the mixture

of the Kantian doctrine as to mind imposing its own forms on existence. This being enough to indicate its place, the chief characteristic of the book is the fulness of treatment given to the doctrine of the "notion." This occupies considerably more than a third of the whole; judgment, reasoning, and the fallacies dividing the remaining space pretty equally. The part on the "notion" is, in many respects, very able, and the distinctions are clearly put. There seems an awkward slip just at the outset, when it is said that "the object or objects apprehended constitute the notion," whereas according to the whole theory of Dr. M'Cosh, the notion and the object are quite distinct. The sentence expresses the opposite, and is otherwise unfortunate.

The theory of abstraction, distinguishing it from generalization, is very well given, and is a prominent merit in the work. Here we think the criticism of Hamilton valid. There is, however, some disadvantage in the appropriation of the term "concept" in a sense more restricted than is common in logical treatises.

There are occasional passages quite away from the rigid formality of the science, but these are rather an agreeable relief, though not essential to the science. Occasionally the style takes a little of the polemic form. As a text-book this treatise is admirably planned, being divided into short paragraphs, each one numbered in very distinct character, while those paragraphs which contain quotations or critical matter are set up in small type, enabling the student to distinguish them at a glance. H. C.

Matter for Materialists; a Series of Letters in vindication and extension of the principles regarding the Nature of Existence of the Right Rev. Dr. Berkeley, Lord Bishop of Cloyne. By THOMAS DOUBLEDAY. London: Longmans.

THIS somewhat lengthy title discovers the general purpose of the present work, which the leading title, contained in the three first words, might have left obscure. The work is intended to prove that there is no such thing as matter, and, in keeping with the plan, the author names his book "Matter for Materialists." To pun in the title of a philosophical treatise is not very philosophical. Then, after the manner of Berkeley, "Materialists" is the name given to those who hold the dualistic theory, maintaining the existence of Mind as strongly as the existence of Matter. This neglect of the commonly-accepted sense of terms should not be found in the present day.

The work is a vindication of Berkeley's philosophy against the dualistic theory, or the doctrine of natural realism as to an external world. The burden of the whole is this: "Berkeley is right;" he laid the foundation of a true philosophy, but the superstructure is still to be reared. As a philosophical treatise the volume gives evidence of independent inquiry, and very considerable metaphysical acumen, without much evidence of extended research. Towards the close of a sketch of philosophy, professedly drawn from the "Biographical History of Philosophy," by G. H. Lewes, the history of philosophy since the days of Berkeley is summed up in one sentence—"Since his epoch we have had the disquisitions, and doubts, and quibbles, and inconsistencies of Kant, of Hume, of Reid, of Fichte, of Hegel, of Hartley, of Priestley, and of Comte." This disposes of the whole of the later philosophical inquiry.

There seems some probability, after sensationalism has had a course of high popularity, that idealism may now have a turn. When Professor Huxley and Alfred Russell Wallace are writing now in its support as representatives of science; and amongst students of mental philosophy, there are rising symptoms of discontent with materialistic tendencies which have been current for a time, we may, even in the face of physiological professions, have a reaction in favour of idealism. We are not sure that the present volume is in any way representative of this, but at least it does not come as a solitary straw on the surface of the stream. The love of unity is natural to the mind, and yet duality may be the more accurate result of research as to known existence. In the interests of idealism, Malebranche, Leibnitz, and Berkeley may be supposed to have done a pretty considerable share of what is possible. But it is well that we do not stand still, and that new thinkers appear to explore the old territory. Few interested can have forgotten in what admirable style Professor Ferrier became champion of the cause by his publication of the "Institutes of Meta-

physic." The present author is much less original in manner and thought, appearing as an upholder of Berkeley, and in some slight measure proposing to rectify his master's work.

The Preface is not altogether promising, on account of the questionable use of terms descriptive of mental operations. The method to be followed is thus stated:—"It is not my purpose, nor is it in my power, to give direct proof of the truth of the Berkeleyan theory. It seems to me that its truth cannot be demonstrated directly. I shall, however, show, I think, beyond all doubt or denial, that the opposite or material theory necessarily involves so many plain contradictions and manifest absurdities, that we are placed in this dilemma—we must perforce try to erect some other theory not material, or we must admit that a theory which involves palpable contradictions may yet nevertheless be true." We are sorry for the upholders of a theory who acknowledge that "its truth cannot be demonstrated directly."

The line of argument followed by Mr. Doubleday may be seen from the Contents, which follow,—"Being, Space, Time, Motion, Magnitude, Vision; Sound, Odour, Taste; Atoms, Germs; Light and Heat; Identity, Habit, Dominion of Mind over Matter. What is the use of Matter? Is not Materialism the parent of Scepticism? What are we to substitute?"

We submit that these headings indicate a line of argument which can never dispose of the question as to the existence of matter. With what show of reason can we begin with "Being, Space, and Time?" Mr. Doubleday sees clearly that all knowledge involves knowledge of self. Is there, then, in any case knowledge of not-self? We must begin with the concrete, and be content to shun the abstract, for a time at least. At any rate, we must attempt something more than merely firing shots into the camp of the opponents of our favourite scheme. We must have something more than attempts to ascertain how many puzzles there are in the universe, and how many more can be invented. Mr. Doubleday has devoted too much space to this style of investigation, and has wonderfully neglected the simplest matters of fact. For example, it is of no consequence at the outset of the argument to settle whether we can or cannot have an idea of *magnitude in the abstract* (p. 40). So also it is really a secondary question whether any two men see the magnitude of an object exactly alike. It is better to begin with one man than with two; and to ask simply, Do I see an extended object? Our author is too eager to write about "things in the abstract," and might well ponder Berkeley's own remarks against "abstract ideas," in the introduction to "The Principles of Human Knowledge." As to these "things in the abstract," we feel disposed to appropriate the language of Berkeley as to matter (Prin. of Human Know., i. 35), "The only things whose existence we deny are those which idealists call 'things in the abstract,' and in doing this, there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss them."

If, however, we begin with personal knowledge, the first thing which meets us is the knowledge we have of the possession and control of our own bodies. Each inquirer as to the existence of matter, must ask whether there be anything he calls his own, distinct from his thoughts, desires, and volitions. There is one sentence in which Mr. Doubleday comes upon this, when he says: "We can dismiss from our minds the idea of all distant existences, tangible and visible, but not the impression of our own bodies and limbs, which must always be present" (p. 19). But unfortunately the author is treating of space when these words are written, and we are entertained with all the familiar puzzles between infinite extension and infinite divisibility, hearing no more about the real question concerning our body, except to exclude it from consideration (p. 41), and to admit that the body is constantly liable to change (p. 93). The work does not in a thorough way examine the questions at issue; but rests its main dependence on the dilemma supposed to arise from the assumption that "for substances to act and react upon each other, they must have some quality or qualities in common" (pp. 14, 114, 116).

There is specially one point upon which Mr. Doubleday differs from Berkeley. It is concerned with the denial of matter, and the form in which that denial should be put. Berkeley denies the existence of matter, but maintains the reality of the sensations given to us, as dependent on the laws or conditions to which the Creator has subjected us. Mr. Doubleday, commenting on the

passage in which Berkeley says that mankind will never miss matter or corporeal substance, whose existence is denied, writes thus: "To me it seems to be undeniable that, at all events, it has been the intention of the Creator that all men, philosophers included, should act and talk as if their impressions and perceptions were caused by material substances, existing without the mind" (p. 7). "The Creator's law is that we must act as if there were an external world" (p. 148). We do not wonder that Mr. Doubleday should add, "It is extremely difficult to convince even powerful minds that the truth may be really at variance with this condition." We think Berkeley's position logically safer for the idealistic theory than Mr. Doubleday's, although the latter is more in harmony with admitted facts, for confessedly men do act as if there were an external world. But it must be obvious how much safer it is for Berkeley, as a system-builder, to entrench himself behind the affirmation of reality in our sensations, than for Mr. Doubleday to advance his lines to the position that it is the intention of the Creator that we should act as if that were real which is at variance with the truth. System-building apart, we want facts, and afterwards their interpretation so far as logic can guide. H. C.

Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection. A Series of Essays. By A. R. WALLACE. London: Macmillan & Co.

EVERY naturalist will welcome with gratitude this volume; which, although it contains several essays that have already appeared, yet has exhumed them from less accessible "proceedings," and presents us with several new ones, the most important in the series. A simple, lucid style, never overcharged with metaphor; and illustrations clear and apposite, never multiplied so as to distract the reader's mind from the chain of argument, are the characteristics of Mr. Wallace's writings. No one has succeeded in placing the arguments for the origin of species by natural selection so clearly and succinctly before the unscientific public. But, passing by the very interesting chapters on mimicry and protective resemblances among animals, and on the philosophy and theory of birds' nests, the portions of the volume which treat of the development of the human races, and the limits of natural selection as applied to man, call for special notice.

In the mental animal economy Mr. Wallace gives small place to what is popularly known as *Instinct*. This he would define as "the performance by an animal of complex acts, absolutely without instruction or previously-acquired knowledge;" and, holding that most of the actions of the lower animals are derived from imitation, memory, or organization, he declines to accept the theory of instinct in any case where all other possible modes of explanation have not been exhausted, which he considers has not yet been done. Simple acts dependent upon organization cannot be properly termed instinct, any more than breathing or muscular motion. Instinct he does not consider man to possess.

But has natural selection, then, acted on man exactly as on the lower animals? Mr. Wallace is here face to face with the objection, more frequently felt than expressed, to the Darwinian hypothesis, that it applies equally to man, in whose case, instinctively (if we may be allowed to use the condemned term), we shrink from the idea. And frankly does Mr. Wallace admit the distinction between man and the lower animals, in a way which we believe will go very far to insure the general acceptance of his modified theory. He shows that there are many things which natural selection cannot do, and which plainly point to a prescient Intelligence in creation. If we can see that special organs and modifications of structure, which are useless or even hurtful in an early or lower stage of existence, become in the highest degree useful at a much later period, and are now essential to the full moral and intellectual development of human nature, we must infer the action of a foreseeing mind, as surely as when we see the breeder setting himself to produce some improvement in a domestic plant or animal. Mr. Wallace shows at some length that there is little or no difference between the bulk of the brain of the savage and of the European, whether we apply the test to the earliest Stone age remains, or the lowest existing races. The mass of the brain in a senior wrangler and an Esquimaux may be the same, yet a thousand to one will not express the chasm between their powers. The savage has a brain with a capacity far beyond his *present* needs. Yet the rudi-

ments of all the higher intellectual and moral powers are in the savage. Pure love of truth, artistic feeling, unselfish love, true gratitude, deep religious feeling, sometimes occur among savage races. The faculties are therefore latent. But in his large and well-developed brain the savage possesses an organ quite disproportionate to his actual requirements—an organ that seems prepared in advance, only to be fully utilized as he progresses in civilization. "The brain of pre-historic and of savage man seems to me to prove the existence of some power distinct from that which has guided the development of the lower animals through their ever-varying forms of being." (P. 343.)

Again, Mr. Wallace shows that man's naked skin could not have been produced by natural selection, for savage man feels the want of covering, and widely apart as are the characters of size of brain and distribution of hair, yet both lead to the same conclusion, "that some other power than natural selection has been engaged in man's production." The author pursues the same line of argument as to the forms of man's hands and feet. Early man, *as an animal*, could have gained nothing by their modification. So as to the flexible and musical voice. Advancing further, there is the same difficulty in accounting for the development of the moral sense or conscience in savage man. Summarizing the whole, Mr. Wallace writes:—

"The inference I would draw from this class of phenomena is that a superior Intelligence has guided the development of man in a definite direction, and for a special purpose, just as man guides the development of many animal and vegetable forms." "The great laws which govern the material universe were insufficient for man's production, unless we consider (as we may fairly do) that the controlling action of such higher Intelligences is a necessary part of those laws." (P. 360.)

To say that mind is a product or function of protoplasm, or of its molecular changes, is to use words to which we can attach no clear conception. There is no escape from this dilemma—either all matter is conscious, or consciousness is something distinct from matter, and in the latter case, its presence in material forms is a proof of the existence of conscious beings, outside of, and independent of, what we term matter. To assert that *will* is but the result of molecular change in the brain, is to take a great leap in the dark from the known to the unknown.

"If we have traced one force, however minute, to an origin in our own *will*, while we have no knowledge of any other primary cause of force, it does not seem an improbable conclusion that all force may be will-force; and thus that the whole universe is not merely dependent on, but actually *is* the WILL of higher Intelligences, or of one supreme Intelligence."

Thus so far as we are able to examine either the outward framework or the mental organization of man, Mr. Wallace removes him triumphantly above the operation of the natural selection which has developed the lower animals. Yet as regards the *mode* of his coming into existence, he would refer him to the same law, but at a remote period, of which we have yet no traces.

"The great modifications of structure and of external form, which resulted in the development of man out of some lower type of animal, must have occurred before his intellect had raised him above the condition of the brutes." "Man was once an homogeneous race, but at a period of which we have as yet discovered *no remains*, at a period so remote in his history that he had not yet acquired that wonderfully developed brain, &c., nor human speech, nor sympathies, and moral feelings." "At length, however, *there came into existence* a being in whom that subtle force we term *mind*, *became* of greater importance than his mere bodily structure." (P. 325.) "It was a revolution which in all previous stages of the earth's history had had no parallel; for a being had arisen who was no longer subject to change with the changing universe."

If, then, man be so exceptional, if between the lowest savage and the highest astronomer, as Mr. Wallace says, "Difference in bodily form and structure there is practically none," if in man's case, in defiance of all the laws of natural selection, "it is indisputably the mediocre, if not the low, both as regards morality and intelligence, who succeed best in life and multiply fastest," why may not that Higher Intelligence, which undoubtedly provided the brain, the voice, the hairless skin, the hands and feet for a future and nobler purpose, have created rather than developed this lord of physical creation? At least until the Meiocene remains of the tropics have yielded up some vestige of the

ancestors of an homogeneous race, we are permitted to retain this belief along with a frank and cordial acceptance of the theory of natural selection, which the patient investigations of Mr. Wallace have done so much to establish.

H. B. T.

Origin of Civilization, and the Primitive Condition of Man. Mental and Social Condition of Savages. By SIR JOHN LUBBOCK, Bart., M.P., F.R.S. London: Longmans.

SIR J. LUBBOCK has here presented us with a vast repertory of facts and observations collected from travellers and writers of every age, in support of the propositions—1st, that existing savages are not the descendants of civilized ancestors; 2nd, that the primitive condition of man was one of utter barbarism; and 3rd, that from this condition several races have independently raised themselves (p. 323). The instances are collected under the several heads of Art and Ornaments, Marriage, Religion, Morals, Language, and Laws; of which those relating to marriage, religion, and morals are naturally the most important. The genius and indefatigable researches of Sir J. Lubbock have done more than, perhaps, any other man has accomplished, to extend and to popularize the knowledge of primitive ethnology; and the volume before us contains more varied information on the subject than any other work in the English language, except the more systematic book of Mr. Tylor, "The Early History of Mankind." But while fully recognising its value, and without any intention of disputing Sir. J. Lubbock's three propositions (which need not imply a full reception of them), it seems to us that exception may be taken to the premises as not *of themselves* bearing out the conclusions in support of which they are advanced.

In reading the volume, the question continually suggests itself, what is the definition of a savage? where does utter barbarism end? We have presented to us a compound mass of authorities, in which Romans of the time of Cato, Tasmanians, Bushmen, ancient Germans, classic Greeks, Jews, and Samoiedes, are all irregularly and indiscriminately adduced. For instance, Sir John, in opposition to Mr. Wallace, seems to deny that savages have any moral sense at all (p. 263). We cordially admit that the moral feelings deepen with the gradual growth of a race. We admit that in a sense authority is the origin, and utility the criterion, of virtue. But what is the authority in its origin? The Santhals of India, whose worship does not rise above the Fetich, and who till lately practised human sacrifice to secure a favourable crop, are noted for their absolute truthfulness. Travellers, officials, and missionaries all concur in this. For instance, 200 prisoners after the Santhal insurrection were allowed to go free on parole, to work for wages at a certain spot. Compelled to leave by a visitation of cholera, 200 savages walked thirty miles back to prison, with money in their girdles, rather than break their word! There was surely here a sanctity in truth, not to be traced to an utilitarian origin. The intuitional theory would explain this by the supposition that there is a feeling—a sense of right and wrong—in our nature antecedent to, and independent of, experiences of utility. Sir J. Lubbock remarks that without temptation, mere innocence has no merit. But Santhal truthfulness here withstands temptation. There are innumerable instances of crime extolled by savages; but if a moral sense is an essential part of our nature, it is easy to see that its sanction may often be given to acts which are useless or immoral. Hence some of the alleged inconsistencies in the descriptions of travellers are perfectly in harmony, as Mr. Ellis's assertion of the moral degradation of the Tahitians, and of their thirst for religious knowledge (p. 258). The observation that the Australians and Tasmanians are without any moral sense, seems scarcely borne out by the subsequent description of the intricate system of property rights and succession among them (p. 309), or the regulated and carefully guarded code of punishments (p. 318). The suggestion, too, that maternal affection is an inherited instinct, apart from moral or intuitive feeling, "because for generation after generation those mothers in whom this feeling was most strong have had the best chance of rearing their young" (p. 263), seems a somewhat extreme application of Darwin's theory.

Sir J. Lubbock's theory of the history of marriage is that originally it was communal, and all women the common property of all the men of the tribe; that individual marriage only gradually arose from the individual right to

female captives, and this to exogamy, or marriage outside the tribe, and then to female infanticide. Now, without going into the question how utterly this theory is abhorrent to the instincts of even the lower animals, which either pair, or among which the strongest male proves and maintains his exclusive claim, the instances adduced seem to fall far short of warranting so general a conclusion. May not the symbolic marriage by capture, on which so much stress is laid, be rather the relic of the usage, at a time when personal prowess was everything, that a man should prove his power to take and to keep a wife? As to the offerings sometimes required from virgins before they could marry, so far from this being an acknowledgment of pre-existing communal rights, was it not an offering to the goddess of fecundity? and is not Dulaure's explanation the true one? Herodotus, in his account of the Babylonian custom, nowhere states that "only after doing so was she considered free to marry" (p. 87). This consideration affects the weight of the argument. Nor can we admit that Cato's monstrous eccentricity, so strangely in contrast with the historical chastity of Roman matrons for centuries before his time, and so reprobated by his contemporaries, should be adduced as a lingering relic of the communal marriage. Still less accurate is the remark, "Tamar, also, evidently might have married Amnon, though they were both children of David; for, as their mothers were not the same, they were no relations in the eye of the law" (p. 108), whereas the law of Moses, centuries before, had laid down, "Thy father's wife's daughter, begotten of thy father, she is thy sister, thou shalt not uncover her nakedness" (Lev. xviii. 11). As to the argument founded on the relationship to the mother being rather regarded among some tribes than that of the father, this may surely be more easily explained as a result of polygamous marriage, than of a relic of a once universal community of women.

Nor does the mass of material which the vast reading and indefatigable research of the author has brought to bear on the religious history of our race, amount to anything like demonstration of the progressive stages in religious thought, which Sir John thinks may be thus classed—Atheism, or the absence of any definite idea; Fetichism, where man supposes he can force the Deity; Nature-Worship, or Totemism; Shamanism, where the deities are more powerful than man, and of a different nature; then Idolatry; and next, the Deity as the author of nature; and, lastly, morality associated with religion. To prove this systematic development we should have preferred to see some more systematic collection of instances. But Sir John rather presents to us one kaleidoscope pattern after another of the pavement of the savage mind, and picking out the pebbles which compose the grotesque design, assigns one to Fetichism, another to Totemism, and a third to Shamanism. As he sorts the pie, contributions fall into each compartment from every race, from the Australian to the Teuton. But were all these pebbles embedded in the human mind in chronological order? As Sir John admits that the growth of the individual is parallel to the growth of the race, and admits that there are cases in which nations have retrograded, may not many of their customs be thus explained? Is the witchcraft story of Father Merolla more than the "Four-and-twenty blackbirds baked in a pie?" Can the fondness of our children for dolls be explained on no better grounds than that "the doll is a hybrid between the baby and the fetish, and exhibiting the contradictory characters of its parents, becomes singularly unintelligible to grown up people" (p. 359)! How are we to reconcile the low and stunted growth of religious ideas, according to the scale, in the Greenlander, with the high moral tone of law, described at page 305? Are the Mexican notion regarding the owl as a spirit of evil, and the Abipones' notion of the nocturnal ducks, anything more than the common European notion of the owl as unlucky, or of the "Ames damnées" of the Bosphorus? Surely too much is built upon these cases. Serpent-worship is admitted (175) not to have a common local origin, but to have sprung up spontaneously in many places. Is there not here a suggestion of one primitive tradition? We venture to think that Sir J. Lubbock has scarcely given sufficient weight to this view. Again there are many admitted cases like that of New Zealand, where a region has been peopled by casual immigration, and old localized superstitions supplanted by new ones suggested by new conditions. The idea of sacrifice appears also to be overlooked. It was surely not so much a "share of spoil" given to the God, as the acknowledgment of life forfeited. We regard sacrifices as unnecessary

because we are taught they were typical. But the passage quoted from Ps. l. (p. 237) was not an intimation that David "was far in advance of his time, and that even Solomon felt that sacrifices in the then condition of the Jews were necessary," but a protest, as the context shows, against the exaggeration of the symbol into the final cause of worship. Similarly Lev. xxvii. 28, 29, must be held not to intimate any prevalence of human sacrifice among the Jews, but as having reference to the dedication of the firstborn to the priesthood of primogeniture, for which the Aaronic was a substitute (p. 243). A like oversight of the context occurs when Elijah is said to have "recalled Israel to the old faith by producing rain, when the priests of Baal had failed to do so" (p. 208). The whole force of the history is in the rain having come *after* the old faith had been acknowledged.

But apart from these criticisms, we owe Sir J. Lubbock a debt of gratitude for the pains and learning which he has here bestowed on a subject of which our knowledge is confessedly limited, and on which few men have laboured with greater success to cast light, or to pave the way for more certain conclusions, though we could wish he had more carefully weighed Scripture and Jewish traditions, and had more carefully sifted the travellers' tales of Pinkerton's voyages. H. B. T.

IV.—CLASSICAL.

P. Terentii Afri Andria et Eunuchus. Edited by T. L. PAPILLON, M.A., Fellow of New College, Oxford. London: Rivingtons.

ANOTHER volume of the "Catena Classicorum," containing the first portion of an edition of Terence, deserves a word of welcome; and though Mr. Papillon's labours cannot claim "the merit of critical research or independent collation of MSS.," they exhibit a fair promise of usefulness as a school and college edition. Coming after Mr. St. John Parry's edition of Terence in the Bibliotheca Classica, Mr. Papillon has manifestly gone over his ground with that volume open before him, and made such free use of it, as required acknowledgment in the footnotes as well as in the preface. These acknowledgments he has not failed to tender; but we are not sure that he has not sometimes been content to go no further than Parry, and to set down to that comparatively recent editor the credit of illustrations (see Andr. l. i. 17) which Parry has borrowed from Lindenbrog; whereas what is really wanted with Terence is as much as possible of independent research and handling. Something in this way, however, he has contributed in his frequent reference to those modern repertories of critical Latin scholarship, the editions of Lucretius by Lachmann and Munro, and of Virgil by Forbiger and Conington; and he has, in our judgment, enhanced the helpfulness of his work by selecting Madvig's Grammar as that to which, on questions of construction, he principally refers. Perhaps, indeed, if we were called upon to select the "specialty" of this edition, we should be justified in saying that it lay in the goodness of the grammatical notes. The general introduction is clear and sensible; the contrast of Terence and Plautus in p. xiii., and the examination of the truth of the ancient criticism, that Terence was deficient in "vis comica" (see p. xv.), being samples of accurate judgment condensed into few words. The footnotes are, in the main, helpful and appropriate, though we could dot down expressions such as "adesdum" and "illico" and "quid multis moror" in the first scene of the Andria, which one is surprised to find unnoticed; and we think, too, that there is a trifle too little said about the stage directions and the plot, as it is being evolved, of the play. Now and then, too, Mr. Papillon yields to needless doubts—*e.g.*, where in Andr. l. i. 55 he hesitates to admit that "captus est" is a gladiatorial allusion, though he owns that "habet," the next word, is undoubtedly so; and here and there his attempts to express plays on words are obscure or superfluous, as where he seeks to make clearer the line—

"*Adibo* atque ab eo gratiam hanc, quam video velle, *inibo*."—Eun., iii. v. 9.

by translating it "I'll get up to him, and get out of him what I see he wants

to let out;" and when he parallels "O factum bene" (Andr. l. i. 78) by the ephemeral slang phrase, "good business." But his grammatical notes are well thought out, and one would not wish a better account of the words "domi focique" (Eun. iv. vii. 45); "*unam* adolescentulam" (Andria. l. i. 91); or a fuller and fairer note on "hæc" for "hæ" (Eun. iii. v. 34) than Mr. Papillon has given at the foot of the pages where they occur. There are a few careless misprints, suggestive of the dangers of letting the proofs of the text go unrevised (*e.g.*, "pro" for "quo" in Eun. iii. v. 7), and calculated to offend a fastidious eye. For these we suppose the printer must be prepared to be the scapegoat.

J. D.

The Commentaries of Cæsar. By ANTHONY TROLLOPE. "Ancient Classics for English Readers" Series. Edinburgh: W. Blackwood and Sons.

To estimate aright the value of Mr. Anthony Trollope's sketch of Cæsar's Commentaries it is needful to keep well in mind the popular character of the series to which it belongs. Were it intended for the young scholar, or for the student who was commencing a military education, and seeking to understand the tactics of the most consummate of generals, it would be undoubtedly below the mark. But inasmuch as it simply professes to popularize for readers who are unfamiliar with the original, and for the most part innocent of scholarship, those famous commentaries which are the records of Cæsar's military as well as literary greatness, we are fully of opinion that the versatile author of "Barchester Towers" has succeeded in this to him somewhat novel task, and produced a readable *resumé* of campaigns which still possess a general as well as a special interest. His pages do not indeed smack of the soldier's concentration of subject and precision of detail; on the contrary, they have a strong taste of parallelism and illustration from other and later authors; but they furnish a very fair and lively sketch of the Gallic campaigns and of the Civil war, with the interspersion of just so much amateur criticism, as the class of readers for whom the series is intended would be inclined to stomach. As sample passages we would point to his account (pp. 48—50) of the surprise of Cæsar's position by the Nervii in the second campaign, and of the imminent danger from which the Roman army was saved by the descent of Cæsar into the field like a "Deus ex machinâ," and that of Cæsar's bridge over the Rhine below Coblenz (p. 68, &c.); both of which pieces of narrative are graphic and clear, and calculated to do all that a mere sketch could do towards possessing a general reader with a notion of what took place. Mr. Trollope's criticism on Cæsar's style in p. 24 is also very much to the point, and he seems to us to have formed, and sustained throughout his sketch, a true estimate of his hero, who, to quote Philip van Arteveld:—

> "Knew himself and knew the ways before him:
> And from among them chose considerately,
> And having chosen with a steadfast mind
> Pursued his purposes."

The prefatory weighing of Julius Cæsar's title to Dean Merivale's estimate of him, as the "greatest name in history," p. 6—8; and the preference shown for the opinion of those who hold "Cæsar's Commentaries" to be his own work based on his secretary's notes, rather than his secretary's work compiled out of Cæsar's Ephemerides, are contributions to this estimate; and an adroit contrast between Cæsar and Kinglake, as contributors to the literature of battle-fields, (p. 32) deserves to be read and pondered. One could have spared the too frequent allusions to the fables of the "Wolf and the Lamb," and of the "Stag and the Horse," which are found in the early part of the volume, the indirect allusion to the true love of "Billy Taylor," and one or two similar trivialities; but we can conceive the writer of such a volume haunted by the fear of being too matter-of-fact, and so erring in the opposite direction. A small map or two of the simplest kind, would have enhanced the value of this volume.

J. D.

Virgil. By the Rev. W. LUCAS COLLINS, M.A. "Ancient Classics for English Readers." Edinburgh: W. Blackwood and Sons.

THE originator of this series is so far the happiest exponent and justifier of his plan. Mr. Lucas Collins presents the works of Virgil as favourably before his

countrymen, in a bright, faithful, and truly poetical glimpse or two at each, as he has already presented those of immortal Homer. In some twenty pages he has dealt, not too diffusely or too cursorily, with the "Pastorals," which, despite the favour they have found among our Elizabethan and later poets, are not likely, he thinks, to set the fashion again for the modern muse. In a dozen more he has glanced rapidly, but "con amore," at the Georgics, illustrating his survey with extracts from Sotheby and Dryden, as well as with a spirited version by himself, in fifteen-syllable ballad metre, of the famous apostrophe to Italy in the second book. And this he does with, to our thinking, the exact infusion of the salt of collateral knowledge which his subject requires; pointing out, apropos of the "variæ pestes" which mar the husbandman's labours in the first book, the animal and vegetable nuisances of the ancient cultivator, and, anent the points of a good cow, in the third Georgic, explaining opportunely that the modern judge of stock does not select with an eye to breeding purposes or to draught, as Virgil does, and that therefore the estimate of "old and new" is likely to be different. Nor is there wanting to Mr. Collins a just perception of Virgil's real creed, which he will not consent to term simply Epicurean—seeing that "he has an eye and a heart for all Nature's riches and beauties, as the 'skirts' of a divine glory" (39). It is easy, however, to see that not to the Pastorals nor the Georgics would Mr. Collins assign the palm of Virgilian poetry. Nearly four-fifths of the volume are devoted to the Æneid, for which he has availed himself of Conington's version by way of illustrative quotation, and which he has discussed in such wise that we the less regret Professor Conington's loss, as it affects the substitution of Mr. Collins's sketch of Virgil's works for that of so eminent a scholar. Indeed he has trodden very carefully in that scholar's track, evincing great tact in his quotations, and much careful reading of old and new commentary. Thus he cites Dr. Henry, whose work is less known than it should be, in answer to the first Napoleon's puzzle about the men that lodged in the fatal horse (p. 56). He recalls from the old commentators on the third book of the Æneid the parallel betwixt Idomeneus and Jephthah (p. 65). He cites Morris's Jason for a fine picture of loathly Harpies, and likens a bit of Conington's description of the voyage from Crete to similar passages in the "Lord of the Isles." To represent the grand storm-burst of Dido's wrath in the fourth book he forsakes Conington for Dryden, and then feeling that even the "glorious John's" heroics hardly realize the fervid passion of the Latin, gives a fine French translation by Delille, which the most critical of readers will admit to have been appropriately thrown in. We could wish that we had space to go further into this clever and most interesting volume, teeming as it does with nice quotations of modern poetry, which Mr. Collins aptly brings to bear upon his subject, and which enrich his pages with a charm that never tires. Such a volume cannot fail to enhance the reputation of this promising series, and deserves the perusal of the most devoted Latinists, not less than of the English readers for whom it is designed. J. D.

Lectures Introductory to a History of the Latin Language and Literature. By JOHN WORDSWORTH, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Brasenose College Oxford: James Parker & Co.

THE object of these lectures, which are but an instalment of a projected course, is to contribute towards what Bernhardy designates the Inner and Outer History of Latin Literature, and it is well that so competent a scholar, and one of so well-omened a name as "John Wordsworth" should essay a task hitherto almost unattempted by English scholars. In the form of a pamphlet of some eighty pages, he publishes a fragment, so to speak, of an "opus magnum," whereof it gives a fair promise; and discusses in Lecture I. the place of Rome in Aryan civilization; in II. the Latin Race in Italy; and in III. the elementary Age of Latin Literature. Considering the necessarily doubtful and general ground of the first two lectures, Mr. Wordsworth has discharged his task, which is tentative and experimental, with skill, acuteness, and research, that redound very much to his credit; but the third lecture is that which is most likely to be read widely and appreciatively, and which will afford the best earnest of what is to come after. It is a thoughtful and readable digest of all that is known of the elementary age of Roman literature, and a sample of its

matter is the attempt in sections 12—19 "to set forth the poor beginnings of Latin poetry," the Saturnian verse, and the chant of the Arval brothers, the Fescennine songs, the Naeniæ, and epitaphs of the Scipios, as well as the earliest forms of Stage Poetry. It is impossible to consider, within our limits, any of the positions or speculations of this clever brochure, but we may confidently recommend it to all who desire to see light as to the "primordia" of Roman literature, especially if they have not the opportunity of approaching such completed works as that of Bernhardy. J. D.

V.—FICTION AND ESSAY.

The Three Brothers. By MRS. OLIPHANT, Author of "The Chronicles of Carlingford," "Salem Chapel," "The Minister's Wife," &c., &c. Three Vols. London: Hurst and Blackett.

MRS. OLIPHANT is inexhaustible. The very first thing that strikes you when you open this novel is, that it is, in point of quantity, a good deal for the money, comparing it with the ordinary run of three-volume performances. And so it is. Instead of the usual 250 or 280 pages per volume of about twenty short lines each, we have here 330 pages in each volume, and each page contains about thirty long lines. The number of Mrs. Oliphant's works is becoming something very considerable; perhaps she has written more than twenty novels, varying in merit, but all of them good. And this last will not disgrace her. On the contrary, it is a vigorously written story which in every chapter impresses you with its author's knowledge of life, and her inexhaustible resource. She invariably leaves off as if she could say a great deal more, never repeats what does not positively demand repetition, is never caught beating a sentence thin, and never writes a chapter or introduces an episode which stands related to the main business of the story as what are called carpenter scenes do to a drama—those scenes which are stuck in to pass the time away while something is going on behind.

We cannot discern in "The Three Brothers" any decay of skill, or freshness, or force, on the part of its accomplished authoress. It is purely a novel of society, and is not nearly so high-pitched as some of her works, but it does not leave so saddening an impression as its brothers in the great Oliphant library of fiction. It is true the authoress keeps up her old sad *rôle;* she is always reminding you that life is hard; that nothing happens as anybody expects; that women are always, to use her own phrase, "tied to the stake;" and that nobody understands anybody else in this perplexing world. In fact, she persistently takes what may be called the embittered, petulant view of life. The moral of the story, if it has one, is that things arrange themselves in spite of you, and that effort is useless. But Mrs. Oliphant's genius is too strong for her dumps, and the mere fact that she takes such an interest in life as to enable her to write such a book, and that the book, after all, leaves the reader cheerful, is sufficient to wipe out of ordinary memories the occasional moanings of the author on what is not satisfactory in the world. She paints love-scenes and love itself just as well as ever she did, and better than, perhaps, any one in England except Mr. Charles Reade. Now this is not to be done without some zest; and when a woman warms to that kind of work, she may say as many dispiriting things in the course of her story as she is driven to do; but she will not persuade her readers that there is an end of cakes and ale yet.

Mr. Renton, a wealthy man, makes an odd will. Desiring that his three sons, Ben, Laurence, and Frank, should work their own way in the world, he leaves them £200 a-year each for seven years after his death, at the end of which time his final will is to be opened. We are not quite sure that such a style of will-making could be sustained in law, if it were challenged by those interested; but it is not challenged in this case, and the three sons go their ways in the world, Ben as a maker of railways in Canada, Laurie as a painter, and Frank as a soldier out in India. Then come the inevitable love-makings. Ben is first of all nearly entrapped by Millicent Tracy, a sort of beautiful Becky

Sharp, only not a bad woman, but simply an adventuress. Then, escaping from the toils, he falls in love with his cousin Mary, who tends his poor silly mother. Laurie conceives a real passion for Mrs. Severn, a painter's widow, almost, if not quite, old enough to be his mother, and is refused. Frank goes very nigh to proposing to Nelly Rich, a charming heiress; not a bad girl, but with no heart in particular. However, he goes madly in love with Alice, aged sixteen, Mrs. Severn's daughter, marries her, and bears her off to India. At the end of the seven years, the final will is produced, and turns out to be—a blank sheet of paper; so that the property descends exactly according to the law of intestacy. In the meanwhile the father's foolish scheme for making his sons all that he wished, has produced no fruit whatever of the kind he desired, unless, perhaps, in the case of Ben. Events have settled themselves in their own way, and defied his posthumous interference. The disposition of the characters at the fall of the curtain it would not be fair to tell.

But for the workmanship, and the use the author has made of her simple material, we have little but praise; nothing, we mean, that is worth saying. Always great in drawing foolish women of the Mrs. Nickleby type, Mrs. Oliphant is scornfully successful with old Mrs. Renton, whose inconsequence and general fluffiness of intellect are delightfully indicated from the first chapter to the close. The interview in the railway carriage between Frank and Nelly, after Frank had declared to Alice, is in Mrs. Oliphant's best manner; she is singularly at home in oblique, uneasy interviews between people who have got to advance sideways to an understanding. It is never easy to make your good girl quite original, and Mary is not so strong as, say, Nelly. Among the men, old Welby, R.A., is, in our opinion, the best drawn. But Laurie is good, and the friendship between him and the padrona, Mrs. Severn, is finely managed. On the whole, we can promise the reader of "The Three Brothers" plenty of pleasure; and he will get no harm out of the occasional dumps. All Mrs. Oliphant's bitter sayings only come to this, that we cannot always see before us, or have our own way, or know how another person feels. Now it is an obvious reflection that if we could, there would be no novels. But this is a world in which things *happen*. And, really, so delightful a writer as Mrs. Oliphant—making such enjoyable capital out of all the flukings and cannonings of life—goes a long way to reconcile us to the arrangement. M.B.

Man and Wife: A Novel. By WILKIE COLLINS. Second Edition. London: Ellis.

IF the only test of fiction is that it shall secure interest, then Mr. Wilkie Collins has succeeded to the full with this novel. The construction is almost perfect, and the interest is so graduated, and the plot so skilfully developed, that no portion can be skipped without loss. Mr. Collins is *facile princeps* in invention, and introduces no detail that is not of importance in reference to the whole. His novels, indeed, are too complete and self-contained to wholly satisfy any taste that is still simple enough to look at life as it is with anything of the pause and wonder that must often overtake the disinterested observer. There are so many loose threads always to be seen even upon the right side of the tapestry of life, that such an one is persecuted with the wish to get a look at the other side, which remains inscrutably hidden. No real story can ever be so completely told that everything at the end can be satisfactorily wound-up and disposed of. Now this brings us to the main criticism we have to make on Mr. Collins's "Man and Wife." He has systematically entered on the field of social reform; and wishes to improve the marriage laws of Ireland and Scotland, and to modify the English passion for athletic sports, and mollify their terrible results, both ethically and physically. Incidentally, through the case of that mysterious, grim, and repellant dumb creature, Hester Detheridge, he glances, too, at our faulty English laws for the protection of women against reckless and drunken husbands. At first sight it would seem as though Mr. Collins's style were well-suited to such a purpose. This, however, is a total mistake. Nothing could well be further from the truth. Thackeray was wont to tell how his characters would insist on going their own way in spite of his conscious intentions in respect to them, and sometimes (as in one of his delectable Roundabout Papers) he would complain of them in this respect with a touch of his characteristically pathetic cynicism. The true effect of any work written how-

ever indirectly for a purpose, is measured by the degree in which we have gracious tokens of the characters having insisted on going their own way, and having, after all, been freely allowed the licence. Now, most certainly, Mr. Wilkie Collins's characters seldom go their own way. They are kept rigidly moving on the puppet-strings of his plot. He is versatile in his knack of pulling a very large number about so cleverly that, while they cross and recross each other's paths in every imaginable way, they never really knock against each other. Take an instance: was it at all likely that Mr. Arnold Brinkworth, who was wholly unsuspicious of the risk he was running in visiting, as his wife, at Craig Fernie "Hottle," the woman Mr. Geoffrey Delamayn had promised to marry, should have been so oblivious as not to have looked after the letter which he had carried to Anne Silvester, and with whose contents he was fully acquainted? Had he been alive to the risks he ran, his want of attention to her and her interests might have had some excuse. But the letter needed to be lost, to make the leading complication of the novel; and accordingly Bishopriggs, the smug waiter at the "hottle," is called in to do his part. All the complications arise out of most glaring improbabilities; it is only Mr. Wilkie Collins's consummate invention which, by decoy circlings, diverts the mind from dwelling on them in a way which would prove fatal to the story. But herein lies his art, of course; and a very remarkable art it is. Only, just as he is consistent as to plot, he becomes totally inconsistent as to character. All is excess, caricature, exaggeration. His characters are not real creatures at all; and, as they do not act, in any one respect, as ordinary people would act, they are amusing; but very often they really furnish arguments the very opposite of those Mr. Collins wishes to enforce by them. The novel, however, has an unmistakeable fascination. Sometimes it has precisely the same effect on the reader as the remembrance of some oppressive and horrible dream, which, though felt to be quite unreal, leaves on the mind for a time an impression as real and as painful as the realest occurrence could do. But just as the reflection that always comes, bringing relief, is that the dream was unreal, so the relief we feel over the thought of the unreality of Mr. Collins's invention, is what composes us, and in composing us, invalidates the lesson he would fain teach by it.

Another defective point in "Man and Wife" is that the poetic justice at the end, under which Anne Silvester becomes Lady Lundie, contributes to satisfy one in a way which is averse to the lesson having its due effect. Had it not been for the Scotch irregular marriage, Anne Silvester would have simply been Geoffrey Delamayn's mistress, and there would have been no conventional social form by which she could possibly have been lifted out of that plane, however much she deserved it. Thus she could not possibly have become the wife of Sir Patrick Lundie, to supersede the *propriety* Dowager Lady Lundie, who had dubbed Anne Silvester The person, had it not been for that irregular Scotch marriage at Craig Fernie. Perhaps had Anne Silvester been liker her mother in her sad end, she would have been a truer heroine, and excited our deeper sympathies yet more; but Mr. Collins had in one way or other to sacrifice her to his conventional morality, while he condemns the law which enabled him to do so *without* outraging certain conventional ideas. Not that we would say a word in favour of the Scotch law: we are simply showing the artistic inconsistencies of Mr. Collins's work.

Further, it is a pity Mr. Collins did not inform himself better as to customs and ways of life in Scotland. We only expect in his pages such caricature as is presented to us in Bishopriggs, such melodramatic exaggeration as we see in Hester Detheridge (whose confession, by the way, in its horrible and ghastly detail forces one to doubt the right of importing so much of the "Newgate Calendar" into fiction); but we have a right to expect something like general fidelity. The gross and almost indelicate manner in which everything is presented which bears on certain forms of Scottish life and character, deserves to be severely dealt with. The Scotch which he puts into the mouths of Scotchmen is simply absurd and unpardonably incorrect. Scott skilfully Anglicised his Scotch without losing anything that was characteristic; but Englishmen are apt to stumble when they try to imitate him in this. We imagine that Scotchmen will get many a laugh over Mr. Collins's pages denied to the ordinary English reader. With respect to the vicious effects of muscularity, Mr. Collins is

more successful, though his sporting men are surely exceptionally ignorant and base. We hope so. But with all its faults, we have not read for long a more weirdly fascinating, or more forcibly written fiction. It amply sustains the reputation Mr. Collins has already won in the same field by such works as "The Woman in White" and "Armadale." H. A. P.

An Editor's Tales. By ANTHONY TROLLOPE. London: Strahan & Co.

THIS is a very amusing collection of stories, and that, no doubt, is all Mr. Trollope would claim for it. It is, as its title hints, a book in which an editor is supposed to recount things that have come to his knowledge in his literary capacity as conductor of some magazine established, or to be established; and, of course, it is brimful of knowledge of the world and small practical wisdom. One, at least, of the narratives we are afraid is true, and it certainly reads as if it were; the interest of the volume would be greatly increased if we could believe as much of the others. "The Panjandrum" is evidently founded on fact; but "The Turkish Bath" is almost too good to be true, though exceedingly natural in certain parts. There are some things, however, which not even Mr. Trollope knows! "Let a man," he says, "have learned the trick of the pen, let him not smoke too many cigars overnight, and let him get into his chair within half-an-hour after breakfast, and I can tell you almost to a line how much of a magazine article he will produce in three hours." If Mr. Trollope had the placing of the other conditions, such as that trifling one whether the man had chosen his subject or had had it chosen for him, there would be a good deal in this. Again, we have as strong a prejudice as Mr. Trollope in favour of morning work, but have known some very good workers who preferred the night, and could not produce in the morning. But the point is this:—"It does not much matter what the matter may be (!), only this, that if his task be that of reviewing, he may be expected to supply a double quantity." Here Mr. Trollope commits the *fallacia accidentis*. This may be true of a good many hardy journalists, but to conscientious people, who are capable of original production in any fair degree, reviewing is, as far as our knowledge goes, the most tedious of all literary work; that in which they turn out the smallest number of pages in a given time, not the largest. There is one more very questionable passage. Mary Gresley offers to write for nothing. "But," says our editor, "we opposed it, and, indeed, would not permit it." This is well; but now note the reason assigned:—"believing that work so done can be serviceable to none but those who accept it that pages may be filled without cost." The majority of the work offered "gratuous" (as we once heard a man put it to an editor) to periodicals is, no doubt, worthless; but obviously that is collateral to the circumstance that it is "gratuous," not consequent upon it. This is surely obvious, and it is a fact that most excellent and effective matter has been written "gratuous" for both magazines and newspapers. Why not?

"The Great Panjandrum" is an account of the troubles of a set of young people who put their heads together for the purpose of bringing out a magazine (which never appeared), and, though a little spun out, it is a capital sketch, and full of instruction. It contains characters who are evidently portraits, and of these Churchill Smith is one of the most striking. We doubt if Mr. Trollope has anywhere sketched a more original figure. M. B

Commonplace, and other Short Stories. By CHRISTINA G. ROSSETTI, Author of "Goblin Market," and "The Prince's Progress." London: F. S. Ellis.

THERE is a certain charm of innocence and freshness about all Miss Rossetti writes, though these qualities, inconsistent as it may sound, especially the first, have something manneristic about them. One can usually read her with some degree of pleasure, and without serious annoyance, and that is saying much. But her prose, if this is even her worst, will not serve as a foil to her poetry, unequal as that, too, is; and we can scarcely see why these three hundred and odd pages should have been published. One of the stories, "Vanna's Twins," is affecting, but only while you endeavour to forget the startling improbability of the main incident—a fond mother despatching her two only children, almost babes, out in the face of a threatening snow-storm on the sea-coast, for no more important purpose than that of carrying a few

oranges to some sick friends. The danger is pointed out to the mother; the stupid woman "looks somewhat anxious;" but "concludes bravely" (she is a Neapolitan), "Nossignore aurà cura di loro." The poor children, however, are lost in the snow, and at last found dead "in a chalky hollow close to the edge of the cliff." The narrator of the story, a woman, is made to say that shortly after they had started she observed that it had begun to snow heavily, and that "the sky lowered dense and ominous over the east cliff"—the spot to which the little ones were bound. Yet this lady does not do what any person of common feeling would have done, take an umbrella, and follow the small travellers whose foolish mother had sent them out on such an errand. The pathos would, we may add, have been more complete if that unnecessarily "appropriate" or "suggestive" incident of the silver cross in the dead girl's hand had been omitted. It is astonishing that the author of "Goblin Market" does not see that this kind of touch has an artificial look with it.

The longest piece, "Commonplace," is free from faults of improbability, but the author tells nearly all her tales with a sort of I'm-not-quite-sure-it's-worth-while accent which makes them only half real to the reader. The piece entitled "Pros and Cons" is assuredly not a story at all, but a short dialogue between a rector and some of his parishioners about pew rents; and it appears to us that Miss Rossetti is better at argument than at incident. "Hero" is a mistake. The last story, for the "childishness" of which the author half-apologises, is the sort of thing you find in the *Monthly Packet*, only more large-hearted, as becomes anything from a poet. It is very natural and life-like, but there is a serious objection to all stories in which the moral is wrought out on the plan here adopted by Miss Rossetti, who expressly avows "a special object" in this little tale. A Hastings girl marries, unknown to her father and against his wish, a Wesleyan photographer. After her husband's death, the widow is brought under the influence of the rector and the rector's wife, and is gradually—of course—brought back from "schism" to "the Church." Here, again, we object, and vehemently too, upon the score of want of fairness. True, people like Sarah, and the rector's wife, can scarcely be said to be capable of opinions worth the name; but we certainly think that if there is a time when we should make it a point of conscience to respect another's convictions in the way of not touching them at all, it is when one's arguments are backed by the artillery of "influence," and the person to be convinced is suffering and sad. In a word, though our convictions in the matter of Church against Dissent had been ten times as strong as Mrs. Grey's, we should have felt it better that Sarah should die in "schism" than that we should take advantage of old family griefs, her poverty, and our own influence as her social superiors, to lead her back to "the bosom of the Church." Might not Sarah justly have said, "You are all cleverer than I am; I am a poor, saddened woman, partly dependent on you, and greatly under your personal influence; and I should think it only fair to my convictions that one of my own people, who is as clever as you, should be present at these interviews, to state the side of the question which my husband took?" In this story, again, far too much strain is put upon the "guilt," such as it was, of Sarah's marriage. The father had not the smallest right to forbid the marriage, when the only objection to the man was that he was a Methodist; and is it not a little *outré* to make a tough fisherman in middle life break his heart and die for any such a reason?

On the whole the volume is not satisfactory. It is clean, now with the cleanness of a cottager's child's white pinafore (on Sunday morning), and now with that of a lady's boudoir. Here and there are hints of fine fancy and delicate insight; but taken as a whole, the volume strikes you as thin in conception, and bare in execution. Simplicity is lovely in itself, but not as mannerism. Miss Rossetti can do better. But "The Lost Titian" is exceedingly good, and there is much to be said in praise of "Vanna's Twins." M. B.

Three Weddings. By the Author of "Dorothy," &c. London: Longmans.

EVEN if it were not well known that the author of "Dorothy" is a lady, there would not be the least difficulty in drawing the conclusion, and drawing it instantaneously, from this little volume of the same writer. Only women, and Mr. Trollope who systematically cultivates "that branch," devote so large a

space to reporting empty conversation as that which is taken up by it in "Three Weddings." No doubt it is open to the sort of people who engage in these conversations to reply that they are all "good form," and that it is mere churlishness to use ugly adjectives about them; and it *is* absurd to break a butterfly upon the wheel; but, after all, talk of a kind which is perfectly simple, sincere, and direct, is as easy as any other—nay, is easier than all others—and conversation-pieces in this painful *falsetto* of "good form" only make one more vividly sensible of the utter artificiality of the life led by the people who go to make up the story, such as it is. The only really respectable—by which we mean respect-worthy—character in this story is Nina; but decidedly next to her in natural sincerity and force of character comes the wretched Merediths. Vulgar and brutal they are, but they know their own minds, go straight to the mark, and will not be trampled upon. They leave the impression that with one-fifth of the social drill and general culture to which the "walking gentlemen and ladies" of the story have been subjected, they would make real men and women, capable of independent action without tyranny; but among the "good form" people of the story the only one who has energy is a bully, who without his culture, would show as badly as the sot of a music-master who is the father of the heroine.

The heroine is Una, a beautiful, half-trained girl, with a fine voice, who gives music-lessons in the family of the Deans. The Deans are "in society," and, though they are not rich, it is considered very shocking when the youngest son, Brian (in the Civil Service, earning £120 a year), falls in love in his poor thin way with Una. He is caught once or twice out walking with the girl, whom her parents at once proceed to bully in the approved style in such cases. Una flies into the open streets. There Brian meets her, and, feeling that he has compromised her, walks her off to a lodging up a mews, and there and then promises to marry her. This he actually does within a few hours. Una, throughout, is feeble; and what people will think appears to be almost the only motive of action either of the parties concerned is capable of entertaining. The same remark applies to the elder brother, Harold, whose virtuous indignation, accompanied by as much active help as can be made consistent with his playing providential tyrant all round, is simply Grundyism intensified. Brian is a flabby creature, who cannot conceive of existence apart from clubs, and good cigars, and cordial admission into his old "set" or clique, breaks his wife's heart with neglect, and eventually marries a rich wife who "manages" him, edits his tailor's bills, and makes him very punctual at family—we were going to say family prayers, as the author does, but prayer is a word not to be so used, and we prefer to say the household ceremony at which the domestics kneel and sniff at each other, and feel more than common hatred of the master and mistress. Of the other weddings we shall say nothing.

The author of "Three Weddings" must not imagine that we are blind to the merits of her book, or that we think it will not have a public. It will. Young ladies in general will find it very readable, and it is written with an ease which often amounts to grace. Yet the unbroken "good form" of the story, and the slight air of superiority to excitement which pervades it, are at such variance with its quasi-tragic burthen, that though the author does not mean to be cynical, the serious reader would really prefer that she should be—unless she were something better. But it is plain, from first to last, that that something better was not in the plan. The author has evidently no first-hand knowledge of any kind of life that is not ornate, and no sympathy with any such life. Hence, the effect of her picture of the vulgar Meredith family, with its rather theatrically posed "victim," Una, has a quasi-cynical effect when contrasted with that of the Deans and the Hesketh, especially when the virtues of the latter class are so obtrusively *bien gantées*—the phrase insists on being used. In fact, the whole of this criticism might have been comprised in the sentence—This is a good story told by a writer who puts *drank* for the past participle of the verb to drink; a symptom which speaks volumes. The astonishing speech of Meredith to his daughter claims one word:—"I shall see your husband, and demand compensation for the loss of your services; if I know the law I have a legal claim upon him." Poor Mr. Meredith assuredly did *not* know the law, and to put such a view of the scope of the action *per quod servitium amisit* into the mouth of a man of the world is rather too much, even in a lady's novel.

M. B.

Among my Books. Six Essays. By JAMES RUSSELL LOWELL, M.A. London: Macmillan & Co.

"To look at all sides, and to distrust the verdict of a single mood, is the duty of the critic." Mr. Lowell, in struggling to do the critic's office faithfully, according to the rule he has thus himself laid down, has, in some degree, sacrificed spontaneity. These Essays are graceful, patient, careful, now and then lit up by a happy break of humour or insight, which only tends to expose the somewhat smooth level reaches of the land. Certainly it seems to us Mr. Lowell has not expressed himself so fully here as in some other of his works. Or do we wrong him in carrying with us the memory of his more characteristic efforts, and laying the measuring-rod of his freer moods too strictly to these more laboured and conscious productions? It is easy to err after this fashion in judging of such work from one who has himself contributed so substantially to raising our literary ideal. And yet it is difficult to judge such a book apart from direct reference to Mr. Lowell's more individual utterances; for here, in the midst of his prose, we catch now and then a whiff of the strong racy flavour of his Biglow papers. But it is only momentary: just as sometimes in passing rapidly along the crowded streets you get a sudden smell of the hay-field, and are confused and burdened by the uprising of a hundred memories. For most part, what is truly American in these Essays is like something sharp and bitter run into a foreign substance. The general spirit is more that of the old-school cosmopolitanism than of modern American literature; the structure is European rather than trans-Atlantic. Where Mr. Lowell expresses himself most distinctly a little sense of disharmony is for the moment felt; when now and then a phrase more than usually sharp-cut and packed with meaning rises up, it disturbs the steady, easy flow of the thought rather than helps it. In criticism, American literature has not relieved itself from the trammels of English tradition, so far as it has in other departments, where fancy and imagination play a more indispensable part. The transition-process is only beginning here; and in Mr. Lowell's Essays decisive symptoms are unmistakably seen. Acting on his own motto, he is desirous that he should test his moods by the touchstone of the moods of others; and in this deliberatively faithful process something of necessity escapes. He is always thus "generously emulating somebody, and needing some external impulse to set his mind in motion." But as he himself significantly adds, "This is more or less true of all authors, nor does it detract from their originality, which depends wholly on their being able so far to forget themselves as to let something of themselves slip into what they write." A little of Mr. Lowell does slip into these Essays, giving them a unique colour and flavour.

There are two noticeable characteristics which are distinctly American: an eclectic large-mindedness and readiness to acknowledge a value even in the errors and prejudices of others; and a determination to accept nothing without attesting it by at least a tacit reference to American standards. The individual judgment of the critic exercises itself in tempering and reconciling, in distributing and harmonising light over divergent opinions; in accepting and adjusting, rather than in condemning and excluding. The Old World has its lesson for the New World, and presents it most piquantly through its representative types; but it can be profitably learned only on the condition that the latter is true to its own possibilities, and can accept benefits without surrendering independence. The national tendency in this direction exhibits itself powerfully in Mr. Lowell's Essays. Why should he harshly separate himself from the wisdom of old Europe? Rather let him master by fully appropriating and assimilating it;—it may deepen, but cannot do away with what is superior to influence,—the American type and character assured in its own destiny. The egotism we find here is, therefore, not personal, but national. To a very large extent, indeed, personality disappears altogether in the attempt to bear up the national judgment to the level of complete urbanity. Mr. Lowell's Essays would have had more novelty for us had he not sought with such constant consciousness after attaining this end. To find a meeting-point for English culture and American freshness and native strength, is the task Mr. Lowell has set himself; and to succeed in it he has largely sacrificed what is most special and peculiar to himself. An air of self-distrustful reserve becomes more and more visible through the conscientious searching out of authorities

and instances; tendencies of mind and features of character are held up before the eye and gazed at closely till the outlines become dim and wavering; and our critic escapes from the difficulty by an implicit assertion, almost Hawthornian in its quiet wistful scepticism, that, after all, every thing has a value, if we can but get the right point from which to apprehend it and turn it to spiritual use. Emerson and Hawthorne both have added some thread of gold to Mr. Lowell's critical philosophy; and, while he is more ready than either to try and fix the definite outlines of the past, he is as truly American as either, with that quaint underflow of Puritan severity, which gave such intensity of satiric sharpness to the "Biglow Papers."

It is very characteristic that an essay on "Witchcraft," which of course leads to a criticism of a most important element in the social history of New England, and an article on "New England Two Centuries Ago," should appear between Essays on such subjects as "Dryden," "Shakspeare Once More," "Lessing," and "Rousseau." Is it unintentional, or is there any purpose in the arrangement? The Essays are full of delicate touches. "Dryden" is a very complete and sympathetic reproduction; and in "Shakspeare Once More" we have some exquisite morsels of criticism—*Hamlet* coming in for special illumination, and some of the obscurer points being touched with the gleam of a faithful imaginative analysis. Now and then we come on expressions, with a crystalline clearness and completeness, as this, for instance:—

"Where Dryden rises he generally becomes fervent rather than imaginative: his thought does not incorporate itself in metaphor as in purely poetic minds, but repeats and reinforces itself in simile. When he *is* imaginative, it is in that lower sense which the poverty of our language for want of a better word, compels us to call *picturesque*, and even then he shows little of that finer instinct which suggests much more than it tells, and works the more powerfully as it taxes more the imagination of the reader."

The articles on American topics are interesting and valuable. Many old tomes have been overhauled, and piquant little phrases and glimpses of early New England life are afforded us. Some of the extracts from the correspondence of the Winthrops are most characteristic, but space prohibits extract. This from the Essay on Witchcraft is significant as an illustration of one statement we have made:—

"If any lesson may be drawn from the tragical, and too often disgustful history of witchcraft, it is one not of exultation at our superior enlightenment, or shame at the shortcomings of the human intellect. *It is rather one of charity and self-distrust.* When we see what inhuman absurdities men, in other respects wise and good, have clung to as the corner-stone of their faith in immortality and a divine ordering of the world, may we not suspect those who now maintain political or other doctrines which seem to us barbarous and unenlightened, may be, for all that, in the main as virtuous and clear-sighted as ourselves? . . . Even Mr. Lecky softens a little at the thought of so many innocent and beautiful beliefs of which a growing scepticism has robbed us in the decay of supernaturalism. But we need not despair; for, after all, scepticism is first-cousin of credulity, and we are not surprised to see the tough doubter Montaigne hanging up his offerings in the shrine of our Lady of Loreto. Scepticism commonly takes up the room left by defect of imagination, and is the very quality of mind most likely to seek for sensual proof of supra-sensual things. If one came from the dead, it could not believe; and yet it longs for such a witness, and will put up with a very dubious one. . . . Just as we are flattering ourselves that the old spirit of sorcery is laid, behold the tables are tipping, and the floors drumming, all over Christendom. The faculty of wonder is not defunct, but is only getting more and more emancipated from the unnatural service of terror, and restored to its proper function as a minister of delight." H. A. P.

VI.—MISCELLANEOUS.

Speeches on Questions of Public Policy. By RICHARD COBDEN, M.P. Edited by JOHN BRIGHT and JAMES E. THOROLD ROGERS. In Two Vols. London: Macmillan & Co.

PRINTING in book form is a trying process for speeches delivered at various times, on various topics, and extending over a long period of years. If flagrant contradictions are not made prominent, and glaring lapses of inconsistency not

rendered apparent thereby, there is surely ground for the presumption that far from ordinary qualities have been at work. Now, the first thing that strikes one in reading these speeches of Richard Cobden's is their homogeneity—their almost purposeless unity and sincerity that only come out the more as they are studied. The key-note is struck by the speeches on Free Trade; and these form, as it were, the great hall to which the others are related by way of cells and side chambers. Cobden's great work was the free trade agitation, and his salient qualities are seen most vividly in these Corn-law speeches. A patient prescience, trustful in the ultimate triumph of right; a withering scorn of wrong, wherever found, but especially when hedged in by privilege; a total disregard for conventional ideas; and a sustained view of the main elements of a question so steadily exhibited that any attempt at conscious eloquence would only have disturbed the unstudied poise and spontaneous balance of the thoughts, together with a pertinacious sagacity that will not be diverted from the real quarry by any amount of circling or skilled *finesse*—these are the chief elements we find here. Cobden's oratory is not studied; it owes its whole force to a simple earnestness, which led him, because of his very fulness of matter, to rigidly compress and condense. Evidently he was often busy with this process while speaking: hence the severe completeness of his speeches, and the piercing sharpness of his *repartée*, in spite of the plain familiar language in which it is couched. He strips the superfluous feathers from his shaft as it whizzes from the bow; but it is carried almost invisibly and with the more terrible directness to the breast of his opponent. His irony stands almost by itself. It is not playful, and smooth, and catlike as is that of Disraeli, for instance, but nervously truthful; more directed to impress on others the keen sense of right out of which it springs than to secure any shadow of admiration to itself. His exposure of Lord Palmerston's policy, and his hits at Sir William Molesworth and Sir John Knatchbull, are patent examples of this; whilst his incisive exposure of the folly of English capitalists in drafting away capital from their own country to be *wasted* by the Russian Czar in keeping down the weak, is unique in its dry and scorching sarcasm, backed as it is by the authority of Adam Smith. Cobden seems to say, "I wish you would see I'm sincere," and not "Admire me for my cleverness." He has none of Gladstone's subtlety. He is direct, and shrewd, and self-sufficient in a certain way; for he has mastered everything bearing on the subject, and knows how to use and apply it. Occasionally he is most felicitous in his phrases; but this is not because he aims at fineness of expression, but simply because he assiduously seeks the clearest and fittest terms. He is eminently purpose-like, and never wastes anything. His insight and wisdom have been proved by a quarter of a century of liberal legislation, and the future of English politics is certain still further to reflect and illustrate his sagacity. He was a man of simple massive character, active and acute in mind; but his thoughts were held in check by a lofty moral purpose, which inculcated reticence, and gave to them a tenfold force, when circumstances forced them into utterance. He was a fearless seeker of freedom, and, whatever may be thought of his opinions, his words have an undoubted accent of sincerity, which will render these speeches standard specimens of honest English eloquence in the nineteenth century. We wish our space would have permitted extract; the volume abounds with passages of quick and convincing eloquence. H. A. P.

The See of Rome in the Middle Ages. By REV. O. J. REICHEL, B.C.L., &c. London: Longmans.

The Growth of the Temporal Power of the Papacy. By A. O. LEGGE. London: Macmillan & Co.

Letters from Rome on the Council. By QUIRINUS. First Series. London: Rivingtons.

The Vatican Council. A Letter to Pius IX. By A. CLEVELAND COXE, Bishop of Western New York. London: J. Parker & Co.

GREATER events swallow up the lesser. At this moment Europe hears nothing but the clang of arms and the booming of cannon. It hardly remembers that only the other day an Ecumenical Council, as it was grandly called, was wrangling in the Vatican over the proposed dogma of Papal Infallibility. Quiet people in this country smiled at the hubbub raised in the religious world

at the notion of adding to the formal creed of Roman Christendom a new article of faith which had long been practically taught by the Romish priesthood. Much sympathy was felt here and there for the more liberal, if less logical, opponents of a dogma which gives a logical completeness to the superhuman pretensions of the Holy See, and destroys the last trace of independent action on the part of the bishops under its sway. The Pope, by a vote of his brother bishops, has declared himself sole lord and master of the Roman Catholic Church. To what great issues such a vote may lead, time alone can show. Already there are signs of coming disunion in the Romish camp. The powerful protests of writers like "Janus" and "Quirinus," and of the leading bishops in France, Austria, and the United States, will bear fruit in due season. The letters of Quirinus are now being put forth in an English dress, having made some noise on their first appearance in the *Allgemeine Zeitung*. Their chief interest now lies in the account they give of different parties and leaders in the Romish Church, and in their exposure of the weakness of that Papal majority in the Council which really represented a poor minority out of doors. "In Church matters," he says, "twenty Germans count for one Italian." Why Anglican bishops should mix themselves up with this last struggle between the Ultramontane and Liberal elements in the Romish Church, is a question we do not now care to answer; but probably there are Protestant readers who may think that Bishop Coxe, of New York, is guilty of no impertinence in lecturing Pius IX. on his departure from Scriptural precedent, and his arrogance in assuming a title forsworn by Gregory VII.

Mr. Legge's review of the growth of the temporal power, would have better served its purpose if he had left out the controversial chapters at the end. A work of a much higher order is Mr. Reichel's history of the Roman See in the Middle Ages. The learned Vice-Principal of Cuddesden College handles an important subject with the mastery of a scholar and a practised writer, and the weight of an impartial critic. His modest preface hardly prepares the reader for the store of good things unfolded to his view. The book is divided into three parts—the Age of Growth, the Age of Greatness, and the Age of Decline; embracing, namely, the whole interval between the days of Gregory the Great and the Reformation. If the author makes no pretence of much original research, he has mastered all the more thoroughly the knowledge conveyed in the great works of men like Milman, Neander, Giesseler, and Hallam. And the spirit in which he writes is specially commendable. His aim being to supply a useful introduction to the history of the Mediæval Church, Mr. Reichel has enhanced the sterling value of his work by his uniform abstinence from controversial claptrap, and his discerning sympathy with the thoughts and aims of a bygone epoch. He is neither an iconoclast nor a blind believer in the past, but an observer who can trace in human affairs the true links of connection between age and age, and acknowledge the worth in their own day of institutions which have become anachronisms in ours. L. J. T.

Fiji and the Fijians. By THOMAS WILLIAMS. *And Missionary Labours among the Cannibals.* By JAMES CALVERT. Edited by GEORGE STRINGER ROWE. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

THE Fijians furnish a remarkable proof of the power of the Gospel, consistently held forth by missionary preaching and example. Thirty-five years ago the two first missionaries landed in Fiji, and now "cruel practices and degrading superstitions have been greatly lessened. Thousands have been converted, have borne persecution and trial well, maintained good conduct, and died happy. Marriage is sacred, the Sabbath regarded, family worship regularly conducted, schools established generally, slavery abolished or mitigated, the foundation of law and government laid, and many spiritual churches formed. A native ministry is raised up for every portion of the Church's work." The Fijians are naturally ungrateful, revengeful, cruel, bloodthirsty, yet such is the transformation which has been effected among them in that short space of years. The history of such a change cannot fail in interest; nor does it. This book is complete and well-written. The additions Mr. Rowe has made, as far as we can trace them, seem judicious; his adverse remarks on Dr. Mullens's statement that "it is feared this native race, saved at length from its

vices, will fade away in presence of the white men now swarming on its shores," certainly do credit to his feelings and his sincere desire for the welfare of the Fijians, however the facts may stand. H. A. P.

English Poems. By JOHN MILTON. Edited by R. C. BROWNE, M.A., Associate of King's College. Vols. I. and II. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

THIS is a well-printed, well-edited "school and college" edition of the English poems of Milton, so thoroughly furnished with all the apparatus for critical study of our great Puritan bard, that we envy those who are still "in statu pupillari" their opportunity and obligation of making systematic acquaintance with it. Its main features are *a life*, compiled with care and intelligence from Mr. David Masson's unfinished biography; *an introduction* which, after a glance at the Elizabethan era of poetry, and the state of literature under the first Stuart, proceeds to survey the "early verse," "prose," and "later-verse" periods of Milton's literary life, and traces the influences which inspired and actuated his poetry at diverse periods; and, last not least, a capital array of annotatory information, in the shape of "condensed" and suggestive notes on salient points, rather than a complete and detailed commentary. These notes are sometimes grammatical and elucidatory of old English words, phrases, and constructions: sometimes, as is needed with a poet so deeply imbued with ancient literature, they explain classical allusions, and illustrate the text by parallel passages from the Greek and Latin. No inexperienced reader need burst in ignorance of what is meant by the "winds with wonder *whist*" in the 64th line of the "Hymn on the Morning of Christ's Nativity," if he has these notes to his hand, which clear up all such archaisms as "the *swink't* hedger" in "Comus," 293, "the *rathe* primrose" in Lycidas, 145; and with equal precision trace the epithet *felon* in "felon winds" to its source. In one case we have to complain of an inconsistency, where in "Comus," 380, the text is printed

"Were all-to ruffled and sometimes impaired,"

and where a note is appended to show that "to" is *an augment to the verb*, as Chaucer uses it—*e.g.*, "The pot to-breaketh." Clearly it should be printed so. But generally the notes are precisely what the student requires, and the diligent use that has been made of such editors of Milton as Warton and Keightley, is deserving of all praise. By such editions as this, and Mr. Pattison's of Pope's "Essay on Man," the Clarendon Press series is proving its high desert. J. D.



THE PAPACY AND NATIONAL LIFE.

WE are accustomed to regard as one of the most prominent and significant characteristics of educated men in the present day, the desire to be free, as far as possible, from ecclesiastical laws and restrictions. Especially is there a desire to emancipate political life and scientific inquiry from the authority of the Church and of dogmas, to make them altogether independent of religion, and, we may say, to secularize them. In fact, since the middle of the last century there has been a powerful and successful movement in this direction. It would, however, be an error to suppose that it is altogether a new movement, belonging only to our age, and never heard of before. The liberation of science and civil life from the authority of religion began in antiquity. It began at the moment when science recognised and contemplated nature as a natural region under the dominion of fixed laws, and not as a region of continual miracle, where every phenomenon was the immediate result of the divine working. It began when human actions, and especially political questions and public undertakings, were no longer determined by oracles, by the flight of birds, or by inspecting the entrails of the victims offered in sacrifice; but by the intelligent deliberation and judgment of enlightened and experienced men. From that time began the liberation of human thought and political

life from the dominion of religion, and so far, in some measure, their secularization. The process, indeed, has been slow and difficult, and not without interruption and retrogression; but in our day the question has become pressing, and has reached a crisis. This is true of science, and still more of the relation of the Church or religion to the State. The present seems a proper time to devote to the subject a closer inquiry. In its most direct form it appears in the conduct of the Papacy towards the civil government in the middle ages, and in the attitude it has assumed towards the governments of the present day. The general bearing of the question, as it relates to other forms of religion, will be manifest as we proceed.

I.

The Catholic Church, or rather the hierarchy which centres in the Papacy, had suffered great defeats, especially in the second half of the last century. It had lost much of its power and influence, whilst the emancipation and secularization of science and civil life had made important progress. But in our century, as most people know, there has been a reaction. The civil governments came again into closer relations with the Church. By means of these relations the Papacy has acquired greater power, and now it contemplates bringing science also under its dominion. The resuscitated order of the Jesuits has been working specially in this direction. Catholic authors of liberal tendencies have been kept down by Church censures and every possible form of persecution. The old science of scholasticism, subject to Church authority, has been inculcated as the only science permitted by the Church. After the people had again become accustomed to the old ecclesiasticism it was thought by the Roman Curia that the time had arrived to make war in the name of the Church against the modern development of national life, and to renew the old ecclesiastical claims of the middle ages. In the Encyclica of December 8, 1864, and in the more recent so-called Syllabus of Errors, this is done in the widest sense, and in a manner not to be misunderstood. This Syllabus formed the programme of the General Council summoned to meet at Rome on December 8, 1869. The essential business of this Council was the annihilation of all the rights of science, the complete deification of the Pope, and an aggressive warfare against national life. Its object was entirely to bind the faith and knowledge of the people to the will of the Bishop of Rome, and to give them a place in his warfare against temporal governments with all their rights and liberties.

The formulated claims of the Pope in relation to civil government are fundamentally the same as in the middle ages, only increased by circumstances peculiar to our times. In fact, so little has any one

single mediæval claim of the Pope been given up, that it is even expressly rejected as an error and anti-Catholic, to say that the Popes have ever at any time gone beyond their lawful rights. By this it is intended expressly to justify all the political arrogance and all the assumptions of dominion over temporal States of which the Popes have ever been guilty. And thus all the acts of the Bishops of Rome as to the crowning or deposing of kings, as to the things which people have seized in their revolt against their rulers, or again, as to the kingdoms and peoples sold or given to princes, without or against the will of the people, and all the attempts to bring princes as such, because of their temporal government, before the judgment-seat of the Popes, are now to be regarded by the Bishop of Rome as nothing more than as the exercise of his legitimate right, which any moment may be exercised again. Whoever does not admit this, is to be regarded as a bad Catholic. On the other hand, the Encyclica denies to any State the right to influence in any way the Papal government of the Church. The Pope declares with blunt vehemence that it is a "notable impudence" (*insignis impudentia*) to maintain the "wicked and oft condemned" position that the highest power of the Church and the Apostle's chair is subject to the judgment (*arbitrio*) of the civil government in the exercise of rights which relate to external order. This refers to those who are so "shameless" (*non pudet*) as to maintain that "the laws of the Church are binding in conscience only when they have been ratified by the State, that the indulgences and decrees of the Bishop of Rome which relate to religion and the Church require the sanction and approval, or at least the assent, of the civil power." To discover the significance of the condemnation of this principle is not difficult. If the laws of the Church, the Pope's indulgences to the faithful, are binding in conscience without the consent of the civil ruler, perhaps even against his will, then is the Pope unquestionably the sovereign ruler over the nations and their governments, and not merely as some suppose a co-partner in the government of every State. By the expressions of his will, or by his indulgences to the faithful, he can remove or hinder the execution of civil laws. On the other hand, he can free the people from the duty of obedience, and demand submission to his own laws in place of those of the State. It depends on his pleasure to require of Catholic subjects under any civil government which may be in conflict with him, that they "obey God rather than man;" while he, according to the universal custom, and as the people are taught to do even from their youth, understands by "God" himself, and by "man" the princes or the civil government. It must then be in the plentitude of the power of the Pope to recognise or to refuse to recognise any government or constitution as it seems

to him to be or not to be in accordance with ecclesiastical laws and Papal supremacy.

Of the exercise of this plenitude of power, not the middle ages only, but recent, even the most recent, times furnish examples. Entirely corresponding to this assumed sovereignty, the Pope claims the power of inflicting external punishments in ecclesiastical cases, and wishes the power of the State to be at his disposal for the execution of the sentences pronounced by the Church—to perform, as it were, the office of a policeman or a hangman. In the Encyclica the position is expressly renounced that "the best condition of society is that in which it is reckoned the duty of the government to keep in check, by lawfully determined punishments, the adversaries of the Catholic religion, only so far as public safety demands it." This position is also condemned, "that it is not the duty of the Church to keep in check by temporal punishments the transgressors of its laws." The condemnation of these two positions sufficiently shows the sorrowful demand of the Papacy on the State. In relation to this, the bishops are strongly admonished by the Pope constantly to teach "that the power of kings is not bestowed merely for the government of the world, but chiefly for the protection of the Church, and that nothing conduces more to the advantage and renown of princes than for them to allow the Catholic Church to exist according to its own laws, and not to suffer any one to hinder its freedom; that it is to their interest to study, when it is a question concerning the things of God, to give by their royal will the precedence to the priests of Christ, appointed in His place." The meaning of this is sufficiently manifest, and scarcely requires any further explanation. God, Pope, and priests are continually used as equivalents or substitutes. This is the great trick of the hierarchy. All that belongs to God is transferred to the Pope. He claims in this way the obedience of princes and the subjection of States to the Church—that is, to himself. The Church is regarded as a united ecclesiastical government, standing over against all States, but altogether independent of every one of them. They are condemned who say that "the ecclesiastical power is not by divine appointment, separate from the civil, and independent of it; nor can such a separation and independence be admitted without the Church usurping to itself the essential rights of the civil power." But the separation of the Church from the State is nevertheless rejected. It is found advantageous to ecclesiastical authority, and the Church would not willingly lose its old obedient servant. The State has nothing to teach the Church, but the Church has everything to teach the State. This union of priest and king the Pope declares to have been at all times rich in health and blessing to the civil, as well as to the religious, community—a declaration

which openly scorns the facts of history, for out of this union have sprung great evils, both to religion and the State. The pure genuine essence of each has been troubled, and, in consequence, there has arisen much hatred, strife, and persecution.

We have seen what are the chief features of the relation of the Church to civil States as the Catholic Church or hierarchy wishes it to be. We have also seen what are the chief points, the inventory, so to speak, of the Papal claims, the programme which the Jesuits in the name of the Church, by command of the Pope, and under his protection, are seeking to realize. They are striving, again, to reach the point, which, expressed in a few words, means that the Church —that is to say, the Pope—commands, and the State—that is to say, the prince—obeys. In order perfectly and decidedly to maintain this dominion, the organs of the Pope—that is, the members of the hierarchy, the whole clergy—are to be independent of the laws of the State, to be free in every way to obtain property, and to use it for the objects of the hierarchy, as the Syllabus expressly desires. Schools and the instruction of youth are to be given over entirely to the Church, that the next generation may be educated as good Churchmen, and the mind of the people made familiar with the supremacy of the Church—that is, the Pope—over the State. For this object the Church is to have a veto on the educational schemes of the State, but the State is to have no veto on the doings of the Church. And so God is to persuade men, to give them laws and restrictions, but men are not to claim to be able to do these things for "God!"

II.

It has been the cause of great and universal amazement and indignation that the Catholic hierarchy, or rather the Papacy, should ever have made such demands as to science and civil government. Still greater have been the amazement and indignation that they should have been made in the presence of modern science and civilization, announced in an aggressive form, and that efforts should have been made in every possible way to establish them. The amazement, however, as well as the indignation, will decrease when we consider out of what historical foundation this ecclesiastical domination arose, and on what particular ecclesiastical principles, or premisses, it is built. These premisses are universally received as correct by Catholics, and partly, also, by Protestants. This inquiry is essentially necessary both to estimate the things rightly in themselves, and to determine in what way in our time these Papal pretensions and assaults on the mental progress of the people are to be met as they ought to be.

We have already said that the striving of science and civil government to be independent and free from the control of religion and the priesthood, is a thing which began in antiquity in relation to the so-called heathen religions. It is universal, and not a mere temporary opposition to the authority of the Christian or Catholic faith. On the other hand, the striving of the Papacy to hinder this emancipation is not one isolated and peculiar to the Catholic priesthood. It has found a place more or less in all religions, and with every religious authority, or community of priests. But it has entered with all its concentrated power and phenomena into the Catholic priesthood, and especially into the Pope, who is the head of that priesthood. Science and philosophy in classical antiquity had to sacrifice their objects; natural knowledge, its development and furtherance, to the dominion of religion or superstition, in the same way as the system of Copernicus had to bow before Catholic authority. And the old zealots of the religions indigenous to their fatherlands and their religious customs, wished to hold the State, and its conduct in political matters, under the power of superstitions and incantations, instead of natural knowledge and the guidance of reason, in the same way as the Popes did in old times, and as the Papacy is striving to do now. In the course of the development of Christianity to an external organization and a visible Church, there came moments which favoured in an extraordinary way the formation of an elevated, and very intensified, sacerdotal power. One, before all, of these favourable circumstances, was that in Rome, the centre at that time of the Roman world-dominion, there arose very early a Christian community. Of this community, tradition pointed out as the founder and head the apostle Peter. There were also other favourable circumstances, particularly through the seat of government being transferred to Constantinople. The bishop of this Roman community soon succeeded in obtaining a greater authority in the West than all other bishops. He also profited by the reverence and obedience of the people towards imperial Rome, which he succeeded in passing over to the spiritual head of this city, the bishop of the Roman Church. Christianity with its new world-moving ideas, was thus in a measure conquered by Rome. These ideas were used for the interest of Roman dominion, and were shaped so as to serve this object. On the other hand, Christianity early obtained an important, influential, and fixed centre for the formation of a settled ecclesiastical organization, which received at the same time the unmistakeable impression of the Roman genius for business and government, and which adopted the rich external ceremonial of the old Roman religion—partly with some changes, and partly imitated. But, on the other side, the dignity and authority of the Bishop of Rome, as head of the Christian Church, depended

chiefly on the credit which was obtained for the tradition that Peter once lived at Rome, and presided for a long time as head of the Christian community. There was but little foundation for the tradition, but it came to be universally received. By means of it, the Bishop of Rome succeeded by degrees in making himself pass for the successor of St. Peter, the head of all other Churches, and the special Vicar of Christ. By means of it he transferred to himself all that importance, and that plenitude of power and right, which the dogmatical development of Christian tradition attributed to Christ. The power and dominion of the Roman priesthood, of the hierarchy, and especially of the absolute Roman Papacy, are essentially grounded, in union with the circumstances mentioned, on principles that belong to dogmatical Christology. They rest on the belief that Jesus being God as well as man, did not merely preach absolute truth, but also possessed absolute divine power, and left these to his successors and Vicars. It belongs therefore to them to give out their doctrine as absolute truth, to claim for it unconditional faith, even to govern absolutely, and to demand unlimited obedience. The bishops soon made this demand, not indeed individually, yet collectively, for their decrees in their Synods, and gradually the Pope, as universal heir, concentrated in himself all the plenitude of power and all the claims which flow from his office as Vicar of Christ. When once the Bishop of Rome possessed superior authority in the Church, he was soon able to put himself above both tradition and Scripture. When he once passed for the successor of Peter and chief Vicar of Christ, he soon succeeded without much difficulty in laying claim to all the powers of the Christ of dogma, as well as those which Christ ascribed to Himself, and those which He communicated to His apostles and disciples. In the full feeling of Divine Vicarship what claims may not arise in the mind of an energetic and ambitious man! From such assumptions and such premisses what could not be deduced and justified by a subtle logic and dialectic! Christ says, according to the Gospel, "All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth." Let us only think of a man who regards himself as the Vicar of Him who spoke these words, and who understands them not in a religious or ethical sense of pure religious life, but in an earthly and literal sense, as meaning that there was committed to him a juridical, and so far along with that in a measure, a physical dominion as well as a spiritual! He will find no end to his claims. He will come to regard himself as God, or as a representative of God upon earth, and make himself pass for such. Or "I give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven. Whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven." When it has been once received that these

words are applicable to the Bishop of Rome as the successor of St. Peter, to whom they were spoken, it was scarcely to be expected but that people in Rome, accustomed to earthly dominion, would understand them in a sense altogether juridical, not religious; and that they were used to obtain spiritual or rather ecclesiastical dominion. They were understood as intended to persuade men that their weal or woe depended on the decrees of the Pope, and that in this temporal life unconditional obedience was to be yielded to him in all things. It is also to be remembered that it was prescribed and enforced that this hierarchical kingdom was identical with the kingdom of God, of which Christ so often speaks, and which He places in such sharp opposition to the kingdoms of the world, which were immediately identified with the State, or the temporal rule of princes. We can now understand how the priests were able to make the Church and ecclesiastical government to prevail over the State and civil governments. And no one who has once received or acknowledged the ecclesiastical stand-point which grants the fundamental assumptions, can rightly reject the hierarchical claims. The hierarchy was the keeper of the Holy Scriptures, and determined their meaning. It prescribed, and had the right to prescribe, a meaning favourable to itself. From the assumptions made by the Papacy, and granted by all Catholics, the Papal claims are deduced consistently and logically.

We come now to the historical development of the Papacy, and the relation of the Church—that is, the hierarchy—to civil governments. When this has been considered we shall be able to judge rightly the conduct of the hierarchy, and especially of the Pope. In the boundless claims of the Papacy, both as to science and national life, we perceive less personal usurpation, or a merely usurped authority, than the necessary working out of what was, and still is, the foundation of all ecclesiastical organization, and its absolute authority in matters of faith. We shall therefore be tender towards the persons, but only in order to be more resolute in our judgment of the system. We shall also find that but little can be done by merely opposing the personal claims of this or that Pope, or rejecting individual usurpations which we may consider excessive or illegal; and that the problems for science and national life are to conquer this Roman hierarchical system, fully to root it out of the consciousness and faith of the people through education and enlightenment, to refuse unconditionally every help for furthering it by force, and as far as possible to take all precautions against spiritual usurpations by securing full and free toleration in religion. If only individual demands of the absolute Papacy are rejected, and not the whole system itself, these will ever be returning

as they find opportunity. No satisfactory results can follow from merely opposing individual claims. For so long as the direct divine authority of the Papacy is allowed to stand, scarcely anywhere can a claim or a fact be shown which is an illegal transgression of the rights belonging to it. We must demand earnestly that in this respect the roots be torn up, or otherwise the overgrown branches that have been cut down will sprout and grow again.

When Gregory VII., for example, with such great decision asserted the supremacy of the Pope over princes, and demanded obedience from them in all things which he chose to explain as Church matters, he did so because he regarded himself, and was acknowledged by all the faithful of the whole Church, as the actual Vicar and plenipotentiary of God. At the same time he regarded the world and the kingdoms of the world, with their princes, as a region of sin and the devil, which could only be sanctified and saved by the Pope. He looked on princes as only a necessary evil, established by force. They were the consequence of the temptation of Satan and of sin, so that in a measure they must be superfluous when the direct divine dominion of the Pope universally prevails. In fact, from the standpoint of the hierarchy and the foundation principles of the Catholic Church, this doctrine is perfectly just and logical. Whoever condemns the claim of this Pope, if he has any real foundation for his condemnation, and thinks out the matter logically, must reject the whole Catholic system, and, chief of all, the foundation or premisses on which it rests. But this supposes an interpretation of the whole of Christianity entirely different from that in which the ecclesiastical system originated. It supposes, too, an entirely different meaning of the places of Scripture on which the power and right of the hierarchy are supposed to be established—yea, an entire modification of the interpretation of dogmas which are received as the essence of Christianity. We must no longer grant that the world in itself is a kingdom of sin and the devil, over against which the Church is to stand as an immediate juridical and externally organized kingdom of God. As little can we admit that Christ is to be regarded as an earthly God-king, into whose place the apostles and their successors entered. Even the doctrine of God must undergo a purification, for so long as the Pope is regarded as the immediate Vicar of God, who interferes in all civil matters, gives temporal laws, inflicts physical punishments, and commands entire nations to be rooted out by the sword: in short, so long as the Popes, with the hierarchy, claim to be the Vicars of the Old Testament God, and are acknowledged as such by the faithful, their claims and interferences in the temporal and political region, even if combined with the exercise of force, can scarcely be rejected as illegal. All this is only the logical consequence

of the theocratic idea and its realization. Whoever—as was the case universally in the middle ages, and must in modern times be the case with all Catholics—whoever believes in the absolute divinity of the Church, and the immediate Vicarship of Christ and God through the Pope, or holds fast to obedience from a submissive sense of duty —whoever, I say, allows the ground principles to be valid, and accepts the premisses, commits a logical, and from his stand-point a moral offence, if he rejects the great, even if unwarrantable and altogether illegal pretensions of the Pope, as they have been put forward from the earliest middle ages. He alone thinks and acts consistently and rationally who rejects, along with the consequences and the pretensions, the ground principles and premisses. The so-called Liberal theologians and statesmen among Catholics should consider this well, that they may come out of the halfness and uncertainty of thought and action in which they are bound, and which greatly hinder them from doing anything really useful for religious reform, and the spiritual development of the people.

If we are justly to estimate the views and pretensions of other Popes these considerations must be our guide. Innocent III. says, "The Roman high priest takes upon earth, not the place of a mere man, but of the true God." This was, in fact, the universal belief at that time, and is to-day with all strong Roman Catholics; and, indeed, it must be with all who regard the Pope as the Vicar of Christ, and Christ as God. Innocent III. avowedly was led entirely by the theocratic idea; only instead of the Jewish national theocracy, a universal one was to be established. The Pope was to be the universal ruler over all kingdoms, princes, and nations of the earth. To us this seems an adventurous thought and a chimerical effort, but well-grounded and legitimate for him who regards himself as the plenipotentiary, vicar, and representative of God upon earth, to whom is committed all power in heaven and on earth, and who can believe that God is so created in the image of man that a man may be His Vicar for all other men; and whose government of this world, at least in its relation to the spiritual life of humanity, is of that kind that it can be transferred to a man as *locum tenens*, and to whom the theocratic endeavours of this Vicar, or Vice-God, upon earth after universal dominion do not appear unreasonable or unwarrantable. What bounds, then, can be put to such a representative of God upon earth? What demands for unconditional subjection and service from men can be regarded as too great or as unlawful by those who once believe this authority and plenitude of power as belonging to the immediate Vicar of God; a being supernatural, endowed with gifts of incantation, and now also declared infallible! Pope Boniface VIII. maintained that God had placed him over kings and kingdoms,

and charged him with the duty of destroying and building, of rooting out and planting again. Kings were made subject to him because of their sins, and he was able to depose them. The Bull "Unam Sanctam" maintains that the temporal sword is subject to the spiritual, and must be drawn by the king for the Church at the will and nod of the priest; that the spiritual power has to sit in judgment on the temporal, if it does wrong, but that the spiritual is responsible to none but God. Whoever denies this power is declared to be a Manichæan. It is said that for every creature there is a necessary condition of salvation laid down by the Pope. This Pope, then, expresses himself with the utmost decision; and who can fairly deny that he only drew the extreme consequences from principles, or premisses, which even now are received, and which, if rightly believed and earnestly carried out, would necessarily lead to the immense pretensions of the Papacy which we have just mentioned?

In like manner the following Popes: Leo X. confirmed the Bull "Unam Sanctam," at the Lateran Council, in 1517. In the Bull against Luther, this Pope says expressly that it is a work of the Holy Ghost to burn heretics. Since the Pope regarded this as good, it must follow that it was also willed by the Holy Ghost, whose organ the Pope is. Paul III., with a lofty sense of his authority as Divine Vicar, and, consequent on this, of his sovereignty over princes and peoples, sent out a Bull against Henry VIII. of England, which freed his subjects from the oath of allegiance, and instigated them to open war against him; offered England to any one who could conquer it, and promised all the goods, movable and immovable, of heretical England to the conqueror. Pope Paul IV. appealed to the decree of the Council of Florence that all power in Christendom belonged to him, that all imperial and temporal power belonged to him. "The Pope," he said, "has two swords in his hand. He created and creates kings every day, and transfers kingdoms as he wills. Since God appoints that the Apostles and their successors shall judge angels, how much more are they able to judge men?" This is spoken plainly and decidedly. But considering the assumptions with which the Popes started, it was impossible to escape going so far in a time when mental scientific activity consisted essentially in drawing with scholastic subtlety the proper consequences from given premisses. But even in the present time, in writings and edifying discourses, this pious insanity concerning the authority and importance of the priesthood comes to light. It is even maintained that the priest has a certain power over God, especially in the Eucharist; that, at the word of the priest, God must come with all His essence into the transubstantiated bread. How then could a

limit be set to the power or the right of the Pope, the priest of all priests? The same Pope Paul explained in the presence of the royal ambassadors, in a full consistory, that he was the successor of the high priests who had deposed kings and emperors; that he would sooner set fire to the corners of the world than forego that right. In 1558, he sent out the Bull "Ex Apostolatus Officio," in which he, as Vicar on earth of God and Christ, out of the fulness of his apostolical power, solemnly sanctions all the most extreme doctrines concerning the universal dominion of the Pope; and curses all his enemies. Pope Pius V. was penetrated by the same consciousness of his absolute fulness of power. In the Bull against Elizabeth, Queen of England, "Regnans in Excelsis," he said that God had set him over all nations and kingdoms. By this power he was "to tear up, to overthrow, to scatter, and lay waste, to build, or plant again," and in virtue of it he orders the excommunication and deposition of the Queen. There is a suspicion, apparently not without foundation, that he hired assassins to attempt her life. By a like spirit almost all the Popes were animated, even to the present time. They never gave up their pretensions and their principles, though they have not always been able to enforce them. Pius IX. believed that in consequence of the resuscitated faith of the people and the powerful influence of the Jesuits, the time had come and the circumstances were again favourable for putting forth these claims, and ratifying them in a General Council. That he has the right to set up and put down kings he does not say expressly either in the Encyclica or the Syllabus; yet it will be easy, when the circumstances are again favourable, to infer this right from the office of divine Vicarship, and to find it contained both in the Encyclica and the Syllabus. It is clearly maintained in them both that, in the rising conflicts between the authority of the State and that of the Church, it is the duty of all Catholic nations to obey the Church, and to prefer its authority to that of the State. The Papal privileges appear also to extend even to the forms of the constitution of States. The Pope certainly in the Encyclica strongly condemns those who "with entire misapprehension and neglect of the most certain principles of sound reason, dare to maintain that the will of the people, through so-called public opinion, or in any other way, constitutes the highest law, independent of all divine and human law." In like manner, the Pope rejects the kind of governments which secure freedom in religion, or make no distinction between the true and the false religion. In this it is implied that from him alone can they learn the true religion. He complains that "people dare apply to the civil community the godless and absurd principle of so-called Naturalism, and to teach that the best kind of government and civil progress to be desired is, that human society be guided

and governed without any reference to religion, as if it did not exist, or at least without making any difference between the true religion and the false." There is, then, nothing given up of all the pretensions to the highest universal sovereignty, and nothing ever will or can be consistently given up so long as the already mentioned assumptions concerning the office, authority, and power of the hierarchy, and especially of the Pope, are rightly held and believingly received in the Catholic world.

Catholic theologians have not omitted to teach and establish with all earnestness, with scholastic subtlety and pious unction, the rights and pretensions which the Popes inferred from their authority and assumed functions. They have also caused these doctrines and the proofs of them, with their scholastic subtleties, to be set forth as the genuine "Church science," which no good Catholic is to oppose. This was done with every circumstance of ecclesiastical authority, and before all by the Pope himself. It was in this business that the Jesuits in particular led the way with the greatest audacity, as, we might say, the logical *enfants terribles*. The Jesuit Molina says, "The spiritual dominion of the Pope, because of its supernatural object, embraces also the highest, most extended power of temporal jurisdiction over all princes and all persons belonging to the Church. So far as this object requires it the Pope can depose kings, and deprive them of their kingdoms; can judge between them concerning temporal things, annul their laws, and perform among Christians all other things which he, according to his wise will, because of the supernatural object and common spiritual salvation, reckons to belong to him. And this he can do, not merely through censures, that is, spiritual penalties, but also by force and arms, the same as any other temporal power; but it is most becoming that the Pope should not do this himself, but cause it to be done by temporal princes. On this account it is said that the Pope has two swords, and the highest temporal and spiritual power." So far this Jesuit. In fact, when it is once admitted that to the Pope belongs the highest spiritual dominion, an actual spiritual imperium; that it is his function, and that he has power to rule the world by means of a juridical organization and canon laws, in order thereby to promote truth and morality in the world; to establish and build up a theocratic kingdom in the world; then it can scarcely be otherwise but that he will also claim the temporal power, since it has the means at command to further and put in force the spiritual power. And as to the physical weapons themselves, how can they be better used than for the furtherance of the kingdom of God, for the propagation of truth, as well as for the extirpation of heretics; the adversaries and enemies of God, who, as destroyers of the Church and kingdom of God, and as offenders against the divine majesty, deserve not merely chastisement, but death?

Like all other transgressors, they must be rooted out, even as the Israelites destroyed the inhabitants of Canaan. It is not, then, amazing that Salmeron, another Jesuit, says that the Pope can command the execution of a heretical prince; for, according to the Scriptures, entire nations with their princes had to be destroyed, because of the chosen people, and to promote the erection of a perfect theocracy; much more must the same be done for the furtherance and protection of the Christian Church, which is a much higher theocracy! The logic is formidable and inexorable if once the premisses are admitted. Most scholastic theologians of later times, especially those of the order of Jesuits, maintain a direct power of the Pope over states, princes, and nations as to their temporal affairs. The people are reckoned the source of the power of princes, to whom they transfer it. But the institution of princely power in this way by the sovereignty of the people can only be valid through the confirmation of the Pope. According to this the Pope is the ultimate or true ground of all legitimate dominion; and it belongs, therefore, to him to crown princes, and to depose them again. The Jesuit Bellarmine avowedly modifies this doctrine. He does not recognise in the Pope a direct, but only an indirect, power over temporal princes; yet with such explanations that the Papal privileges remain fundamentally the same as if the power were direct. But so decidedly is the direct power over princes received at Rome that by the command of the Pope of that time, the furious Sixtus V., Bellarmine's work was put in the Index of books forbidden. It was not till the reign of the next Pope that the Jesuits succeeded in getting it out of the Index. Afterwards, in the seventeenth century, with all possible decision, the doctrine of the direct spiritual-temporal universal dominion of the Pope was restored. By it princes themselves, because of their sins, their religious belief, or their incapacity, might be deposed, their subjects freed from the oath of allegiance, their lands given to others, and even the princes themselves punished with imprisonment and death. This was the Roman theological doctrine of Papal power, a doctrine which agreed entirely with the Papal exercise of it. According to the theory of Catholic theologians it must accord with the will of the Pope; for in the Syllabus, as we have already remarked, it is declared to be un-Catholic and an error to say that the Popes have ever at any time exceeded their legitimate power and authority.

III.

It is impossible that modern States can endure such an ecclesiastical authority, or enter into union with it, if they are to execute their own functions and be true to their mission of culture. These functions are, to bring the entire being of humanity to its highest

development and perfection in matters spiritual as well as material. Even if they agree to the most extreme concessions as to the absolute power of the hierarchy, which claims an unlimited plenitude of divine power, yet they will not satisfy the Pope so long as they do not renounce their sovereignty, acknowledge Papal supremacy, and regard its highest privileges as a gift of grace. Unless this is done, they will find the Papacy and the Jesuits always aggressive, and always ready, as far as possible, to excite the ignorant and credulous people against the civil governments in favour of Church domination. This will be done by the watch-word that "we are to obey God rather than man." Under these circumstances there is no other way for the State to secure its independence and to render possible the execution of its functions than the perfect severance of the union with the Church; the most complete liberation from its influence as a hierarchical organization and system of government. This is what we call the complete secularization of the State. If the civil power does not do this, if it remains in union or in contract with the Church as a kind of spiritual government, then, to be consistent, it must acknowledge the higher authority of the Church over itself, and for the most part be subject to it, waiting the privileges which the Pope will be pleased to confer. But if, notwithstanding this recognition of the Church, and of the absolute Papacy as a legal power and as a direct divine authority,—that which it claims to be; if the State does not seriously regard the Church as altogether divine, but in part limits and opposes it in its claims, not merely provoking its opposition, but treating it with halfness and inconsistency, then the reproach of injustice towards the authority of the Church is not undeserved. For, in this case, the State has placed itself on the same ground with the absolute Papacy, and, notwithstanding its superhuman and supernatural pretensions, has recognised it as a power with which terms may be made. It appears then to us, that the only right and consistent thing which the State can do, is not to acknowledge the direct divine foundation which the Church maintains for itself, that is to say, to let it rest on itself in the same way as with all other religions and denominations. The State should ignore the premisses, and then it will have a right, logically and juridically, entirely to ignore the consequences. But it is altogether inadmissible, yea, irrational and illogical, to yield the premisses, and yet, arbitrarily or according to human law, to judge, limit, partly or even entirely to remove that which has been acknowledged as divine. It is not to be wondered at, if the advocates of the ecclesiastical claims say that the State and human law in this set themselves above God, and constitute themselves judges of God, since they wish to judge and limit by human measures that authority with which, notwithstanding its claims to an immediate Divinity, they have entered into

a union which presupposes an admission that these claims are valid. Such a proceeding must be dangerous to the State itself. On the one side it is granted that to the people this authority, recognised by the State, is announced as divine, supernatural, above all other, and the recognition of it to be enforced even by physical means. On the other side, the civil governments themselves limit the claims of this divine power, oppose and thwart it, so that by the people it may easily be suspected as wicked and godless.

In our judgment, the only way out of these difficulties is in the dissolution of the connection of the State and the Church, especially the Catholic Church, or the absolute Papacy. The middle age connection must be thoroughly removed, since all the grounds which gave it meaning and made it useful are now gone. The State as such can no longer believe in an immediate direct divine power in the Church or the Papacy, and yet not believingly be subject to it. On the one side, if it did this, it would illegally overstep its own province, and interfere in ecclesiastical and religious matters without either right or competency. Whilst on the other side its own sovereignty must lie in submissive obedience to that of the Church, that is, at the feet of the Pope. But again the old idea of the State as a temporal kingdom, a profane world, the special region of sin and the devil, standing over against the Church as the kingdom of God and redemption, must be regarded as an idea of the past. It can never again exercise that influence on the relation of Church and State which for centuries hitherto it has exercised, to the setting up of the authority of the Church, and the putting down of that of the State. So also every mean or superficial view of the constitution of the State must be overcome. Such as that its only duty is to take care of bodies, but that souls are the property of the Church, to be placed under its spiritual jurisdiction. The functions of the State, as we understand them now, are to form and nourish the entire human life, chiefly indeed through the furtherance of the spiritual development, but to raise also the physical material well-being, to beautify and ennoble the external as well as the spiritual existence. The State has also an ethical and intellectual function to fulfil. It is a kingdom of right, of truth, and of morality. The right ordering of human relations, and the furtherance of science and humanity in all their relations, is the goal of its endeavours. On the other hand, in regard to religion, especially the Christian religion, we are irresistibly driven to the conviction that it was not intended to be, and cannot be, an external spiritual dominion. Christ Himself expressly forbade His disciples to seek after the manner of earthly kings to rule over the faithful in his kingdom.

The relations of Church and State will have been duly considered

if we can show that the objections usually brought against the separation of this union are of no weight. The objections which chiefly concern the State are that through this separation it will be perfectly "godless," that the secularization will be a profanation. This can only be maintained according to the old way of seeing in nature and the natural formations of history a kingdom of the wicked or the devil, and only recognising something divine in miracles and in the so-called supernatural region of the Church. This view—in fact a remnant of the old Manichæan dualism—must be regarded as a stand-point which has been conquered. Nature, even matter itself in its essence and operations, is no longer regarded as a reasonless region of darkness and a kingdom of the wicked, as formerly it was, especially in the East. In consequence of scientific inquiry, it is discovered even in its minutest parts to be a kingdom of law and order, a region of rational phenomena, and so far a divine revelation. So also is it with the State. It is indeed a natural work of man, created and formed in all its relations through the natural powers of man, and yet not to be considered as a bad, profane kingdom of the world, and region of ungodliness and anti-godliness. On the contrary, it is to be regarded as the expression of the legal rational striving of the spirit, an effort continually perfecting itself, to bring the being of humanity to an expression of the full measure of reason, and to realize in it divine ideas. And therefore the State in its way is divine as well as the Church. It is at length time to admit that reason, order, and law, are the proper expressions of the divine existence and government; not that which wants order, and cannot be comprehended; not that which appears lawless and marvellous. It is for the protection and furtherance of religion itself that we desire earnestly to acknowledge, and to lead the people to acknowledge, that the highest and most manifest revelation of the Godhead is to be found in the known, the clear, the rational, and the orderly; not in the dark, the inconceivable, the incomprehensible, and what is called the miraculous. Hitherto religion and faith in God have been grounded on miracles and incomprehensibles. By these the truth of religion and the existence of God have been proved. So now every incomprehensibility explained, every law of nature or history disclosed and divested of its miraculous character, removes a pillar from religious belief, gives it a shock, or annihilates it altogether. It is then no marvel that the authority of faith and the positive theology are unfriendly to science, that they treat it with distrust, and in every way try to hinder it. The blame, however, of injuring religion does not fall fairly on science, but on the misunderstanding of religious faith, and the resting it on a wrong foundation. By the believers in positive theology the present age is charged with the worship of

reason, which puts itself in the place of the worship of God; with "Rationalism," which takes the place of faith, and renders it unnecessary. But even if this were the case, which we do not for a moment admit, it would probably be better, more worthy of man, and more pleasing to God, to reverence the divine in reason and in law, than in the inconceivable, the accidental, and the miraculous. Reason and the rational is ever the expression of the Eternal. It is the divine, that in which God is revealed, manifests Himself, works, and is. The consciousness of the divine, and the reverence of it, which are grounded in science, are firm, sure, and unchangeable; as reasonable as the religious faith commonly is, which rests only on miracles, darkness, and incomprehensibility. Morality also has a firm foundation in rational convictions, so that it cannot in any case come into collision with science.

The State then can no longer be regarded as something merely worldly, profane, or directly undivine. It appears rather as the stamp of the divine, because in it reason, right, morality, humanity, ever find their highest representation. An era therefore may begin in which again, as in the earlier times of the human race, all that happens and all that is will be regarded as the continual moving and working of God. Not merely, as in former times, that all phenomena and all the operations of nature be fantastically personified and divinized, but that through the active understanding of the orderly and rational course of existence the divine will be seen in the reign of law rather than in the miraculous. The Bible as well as Homer, ascribes great thoughts, wise counsels, and good resolutions to the influence of the Deity agreeably to the religious mode of contemplating the world in these early times. Would it not be admissible even now to maintain this, only not in the sense of a supernatural divine development or miraculous inspiration, but in the sense that the natural powers of the mind and the exercise of them is a proof or proclamation of the divine in the present constitution of the world.

With this view of the State and its functions we are, however, far from putting it in the place of religion, or from wishing to concede to it the dominion over religion and the Church. We wish rather that religion and all the forms of religion be altogether separated from the State and from civil governments. It is entirely consistent with our view that the State and religion become uniform and homogeneous, that thereby more unity and harmony come into the spiritual life of the people, and that every remnant of the Manichæan dualism should disappear; yet the State and religion are entirely distinct regions, and have very different functions to perform. The State, with all its strivings, is contained purely within the temporal,

the mere earthly stream of the transient. The goal which waves before it and towards which it aims, is only the ideal and the realization of the ideas of perfection in their earthly relations. Religion, on the other hand, in accordance with its nature, presses out continually beyond this earthly being, seeks to determine and to realize first the relation of the soul, and then of the whole of the earthly life, to the divine and eternal, to the absolute first ground and essence. Its tendency ever is to turn away from the world-striving and to sink into its divine Original.*

But religion will reform itself in accordance with this, its true essential being, and as the result of the interpretation of the State which we have given, when the State, on its side, has been put right. And Christianity must especially be made conformable to the mind and will of its Author. It must, as we have already said, cease to be a region of earthly dominion, and must at the same time cease to influence earthly relations by incantations and by means of the supernatural. It must not seek to rule over or hinder the activity and development of earthly powers, whether they be physical or mental. It must become a purely spiritual, purely inward disposition of the heart or mind, and must have for its objects only piety and morality. No more must it seek to change the course of nature through direct divine working, arbitrarily and in the way of miracle, at any moment according to the wishes or necessities of men. Its only aim must be the disinterested worship and glory of God, the purification and elevation of the human soul, the working in it of higher feelings, of a humble resigned disposition, of a pure mind and moral rectitude of will. But this inward ennobling and sanctifying of the human soul must no more be carried on in an arbitrary and accidental way, by magic and incantations, but through the individual activity of men under the intelligible influence of the universal divine government. Christ nowhere attaches importance to a magical, mysterious, divine favour, communicated as an especial gift. He everywhere teaches that men, through ethical striving, through fulfilling the will of the "Heavenly Father," shall make themselves well-pleasing to God, and obtain everlasting life. If the "Christianity of Christ" seems on the one side too much to favour fleeing from the world, this is yet more than counterbalanced by the express command of practical love to our neighbour, which is equally enforced with the command for the perfect love of God. It is to be ascribed to the influence of the old religions, which chiefly consisted of magic and theurgy, that

* These ideas are brought out more fully in the author's work "Das Christenthum und die moderne Naturwissenschaft," in the section "Das Christenthum und die moderne Civilization."

ceremonies and worship of this kind were introduced into the Christian Church, and with the same object. It may have been that, in the centuries that are past, these corresponded to the circumstances of men and nations, and so were in some sense necessary. But now that the orderly and necessary course of nature has been clearly understood, and since, through inquiries of all kinds, the old idea of God has become in part untenable, has undergone, and must still undergo purification, such religious ceremonials and continuous miracles are no more to be received. How could it accord with our idea of the all-good and all-just God, that arbitrarily, through easy and partly external mechanical means, the divine displeasure could be removed from men, or the divine favour obtained? How could God, if He can help all men by a miracle, not be willing to help all men? If He can help some without this co-operation, how can He not be able to help all? Or how can He only help half, when it is possible for Him to help all together? If He has resolved, in consequence of His power and might to help them by miracles, how is it that He leaves this help to the accident of the earthly course of this world, and to the uncertainty and weakness of human endeavours?

When these things are duly weighed, it will be admitted that the old ideas are as untenable with the course of nature as they are irreconcileable with the idea of God. In connection with this is the necessity to free the conception of divine "revelation" from the narrowness and narrow-heartedness which have been attached to it by positive theology and the Church, and to understand it in a wider and fuller sense. It is impossible to believe concerning such a God as Christ taught and science requires, that He could arbitrarily give or promise a revelation as a special privilege, that He could give it only to this or that people, preserve to them truth and law whilst He refuses these to all other men and nations, although it would have been easy for Him to communicate it also to them, and thus to free them from error, sin, and everlasting destruction. So, likewise, it is not reconcileable with the higher idea of God, and with an actual divine revelation, that it should be given to mankind and yet committed only as a peculiar inheritance to a few men who are to administer it at their will or according to their capacity. How could the Christian's God have given up the salvation of men, "His children," to the power and arbitrary will of a few weak men, if according to His goodness and justice He wills all men to be saved, is impartially disposed towards all, and has had the same object in the creation of all? The idea of revelation must then be taken in a wider sense. In reality all religion, all religious consciousness rests on revelation, on that universal and natural revelation which is given in and with the spirit of man by means of its capacity to have a God-consciousness, and thereby a religion. Hence this revelation is the ground of all

religions, and the truth or essence of religion is in all so far as they are, more or less a perfect, often, indeed, a very perverted, activity of the revelation-talent of human nature. Judaism and Christianity are not separated by an absolute cleft from all other religions, nor is their essence so different that they alone and expressly are absolutely divine, true, and perfect, while all others are undivine, false, and wicked. Even the highest pride of the orthodox might be satisfied that in Christianity they consciously recognise and practise the relatively best religion. But this will not satisfy them: they find it agreeable to Christian modesty, humility, and the belief that God is the Father of all men, to think that they and they only possess the absolute, true, and perfect religion, but that all other men are bound in chains of error and consigned to destruction! It is really time, especially for Christians, to give up this foolish imagination. In any case we are to believe that religion, with all its forms in time and space, is under definite laws of nature and history. It must follow a certain historical course of development which cannot be changed at the desire of man, and will not be changed by the power of God. We may assume that but for this, salvation would have come long ago to the human race. To learn something concerning this dark law is one of the problems of science. It must be learned ere we can understand human existence, or be able "to justify the ways of God to man."

To these remarks we only wish to add a few explanations in reference to the religious reform which out of the present crisis has arisen in the Catholic Church, and more or less also in all Christian Churches. It is highly probable that many will not be friendly to our views, that they may appear strange and contrary to their own, perhaps, also unchristian according to their views of Christianity. But we do not ask a blind assent without examination. We do not set forth these views as propositions of faith. Let them be earnestly and freely examined, and let them find as much assent or consent as the reasons we have brought forward have weight and significance. If the religious change in relation to faith and the essence of the Church which at the present time seems offered, is to be great and thorough, we must reflect that never in the course of human history has there been a period in which the views of nature and of the historical, political, and social relations, have experienced so thorough a change, on sure scientific grounds, as at present; and moreover that there has arisen the pressing necessity in the interests of religion itself to undertake a decided reform for the preservation and furtherance of its true essence, and in order so to set it forth that it may be in harmony with the certain results of science and with all other human culture; and that the people remain or again become partakers of its blessings.

J. Frohschammer.

PRINCIPLES AND ISSUES OF THE WAR.

I SIT down to write these pages (September 17th) in the midst of circumstances which have as yet no parallel in modern history. Paris, the metropolis of continental Europe, the capital of the world's pleasures, stands invested by hostile hosts, and that, not after a protracted warfare, but after a campaign of seven or eight weeks only; nor are those hosts the gathering together of a world in arms, as has been seen twice before this century, but the outpouring of a single nation, risen for the first time in its gigantic unity. It is a life-and-death duel, in the main, between Celt and Teuton, that we see: a fight, as it has been termed already, for the military championship of the world. This it is, indeed, which makes the struggle so awful a one, its immediate results so difficult to define. The presence of many different flags within the allied camps in 1814 and 1815, though it might seem to make the material force brought to bear upon France more overwhelming, bore yet with it a limiting, restraining power. The interests, the passions, of each invading nation were kept in check by the interests, the passions of every other. Here the passions, interests, of a single invading people are brought into play, giving thereby to the struggle a singularly personal character; the roused fury of the German will haughtily spurns already all control but that of sheer force.

I shall not, therefore, attempt to forecast the immediate future. I may believe still, as I believed before the beginning of this war, that both France and Germany, once on foot in self-defence, are invincible on their own soil; that, come what may in the interval, the ultimate woe inexorably betides the invader of either. I may be entirely mistaken in so believing; events may have given me the lie before my words reach their readers. What I wish mainly to consider here are—first, the principles involved in the present war; next, the more permanent issues likely to be evolved from it, as respects the two nations engaged in it, the other states of Europe, and the world at large.

At its outset—irrespectively of all pretexts on the one side or the other—the war was, on the part of the rulers of France, avowedly one for the limiting of the power and influence of Germany; one of self-defence on the part of Germany, not against the French nation as such, but against the Government of the Second Empire, in the hope of better constituting its own unity. The French declaration of war, delivered at Berlin on the 19th of July, assigns for it no other cause than that, in the refusal of the King of Prussia to pledge himself that no Hohenzollern should ever ascend the throne of Spain, "the Imperial Government has been forced to see . . . an *arrière pensée*, menacing, in like manner, to France and the European equilibrium." The public declarations of Germany are no less explicit on the other side. In the King of Prussia's speech to the North German Parliament (19th July) the following passage occurs:—

"With a clear gaze we have measured the responsibility which before the judgment seat of God and of mankind must fall upon him who drags two great and peace-loving peoples of the heart of Europe into a devastating war. The German and French peoples, both equally enjoying and desiring the blessings of a Christian civilisation, and of an increasing prosperity, are all called to a more wholesome rivalry than the sanguinary conflict of arms. Yet those who hold power in France have, by preconcerted misguidance, found means to work upon the legitimate but excitable national sentiment of our great neighbouring people, for the furtherance of personal interests and the gratification of passions."

Clearly, then, at its inception, this was, from the point of view of the Prussian government, no war of nation with nation. France was acknowledged to be "peace-loving," as well as Germany; it was the "preconcerted misguidance" of those who "hold power" which had worked upon her, so as to "drag" her into warfare. The address* of the North German Parliament, in reply to the king's speech, is still more outspoken as to the war being one of Germany against the Bonapartes:—

* Two different texts of this address have appeared in the *Times* of July 21 and 25. I follow the latter, which is, by the *Times'* correspondent, professed to be the more authentic one.

"The German nation has no more ardent wish than to live in peace and amity with all those nations which respect its honour and independence. As in 1813. . . . we are now forced again to take up arms to vindicate our rights and liberties against a Napoleon. . . . That portion of the French people which by envy and selfish ambition has been seduced into hostility against us, will too late perceive the crop of evil sure to grow out of sanguinary battle-fields. We regret that the more equitably inclined in France have failed to prevent a crime, aimed no less at the prosperity of their own country than the maintenance of amicable international relations in this part of the world. . . . Friendly nations are looking forward to our victory, which is to free some from the ambitious tyranny of a Bonaparte and to avenge the injury inflicted on so many others."

It was thus only a "portion of the French people" which had been "seduced into hostility" against Germany; the efforts of "the more equitably inclined in France" to prevent the "crime" of the war were acknowledged. The same tone of clear disavowal of the idea of a really international war between Germany and France, the same clear distinction between the acts of the French people and of its rulers pervades other important documents of the period. Thus the address to the king by the Berlin Town Council (16th July) says,—

"Two nations who might live harmoniously side by side, engaged in developing their institutions and increasing their prosperity, have been forced to a duel by a Government which cannot bear the idea of a United Germany on the borders of United France."

More emphatic still is the "Proclamation to our Countrymen" of the Committee of the National Liberal Party, embodying the vast majority of the educated middle class:—

"To mask his domestic embarrassments, to save his throne, which would otherwise succumb to the hatred and contempt of his own subjects, the sanguinary adventurer has embarked on his last military job . . . In contending against the execrable system of Bonapartism, we shall be fighting not only for our independence, but for the peace and culture of Europe. Unknown to the Germans is the lust of conquest; all they require is to be permitted to be their own masters. While protecting our own soil, language, and nationality, we are willing to concede corresponding rights to all other nations. We do not hate the French, but the Government and the system which dishonours, enslaves, and humiliates them. The French have been inveigled into war by their Government misrepresenting and calumniating us, but our victory will be their emancipation also." . . .

It would seem impossible for words to convey more strongly the sense of the German Liberals that they were about to wage war, not against the French, but against the government which "dishonoured, enslaved, and humiliated them," a war in which Germany's victory would be the "emancipation" of France. That the view was a true one is proved as well by contemporary as by subsequent events. It cannot be too strongly insisted on that the motto of the Republican party under the Second Empire has been Peace, and, as the essential

means thereto, abolition of the standing army. In the Legislative Assembly the war was resisted by them to the uttermost. When M. Ollivier (sitting of July 15) made his famous declaration that he entered upon war with a "light heart," M. Esquiros flung in his teeth at once the bitterly deserved reproof,—"You have a light heart, and the blood of nations is about to flow." When the minister persisted in declaring that war was "forced" upon the government, M. E. Arago exclaimed, "You made it." M. Depreaux again, "You have provoked it." Again M. Arago declared: "When this becomes known, the civilized world will know you to be in the wrong. . . If you make war, it is because you desire it at any price." As to the Republican papers, they were still more outspoken. The *Cloche* declared (July 16) that there was not "a shadow of pretext for the war." In fact, the government could only succeed in kindling the war-fever by the successive suppression of every one of the ultra papers, not only the *Cloche*, but the *Réveil*, *Rappel*, *Marseillaise*. In spite of all, cries of "Vive la Paix!" were raised on the Boulevards till the very outbreak of hostilities. And what was true of Paris was true also of the provinces, wherever Republican sentiments could make themselves heard. In Limoges, which has a large and energetic working class, men were arrested for shouting "Vive la Prusse!"

In short, whilst Germany took up arms as for a holy war against a crushing despotism, that portion of the French nation which most closely represented the sentiments of the popular classes, so far as these knew their own minds, was entirely averse to the struggle. Never, therefore, was there a war which gave so fair a promise of not degenerating into a mere duel, of terminating in a durable peace, so soon as the stumbling-block of the Napoleonic empire was removed, as this one.

I do not hesitate to say that at the commencement of the war my sympathies were absolutely and entirely with the Germans. For twenty years the Napoleonic *régime* had weighed upon mankind like a nightmare. It stood forth, the very Babel-kingdom of our days, the colossal embodiment of successful force and fraud. All the lies and hypocrisies, all the lusts and greeds of the world basked in its smiles, shouted its praises, whetted their swords at its bidding. It had made Paris more than ever before, the *lupanar* of the nations. Whilst banishing or choking all free speech, all free thought, all free action, it exalted the *demi-monde* into rulers of fashion, it spread throughout the world the name of "Mabille," and glorified a "Thérésa." French novels—to a great extent French newspapers—became utterly unreadable by a decent woman, the French stage unfrequentable by such. A Schneider ruled the boards of opera. Cassagnacs gave the tone to journalism. A La Roncière, who had

been convicted for rape and fulfilled his sentence, was governor of a colony. The shameless dishonesty of almost every prominent servant of the empire was notorious. A Pierre Bonaparte was a member of the Imperial family. The Emperor's mistress's brother could become, after a series of scandalously rapid promotions, a marshal and minister of war. The new Cæsarism was utterly poisoning France, and thereby poisoning Continental Europe at the heart. Whilst withholding jealously the means of self-defence to the population, reducing the National Guard to a shadow, it was assiduously building the army into a military caste, or rather a series of military castes, and, through the employment of Mussulman or heathen "Turcos" (more and more recruited from among the negroes of inner Africa), ostentatiously threatening all inward or outward foes with the most hideous barbarities of warfare. Its *militarism* was slowly penetrating the whole civilized world. As it was evidently utterly reckless in choosing pretexts for warfare—now claiming to protect Turkey against Russia, now championing the "nationality" idea on behalf of Italy, now conquering a whole realm in Cochin-China on the plea of some apocryphal, or all but apocryphal, massacre of Roman Catholics; now intervening in Mexico to set up a Latin empire in the New World—no one knew whose turn might come next, every nation felt compelled to be on its guard. Courting itself a false popularity by the recklessness of its expenditure, the French empire was raising the level of expenditure in all nations. And since every evil example, the larger the scale on which it is offered, spreads its influence to the greater distance, and into the remotest corners, there was probably not a well-to-do household throughout the civilized world in which the rate of expenditure was not increased through the ever-increasing extravagance of the Tuileries, and the caprices of an Empress, the acknowledged arbitress of the world's fashions. Meanwhile, as extravagance always goes side by side with dishonesty, the wildest speculations, distinctly originating with certain notorious French experiments on the purses of the simple, were more and more contaminating the commerce of the world. Perhaps it was in this quarter that our own nation most suffered through the corrupting influences of the Second Empire. The soil had been but too well prepared amongst us by our railway mania, amongst other causes, not to yield a rich growth of financial rascalities when the seed was wafted from over the Channel.

Sooner or later some nation or other must have risen up against this baleful oppression. As it happened, the lot fell to Germany so to do. Her attitude at the first seemed to show how fully she felt the moral grandeur of her part. It was resolute but unboastful, grandly self-possessed in its moderation. Even after the com-

mencement of hostilities, even after the first German successes, the proclamation of King William from Saarbrück "to the inhabitants of the French territories occupied by the German armies" seemed to confirm this fair promise:—

"The Emperor Napoleon having made by land and by sea an attack on the German nation, which desired and still desires to live in peace with the French people, I have assumed the command of the German armies to repel this aggression, and I have been led by military circumstances to cross the frontiers of France, and am waging war against soldiers, not against French citizens. The latter consequently will continue to enjoy security for their persons and property so long as they themselves shall not by hostile attempts against the German troops deprive me of the right of according them my protection" . . .

This is more than the ordinary form of address by an invader to the civil population of the invaded land. The attack spoken of is only that of "the Emperor Napoleon." Only "military circumstances" have led the King to "cross the frontiers of France." "French citizens"—not merely, as it would have been easy to say, private individuals—will "continue to enjoy security," unless by hostile attempts they "deprive" the King of "the right of protecting" them. If no express pledge against annexation be given, it is yet impossible not to see that such words imply all through the recognition of the French nationality of the occupied territories, and the purely temporary character of the occupation.

Then came the three days' slaughter before Metz, the fall of the Ollivier cabinet, its substitution by the makeshift Palikao one, obviously chosen rather with a view to hostilities against Paris than against Prussia; the final downfall of the French military system before Sédan, and that unheard-of capitulation, the huge caricature of that of Fontainebleau, which surrendered France's last army and her Emperor;—and to sum up all, the indignant sweeping away of the Empire itself by an irresistible impulse of universal contempt, on the 2nd September, and the sudden flinging of the reins of power into the hands of that minority which had combated the war and condemned it.

Now, after this wonderful stroke of God's avenging Providence in the fall of the Second Empire, without a blow being struck for its defence, the original principles of the war ceased to operate. As a warfare of Germany against the Bonapartes, that war was virtually at an end. It did not require the assurances of Jules Favre's circular to prove to the German nation that all thought of aggression on the independence and unity of Germany was withdrawn; his mere signature was sufficient for the purpose. Had the King of Prussia been faithful to the spirit of his speech to his Parliament, he would at once, without waiting even for the action

of the new Government, have addressed himself to the "peace-loving people" of France, freed henceforth from the yoke of those whose "preconcerted misguidance" had "dragged" it into war, offering to return the sword into its sheath. That he has not done so, shows that a new war has virtually begun, upon new principles, a war on the part of Germany no longer against the Bonapartist tyranny, but against the French Nation.

What the principles of this new war are is as yet set forth, on the German side, in no authoritative documents.* But they may be clearly discerned from the acts of the Government and of its armies, no less than from all manner of unofficial utterances : over and above enormous money indemnities, annexation of territory, either on its own account, or as a mere *glacis* to fortresses, is pronounced to be necessary to the security of Germany. French administrative denominations, the division into departments of occupied territory, are ignored, old provincial designations revived, a governor of "Elsass" and "Lothringen" has been appointed. The forcible reduction, at almost any cost, of Strasburg, has become one of the main objects of military operations. Those "French citizens" to whom the King of Prussia had promised his "protection," when, "led by military circumstances," he was about to "cross the frontiers of France," are treated as subjects bound to allegiance. A captive Emperor, a Regency in flight, are affected to be considered as being still the rulers of France. When voices are raised in Germany for peace without annexation, summary measures dispose of such impertinence. Brunswick workmen are seized and sent to the Russian frontier. Even a politician of high character and prominent standing like Jacoby has been put under arrest, and public meetings are wholly forbidden in Königsberg. Force rules once more in Germany—force alone is brought to bear on France, which, on her side,

* Since the above lines were in print, Count Bismarck's circular of September 16 has appeared, which declares that "France, if she asks a peace, only desires a truce;" that "there must be no hesitation in weakening her;" that "the fortresses of Strasburg and Metz menace Germany, and therefore it is necessary to turn them against France, and to take possession of Alsace and Lorraine. Doubtless," the Chancellor adds, "the territory of France will be exposed to the invasion of our armies, but *our mild and peaceable character is a guarantee to her against that peril.*" It will be seen that the tone of this circular is in direct opposition to that of the King of Prussia's speech to the North German Parliament and the other documents above quoted. The declaration that the "mild and peaceable character" of the German race is to be France's sole guarantee against German invasion, is a piece of irony which will be appreciated not only by Frenchmen, but by Italians, who know for how many centuries the "Tedeschi" weighed upon their own race and denied its nationality; by Poles, who have seen two German powers join with Russia to extirpate their own; by Danes, who after having been kept to this hour out of North Schleswig, in spite of treaty stipulations, see at this moment a claim raised that the treaty should be ignored against them altogether. The reasoning in the text is only confirmed by the publication of the circular in question.

sues for peace on almost any terms, short of the abandonment of populations united to her by generations of a common nationality, only the more genuine, because in the case of Alsace it has outweighed diversity of speech.

Of the present temper of the German people I can give no better instance than some extracts from a letter by a friend, a Frankforter, whose family resides in Bavaria; not a combatant, but a proximate Professor of Political Economy; not a Prussian partizan, but, on the contrary, one who two years ago could scarcely be reconciled to the Prussianizing of his native republic; not one who has lived in a hole, and speaks and thinks at second-hand, but a man of singularly independent judgment, of wide experience in the knowledge of his own country, of considerable travel, familiar with, and passionately fond of, England. In an earlier letter, dated 25th July (which contained some curious details as to the then absence of enthusiasm for the war among the main bulk of the population of South Germany), he had warned me that the effect of German victory would be that King William would become Kaiser of Germany, "and probably the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine, the dream of every German patriot." On the 30th August, he wrote to me as follows in respect to those territories:—

"In the wrong which we suffered with regard to those two provinces we see incarnated all the wrong which we have suffered from the French since there was a distinct French and German history. If we were to settle accounts for all these wrongs, we should have to take far more from France. Look at our history. Whenever you will find that we have reason to be ashamed of it, you will find that the French had their hand in it. Ever since the ninth century they have sown discord amongst us, in order to weaken us, and to seem strong by our weakness. German history is at the same time the history of French iniquity. The remembrance alone of how they behaved in the Thirty Years' War makes one's blood boil; and when shortly afterwards, whilst we were living with them in full peace, they on a sudden seized upon Strasburg, is a crime, the desire of revenge for which is even now most keenly alive, even in the lowest regions of our people. Whoever has passed through a school thinks first of Strasburg, when he hears of war with France, and our 'Volkslieder' in the mouth of the most illiterate peasant or shepherd prove how the people feel it still a living member of our own body. It is a most noteworthy sign that at once after the victories of Worth and Forbach there appeared a letter in one of the Munich papers from a member of the anti-Prussian majority in the Bavarian chamber, declaring that he was ready to submit readily, as to a 'Deutsche Kaiser,' to him who should recover to the Empire what had been lost in the worst days of its decadence. The only means to obtain German unity, to make our internal feuds disappear and to make all parties willingly bow under the new Kaiser, is the recovering of Alsace and Lorraine. Do you know what was the German title of our former Kaisers? They were called 'Mehrer des Reichs.' And what was the misfortune of the Hapsburg dynasty, and what the title of Prussia's claim to the lead in Germany?

That instead of augmenting the Empire, the Hapsburgers by their weakness lost one province after the other, whilst the Prussians claimed that Germany was in their camp . . . .

"Besides, we want Alsace and Lorraine for military reasons. The Rhine is no frontier to protect us from an inroad. We want the Vosges, we want Metz, and the Ardennes. The French, whether Royal, Imperial, or Republican, have always shown a most dangerous inclination to fight us. Another time we might not be so lucky as to be able to fight our battles on their ground; and Zouaves and Turcos might commit their atrocities against our wives and daughters. There must be a definitive stop put to this danger. And whether the Alsatians and Lorrainers now like our rule or not is a thing not of the slightest importance. If they knew how to adjust themselves in so short a time to the foreigner they will know how to do so in a still shorter time to their kindred. The present generation will be subdued by an army of soldiers, the next by an army of schoolmasters. The question as to annexations is not whether the people, whose annexation becomes necessary, like it or not, but whether there is a possibility of making them sound and patriotic members of their new country. . . . . The present anti-German whim of Alsatians and Lorrainers is absolutely indifferent as compared with the security and prosperity of a nation like ours. You say, it is true, that our possessing Alsace and Lorraine will drive France to war again. This may be. But France will attempt anyhow to revenge her present defeats, and to recover her *prestige* in Europe. . . . . And we certainly will be better able to hold our position with defensible frontiers than without them. Thus the possession of these two provinces is for us not a question of territorial aggrandizement, but the question of our position in Europe; it is the question whether we are to be the first or the French. . . . . The feeling against France is daily rising higher, and daily it becomes bitterer. Besides, the losses of our victories have been awful. There are very many families already in mourning, few that have not a friend or relative wounded, none that have no one in danger. . . . . The longer the struggle will be, the harder the conditions. . . . . I and a lot of others would still now enter the army as common soldiers, if any reverse in the fortune of war should endanger what we have already won by the blood of our brothers."

And the letter winds up with an almost violent tirade of invective against England (to which the writer is nevertheless, as I have said, deeply attached, so much so that but a few months ago he was thinking of taking up his residence in this country) apparently for not at once joining Germany in the war.

From the above expressions of one who had so much reason, so much capacity for being moderate and impartial, may be judged the wildness of passion, the cynicism of self-interest which must pervade those Germans whose prejudices and preferences have been from the first enlisted on behalf of Prussia, those who smart with feelings of personal revenge for their own sufferings or those of near and dear ones, those who seek their fortunes through victory and conquest, or merely those who are carried away by popular clamour, maddened by popular calumnies, always so rife against a foe. The mournfulness of such pleas for the spoliation of a neighbour is that they are identically the same in character—*minus* a little literary

archæology—as those French pleas for the annexation of the Rhenish provinces, which gave a colour of nationality to the war on the French side. Germany has the Thirty Years' War and all subsequent French invasions to avenge. France has 1791, 1814, 1815, Waterloo. France thinks a river her necessary military frontier; therefore she must have the Rhine. Germany thinks a range of mountains; therefore she must have the Vosges and the Ardennes. Germany claims that Alsace and Lorraine must be German, because centuries ago they were vassals to a German "Reich." But from the earliest days of Frankish invasion the Rhineland was Frankish, and the great Emperor of the West, if he made his palace at Aachen, did it only that he might the better chastise the Saxon barbarians with his rod of iron. If a prince's title to sovereignty be the "enlargement of the realm," the most lawless conqueror is the most lawful king. The annexation of Nice and Savoy gave an increase of right to the Second Empire, the annexation of the Rhine would have justified it still further. If the sentiments of Alsatians and Lorrainers are to go for nothing, every nation is a prey to every other. If rivers of blood are to be shed in order to determine which of two nations is to be the first in Europe, France had, and will have, as much right to begin war as Germany, and those rivers of blood need never cease to flow.

In short, on the principles on which the war appears now to be carried on by Germany, whatever slight indications of the development of a truly Christian policy we may fancy to have perceived among the nations of Europe are swept away. The ideal greatness of a people is once more the pagan one of victory and conquest.

The plea of a convenient military frontier is just the one on which Austria so long claimed her Quadrilateral from Italy, on which Denmark has been spoliated in North Schleswig; on it Holland may be despoiled to-morrow by Germany, as France to-day. If a century, two centuries, are to create no prescription between nations, where will such prescription begin? Is there one state in continental Europe whose area within Europe itself—let alone other parts of the world—Spain only and Portugal excepted, is the same as it was only one century ago? If language and popular songs are to prevent such prescription from occurring, then must Switzerland be riven asunder, whilst England would have an eternal right to "re-vindicate" the whole United States. In short, every reason urged by Germany for the annexation of its long-lost provinces is one urged not against the security and integrity of France alone, but against the security of all Europe, of the world, the integrity of almost every state in Christendom.

But whether or not Alsace and Lorraine, or any portion of them,

be annexed to Germany—and the utmost the most hopeful of Frenchmen can look forward to probably is that they should *not* be—the issues of the war remain substantially the same. That German unity under Prussian leadership stands henceforth constituted, whether or not the "Kaiserthum" be immediately restored, is conceded on all sides. But that unity will be essentially one after the Prussian pattern, based on the subordination of the civil element to the military, or, at all events, of the haughty independence of the latter; a unity of the drill-sergeant, which may allow oceans of parliamentary talk out of drill hours, but when these have come, allows no talking in the ranks, and marches off any citizen to prison in war time, however humble or however eminent, who dares to talk of peace without increase of territory, whilst only 100,000 Germans have lost their lives on the battle-field.

For France, on the other hand, the sure consequence is the final collapse of all "Napoleonian Ideas," the utter downfall of militarism. On the political present, or immediate future of the country it is needless to speculate. The present Republic may either stand or fall; the Orleans dynasty may or may not sit again on the throne. I cannot believe in the latter case that any such restoration can be other than temporary. Dynastic loyalty is a thing of the past in France. A few specimens of it may still exist in châteaux of the west or of the south. But no mass—not even a group of men, I feel sure—can be found in any part of France who are willing to sacrifice their lives for the rule of a family. Hence, the future of France must be essentially republican, however short or however long a time it may take her to find the form of Republic which suits the genius of her people. Moreover, such Republic must be one of peace. The antagonism between militarism and monarchy on the one hand, and a Republic only to be armed for self-defence on the other, became irreconcileable before Sédan. I do not say that many a torch might not be lighted throughout Europe through a French Republic. But it would only be by the hands of oppressed and discontented peoples. No truly national government has anything to fear from a French Republic. France ceases henceforth to be a terror to the world. If she does not remain hopelessly prostrated by the struggle, its blessings will eventually be mainly for her. She will be purged from military ambition, from the vain thirst for glory; she will learn to understand true freedom, and acquire a true self-respect by respecting the rights of other nations.

Very bitter, however, unless the German temper changes greatly from what it now is, must be for a long time yet the feelings of France towards Germany. The balance of magnanimity was for a long time on the German side. It can hardly be said to be so now.

Even if we admit the starving and maltreatment of the surrendered army at Sédan, the frightful massacre of Bazeilles, the outrages on women, of which Mr. Alfred Seymour bears witness, to have been but exceptional instances, the family of every ruined peasant, still more of every one who has been put to death—hanged, drawn, and quartered, as seems to have been one form of such executions—for the crime of firing a shot in defence of his fatherland, will long cherish a deep hatred for the German. It is idle to say that if the French had invaded Germany they would have done worse. The fact is, that in exchange for a few shells thrown into Saarbrücken or Kehl, France has been ravaged to the very walls of Paris. The heavy debt of suffering, with all its attendant rancours, lies to German credit for every Frenchman.

But if France ceases to be a danger to Europe, it is not so with Germany. For the time being, Germany has shown itself stronger than France. But it is, as I have shown above, *Prussianized* Germany; a Germany inheriting all the unscrupulousness of Prussian policy, from a Frederick the Great to a Bismarck; ready to invade a coveted territory on one plea, and to retain it on one directly opposite, as in that noteworthy Schleswig-Holstein instance, in which provinces were first wrested from Denmark on the plea of German right, and then annexed to Prussia, according to the solemn opinion of the Prussian Crown lawyers, taken *after* the war, that inasmuch as the King of Denmark had alone any right to them, and Germany consequently none, Prussia had succeeded to the Danish title by right of conquest.

With this powerful, unscrupulous military nation in her midst, Europe, whatever be her longings for peace, must remain under arms. Not, indeed, after the old fashion. The phrase now hackneyed, that the nation in arms has conquered the army, is essentially a true one. The power of the army as a military caste has been shattered for ever with the fall of the Second French Empire. Every State—some after one manner, some after another—must learn how to habituate its whole population to the use of arms. Eventually there is a vast promise to human freedom in this great fact. Substantially, every mere personal despotism, every government which does not succeed in identifying itself with the feelings and aspirations, passions at least, of the people ruled by it, must become impossible. But in the present uninstructed state of the masses it is impossible not to see that it will be too easy in many cases for a government to rule by the passions of those masses, since German passion, no longer principle, as we have seen, is that which now carries on the war. Hence the form of the German triumph entails unfortunately a prolongation of that terrible state of military *tension*, if I may so call it, of "bloated armaments," ever-increasing

expenditure for naval and military purposes, for which the Second French Empire has hitherto been responsible. There will have been but a displacement of Europe's danger.

Another still more awful issue of the war must be steadily looked in the face. It has been unprecedented in point of slaughter. Engines of warfare have been employed of a deadliness hitherto unexampled, not only at ranges where death was hitherto impossible, but at ranges where it would seem beyond escape; since "chassepots" and "needle-guns" have been used at fifty paces. Yet we are only on the threshold of horrors still greater. The reign of nitro-glycerine in warfare—that fearful compound of which the mere leavings in a can supposed to have been entirely emptied of it, were sufficient the other day in Scotland to kill six persons and wound several others—is but commencing. The shells filled with it which it is said are to be shed over devoted Strasburg, are assuredly only the precursors of warlike contrivances at which the imagination stands aghast. Where weapons now in use slay their hundreds, those of the future will perhaps slay their tens of thousands. Professor Tyndall speaks of putting the sky into a snuff-box. The means for destroying all London could probably be put into a couple of walnut shells.

Moreover, to the frightful waste of human life entailed by the present scale and appliances of warfare, corresponds henceforth a corresponding frightful waste of the means of existence. Where armies have to be reckoned by the hundred thousand, they must be fed, clothed, &c., by the hundred thousand. In an invasion, the feeding, clothing, &c., of the invading host must primarily be borne by the producing classes of the invaded country. The mass of these barely earn more than their own subsistence. The burthen of the invasion is simple ruin to them. If one hundred thousand Frenchmen have little more than enough to feed themselves and their families, and they are compelled to feed one hundred thousand Germans, it is simply death to nearly so many Frenchmen, if the burthen be at all prolonged. The thing may be done in the most orderly manner; requisitions may be signed and counter-signed by any number of officials, receipts scrupulously given for any "required" article. But of what avail are such receipts, payable after the war, to the man who needs the article so "required," if not to-day, yet to-morrow, or the next day, or the day after that? A friend who has tracked the invading army to near Metz, sleeping always in peasants' houses, declares that from the ravage already done, France will take two centuries to recover. Already the immediate theatre of war has been so utterly wasted that the troops investing Metz have to be fed from Germany; and the correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* saw Hessian soldiers fainting away with the hunger of three whole

foodless days. And the Germans talk of levying on France a war-contribution of £200,000,000 sterling!

Nay, if they persist in their present claims for territory it is almost a matter of necessity for them to crush France with their exactions. Metz fortified, in the hands of the foreigner, is alone such a permanent threat to Paris that France, if she retains any means for doing so, must remain armed to the teeth ready to reconquer her own on the first opportunity. But no German, indeed, affects to deny that France will be always aiming at the recovery of her lost provinces. She must be ruined before she ceases to do so.

Yes, a war which to the day of my closing this article has barely yet lasted two months, has brought a great country of forty millions of souls, one of the foremost in the civilization of the world, to the very verge of ruin. Can we realize this stupendous fact? Do we understand that the rich, prosperous, luxurious France of yesterday, so large a customer for the products of other nations, so prolific a caterer for their wants in turn, in almost all that is daintiest and most refined, from choicest wines to richest silks and newest fashions, exists, so to speak, no longer; that a poor, struggling, all but bankrupt France, holds her place, which a literally bankrupt, crushed, hopeless France may fill to-morrow? Can we measure the void which would be made in the world by the utter downfall of France? The curse of the ages would rest upon Germany if she were allowed to fulfil that downfall; upon all other nations who should tamely stand by to see it consummated.

I believe still that Prussian politicians are too shrewd to carry matters to this extremity. I am sure that no nation would more immediately suffer through the utter prostration of France than Germany herself. But the mere fact of such a possibility being discussed is a terrible lesson to all other nations. This war has indeed been distinguished by one remarkable feature hitherto—its being absolutely confined to two combatants—the strict ring which has been formed round it by all other nations. Only Italy,—like Mr. Winkle when he assaulted the small boy, but with a much shrewder eye to the main chance,—is taking her part in the fray by bowling down that smallest of European potentates after the Prince of Montenegro, the Infallible One who rules at the Vatican.—But mere non-interference will not do another time.

War is henceforth too horrible, too profligate, too ruinous a thing for the nations to carry on. The time is coming when peace must be *enforced*. It is idle for each people separately, large or small, to be arming to the teeth at the peril of destruction. What is needed is a league of peace among States, and the nation which dares to initiate such a league will carry the bulk of the civilized world with

her. That initiative belonged of right, and, as it were, by the instinct of the world, to England. Alone perhaps in all Europe, she has no reason to covet one inch of territory not her own; she demands but to be respected; her fleet must almost of necessity rule the seas. Alone in all Europe, she has, through the long enjoyment of freedom, learnt thoroughly the value of peace. But England's part in this contest, I am sorry to have to say so, has been hitherto miserably small. She has mediated when there was no danger in mediating, and shrunk from mediating when there was. Her Belgian treaty is the laughing-stock of Europe, a paper promise which the sword of Prussia almost already threatens to tear in pieces. Yet had she from the first stepped forward to organize a league of neutrals, half Europe was already eager to enter into it. The smallest State in such a confederacy would have its value, if it acted up to the proportion of its engagements. But Austria and Italy, prominent second-rate Powers at least, if the one be no longer, the other not yet, first-rate, were awaiting but a signal. Such a league, with the various contingents at its disposal, with the fleet of England to rule the seas, would have been able at any time to interfere in the conflict with overwhelming weight, if it were carried to extremities dangerous themselves to European peace hereafter; it would have the power, for instance, as I believe it would be its duty, to insist on the adequate maintenance of the power of France. It is perhaps not even now too late. But unless a police of the world be organized ere long; unless the enormous power which modern appliances of warfare give, and will increasingly give, to one nation for the destruction of others be met by the confederated forces of all; if the mere policy of non-intervention with folded hands be persisted in from quarrel to quarrel; the world may find itself drifting, as a result of so-called modern civilization, into a state of lawless anarchy, such as has not been known since the darkest ages. The fall of France, if it carries a fearful warning as to the ultimate retribution which must fall upon an ambitious military despotism, contains a no less fearful one as to the perils of a selfish national individualism. It cries aloud to the world, "The wars of the future will be wars of annihilation; unite for peace, ye nations, lest ye perish."

J. M. Ludlow.

MUSIC AND EMOTION.

The Fount of Colour.

THE sun smiting through crystal drops shakes its white light into blue, and red, and yellow fire; and, as the beads of freshly-fallen rain tremble in the wind, we may see the primary colours of the rainbow, combined and recombined with wondrous alchemy into more subtle flame of emerald, purple, and orange. A cloud passes over the sky, and in a moment every tiny globe hangs before us, scintillant still, but pale and colourless, with its one quivering speck of crystalline light. Then we can see with quiet eyes the metallic lustre upon the wide blue wings of the Brazilian butterfly—the green dissolving into glitter of rubies upon the breast of the humming-bird—the long reaches of golden king-cups in June meadows, or opal tints upon wet shells and blown foam. Have we not looked into the great laboratories of light itself? Have we not seen the essential colours in the very moment of their evolution falling like shattered flame-flakes from the sun? Is it so strange to find them mingled bountifully with all created things, and made fast in every conceivable tint upon plume of bird and petal of flower?

The painter goes forth each day into a new Eden, and finds his palette ready laid for him. He cannot choose but take the materials and follow the suggestions which Nature so freely gives him. He, too, can combine and recombine; can distribute his hues in concord

and discord of colour; can associate them with definite images, or making them the vehicles of poetic emotion, paint "the sunshine of sunshine, and the gloom of gloom."

The Fount of Sound.

The wailing of the wind at night, the hum of insect life, the nightingale's note, the scream of the eagle, the cries of animals, and, above all, the natural inflections of the human voice—such are the rough elements of music, multitudinous, incoherent, and formless. Earth, and sea, and air are full of these inarticulate voices; sound floats upward from populous cities to the cloudland, and thunder rolls down its solemn answer from on high. Alone by the sea we may listen and hear a distinct and different tone each time the swelling wavelet breaks crisply at our feet; and when the wind with fitful and angry howl drives inland the foam of the breakers, the shriek of the retiring surge upon the shingles will often run through several descending semitones.

Nature and Art.

It would seem, then, that we have only to take the colour and the sound provided for us by nature and transform them at once through the arts of Painting and Music into the interpreters of human thought and emotion. But, in reality, between music and painting there is fixed a great gulf of difference. Nature gives man the art of painting, as it were, ready made. For him the sun sets and rises, and the summer glows, and the woods change so softly and slowly beneath his gaze that he has time to chronicle every tint before it has passed away. All forms of beauty, from the supreme outline of the human body to the filmy speck of the minutest insect, are constantly limning themselves upon the retina of his eye until his sensitive brain is supplied with objects of enchanting loveliness, which he is at liberty to reproduce and recombine at will. And nature not only provides the painter with fair forms and rich colours, but she also teaches him the magical art of selection and arrangement.

But what has she done for the musician? She has given him sound, not music. Nowhere does there fall upon his ear, as he walks through the wide world, such an arrangement of consecutive sounds as can be called a musical subject, or theme, or melody. Far less do we find anything approaching such a combination as musical harmony. The thunder is not affecting because it is melodic, but because it is loud and elemental. The much extolled note of the lark is only pleasant because associated with the little warbler, the "sightless song" in the depth of the blue sky, for when the lark's trill

is so exactly imitated (as it can be with a whistle in a tumbler full of water) that it deceives the very birds themselves, it ceases to be in the least agreeable, just as the moaning of the wind, which can also be well imitated by a person with compressed lips in the next room, ceases under such circumstances to be in the least romantic. The nightingale's song when at its best has the advantage of being a single and not unpleasantly loud whistle. That, too, can be imitated so as to defy detection. But once let the veil of night be withdrawn, and the human nightingale disclosed, and we shall probably all admit that his performance is dull, monotonous, and unmeaning. The cuckoo, who often sings a true third, and sometimes a sharp third or even a fourth, is the nearest approach to music in nature, but this tuneful fowl gets less credit for his vocal powers than almost any other, and whilst he is screamed at and hunted from hedge to hedge by his own species as a very outlaw among birds, he is voted but a coarse and vulgar songster by man. At any rate, though some may admire his call as the herald note of spring, yet when "cuckoo cuckoo" is blown, as boys know how to blow, upon the hollow fists, no one except the cuckoo cares to listen to the strain for its own sweet sake. The cries of most large birds, such as the ostrich and peacock, are intolerably disagreeable. Nor are the voices of the animals, from the pig, the cat, and the donkey downwards, any better. Poets from time immemorial have tried to throw dust in the eyes of mankind whenever they have touched upon this subject, but it is high time the truth should be told. The harmonies of nature are purely metaphorical. There is no music in nature, neither melody nor harmony: music is the creation of man. He does not reproduce in music any combination of sounds he has ever heard or could possibly hear in the natural world, as the painter transfers to his canvas the forms and tints that he sees around him. No: the musician seizes the rough element of sound and compels it to work his will; and having with infinite pains subjugated and tamed it, he is rewarded by discovering in it the most direct and perfect medium in all nature for the expression of his emotions.

The painter's art lies upon the surface of the world; its secrets are whispered by the yellow corn-fields spotted with crimson fire and the dappled purple of heather upon the hills; but the musician's art lies beneath the surface. His rough material of sound is like the dull diamond, earth-encrusted and buried in deep mines; it simply does not exist as a brilliant and a thing of priceless beauty and value fit for human service, until it has been refined and made luminous by deliberate arrangement of glittering facets, and set in splendour of chaste gold.

Music and other Arts.

And then—what then, it will be asked, what does all this manipulation of sound end in? what is the value or dignity of this art of music?

We easily recognise the foundation of other arts. The art of sculpture rests upon the fact that when man awakens to a sense of the beauty, power, or even grotesqueness of form, he is impelled by a creative instinct to reproduce, select, and combine its various qualities—firstly, that he may perpetuate the forms of fleeting beauty that he sees around him; and secondly, that he may impart to the ideal conceptions of his imagination an outward and concrete existence. We are not ashamed to derive the keenest satisfaction from the Niobe or the Antinous, for we see in these a perennial and dignified expression of human grace and pathos. And even when we turn to such painful and distorted figures as the Laocoon, although we may call them "debased art" according to our canons of taste, yet neither these nor any other specimens, however corrupt or weak, can affect the real dignity of sculpture itself. Similarly, the art of painting rests upon a rational impulse to select and combine colours, chiefly in connection with intelligible forms, and subjects of definite interest; and although painting is less definite in some respects, and less complete in others, than sculpture, yet its range is wider, its material infinitely more ductile, whilst its command of emotion through the vehicle of colour, and of ideas through variety of outline, gives it an importance and dignity which it would be difficult to over-estimate. Even such an art as legerdemain is capable of a satisfactory explanation; for it is the outward realization in one department, however narrow, of certain excellent qualities of the eye and hand.

A Phidian sculpture, a picture by Titian, even a conjuring trick by Professor Frikell, can be accounted for and justified in a few words. But when we come to a symphony by Beethoven, philosophy is dumb, or rides off upon a quibble about the scientific structure of music or its technical qualities, all true and interesting, no doubt, but still leaving untouched the great art-problem of music—what is the rationale of its existence, what the secret of its power over the soul?

Music, as distinguished from the various rude attempts of the past, is only about 400 years old. Modern music, which is alone worthy of the name, is in fact the youngest of the arts, and stands at present in a correspondingly unfavourable position: for whilst it has been brought to the highest perfection, the secret of its power is almost wholly unexplored; and as long as this is the case, music

must continue to be ranked last among the fine arts. But the day is at hand when the veil of the prophetess will be lifted. Already in Germany, the land of thought, music has been adopted as the national art — as painting was once in Italy, and sculpture in Greece. Already the names of Beethoven and Mozart are whispered through the civilized world in the same breath with those of Phidias and Michael Angelo, and the time is probably not far distant when music will stand revealed perchance as the mightiest of the arts, and certainly as the one art peculiarly representative of our modern world, with its intense life, complex civilization, and feverish self-consciousness.

It has often been said that music is the language of the emotions; but what there is in music to act upon emotion, or how it both expresses and excites it, sometimes compelling the mind to clothe the awakened emotion with definite ideas—at others, dispensing with ideas altogether—this has never yet been explained. With the cautiousness and humility of one who feels himself upon untrodden ground, I offer the following reflections as a contribution to the much neglected study of musical psychology.

Emotions and Ideas.

We cannot do better than start with the popular assertion that music is the language of the emotions. But before we attempt to show the points of contact between emotion and its art-medium, and before we can understand how it is that music finds itself on the same plane of action with the emotions, and so fitted to become at one time their minister expressing them, at another their master commanding them, it will be necessary to form a clear and almost concrete conception of the emotions themselves. Of course we can no more get to the root of that aspect of life exhibited in emotion, than we can get to the root of life itself in man, or beast, or vegetable. Life is only known by the sensations and appearances which accompany it—by its proximate, and not its ultimate causes. Speaking physically, then, what happens when a person is moved or excited? A certain quickening of the blood as it rushes through the heart, or what we call a hurried pulse, and a corresponding disarrangement of molecules in the brain. If it were not for these, we should not be capable, constituted as we are at present, of experiencing any emotion at all. The nature of our emotions may depend either upon the nature of external objects presented to the senses, or upon internal and unexplained processes connected with what we call our thoughts. Now, what most people are alive to is the existence of emotions in their more intense forms. Once in the course of the day, or two or three times during the month, they have been greatly moved or

excited pleasurably or otherwise. But what few people realise is, that emotion is actually coextensive with consciousness. Physically this is the case, for there is no pause in the incessant disturbance and rearrangement of the cerebral molecules which are inseparably connected with the phenomena of human consciousness, and human consciousness itself is nothing but an uninterrupted concatenation of emotions, most of them so unimportant, so involved, and succeeding each other with such intense rapidity, that we take no note of them. Like distant lights in a dark night, only those of a certain brightness are visible to the naked eye. As a traveller in a railway-carriage sees the objects fly by him with a rapidity which lessens the impression that each is calculated to make by itself, but takes note of a cathedral or a regiment of soldiers, so the multitudinous objects and events that crowd upon us during the most uneventful day may indeed affect us consciously, and produce a great variety of feelings without once awakening the self-consciousness of a strong emotion.

It may be a relief to the reader if we ask him to pause at this stage of the proceedings, and analyze very roughly a few of the emotions which in a very short space he is in the habit of experiencing. It would require volumes to analyze properly the emotional history of a single hour, but the reality and continuity of such a history may be briefly indicated.

On first awakening we may all have experienced at times a puzzled kind of feeling. This is produced by the conflict between the conditions of the waking and the sleeping states. A feeling of doubt, as to whether we are really going to be hanged, as we just now dreamed, is succeeded by a sense of relief, passing quickly into a sense of humour, which in its turn is arrested by a sense of depression caused by the eye falling on a letter containing bad news received on the previous night. Then follows a train of speculation, resulting in an infinite series of little elations and depressions as we take a hopeful view of the concern or otherwise. A knock at the door brings a welcome distraction, and we leap up with an energy which is really the result of a complex state of feeling; that is to say, emotion of relief at getting rid of a disagreeable subject; emotion caused by a resolution to get dressed; emotion caused by anxiety to be in time for an engagement; emotion caused by a chilly feeling, which reminds us of a fire down-stairs, &c., &c. Upon opening the door and seizing the hot-water jug, we experience a sudden depression on finding the water barely tepid; but quick as thought the elation of anger succeeds as we rush to the bell-rope, which comes down beneath our too vigorous efforts, and again supplies us with a complex emotion; emotion of resentment against the servant, the cause

of all the mischief; ditto against the carpenter who put up the bell-rope the day before; ditto against ourselves for angry haste; reflex feeling of resolve to be more careful next time; prospective feeling of annoyance at having to pay for putting up the rope again. It is perhaps needless to continue the analysis of that internal life which consists of such an infinite variety of important, trivial, and complex feelings. But before we consider how music deals with emotion, we must try and seize the fact that the history of each hour does not only consist of outward incidents, but that each one of these incidents and objects, as also every thought which flits through the mind, has its own accompanying emotion, or train of emotions, and that the whole of human life forms one vast emotional fabric, begun long before thought, and continued down to the feeblest pulse of second childhood.

Abstract Emotion.

Hitherto we have considered emotion in connection with definite images such as letters, bell-ropes, hot-water jugs: but it is quite a mistake to suppose that definite ideas are indispensable to the existence of emotion.

We may be tempted to think that emotions derive all their importance and dignity from the nature of the ideas with which they happen to be associated. The very reverse of this, however, is the case. Emotion is often weakened by association with ideas, whereas ideas are always strengthened by emotion. Indeed emotion is the very breath and life-blood of an idea, which without it would remain but a pale and powerless shadow, incapable of asserting itself, or of exercising any kind of influence, good or bad. As the sun brings light and warmth to the visible world, as without it the whole realm of physical life would lie forlorn in one long midnight of cold paralysis, even so the solar orb of our emotions kindles each thought and endows each conception with fertile activity. What power can any idea have without emotion? When a man is exhausted with hunger and fatigue you may pass through his mind the most striking thoughts of Shakspeare or the most thrilling images of Byron, they will be without effect, because of the absence of emotional force in him. On the other hand, the commonest object in nature, a wayside daisy, "the meanest flower that blows," seen a thousand times without the smallest emotion, may one day be seen with the poet's eye, and will suddenly be found to contain thoughts "too deep for tears."

No doubt, granting a certain measure of sensibility, out of a definite idea an emotion of some sort will arise; it is equally true that out of an indefinite emotion corresponding ideas will often arise.

But there is this difference between an idea and an emotion—that an idea is dead without emotion, whereas emotion has a life of its own entirely independent of ideas. Ideas are but wandering spirits that depend for their vitality upon the magnetic currents of feeling.

The essential superiority of emotions over ideas is recognised in the most popular forms of thought and language. The idea of heaven as a *place* is sufficiently powerless, however much we may deck it out with apocalyptical splendours; but we speak of the *state* of the blessed as of a certain emotional condition of joy, and are perfectly satisfied to rest in that definition as the profoundest of all realities, although we may not be able to illustrate it by one definite idea, or associate it with any one distinct conception. But more than this, when viewed through the lenses of accurate thought, ideas in the sense of outward images are seen more clearly still to be but the poor helps and crutches to something beyond them. For once raise an idea to its highest power, and it not only is accompanied by the strongest emotion, but strange to say, actually passes out of the condition of an idea altogether into the condition of an emotion, just as hard metal raised to a sufficient power of heat evaporates into the most subtle and attenuated gases. The pious Catholic kneeling before the crucifix passes through successive emotional stages, from the gross representation of a tortured human body to the ideal form of a risen and glorified Saviour, until at length to the devotee, whose adoring eyes are still fixed upon the wooden crucifix, nothing remains but the emotion of a presence, felt but not understood, in which he seems to live, and move, and have his being. That is the moment, he will tell you, of his highest life, the seventh heaven has been reached, more intensely real than any scene of earth: but it is wholly internal, a kingdom within, the fulness of life, and yet to the common senses impalpable, without form and void. The same phenomena are presented to us by every fine actor; we feel that his art culminates, not in the rounded period, nor even in the loud roar and violent gesticulation of excited passion, but in the breathless silence of intense feeling, as he stands apart and allows the impotency of exhausted symbols, the quivering lip and the glazed eye, to express for him the crisis of inarticulate emotion.

But, it will be urged, in each case we start from something definite; in the latter we start from the incidents of the play. That provides us with a key to the emotion. Exactly so. But what I maintain is, not that a play has no ideas, or that emotion does not accompany ideas, but simply that when ideas reach a certain intensity they pass into a region of abstract emotion independent and self-sufficing.

In the same way Poetry, which, as Mr. J. S. Mill somewhere says, is nothing but thought coloured by strong emotion, expressed

in metre, and overheard, is constantly composed of words which will hardly bear analysis, as vehicles for ideas, but which may be justified as attempts to express the quickening of an idea, or the evaporation of thought in emotion.

Nothing is more common than to hear a person say, "A truly exquisite poem; but what on earth does it mean?" A search for definite ideas may very likely be in vain. What the poem really means is a certain succession or arrangement of feelings, in which emotion is everything, and the ideas only helps and crutches. This result is often obtained by what stupid people call extravagance of language or confusion of thought, and by what Mr. R. H. Hutton has happily termed "the physical atmosphere of words."

J. M. W. Turner's vagueness and extravagance, so much complained of by common folk, is another example of the transformation of ideas into emotion. Mr. Ruskin has observed that Turner painted the *souls* of pictures. Even Turner's opponents will agree that in many of his pictures most of the ideas have evaporated; while others perceive that ideas have only vanished to make way for emotions of transcendent force and beauty.

It seems to us evident, then, that the tendency of emotion in all its higher stages is to get rid of ideas—is it equally certain that it occupies an independent region, and can start without them? It will, probably, be admitted that most of, if not all, an infant's emotions are unaccompanied by ideas. It is equally certain that we may be in a state of emotional depression, or otherwise—what we call in good spirits or in bad spirits—without being able to assign any definite reason, or to trace the mood in any way to any idea or combination of ideas. An idea may, indeed, flash upon the depressed spirit, and dissipate in an instant our depression—or the fit of depression may pass away of itself by mere force of reaction. Sensitive temperaments are peculiarly liable to such "ups and downs;" but they will find, if they examine their experiences, that although the emotional region is constantly traversed by ideas of every possible description, it has a life of its own, and is distinct from them even as water is distinct from the various reflections that float across its surface.

Analysis of Emotion.

So far we have merely attempted to show the connection which exists between ideas and emotions; and during the process we have affirmed the independent existence of an emotional region, in which there takes place a never-ceasing play and endless succession of emotions, simple and complex.

But in order to show the ground of contact between music and emotion it will be necessary to put emotion itself into the crucible of thought, and ascertain the essential properties of its phenomena.

We shall then subject Sound, as manipulated by the art of music, to the same kind of analysis; and if we find that Sound contains exactly the same properties as emotion we shall not only have established points of resemblance between the two (for things which are equal to the same are equal to one another), but we shall have actually reached the common ground, or kind of border-land, upon which internal emotion becomes wedded to external sound, and realizes for itself that kind of concrete existence which it is the proper function and glory of art to bestow upon human thought and feeling.

If we now attempt to analyse the simplest emotion we shall find that it invariably possesses one or more of the following properties; when the simplest emotion combines with others, and thus becomes complex, we shall find that it possesses all the following properties—

EMOTIONAL SYMBOLS.

(Fig. 1.)

I. Elation and Depression . .



(Fig. 2.)

II. Velocity . . . . . .

(Fig. 3.)

III. Intensity . . . . . .



(Fig. 4.)

IV. Variety . . . . . .



V. Form :—(See Fig. 5.)

EMOTIONAL DIAGRAM OF THE MAN IN THE DESERT.

(Fig. 5.)



A. Thirst.
B. Expectation.
C. Disappointment.

X. Mental repetition of A B C.
D. Satisfaction.
E. Complex feeling.

I. Elation and Depression.—When a man is suffering from intense thirst in a sandy desert the emotional fount within him is at a low

ebb; but, on catching sight of a pool of water not far off, he instantly becomes highly elated, and, forgetting his fatigue, he hastens forward upon a new platform of feeling. On arriving at the water he finds it too salt to drink, and his emotion from the highest elation sinks at once to the deepest depression.

II. Velocity.—At this crisis our traveller sees a man with a water-skin coming towards him, and, running up to him, he relates how his hopes have been suddenly raised, and as suddenly cast down; but long before his words have expressed or even begun to express his meaning he has in a moment of time, in fact spontaneously with the utmost mental velocity, repassed through the emotions of elation and depression which may at first have lasted some time, but are now traversed in one sudden flash of reflex consciousness.

III. Intensity.—As he drinks the sparkling water, we may safely affirm that his emotion increases in intensity up to the point where his thirst becomes quenched, and that every drop that he takes after that is accompanied by less and less pungent or intense feeling.

IV. Variety.—Up to this time his emotion has been comparatively simple; but a suffering companion now arrives, and as he hands to him the grateful cup his emotion becomes complex, that is to say, he experiences a variety of emotions simultaneously. First, the emotion of contentment at having quenched his own thirst; second, gratitude to the man who supplied him with water—an emotion probably in abeyance until he had quenched his thirst; third, joy at seeing his friend participating in his own relief.

V. Form.—If the reader will now glance over this simple narrative once more by the aid of the accompanying diagrams, he will see that both the simple and the complex emotions above described have what, for want of a better term, we may call *form*, *i. e.*, they succeed each other in one order rather than another, and are at length combined with a definite purpose in certain fixed proportions.

Now although I have tacked on a story to the above emotional diagram, I wish to remind the reader that it needs none, and that it is capable of indicating the progression and the qualities of emotion without the aid of a single definite idea. It must also be observed that although I have here given symbols indicating roughly elation, velocity, and the other properties of emotion, simple and complex, we have as yet arrived at no art-medium of emotion; nothing but barren symbols are before us, incapable of awakening any feeling at all, however well they may suffice to indicate its nature and properties. We have now to discover some set of symbols capable of bringing these emotional properties into direct communication with sound, and Music will then emerge, like a new Venus from a sea of

confused murmur, and announce herself as the royal art-medium of Emotion.

Connection between Music and Emotion.

The reader will perceive in a moment that musical notation is the symbolism required, for it is capable not only of indicating all the properties of emotion, but of connecting these with every variety and combination of sound. That every musical note corresponds to a fixed sound may be called a self-evident proposition. I hasten further to point out that the art of music is an arrangement or manipulation of sounds, which clearly reveals to us the fact that sound possesses all the properties of emotion, and is, for this reason, admirably calculated to provide it with its true and universal language.

In order to realize this we had better at once compare our analysis of emotion with the following brief analysis of sound, as it comes before us in the art of musical notation.

I. Elation and Depression.—The modern musical scale consists of seven notes, or an octave of eight, with their accompanying semitones. The human voice, or a violin, will, in addition, express every gradation of sound between each note; thus from C to C, ascending or descending, we can get any possible degree of Elation or Depression.

II. Velocity.—This property is expressed by the employment of notes indicating the durations of the different sounds, *e. g.*, minims, quavers, crotchets, &c. Also by terms such as *adagio*, *allegro*, &c., which do not indicate any change in the relative value of the notes, but raise or lower the Velocity of the whole movement.

III. Intensity.—Between *ppp* and *fff* lie the various degrees of intensity which may be given to a single note. Intensity can also be produced by accumulating a multitude of notes simultaneously either in unisons, octaves, or concords, while the words *crescendo* and *diminuendo*, or certain marks, denote the gradual increase or decrease of Intensity.

IV. Variety.—We have only to think of the simplest duet or trio to realise how perfectly music possesses this powerful property of complex emotion; and we have only to glance at a score of Beethoven's or Spohr's to see how almost any emotion, however complex, is susceptible of musical expression.

V. Form.—Nothing is more common than to hear it said that Mozart is a great master of form; that Beethoven's form is at times obscure, and so forth. Of course what is meant is, that in the arrangement and development of the musical phrases, there is a greater or less fitness of proportion producing an effect of unity or incoherence, as the case may be. But the idea of musical form can be made intelligible to any one who will take the trouble to glance

at so simple a melody as the "Blue Bells of Scotland." That air consists of four phrases, each of which is divided into an elation and depression. The first two phrases are repeated: the third and fourth occur in the middle: and the first two phrases recur at the close. We might express the form numerically in this way:—

THE BLUE BELLS OF SCOTLAND.

Thus music appears visibly to the eye to possess all the essential properties of emotion. May we not therefore say that the secret of its power consists in this, that it alone is capable of giving to the simplest, the subtlest, and the most complex emotions alike that full and satisfactory expression through sound which hitherto it has been found impossible to give to many of them in any other way?

When alluding to the succession of emotions through which we pass hour after hour, I called attention to the fact that most of them were so unimportant as hardly to be worth the name of emotion, that yet so long as consciousness lasts, we must be in some emotional state or other. This consideration may help us to understand the nature of a good deal of dull music which is, in fact, the expression of what may be called neutral emotion. How strange it seems to some people that composers should think it worth while to write down page after page which seems devoid of interest! But if we lived more in the composer's world, our wonder would cease. We should soon feel with him that our neutral states called for musical expression as well as the higher intensities and velocities of elation and depression. Music does not cover a little excited bit of life, but the whole of life; and the mind trained to the disciplined expression of emotion in music, takes delight in long trains of quiet emotion, conscientiously worked out by what some may call diffuse and dull music. There is a quantity of music—of Schubert, for instance—which seems hardly written for the public at all. It is the expression of unimportant and uninteresting successions of emotion, whose only merit consists in their being true to life; and until we have learnt to think of every moment of our life as being a fit subject for music, we shall never understand the sound-reveries of men who were in the habit of regarding the whole of their inner life as melodic and symphonic, and setting vast portions of it to music, quite regardless of what the world at large was likely to say or think about it.

And here let me pause to say that I am perfectly aware of the

objections that may be urged against my analysis of emotion and music into five properties. I shall be told that my explanation is inadequate; that it is impossible to analyse a great many emotions at all; and that music is often in the same way incapable of being cut up into the above-named five properties. My answer is, that it is only possible to indicate very roughly by words and symbols the bare outlines and coarsest forms of the general laws and properties of emotion. At the bottom of some historical engraving containing the portraits of a number of eminent personages, we may have sometimes noticed a row of heads in outline sketched, without colour, shadow, or expression, but docketed with the names of the eminent personages above; so we have sketched in the bare outlines of emotion. They lie before us dumb and passionless. They are no more than skeleton likenesses of what cannot be given in mere black and white. But if we had space, it would be possible to show by diagrams much more clearly the enormous detail and intricacy of musical phraseology covered in our diagram by one meagre line up and down, and expressed in such words as elation and depression: I might show that an elation can consist of any length, and might contain within itself an infinite number of subordinate elations and depressions, involving different measures of velocity, intensity, variety, and as complicated in form as those gossamer webs we meet with on misty commons about sunrise.

The eye gathers some notion of the capacities of sound for the expression of the most labyrinthine and complex emotion, by looking at a full orchestral score, or trying to follow the minute inflexions made by the *bâton* of a fine conductor. Such things no words can convey. Language is given us to indicate the existence of a vast number of truths which can only be fully realised by other modes of expression.

Connection between Music and Words.

As emotion exists independently of ideas, so also does music. But music may be appropriately wedded to ideas. It is a mistake to suppose that the music itself always gains by being associated with words, or definite ideas of any sort. The words often gain a good deal, and so do the ideas, but the music is just as good without them. I do not mean to deny that images and ideas are capable of exciting the deepest emotions; but they are inadequate to express the emotions they excite. Sound is more adequate; and hence will often seize an emotion that may have been excited by an image, and partially expressed by words—will deepen its expression, and by so doing, will excite a still deeper emotion. That is how words gain by being set to music. But to set words to music—as in oratorio or opera, or

any kind of song—is in fact to mix two arts together. On the whole, a striking effect may be produced; but in reality it is at the expense of the purity of each art. Poetry is a great art; so is music: but as a medium for emotion, each is greater alone than in company, although various good ends are obtained by linking the two together, providing that the words are kept in subordination to the greater expression-medium of music. Even then they are apt to hinder the development of the music. What an amount of feeble recitative and incoherent choral writing, do we not owe to the clumsy endeavours of even good composers to wed music to words! How often is the poet hampered by the composer, and the composer by the poet! And yet when we remember such operas as *Don Giovanni*, and such oratorios as the *Elijah*, and note how instinctively the composer has treated the leading emotions, without being hampered by the words and the sentences of the libretto, we are bound to admit that the objections to the mixed art may be to a great extent overcome, whilst its advantages are obvious. Words, situations, and ideas are very useful to the composer, and still more so to his audience; for a story, or the bare suggestion of some situation, provides a good skeleton form, and serves to awaken trains of emotion, which music is all powerful to deepen; and whilst the words are being declaimed, the music has already passed in depths of feeling beyond the control of words. Let any one look at the four parts of a chorus, and see the kind of subordinate use made of the words. After the first glance no one thinks much about the words: they come in more as incidents of vocalization than of thought, and are piled up often without sense, and repeated by the different voices *pêle-mêle*. And yet the first sentence of such choruses as "Rex Tremende," in the *Requiem*, or "The night is departing," in the *Lobgesang*, is an immense assistance to the hearer, striking the key-note to the emotions which music alone can fully express.

On the other hand, when we turn to the pure art, and inquire what good could any words do to a symphony of Beethoven, it must be answered, less and less good just in proportion as the symphony itself is musically appreciated. Even an opera is largely independent of words, and depends for its success not upon the poetry of the libretto, or even the scenery or the plot, but upon its emotional range—*i.e.*, upon the region which is dominated by the musical element.

Has the reader never witnessed with satisfaction a fine opera, the words of which he could not understand, and whose plot he was entirely unable to follow? Has he never seen a musician in estimating a new song, run through it rapidly on the piano, and then turn back to the beginning to see what the words were all about? We may be sure long before he has read the words he will have estimated the value of the song. The words were good to set the composer's

emotions a-going. They are interesting to his audience exactly in proportion to its ignorance of, and indifference to, music. Persons who know and care little about music, are always very particular about the words of a song. They want to know what it all means—the words will tell them of course. They are naturally glad to find something they can understand; yet all the while the open secret which they will never read lies in the music, not the words. The title, "Songs without Words," which Mendelssohn has given to his six books of musical idylls, is full of delicate raillery, aimed good-humouredly enough at the non-musical world. "A 'song without words!' What an idea! How can such a song be possible?" cries one. "What more perfect song could be imagined?" exclaims another. If we are to have words to songs, let them subordinate the sense to the emotion. The best words to music are those which contain the fewest number of ideas, and the greatest number of emotions. Such are the shorter poems of Goethe, of Heine, of Byron, and, as a consequence, it is notorious that Beethoven, Schubert, Mendelssohn, and Schumann between them have, with pardonable avidity, set to music almost all these precious lyrics.

Sound-Art and Colour-Art.

The only possible rival to sound as a vehicle for pure emotion is colour, but up to the present time no art has been invented which stands in exactly the same relation to colour as music does to sound. No one who has ever attentively watched a sunset, can fail to have noticed that colour, as well as sound, possesses all the five qualities which belong to emotion: the passing of dark tints into bright ones corresponds to Elation and Depression. The palpitations of light and mobility of hues gives Velocity, poorness or richness of the same colour constitutes its Intensity, the presence of more than one colour gives Variety, whilst Form is determined by the various degrees of space occupied by the different colours. Yet there exists no colour-art as a language of pure emotion. The art of painting has hitherto always been dependent upon definite ideas, faces, cliffs, clouds, incidents. Present by the engraver's art a Sir Joshua Reynolds, or even a Turner, and although the spectator has no notion of the *colouring* of the original, he gets some notion of the work because the colour was an accessory — most important, no doubt, but still an accessory—not an essential of the artist's thought. But to present a symphony without sound, or without the notes or symbols which, through the eye, convey to the ear sound, is impossible, because sound, heard or conceived, is not the accessory, but the essential, of the composer's work. The composer's art makes sound into a language of pure emotion. The painter's art uses colour

only as the accessory of emotion. No method has yet been discovered of arranging colour by itself for the eye, as the musician's art arranges sound for the ear. We have no colour pictures depending solely upon colour as we have symphonies depending solely upon sound. In Turner's works we find the nearest approach; but even he, by the necessary limitation of his art, is without the property of velocity. The canvas does not change to the eye—all that is, is presented simultaneously, as in one complex chord, and thus the charm of velocity, which is so great a property in emotion, and which might belong to a colour-art, is denied to the painter.

Colour now stands in the same kind of relation to the painter's art as sound amongst the Greeks did to the art of the gymnast. But just as we speak of the classic age as a time long before the era of real music, so by-and-by posterity may allude to the present age as an age before the colour-art was known—an age in which colour had not yet been developed into a language of pure emotion, but simply used as an accessory to drawing, as music was once to bodily exercise and rhythmic recitation.

And here I will express my conviction that a colour-art exactly analogous to the sound-art of music is possible, and is amongst the arts which have to be traversed in the future, as sculpture, architecture, painting, and music have been in the past. Nor do I see why it should not equal any of these in the splendour of its results and variety of its applications. Had we but a system of colour-notation which would as intensely and instantaneously connect itself with every possible tint, and possess the power of combining colours before the mind's eye, as a page of music combines sounds through the eye to the mind's ear—had we but instruments, or some appropriate art-mechanism for rendering such colour-notation into real waves of colour before the bodily eye, we should then have actually realized a new art, the extent and grandeur of whose developments it is simply impossible to estimate. The reader, whose eye is passionately responsive to colour, may gain some faint anticipation of the colour-art of the future, if he will try to recall the kind of impression made upon him by the exquisite colours painted upon the dark curtain of the night at an exhibition of fireworks. I select fireworks as an illustration in preference to the most gorgeous sunset, because I am not speaking of nature, but art—that is to say, something into the composition of which the mind of man has entered, and whose very meaning depends upon its bearing the evidences of human design: and I select pyrotechny, instead of painting of any kind, because in it we get the important emotional property of velocity, necessarily absent from fixed colouring.

At such a display as I have mentioned, we are, in fact, present at

the most astonishing revelations of light and colour. The effects produced are indeed often associated with vulgar patterns, loud noises, and the most coarse and stupid contrasts. Sometimes the combinations are felicitous for a moment, and by the merest chance. But usually they are chaotic, incoherent, discordant, and supportable only owing to the splendour of the materials employed. But what a majestic symphony might not be played with such orchestral blazes of incomparable colour! what delicate melodies composed of single floating lights, changing and melting from one slow intensity to another through the dark, until some tender dawn of opal from below might perchance receive the last fluttering pulse of ruby light and prepare the eye for some new passage of exquisite colour! Why should we not go down to the Palace of the People and assist at a real colour-prelude or symphony, as we now go down to hear a work by Mozart or Mendelssohn? But the colour-art must first be constituted, its symbols and phraseology discovered, its instruments invented, and its composers born. Up to that time, music will have no rival as an art-medium of emotion.

Music and the Age.

Modern music is the last great legacy which Rome has left to the world. It is also remarkable as a distinct product of Christian civilization. Christianity ended by producing that peculiar passion for self-analysis, that rage for the anatomy of emotion, which was almost entirely unknown to the ancient world. The life of the Greek was exceedingly simple and objective. His art represented the physical beauty in which he delighted; but the faces of his statues were usually without emotion. His poetry was the expression of strong rather than subtle feeling. He delighted in dramas with but few characters, and with hardly any plot. He could have but little need of music to express his emotions, for they could be adequately rendered by sculpture and recitation. Ancient Rome, in its best times, had no sympathy with any kind of art; to conquer and to make laws for the conquered was her peculiar mission. Still less than Greece could she stand in need of a special language for her emotions, which were of a simple, austere, and practical character, and found in the daily duties of the citizen-life a sufficient outlet of expression. Christianity first revealed the sanctity of the individual life, deepened the channels of natural feeling, and unfolded capacities of emotion which strove in vain for any articulate expression. But Christianity had to pass through several stages before she met with Music.

The active missionary spirit had first to subside and be replaced by the otiose and contemplative mood, before anything like a desire

for an art-medium of expression could make itself felt in Christendom. It was in the peaceful seclusion of monastic life that this desire first arose. The monks created modern music. From being intensely active the genius of Christianity became intensely meditative and introspective. The devotee had time to examine what was going on within him, to chronicle the different emotional atmospheres of his ecstasy, to note the elations and depressions of the religious life, the velocity of its aspirations the intensity of its enthusiasms, the complex struggle for ever going on between the spirit and the flesh, and the ever-changing proportions and forms which one and the other assumed. Out of these experiences at length arose the desire for art-expression. Gothic architecture supplied one form, and the Italian schools of painting another; but already the key-note of a more perfect emotional language had been struck, which was destined to supply an unparalleled mode of utterance, both for the Church and the world. Such a language would be valuable exactly in proportion to the complexity of thought and feeling and the desire for its expression. The fusion of the Church and the world at the time of the Reformation was at once the type and the starting-point of all those mixed and powerful influences which characterize what we call modern civilization, and it is remarkable that the sceptre of music should have passed from fallen Rome to free Germany just at the time when Rome showed herself most incompetent to understand and cope with the many-sided spirit of the age, which Germany may be said to have created.

If we were now asked roughly to define what we mean by the spirit of the age, we should say the genius of the nineteenth century is an analysing and a recording genius. There is hardly anything on earth which Goethe—the very incarnation of modern culture—has not done something towards analysing and recording. Scientific research has taken complete possession of the unexplored regions of the physical world. Kant and Hegel have endeavoured to define the limits of the pure reason. Swedenborg set the fashion for giving law and system to the most abnormal states of human consciousness. There is not an aspect of nature, or complication of character, or contrast of thought and feeling, which has not been delineated by modern novelists and painted by modern artists, whilst the national poets of Europe, whether we think of Goethe, Heine, Lamartine, De Musset, or our own living poets—Tennyson and Browning—have all shown the strongest disposition to probe and explore the hidden mysteries of thought and feeling, to arrange and re-arrange the insoluble problems of life, which never seemed so insoluble as now, to present facts with all their by-play, to trace

emotion through all its intricate windings, and describe the variations of the soul's temperature from its most fiery heats to its most glacial intensities.

If I were asked to select two poems most characteristic of the emotional tendencies of this age, I should select the "In Memoriam" and the "Ring and the Book"—for in both these works the introspective tendency and the restless endeavour to present, with minute fidelity, an immense crowd of feelings with something like a symphonic unity of effect, culminate.

Art, literature, and science are all redundant with the same analytical and emotional tendencies.

Is it wonderful that such an age should be the very age in which music, at once an analytical science and a pure art-medium of emotion, has, with a rapidity like that of sculpture in Greece or painting in Italy, suddenly reached its highest perfection?

Music is pre-eminently the art of the nineteenth century, because it is in a supreme manner responsive to the emotional wants, the mixed aspirations and the passionate self-consciousness of The Age.

H. R. HAWEIS.



JOSEPH MAZZINI:

WHAT HAS HE DONE FOR ITALY?

IN order to form a correct judgment of a public man who has exerted so remarkable an influence over his countrymen as Joseph Mazzini, and to estimate the good or evil effect of that influence, it is necessary summarily to review the moral and material condition of his native land at the opening of his career. Italy was at that time a country without any political existence or rank among European nations. She had no common centre or flag; no common law or market. She was parcelled out into seven different states,* all independent of one another; without even the semblance of a common aim, alliance, or organized connection between them. Internal maladministration and corruption were rife in each of these states; eight lines of custom-houses severed the material interests of each, interposing a barrier to all progress, and rendering industrial or commercial activity on a large scale impossible. Oppressive and prohibitive duties checked the importation and exportation of articles of the first necessity from one province to another; eight different systems of currency, of weights and measures, of civil, commercial, and penal legislation, of administrative organisation, and of police restrictions, held the people of the separate states apart, and rendered them, as far as possible, strangers. All of these states were ruled by despotic governments, in whose administration the people had no share; while in none of them did there exist either liberty of the

* Lombardy, Parma, Tuscany, Modena, the Papal States, Piedmont, and Naples.

press, of speech, of collective action or petition, of education, or even of the introduction of foreign books. The treaties of 1815 had handed over one-fourth of the whole peninsula (Lombardy and Venice) to Austria, who maintained her supremacy by an army of 80,000 men. The rulers of the other states were practically viceroys of Austria, so that whenever a cry for liberty, progress, or even for the slightest amelioration of the despotic system was raised in any of these viceroyalties, their petty tyrants either appealed to Austria, or she voluntarily stepped in to silence it by brute force. "Silence was the common law: the people were silent from terror; their masters were silent from policy. Conspiracy, strife, persecution, vengeance, all existed, but made no noise. One might have fancied the very steps of the scaffold were paved with velvet, so little noise did heads make when they fell." The very idea of the *unity* of Italy—the dream of all her greatest men in the middle ages—had been lost, through this subdivision under foreign* rule; and Italian patriots conspired and struggled solely for *liberty* in the several states to which they belonged, but raised no cry of nationality and unity.

The revolution of 1820 in Naples overthrew the despotic government, and compelled the king to grant a constitution, but made no attempt to carry these advantages into the neighbouring states. The same is true of the insurrection of 1821 in Piedmont,† and of those of 1831 in Parma, Modena, and the estates of the Pope. Each triumphed in turn over its petty ruler; but, neglecting to consolidate the victory by extending it, were speedily crushed by the intervention of Austria. The diabolical policy, *Divide et impera*, had done its work; the people of Italy (a few exceptional minds apart) had learned to regard themselves as Lombards, Romans, Piedmontese, &c., but had forgotten that they were Italians. Such, in a few words, was the state of Italy when Mazzini's political career began.

In the autobiographical portion of his "Life and Works" ‡ (unfortunately very scanty) he refers the awakening of the national idea within him to a day in the year 1821, when the Piedmontese insurrection had just been crushed by Austria, and he, then a lad of fifteen, was accosted in the streets of Genoa by one who was collecting subscriptions to send the revolutionists who had escaped to Spain.

"The idea of an existing wrong in my own country, against which it was a duty to struggle, and the thought that I too must bear my part in that struggle, flashed before my mind on that day for the first time, never again

* Naples and Parma were ruled by Spanish and French Bourbons; Modena and Tuscany by Austrian archdukes; Lombardy and Venetia by the Emperor of Austria; Piedmont and Sardinia by Savoyards, united by marriage with Austria.

† Headed, and afterwards betrayed, by the Prince of Carignano, afterwards Charles Albert.

‡ "Life and Works of Joseph Mazzini." Smith, Elder & Co.

to leave it. . . . I began collecting names and facts, and studied, as best I might, the causes of the failure."

He was not long in discovering the cause of the failure of all revolutionary attempts in Italy to be the lack of a national instead of local aim; and, being unable then to bear testimony to the national idea in action, commenced disseminating it covertly, through the medium of literature. This was in the days of the literary warfare between the Romantic and Classicist schools. Mazzini ardently embraced the Romantic theory; but literary independence was, in his eyes, only a veil to cover the idea of political independence, and he made of his articles "an indirect appeal to the youth of his country to infuse some of their own young life into the latent hidden life fermenting deep down in the heart of Italy," knowing that the endeavour to unite these two elements would be opposed both by foreign and domestic tyranny, and seeking to induce rebellion against both. The governments of Sardinia and Tuscany did, in fact, extinguish the journals in which his writings appeared; but not before he had "awakened chords that had long lain mute in the minds of his fellow-countrymen, and proved to the young men of Italy that the governments were opposed to *all* progress, and that liberty was impossible until all were overthrown." His writings had already gained him some fame and influence, when he took his first step towards action by joining the Carbonari. He neither approved their doctrines nor system; but found in them a body of men in whom, however inferior to the idea they represented, faith and works were identical; who braved excommunication and death in pursuit of liberty. He, however, "reflected with surprise and distrust that the oath administered to him was a mere formula of obedience, and that his initiator had not said a single word about federalism or unity, republic or monarchy. It was war to the government—nothing more." He was also displeased to find that while he already looked to her own people as the means of saving Italy, the Carbonari hoped in France.

Shortly after the French Revolution of 1830 Mazzini was arrested. His father asked the governor of Genoa of what crime his son was accused, and received for answer, that his son was a young man of talent, much given to solitary walks at night, and "the government was not fond of young men of talent the subject of whose musings was unknown to it." He was confined in the fortress of Savona, and it was in his cell, at the top of that fortress, "with the sea and sky —two symbols of the Infinite, and, except the Alps, the sublimest things in Nature—before him, whenever he approached his little grated window," that he conceived the plan of the National Association of "*Young Italy*," and "meditated deeply upon the principles upon which to base the organization, the aim and purpose of its labours,"

&c.; principles and labours which were destined gradually to change the face of Italy.

After less than a year's imprisonment, Mazzini was tried and acquitted, but nevertheless exiled. He went to Marseilles, and there founded the association. Charles Albert ascended the throne in that year, and the majority of Italian patriots were full of hope that the king would redeem the broken pledges of the prince. Mazzini did not share these hopes; but he published at that time the celebrated "Letter to Charles Albert," recalling to him, in explicit terms, his duty towards Italy, with the object of proving to the Italians the king's absolute lack of all the qualities which would have rendered the performance of that duty possible. The letter was immediately reprinted in Italy by the clandestine press, and its circulation was immense. The king answered it by forwarding the writer's *signalement* to the frontier, with instructions to the authorities to imprison him if he should attempt to enter Italy.

The centre of Italy rose in insurrection in 1831; and as each town in succession freed itself from foreign rule, the leaders once again evinced their forgetfulness of the Italian idea. Far from seeking to spread the insurrection in other provinces of Italy, they proclaimed each movement to be purely *local*, and sought the protection of foreign diplomacy upon that ground. The natural consequence was that they were speedily betrayed, and again consigned to the hands of their masters.

Our space will not allow us to transcribe the whole of the remarkable "*Statutes of Young Italy*," which professed itself at the outset to be a—

"Brotherhood of Italians, who believe in a law of progress and duty, and are convinced that Italy is destined to become one nation . . . and united in the firm intent of consecrating both thought and action to the great aim of reconstructing Italy as one independent sovereign nation of free men and equals; . . . the aim of the Association is revolution, but its labours will be essentially educational." *

Mazzini considered the predominating moral evils in Italy to be: superstition and materialism:—

"Superstition was the habit of a part of the population, to whom all light, all education was forbidden. . . . Materialism, the natural reaction of those who had been able to emancipate themselves from the abject spectacle which religion offered, from the brutal yoke it sought to impose upon their intelligence. It was said to them, '*Believe all that we affirm:*' they replied by denying all."

* The symbol of the Association of Young Italy was a sprig of cypress, in memory of the Italian martyrs: its motto, *Ora e sempre* (Now, and for ever). The banner of the Association, composed of the three Italian colours—green, white, and red—bore on the one side the words *Unity* and *Independence;* and on the other, *Liberty, Equality, Humanity.*

Himself deeply religious by nature, and confirmed in his religious tendencies by severe study and reflection, it was Mazzini's aim to educate his countrymen to "desire to progress, not in order to obtain the satisfaction of certain appetites, *panem et circenses*, . . . but to fulfil a mission upon earth for our own and for our brethren's good;" and the development of these ideas occupied his thoughts and formed the subject of his writings even in the earliest days of his political career. He believed it—

"Necessary to reunite politics to the eternal principles which should direct them. . . . God, religion; the People, liberty in love: these two words, which as individuals we inscribed upon our banner in 1831, and which afterwards—significant phenomenon—became the formula of all the decrees of free Venice and Rome,* sum up all for which we have combated, all for which we will combat unto victory."

The people of Italy instinctively comprehended the value of the National idea, and the Association rapidly became a power among them,—spreading from Genoa and the two Riviere to Naples, Lombardy, and indeed to all parts of Italy; and as the secret committees multiplied, tolerably secure means of communication, for conveyance of instructions, documents, &c., were established between province and province. The anxiety to obtain Mazzini's writings was such that the number of copies of the Journal of the Association† which he was able to send to Italy was quite insufficient, and clandestine presses were established in order to reproduce them. Although Young Italy professed itself in principle republican, its aim was the *unity* of Italy, and her independence from the foreigner; and it declared that obedience to the will of the nation, with regard to the form of government to be adopted, *so soon as she should be free*, was the citizen's first duty. "In less than one year from the date of its foundation, Young Italy had become the dominant association throughout the whole peninsula, and had concentrated against it the alarmed persecution of seven governments." The most severe punishments were inflicted upon all who, in any way, assisted in introducing Mazzini's writings into Italy. Charles Albert condemned those guilty even of *non-denunciation* of such offence in others to two years' imprisonment and a fine,—half of which was given to the informer, *with promise of secrecy*. At the request of the Piedmontese government, Mazzini was banished from France; but he contrived to remain for another year concealed in Marseilles, editing his paper, corresponding with Italy, and holding secret interviews with travellers from his own country and the republican leaders of France. Not only the people, but the most distinguished men in Italy joined his association; but the majority of the latter forsook the insurrectionary

* The official acts of the Republics were issued "*in the name of God and the People.*"

† Edited by him in Marseilles.

standard, after a few years of exile or persecution had tried the stability of their principles; and these became, in after years, his bitterest calumniators and opponents.

Mazzini now determined to turn the enthusiasm he had awakened to account by attempting action. For reasons given in his Life, Piedmont was chosen for the first outbreak of insurrection. Amongst these reasons we may mention the strategical importance of Alexandria and Genoa, which were precisely the points where the association was most powerful, especially among the artillery in charge of the arsenals. The conspiracy was discovered on the eve of action, through some indiscreet words spoken by an artilleryman, which aroused suspicion. Perquisition and the arbitrary imprisonment of the suspected did the rest; the prisons were soon crowded, and tortures of the most cruel description were employed to extort confessions and denunciations. The barbarities of the government were such that it has been truly said that "this page of the history of the Sardinian government is one which only a Tacitus could fitly describe, and even he would have to dip his pen in blood." * Mazzini, however, considered that "the duty and necessity of action were not diminished by this failure." By the end of the year a movement was prepared in Genoa, which failed, owing to the youth and inexperience of the leaders; amongst whom we may mention Garibaldi, who with difficulty saved himself from the vengeance of the government by flight. Mazzini, undeterred by these reverses, proceeded to organize an insurrection in Savoy, then greatly disaffected to the Italian crown, and crowded with exiles from all parts of Europe. This expedition, which it has been customary to represent as a mere ebullition of youthful folly and reaction, was, in fact, very carefully and maturely planned, and had great probabilities in its favour; but it was rendered abortive by the treachery of General Ramonino, whom the insurgents had chosen as their leader, against the advice of Mazzini, who suspected him at the time, and who "afterwards learned that he had been induced to betray them, partly by the threats of the French government, and partly by their offer to pay his debts."

The alarm excited by this attempt, the effect of Mazzini's untiring propaganda † among the exiles, some of whom were despatched into

* Brofferio tells us, in his "History of Piedmont," that Charles Albert, rendered cruel by terror, had acquired such a thirst for blood that he complained to Villa Marina of the humble station of the first victims, saying, "*The blood of mere soldiers is not enough; you must contrive to find some officers.*" The governors of the various provinces obeyed him only too well. Upon the most ferocious of them he conferred the Order of the Holy Annunciation, with the right of calling the king *cousin;* a right which, as Mazzini observes, he had well deserved.

† While residing in Switzerland, Mazzini formed an association composed of exiles from different countries, and called "*La Jeune Europe;*" and another among the Swiss population themselves, called "*La Jeune Suisse.*" Both professed the same religious

various parts of Europe as emissaries from the associations "which troubled the repose of governments," the influence of his name upon the Democratic party in Europe, and the visibly increasing power of his Italian apostolate in Switzerland (a country, the strategic importance of which could not be overlooked by European despotism), served as a pretext for renewed persecution. Notes poured in from all the European governments, desiring the Swiss government to disperse the political associations he had formed in that country. France especially demanded a system of coercive measures against the exiles, and declared that if Switzerland did not cease her toleration of "*the incorrigible enemies of the repose of governments, France would take the matter into her own hands.*" Switzerland yielded; Mazzini and the most important of his followers were expelled, and he took refuge in England.

"The first period of Young Italy was," he says, "concluded, and concluded with a defeat."

It does not enter into the scope of our article to describe Mazzini's ten years' residence in England further than to say that he contrived to maintain and even increase his influence in his own country during his exile, not only by his meetings, but by an untiring propaganda of unitarian ideas, and by gradually weaving a vast network of secret organization and conspiracy over Italy, by means of a prodigiously extended correspondence.* The failure of the attempt upon Calabria in 1844 spread discouragement and distrust among the popular party, because it was attributed to him by the Monarchical, or (as they style themselves) the Moderate party in Italy, which rose into importance towards the end of that year, and took advantage of the general dismay to lead the people away from the idea of unity as Utopian, and induce them to enter upon the path of compromise, or "*opportunism,*" to use their own term. The leaders of the Moderates were nearly all of them men who had formerly conspired with Mazzini:—

"Their very name was significant. They styled themselves *Moderates*—as if, in the then dismembered state of Italy, when the question was between

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principles as Young Italy, of which the following is a brief summary:—"One sole God. One sole ruler—his Law. One sole interpreter of that law—Humanity. To constitute humanity in such wise as to enable it through continuous progress to discover and apply the law of God, by which it should be governed, as speedily as possible: such is the mission of Young Europe." Its political purpose was the federal organization of European democracy under one sole direction, so that any nation arising in insurrection should at once find the others ready to assist it, if not by action, at least by a moral support sufficiently powerful to prevent hostile intervention on the part of their governments.

* It was during Mazzini's residence in England that he created an Italian fame for Garibaldi, by publishing accounts of his exploits as a guerilla chief in Monte Video, foreseeing the advantages that might accrue to Italy from his services in that capacity. It was, in fact, through means furnished by the Mazzinian element that Garibaldi was enabled to come to Europe in 1848.

existence and annihilation, between the future Nation and the petty Princedoms which, under the wing of Austria, contested that nation's development, there could exist a middle course. . . . They were royalists, willing to admit a certain infusion of liberty—enough, and not more than enough, to make monarchy tolerable; ready to assert for themselves the right of publishing their own opinions, and of taking their seats in a Constitutional Assembly, but without extending the same liberty to the masses, through fear of awakening in them an idea of rights which they detested, and of duties for which they had no reverence."

None of them had any belief in the possibility of Italian unity. The thinkers of the party, from Balbo to Cavour, did not go beyond the idea of a Kingdom of the North (that is to say, an aggrandized Piedmont), a Kingdom of the South, and a Papal Princedom in the centre.

The accession of Pius IX. and the papal amnesty threw the Moderates into ecstacies. With very few exceptions, it may be said that the whole nation forsook at that time the austere doctrines of duty and sacrifice in the national cause taught by Mazzini, and thought only of rushing along the easy royal road to victory, which they believed must be disclosed to them by a liberal Pope. When urged to join the throng of Pope-worshippers who declared Pius IX. the "initiator of the future destiny of Italy," he replied that so soon as the Pope should initiate it in fact, he would be the first to follow the banner raised. "But where," he added, "is the banner you would have me support? The only banner I recognise is the banner of the nation, of *Unity*. For this I would renounce for a time whatever device I might desire to see inscribed on our flag; but this I can never renounce. I should believe myself unfaithful to God, my country, and my own soul." And he further declared that any policy which did not "begin and end with that one word, Unity," was "not merely negatively useless, but positively harmful." On the Pope's unmasking his real character, the Moderates turned king-worshippers again, and when Mazzini was urged to countenance the new idolatry, he replied that notwithstanding the contempt he felt for Charles Albert's weak and cowardly nature—"notwithstanding all the democratic yearnings of my own heart, yet could I believe he possessed enough even of true ambition to *unite* Italy for his own advantage, I could cry Amen."

No portion of Mazzini's career has been more persistently misrepresented in Italy, and more completely misunderstood in England, than his conduct during the war between Piedmont and Austria, following upon the Milanese insurrection in 1848. Almost the only trustworthy source of information upon Italian matters open to untravelled Englishmen is contained in our own Blue Books; but as these are only attainable by the public after the immediate interest in the subject has passed away, they are rarely read. A careful study of

them has enabled us to form an opinion as to the events of '48 and '49 in Italy the opposite of that generally entertained by our countrymen. We are decidedly of opinion that every step made towards unity in those years was the result of Mazzini's previous teachings and influence, and that had his countrymen continued to listen to him then, instead of being dazzled by the brilliant promises of the King of Piedmont and the Moderates, not only might the disastrous termination of the war have been prevented, but Italy might, in all human probability, have been united at that time.

The insurrectionary movement which spread like molten lava over the whole soil of Italy in '48, was the issue of Mazzini's seventeen years' apostolate. It was, in every instance, unitarian and republican. From extremest Sicily to the Venetian Alps the people everywhere rose to the cry of "*One Italy! Rome the capital! Viva la Repubblica!*"* The Moderates, being monarchists at any price, pronounced the idea of unity Utopian, and substituted for it their so-called "practical" notion of an "Italy of the North." It was not, however, the hope of adding the Lombard gem to his Piedmontese crown which induced Charles Albert to declare war on Austria, but the threat of republican insurrection in his own states. The people of Piedmont and Sardinia demanded to be led to the assistance of Milan. *One Italy, and Rome the capital,* the doctrine of Young Italy, had been enthusiastically accepted by the people of the whole peninsula; and with that instinctive logic which is the speciality of multitudes when under the influence of a great idea, "*War with Austria,*" as the true obstacle to Italian unity, had become the insurrectionary watchword, even in those provinces not under her immediate rule.†

* The astute Metternich understood the character of the Italian movement even before it was decisively proved by the events of 1848. In August, 1847, he wrote to Count Dietrichstein:—"Under the banner of administrative reform, the factions are endeavouring to accomplish an undertaking which could not be confined within the estates of the Church, nor within the limits of any one of the states which in their *ensemble* constitute the Italian Peninsula. The factions seek to merge these states into one political body, or, at least, into a confederation of states, subject to the direction of one central power." Mazzini, commenting on this despatch, remarks:—"Metternich spoke truly, except that all Italy was the *faction.*" The Austrian statesman also judged Charles Albert precisely as he was judged by Mazzini. He goes on to say:—"An Italian monarchy does not enter into the idea of the factions. One positive fact necessarily turns them from all idea of a monarchical Italy; *the possible king of such* a kingdom does not exist on either side the Alps. They are marching straight to a Republic."

† These facts are attested by Austria herself. "A Plan for the Pacification of Italy," discussed in the council of ministers at Vienna, and sent to Lord Palmerston, declares:—"It is certain that the germ of Italian nationality, so long buried, but *resuscitated* by the efforts of young Italy, . . . must in any case have ultimately broken through its bonds, and brought on the events which we have witnessed; for the universal cry of 'Death to the Austrians' arose, not first from Lombardy or Venetia, but from the depths of Sicily, where Austria had never exercised any oppressive influence, and traversed all the peninsula, until it reached the Italian Tyrol, which had appeared sincerely attached to the monarchy."—*Correspondence relating to the Affairs of Italy*, part ii. p. 444.

The Milanese insurrection was, like all the others, republican,* and the work of the people. It was neither foreseen nor desired by the upper classes and municipal authorities, who, when the people had been fighting for three days, issued a proclamation, "regretting the abandonment of legal measures," and proposing an armistice. The people went on fighting without heeding them, and on the fifth day Radetsky fled in disorder, leaving four thousand dead. So long as the issue appeared doubtful, the King of Piedmont declined to receive the messengers despatched by the Moderates of Milan to implore his aid; but no sooner had the insurrection triumphed in the city, than he sent to the municipality to offer the assistance of his troops to carry on the war in the provinces, "on condition of the absolute surrender of Lombardy to Piedmont, and the formation of a provisional government, which should draw up a proposal to that effect." Radetsky fled from Milan on the 22nd of March, and on the evening of that day the king, who in the morning had sent to assure the Austrian ambassador of his desire to confirm "the relations of friendship and good neighbourhood between the two states," declared war against Austria. To the other courts of Europe the king issued a manifesto, explaining that he was reluctantly driven to this course by fear of the republic.† To the people of Lombardy his proclamation held, of course, another language—declaring that he came "to lend them that assistance which brother may expect from brother," and adding, "We abstain from every political question. We have solemnly and repeatedly declared that *after the struggle* it would belong to the nation to decide upon its own destinies." The people enthusiastically welcomed the friendly king and the Moderates who brought the "liberator" among them; and Mazzini, with the rest

* Vice-Consul Campbell's despatch to Lord Palmerston of the 18th March, 1848 (the day on which the insurrection began), describes the citizens "armed with fowling-pieces, rifles, swords, pistols, and old halberds, carrying tricoloured flags, with tricoloured cockades in their hats, crying, 'Viva Pio Nono!' (the Papal bubble had not then burst) 'Viva l'Italia!' 'Viva la Repubblica!'"—*Ibid.*, p. 212.

† Our own agents give ample details to Lord Palmerston, proving that the desires and intentions of the king were peaceful, but that he was forced to take up arms by the people; that it was "impossible to dissimulate that the danger of the proclamation of a republic in Lombardy is imminent; . . . the situation of Piedmont is such, that at any moment . . . a similar movement might burst forth in the States of his Majesty the King of Sardinia;" and dwelling upon "the immense influence exercised by the people, who threatened to revolt in Piedmont, and to attack the Austrians, in spite of the authority of the government, and the imminent danger of the monarchy of Savoy, which had *forced* the ministry to take up arms." The manifesto above alluded to states that "the king thinks himself obliged to take measures which, by preventing the actual movement of Lombardy from becoming a republican movement, will avoid for Piedmont and the rest of Italy the catastrophes which might take place if such a form of government were proclaimed. . . . The government and the king have not hesitated, and they are profoundly convinced that they have acted, at the risk of all the danger to which they have exposed themselves, *for the safety of all other monarchical states.*"—*Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Italy*, part ii. pp. 184, 185, 206, 207, 230, *et passim.*

of the Republican party, accepted the proposition of leaving the political question aside until the nation were free, and abided by it in perfect good faith. It is true that Mazzini, although at that time unaware of the treachery of the king, had no belief that he would prove equal to the task before him; but he accepted the programme of political neutrality, because he believed it "especially the duty of Republicans to teach implicit obedience to the national will;" and he exerted all his influence to rally the Republican party round the Provisional Government.

When repeated Austrian successes began to alarm the Moderates, they owned to the people that men and arms were wanting, but declared that if they would prove their confidence in the king, by decreeing the fusion of Lombardy with Piedmont, millions of money would be forthcoming from Genoa, and thousands of soldiers from Piedmont, while an attempt was made to induce Mazzini to desist from the part of Cassandra of the war, by magnificent offers of royal favour.*

The whole story may be learnt in the documents contained in our own Blue Book, and it is not our purpose to recount it here. Suffice it that every effort of Mazzini to enlighten the Milanese as to their true position was defeated by the Moderates, who kindled a storm of popular fury against him, which at one time threatened his life. The decree ceding Lombardy to the Crown was passed, to the triumph of the Moderate party: the real object of the war was thus obtained, for all danger of a republic was for a time averted, and a *precedent*, as diplomatists call it, was obtained for the house of Savoy.†

* Castagneto, the king's secretary, sent a messenger to him to propose that he should constitute himself patron of the idea of ceding Lombardy to the Crown, and bring over the indignant Republicans to the idea; offering him, in that case, power to draw up the constitution of the new kingdom, an interview with the king, and the position of First Minister of the Crown. The one aim of Mazzini's life had, as we have seen, been unity; for this, as he declared to the king's envoy, he would have sacrificed the minor points of the form of government; but the all-important question at that time was *War with Austria*, and he knew that this notion of a kingdom of the north would prove fatal to the war. Such an aggrandizement of the House of Savoy would give the other princes of Italy an excuse for withdrawing the aid of their subjects, while this open abandonment of the national idea had extinguished all sympathy and enthusiasm among the populations. The only way to rekindle this was to transform the war into a war of the whole nation. If the king would risk his *Piedmontese* crown for an *Italian* crown, by putting himself at the head of a national war, Mazzini declared himself ready to throw the weight of his influence into the royal scale. Being asked by the king's envoy what guarantee he should require, he drew up a few lines to this effect for the king to sign. The king of course refused, and Castagneto remarked of Mazzini, that "he perceived there was nothing to be done in that quarter."

† That this was the true aim of the royal war is further proved by the fact that the same arts which were employed to obtain the decree of the fusion of Lombardy with Piedmont having been equally successful in Venice, two royal commissioners were sent to take possession of that city in the name of Charles Albert, two days after the king had ceded Venice by treaty to the Austrians.

When the news of the retreat of the royal troops, and the approach of Radetsky, with his refreshed and victorious army, towards Milan, awakened the people to a sense of the deceptions practised upon them by the Provisional Government, they resolved to defend the city to the last extremity, and returned to their former allegiance to Mazzini. The government implored him to organize a Committee of Defence. He did so; and the enthusiasm with which the populace assisted and supported the labours of the Committee, and prepared for battle, filled him with new hope. When General Fauti brought news from the camp that the king was coming to defend the city with 40,000 men, he was preceded by two royal commissioners, who assumed the executive power.

"I saw them," wrote Mazzini, "and heard their words to the multitude assembled under the windows of the palace. . . . I traversed the streets of Milan, studying the faces and words of men, and I despaired. The people believed themselves saved; they were therefore irrevocably lost. I left the city, God alone knows with what grief, and joined Garibaldi's column at Bergamo."*

The history of the king's return to Milan, of his swearing to save the city or die with his two sons in her defence, *after he had secretly signed the treaty of capitulation with Radetsky*, of his cowardly flight during the night, carrying the army with him, and of Radetsky's entry into the abandoned capital of Lombardy, form no part of our present subject.† We have shown that it was to Mazzini's labours that Italy owed the spirit of nationality and the awakened instinct of

* Colonel (now General) Medici has written a short account of Mazzini's joining his legion, from which we extract the following: "Garibaldi was just about going to Bergamo . . . . when we saw appear amongst us, rifle on shoulder, Mazzini, asking to join our ranks as a simple soldier of the legion I commanded. . . . . A general acclamation saluted the great Italian, and the legion unanimously confided its banner, which bore the device '*God and the People*,' to his charge. . . . The march was very fatiguing, rain fell in torrents, we were drenched to the skin. Although accustomed to a life of study, and little fit for the violent exertion of forced marches, his constancy and serenity never forsook him for an instant, and notwithstanding our counsels—for we feared for his physical strength—he would never stay behind nor leave the column for an instant. . . . . Seeing one of the youngest volunteers clothed only in linen, and consequently with no protection from the rain and sudden cold, he forced him to accept and wear his own cloak. . . . From Monza to Como my column, always pursued by the enemy and menaced with destruction every moment by a very superior force, never wavered, but remained compact and united, ... and kept the enemy in check to the last. In this march, full of danger and difficulty, the strength of soul, intrepidity, and decision which Mazzini possesses in such a high degree, never failed, and were the admiration of the bravest amongst us. His presence, his words, the example of his courage, animated our young soldiers. . . . . His conduct has been a proof that to the greatest qualities of the civilian he joins the courage and intrepidity of the soldier."—*Life and Works of Mazzini*, vol. v.

† The reader desirous of knowing the details of this melancholy episode of Italian history, may consult the work of Carlo Cattaneo, "The Insurrection of Milan in 1848," Lugano, 1849; and a little book called "Gli ultimi tristissimi fatti di Milano," published by two members of the Committee of Defence, and the parliamentary correspondence to which we have already referred.

unity that rendered her emancipation possible in 1848; as it was through her heedlessness of his counsels, and departure from that path of struggle and sacrifice by persisting upon which she alone could have deserved her freedom, that she fell. We will now follow Mazzini upon the difficult and perilous, but logical and consistent, course he has since pursued. After the fall of Milan he had still one hope left. Venice still held out against the Austrians, and he trusted that she might be made a new centre and leader of the people's war. For this reason he strove to induce Garibaldi, on his arrival in Italy, to hasten to the assistance of Venice; but Garibaldi offered his sword to the king, by whom he was coldly received, and, after much delay, appointed to a trifling command. Mazzini sent messengers to Manin, informing him of the numbers still under arms among the mountains, of the exiles crowding the Ticino eager to renew the struggle, of the popular ferment in the valleys of Bergamo and Brescia, and urging him to give the agitation a visible centre and moral support, by assuming the direction of it. Manin, however, did not respond to the appeal. Mazzini then exerted himself to the utmost to rekindle the war in the Val d'Intelvi; but dissensions among the military leaders and the discouragement produced by the fall of Milan rendered the attempt abortive.

Meanwhile the Pope had fled from Rome, leaving the people free to choose their own form of government. A Constituent Assembly was chosen to debate the question, to which Mazzini was elected a deputy, and he determined to hasten thither. Passing through Tuscany, he arrived at Leghorn precisely when the Provisional Government received intelligence of the flight of the Grand Duke. On the 9th of February, 1849, the Republic was proclaimed at Rome, and, as a first step towards that unity which had been his life's aim, Mazzini strove to induce the Provisional Government at once to proclaim the union of Tuscany with Rome. He saw that Tuscany, menaced by Austria, and secretly undermined by Piedmont,* could not stand alone; but, "by sheltering herself under the wings of Rome, and placing herself under the protection of the Italian Right, she would have increased her own strength, and rendered possible a magnificent national movement."

"The people," he says, "with their usual instinct, comprehended the idea at once: in a public meeting of more than ten thousand persons, held under the Loggie degli Uffizii,† I obtained their vote for the Republican

* Gioberti, the Piedmontese minister, was intriguing to restore the princes on every side. See his letter to Mazarelli, President of the Roman Ministry, proposing to restore the Pope to political power under the protection of a Piedmontese garrison at Rome. He made similar suggestions to the Tuscan Government, and revenged their rejection by open hostility, provoking the desertion of Tuscan troops, and ordering La Marmora to occupy Pontremoli, Fivizzano, &c.

† At Florence.

form of government, and union with Rome. The men in power refused their adhesion to the popular vote, and I then started for Rome."*

It would be an agreeable task to follow Mazzini to Rome. The magnificent page of history inscribed by Republican Rome during the siege, and the heroic attitude of her people awakened from degradation to the noblest virtues of citizens and soldiers, during Mazzini's three months' triumvirate, is too brilliant for even calumny to obscure, and the chief facts of that brief but glorious period are well known. Our present purpose is to lift some portions of the veil cast over Mazzini's career as a conspirator and agitator, and we therefore turn with reluctance from the records of the moral victory won by his principles in the short life of the Roman Republic, to the gloomy record of the twenty years of untiring and unrewarded labour which have passed over the head of the triumvir since her fall.

After the French had entered Rome, and with them the whole body of adverse priesthood which had formed a centre of conspiracy at Gaëta, Mazzini remained for a week publicly in the city. "The lies promulgated by the French and Catholic press as to the *terror* I had exercised in Rome during the siege," says he, "made me desirous of proving the falsity of the accusation by thus offering myself as an easy victim to any who might believe they had an injury to avenge, or feeling desirous of being rewarded by the dominating sect." At last he departed, without passport or papers of any kind, on a little steamer commanded by a Corsican, who consented to undergo the risk of conveying him to Marseilles, which he contrived to enter and to quit without a passport, and so traversed the enemy's country till he reached Switzerland.

Before leaving Rome, Mazzini had organized a vast secret association to maintain a link between the people there and the national party in the rest of Italy. The soul of this association was Petroni, a distinguished lawyer of Bologna, who conducted the clandestine press. His hiding-place was betrayed to the Papal authorities in

* Mazzini thus describes his feelings on entering Rome—"Rome was the dream of my young years, the generating idea of my mental conception, the key-stone of my intellectual edifice, the religion of my soul; and I entered the city alone, one evening early in March, with a deep sense of awe, almost of worship. Rome was to me, as in spite of her present degradation she still is, the temple of humanity. From Rome will one day spring the religious transformation destined for the third time to bestow moral unity upon Europe.

"I had journeyed towards the sacred city with a heart sick unto death from the defeat of Lombardy, the new deceptions I had met with in Tuscany, and the dismemberment of our Republican party over the whole of Italy. Yet, nevertheless, as I passed through the *Porta del Popolo* I felt an electric thrill go through me, a spring of new life. I shall never see Rome more, but the memory of her will mingle with my dying thought of God and my best beloved; and wheresoever fate may lay my bones, I believe they will once more know the thrill that ran through me then, on the day when the Republican banner shall be planted—in pledge of the unity of our Italy—upon the Vatican and Capitol."

1853, and he was cast into prison, where he lingers to this day. The sole medium through which the Roman people could receive either manly counsels or even true intelligence as to the state of feeling in other parts of Italy being thus destroyed, the Moderates gained possession of the ground, and gradually instilled into the ignorant populace their fatal doctrine of inertia, through their everlasting promises of approaching kingly intervention. In other parts of Italy the organization of the party of action was resumed by means of private correspondence and published writings, invariably sequestrated, and as invariably reproduced by the clandestine press. A conspiracy against the Austrians in Venetian Lombardy was discovered in 1852, and notwithstanding the execution of three of the leaders in Mantua, a still more formidable one in Milan, very skilfully planned on a scale of great magnitude by Mazzini himself, was only prevented from succeeding by an accident a few hours before the time appointed for surprising the fortresses. Mazzini was able to prevent the outbreak in the towns that were to have followed the signal of Milan, and to give timely warning to the majority of the conspirators in the city; but many arrests were made on suspicion, and three of the leaders were hung. The whole nation, however, was so full of hatred to its foreign masters that Mazzini had proceeded very far in preparations for action in Carrara, Pisa, Florence, Bologna, Leghorn, and Naples before the end of 1854. These plans also were overthrown: in the south by the Anglo-French demonstration before Naples, and in the centre betrayed by Moderate agents who had feigned to join in the conspiracy. The usual persecutions, arrests, and executions ensued, and the popular exasperation culminated in the assassination of the Grand Duke.

The attempt of Pisacane upon Naples, and the simultaneous rising in Genoa and Leghorn in 1857, were the next public revelations of Mazzini's untiring apostolate. Pisacane seized upon the *Cagliari* steamer, freed the political prisoners in the island of Ponza, and landed with them on the Neapolitan shore with the intention of co-operating with the insurgents in the kingdom itself against the ferocious Bourbon; and Genoa sought to aid the movement. "Genoa willed that her materials of war and her means of action should be mobilized in aid of that enterprise and of the common country." "The question," said Mazzini, in a defence of the movement* published shortly after in refutation of the calumnies spread by the monarchical press, "was not between Republic and Royalty, but between action and inertness. I am a Republican, and such are almost all those who support me in a struggle now lasting since twenty-five years; . . . but we maintain that no one has the right

* A translation of this defence, entitled "The late Genoese Insurrection defended," was published by Mr. Joseph Cowen, of Newcastle, in 1858.

to substitute his own will, or that of his section, for the national will." But he and his followers refused to recognise in Piedmont other than the freest portion of Italy, and, consequently, "the basis for a line of operations whose objective point is beyond." Upon the map of Europe they recognised not Piedmont, Tuscany, Naples, &c., but only *Italy*. Whosoever rejected that programme might be a Piedmontese, Tuscan, or Neapolitan, but he was not an Italian. The fact that Genoa was free imposed upon her a greater obligation; by the laws of God and man, duties were in proportion to means;* Genoa had means, and was bound to use them, or unworthy to be free. But in Mazzini's sense of the word the Moderates were not Italians—"the duality between the prosperous and the wretched, under the names of Piedmont and Italy, had taken hold of their minds . . . . the lesser country had made them forget the great, the true country—Italy." To the monarchical agents and journalists who incessantly preached to the Piedmontese people to be content with *offering the example of constitutional government* to the provinces under despotic rule, he exclaimed:—

"Speak not of example! To whom? To the men upon whose head is placed the *cap of silence!** To the men who, hemmed in by foreign bayonets, are forbidden to meet together by five at a time . . . to counsel each other through the press? . . . It is the example of the man who bars his own door when murder is doing without. . . . Act, in God's name, and we will follow you; if not, we will act ourselves, and drag you into the arena in search of that *opportunity* you pretend to await."

Nor was it without reason that he spoke thus. Piedmont had been free for ten years, and although possessed of a well-organized army and navy, and well-filled treasury and arsenals, had won no inch of ground from the foreign rulers of Italy. The Moderates stifled all proposals of action as fatal to the "vaster and more secure designs gradually being matured by the monarchy," and—

"The credulity of the uneducated, the prestige exercised by even a phantom of force, . . . the conscious or unconscious selfishness of the comfort-seekers in life, had created," says Mazzini, "a population of dupes, who persisted in committing the salvation of Italy to protocols which recognised the dominion of Austria in Lombardy; to the propositions of Ministerial *Liberators*,† who teach their masters how to *prevent* the unity of Italy; to wars in the Crimea, seeking the co-operation of Austria; to Anglo-French mediations which demand—but do not obtain—the liberation of a few prisoners; to the occult designs of the man who, having extinguished in blood the liberties of France and Rome, is doomed, by an inexorable fate, to live and die a tyrant."

The heroic attempt of Pisacane upon Naples was crushed. He himself fell in a desperate hand-to-hand fight against overwhelming

* A mode of torture practised in the Neapolitan prisons. † Cavour.

numbers,* and the few of his little band who were taken alive were cast into the hideous Neapolitan dungeons. The movement in Genoa in support of his expedition was put down by the Piedmontese monarchy; that in Leghorn by the Austrian Grand Duke. Both of these movements having been prepared by Mazzini, the Moderates misrepresented their purpose, declaring the attempt had been intended to overthrow the Piedmontese monarchy and establish a republic. Their journals vied with one another in calumnies against Mazzini, and groans over his "fatal influence" upon the people.

"For six-and-twenty years," wrote he, in answer, "if I am to believe you, I have been fatal to the Italian cause. . . . I have committed nothing but errors; nay, many times have I been declared utterly extinguished, null, unworthy of being spoken about; yet, nevertheless, grown grey in years and care, my means exhausted, opposed by all the governments, gendarmes, and spies of Europe, so that—England only excepted—there is not therein an inch of ground I can tread legally and without danger, from time to time I reappear, an agitator, followed, you can no longer say by a few, and feared by the powers who are strong in public and secret organization, in their armies, their gold, and some of them even—if their press speak true—in opinion. Why is this? I will tell you. . . . I am but a voice crying Action: but the state of Italy cries for action; the best men of Italy cry for action; the people of her cities . . . cry for action; the scourge and the *cap of silence* at Naples point to action; and the glorious memories of '48, and the unspeakable shame of the people to whom these memories belong, and whose teachers lead it—the Belisarius of liberty—to beg from the protocols of every conference, from the memoranda of all semi-liberal ministers, a deceitful hope of *ameliorations*—call for action as a solemn duty. . . . While you offer to remedy the ills of Italy by sleeping draughts, immobility, and . . . *opportunities*, the souls who thirst for action will turn to me, . . . to us, who when asked by the south of Italy . . . to send a steamer to Ponza, found means to send one, while you gave nothing but words and pity. Do you wish to destroy my fatal influence? Act; act better and more efficaciously than I. Where I—left alone by you—act on what you call a small scale, unite and act upon a larger scale. . . . You also are Italians. . . . Agitate Piedmont till she awaken to a sense of her duty. . . . Give money and muskets to your brothers in the south, the centre, and the north."

The Moderates, however, continued their system of decrying all present action, in the name of imaginary action to come, coining medals meanwhile to Cavour as the future *Liberator* of Italy, in spite even of his own repeated declarations that "the monarchy abhors revolution; the monarchy exists in virtue of treaties which it respects; † the emancipation and unity of Italy is a Utopia."

The Moderates replied to Mazzini by condemning him to death; but

* The agents of the Neapolitan Government persuaded the villagers at Sapri, where he landed, that he and his men were escaped banditti, and by this deception obtained their assistance against them.

† Treaties which guaranteed Lombardy to Austria, Tuscany to Leopold of Austria, Rome to the Pope, and Naples to the Bourbons.

he, unshaken as ever by failure, continued calmly re-weaving the broken web of the National party, exposing the intrigues and deceptions of the Moderates, and endeavouring through private correspondence and published writings "to *Italianize* Piedmont," and prepare the way for action. In order to counteract his fast reviving influence, Cavour formed, in 1857, a "National Society," under the auspices of the government; the avowed purpose of which was to prepare for war with Austria. By this means he succeeded in bringing over the majority even of the Republican party to the monarchy; and as soon as the rumour of the Franco-Sardinian alliance spread through Italy all the experiences of the past were forgotten, and Victor Emmanuel and Cavour became the idols of the people, who proclaimed them in anticipation the "*unificators*" of Italy. In his journal, *Pensiero e Azione*,* Mazzini endeavoured to recall the Italians to their senses by publishing the agreement entered into between Cavour and the Emperor Napoleon in the secret treaty of Plombières; and revealing, *as early as December*, 1858, the price which was to be paid to the "magnanimous ally" for execution of an "idea," which was quite other than the idea of the Italian people, who—however easily misled by false promises as to the means of realizing their aim—were bent, even more decidedly and emphatically than in 1848, on unity and independence. The purpose of Cavour was to prevent the people from taking the war into their own hands, by pretending (as Charles Albert had done in 1848) to save them fresh sacrifices by conquering for them, and thus regain the prestige of the monarchy, checkmate the growing republican element, and obtain the territorial aggrandizement of the House of Savoy.†

All these things were declared to the people before the fact by Mazzini; he warned the Italians that an alliance with the bombarder of Rome, the man who had strangled liberty in his own country, could never lead to liberty in Italy. The people, blinded and fascinated, as usual, by a display of force, heeded him not. He, however, continued his revelations of the occult designs of the Emperor, saying:‡—

* The *Pensiero e Azione* (Thought and Action) was started in this year. Its aim was "to re-temper the morality of the party, undermined by the Moderate press . . . . to spread the ideas which are the justification of the party . . . . and to prepare for action." It was published in Switzerland. Sequestration of all the liberal papers had become, in Piedmont, a system so rigidly carried out as to be equivalent in effect to their suppression. The *Italia del Popolo*, an opposition paper, was sequestrated exactly fifty times between February and September of that year (1858), and no less than four editors of the paper were imprisoned. The spirit in which the Government prosecutions were carried on may be inferred from the following fact: "On one occasion when an editor who had already endured two months' *preventive* imprisonment was acquitted, the Advocate for the Crown angrily exclaimed, "You may acquit him, but God himself can't undo the two months' imprisonment he has suffered already!"

† The reader will remember the *precedent* of '48.

‡ *Vide Pensiero e Azione:* Lausanne. Trübner & Co.

"Napoleon seeks Nice and Savoy—the price stipulated for Lombardy—the throne of Naples for Murat, and of the centre for his cousin. . . . Cavour has agreed to these things. . . . If Austria resist to the utmost, the whole design will be completed; if, after the first defeats, she should offer to abandon Lombardy in order to have Venetia secured to her, they will accept; and only the conditions concerning the aggrandizement of the House of Savoy will be fulfilled: the rest of uprisen Italy will be abandoned to the vengeance of her masters."

The reader is aware how truly these prophecies (published six months before the event) were fulfilled; as was also the following warning of the abrupt conclusion of the war, published in December, 1858, and fulfilled to the letter in June, 1859:—

"A sudden, ruinous peace, fatal to the insurgents, before the war is half over. . . . Louis Napoleon, fearing the action of the peoples should the war be prolonged, will compel the Sardinian monarchy to desist, *conceding to it a certain portion of territory, according to circumstances, and abandoning the betrayed Venetian provinces, as well as a portion of Lombardy*, to Austria."

The people, however, dazzled by the proclamation of the Emperor, which declared that Italy should be freed "from the Alps to the Adriatic," persisted in hailing the despot of France as the Liberator of Italy, unmindful of the truth forcibly and bluntly stated by one* of the wisest and noblest members of the National party, that "*one cannot get into heaven arm-in-arm with the devil.*" Volunteers flocked to the royal standard from all parts of the peninsula, notwithstanding the appeals made to them by the official press *not to embarrass the Government*, as the regular armies more than sufficed to complete the emancipation. Neglected and discouraged in every possible manner, they still continued to arrive, until it became absolutely necessary to quiet the popular excitement by accepting a few thousands† of them; who, miserably armed and equipped, were at length enrolled under Garibaldi, and despatched to the most exposed positions in the Valtellina and Stelvio to encounter vastly superior Austrian forces, unsupported by the regular troops.‡

The Moderates also induced the Parliament to pass a vote conferring the *Dictatorship* upon the king,§ thus depriving the country even of the phantom of constitutional government it had possessed; and the deluded people applauded, thinking only of enabling the king to overcome Austria; not a seditious cry was raised, not a murmur heard at the sacrifices demanded of them. Napoleon's

* Quadrio.

† Of more than 40,000 Italians who thus "embarrassed the monarchy" by imploring to fight under its standard, less than 10,000 were accepted.

‡ Garibaldi and his volunteers performed prodigies of valour which the inhabitants of those provinces still relate with pride. On the site of one of his bloodiest battles, upon the mound that covers those who fell, a monument has been erected to *Cavour and Victor Emmanuel.*

§ The manifesto declared that "*an iron discipline* would be observed, not only in the camp, *but in the cities.*

proclamations had declared that the populations of Italy should be "free to express their legitimate desires." The Tuscans, on the flight of their Grand Duke, the Modenese, the Legations, and the Marche, expressed their "legitimate desires" to become subjects of Victor Emmanuel, "the soldier of Italian independence, the incarnation of the National cause." The Italian troops fully divided the glory of every battle with their allies. From victory to victory, the allied troops had penetrated the *enceinte* of the celebrated quadrilateral of fortresses, and after the defeat at Solferino had rendered Austria, for the time, helpless, the emancipation of Italy appeared, as had the war been carried on it might have been, certain. But "the sudden ruinous peace" which Mazzini had predicted gave the death-blow to the hopes of Italy; the four fortresses, Venetian Lombardy, and the city of Venice were secured to Austria; Lombardy was *ceded to Napoleon*, and thrown by him to Victor Emmanuel, "like a bone to a hungry dog."*

The Dukes of Modena and Tuscany were declared restored to their rights, and an Italian Confederation formed, of which the Pope was the head. The peace was even more ruinous, both to the honour and security of Italy, than Mazzini had foretold; for the proposals, which, according to the secret treaty of Plombières, were to be accepted if offered by Austria, were made by the Emperor himself. "Peace is concluded between the Emperor of Austria and myself," said the "magnanimous ally;" and the King of Italy—*who had got his bone*—was not so much as named in the matter.

It is well known that Bologna and Tuscany refused to accept their former masters, and persisted in offering themselves to Piedmont. It was a part of the Napoleonic "idea" to preserve the temporal power of the Pope, and to enthrone his cousin in Tuscany, and he therefore forbade Cavour to accept the proposed annexation. Ultimately, however, the manifestations of the popular will were so vigorous, and the anti-French manifestations, made on the visit of the Emperor's cousin, so unequivocal, that the scheme was of necessity abandoned, and Bologna and Tuscany maintained their independence until the king was allowed to accept what could no longer be withheld, and these new gems for his crown were, like the rest of his "greatness," *thrust upon him.*

Mazzini's whole energies were now directed to the one idea of carrying on and *Italianizing* the war. He implored all parties to set aside every internal question in this great aim. "In the name of

* The meaning of despatching Garibaldi to the Valtellina was now evident. Should he and his volunteers refuse to recognise the peace and desire to carry on the war, they could neither enter the Venetian territory nor cross to join the malcontents of Tuscany and the Romagna without crossing the line of the Austrian army.

the honour of Italy," said he, "let us all make One." He addressed a magnificent letter to the king, pointing out to him that the war was but begun, and assuring him that if he would put himself at the head of the Nation to unite Italy, the Republicans would loyally support and aid him in the enterprise. "All parties would then be extinguished," said he; "the only things left in Italy would be the people and yourself."

The excitement produced by this letter was such that it became impossible for the king to ignore it. The popularity of Cavour had been shaken by the ignominious peace, and the Ratazzi ministry, which succeeded, was compelled to coquette with the war party, to caress Garibaldi, and to feign sympathy with the popular will. Brofferio, the celebrated historian of Piedmont, carried Mazzini's letter to the king, who informed him that he had already read it; declared himself determined that "Italy should exist at any cost," and desired Brofferio to offer Mazzini an interview.

Mazzini answered that it was as well to speak clearly on both sides before meeting; that, convinced that the majority of the Italians desired Victor Emmanuel for their king, he, bowing to the will of the nation, assured him that if he would sincerely endeavour to become such by winning the now enslaved provinces to the crown, he and the Republicans would help him to the utmost; but the king must promise not to sheath his sword until he were victorious:—

"I cannot," said Mazzini, "accept '*union*' or 'progressive unification,' . . . no such compromise. I will not accept the offer to fight to-day for the Duchies; to-morrow, for some other portion of Italy; then to wait till the Pope die for another; then wait two or three years for war for Venice. . . . The fact of the day is the revolution in the centre. *There* must be the fulcrum of the lever. The king must openly make common cause with the centre, and unite it to Italy: if not, not. My proposal is based on the conviction that Piedmont and the Italian revolution are strong enough for the enterprise. To revolutionize the south is easy;* and that done, with the actual Neapolitan army, the troops of Sicily, those already in arms in Piedmont, Lombardy, and the centre, and those which such a fact would create in Italy, the king would have 500,000 men and a marine. If the monarchy has amongst its servants no man who understands these things, all action in common is impossible: each of us must do what he can alone. . . . The enterprise in the south is easy: I do not even ask Piedmont to initiate it—we will do that."

He adds that if the king really desires unity, all that is wanted is that he should send word to the small governments in the centre to cease their persecution and imprisonment of Italian exiles, and let Garibaldi know (directly or indirectly) that if he passes the fictitious frontier he would be tacitly approved by the Govern-

* Facts showed the truth of this a few months later.

ment, and (should Austria intervene against him) have its open support. Should the king loyally accept these propositions, he promised to maintain absolute secrecy upon the matter. He also said that the insurrection of Sicily was a certainty so soon as Garibaldi should pass the frontier, but would, if the king should prefer it, undertake to secure that insurrection beforehand, so as to furnish an ostensible reason for his passing. "As soon as Garibaldi reaches the Abruzzi," he added, "the insurrection of Naples itself is certain; certain, also, the offer of annexation to Piedmont (if the National party have instructions not to oppose it), which offer the king must undertake to accept at once." Piedmont might thus make Italy her own, and "the king become the man of the century." He concluded by saying—"If the king agrees to these propositions, we can arrange matters together at once; if not, all interviews are needless, as in that case, I am irrevocably determined to maintain my own independence." Brofferio tells us that Cavour returned to power immediately after this letter had been received, and that all contact, not only with Mazzini, but even with Garibaldi, was broken off.

It had been found impossible openly to outrage the warlike sentiment of the population by disbanding Garibaldi's brigade. The fact that it was incorporated into the royal army, and despatched, with mysterious hints, to the centre, awakened the liveliest hopes in the credulous population as to the intentions of the king. Mazzini, however, having reason to disbelieve in these intentions, from the failure of his own negotiations with the monarch, now urged upon Garibaldi himself the scheme he had formerly pressed upon the king, hoping either to compel Victor Emmanuel to follow lead, or, by convincing the people of his utter lack even of Italian pride, to induce them to act without him. Garibaldi agreed to the plan in writing. We ourselves visited the general's head-quarters at Bologna at that time, and conversed with Colonels Medici and Cosenz, who, full of enthusiasm, and certain of success, indignantly answered our doubts of Garibaldi's persistence in any plan unsanctioned by royalty by the repeated assurance—"He has given his word. He will pass the frontier the day after to-morrow." On the next evening, however, when all had been made ready for the troops to march the next day, a private telegram from the king induced the general abruptly to leave the camp, break faith with Mazzini, and throw up the whole matter. Colonels Medici and Cosenz were shortly afterwards promoted to the rank of generals in the regular army.

Neither deception nor betrayal, however, could divert Mazzini from his aim. His agents had long traversed the south, and, knowing Sicily to be more disposed to initiate the struggle than Naples,

it was decided to despatch Rosalino Pilo, a distinguished young Sicilian, to head the insurrection there. Rosalino, and Quadrio, a man esteemed throughout all Italy for his lifelong devotion to his country, had used every effort to persuade Garibaldi to head the expedition; but the general persistently refused even to lend his countenance to the scheme. At length, wearied by the entreaties of Rosalino, he answered, "Well, if you succeed, I will come." Rosalino, with one companion (Corrao), started from Genoa in a little unseaworthy boat, with five sailors, his sole material of war being a few thousand francs and some pistols furnished by Mazzini. Rosalino, however, who had been through the country beforehand, in order to judge of the spirit of the people, was confident of success. It had been arranged that the insurrection he was to head should be begun in Palermo on the 3rd April. He was detained by stress of weather till the 11th, but the insurrection broke out on the appointed day. On his arrival he found that the movement had been suppressed in the city, but the country-people were still in arms. Rosalino at once took the command, beat the royal troops in every encounter, re-awakened the enthusiasm of the people, and carried on the war until the news of his successes induced Garibaldi to follow. The flight of the king at the mere terror of his name, and the half-comic, half-romantic story of Naples opening her gates to a conqueror who had not as yet struck a blow against her is well known. Rosalino, the true hero of that insurrection, was killed by a gunshot at the moment of winning a decisive battle, just having received the intelligence of the landing of Garibaldi to complete the enterprise.

While Garibaldi was in the south, Mazzini, concealed in Genoa, organized an expedition to the centre under Nicotera.* The volunteers were openly recruited and drilled within a few miles of Florence, under the feigned sanction of the governor, Ricasoli. When the preparations were complete, however, he compelled Nicotera to renounce the idea of entering the Papal States, and embark his troops for the south, threatening to call out the Piedmontese troops against him should he refuse. He afterwards defended this treachery by asserting that he had had information that Nicotera had combined with Mazzini to inaugurate a republic.

Mazzini then hastened to Naples to implore Garibaldi, who had been proclaimed Dictator there, to avail himself of the immense resources in men, money, and material of war, thus placed at his disposal by the gratitude of the Neapolitan people, to free Rome. It is known, however, that instead of listening to Mazzini, the general handed over the fruits of the popular victory to the king, and retired

* One of the few survivors of Pisacane's expedition.

to Caprera. How, seeing that no effort was made to win for Italy her capital, he allowed himself to be again deceived by the deceitful promise of the king that, although unable to risk offending France by attacking Rome himself, he would wink at the proceeding in others; —the whole sad story, in fact, of his betrayal at Aspromonte, and subsequent imprisonment by the monarch to whom he had so rashly given a kingdom—it is not our purpose to relate here. Mazzini's course of action, during the nine years that have elapsed since Garibaldi's imprisonment, has been the consistent carrying out of the principles which have governed his whole life. Believing that "duties are in proportion to means," every increase of power to the Italian kingdom has created, in his eyes, a stronger duty towards the provinces still enslaved. After the betrayal of Garibaldi at Aspromonte, Mazzini declared to the people that their eyes must now be opened to the faithlessness and incapacity of the Government, and it was therefore their duty to win Venice and Rome for themselves, whether *with*, *without*, or *against* the king. He succeeded in producing so great an agitation in favour of war, that Garibaldi left Caprera and proceeded to Lombardy, with the view of organizing an expedition into Venetia. The king now again attempted to come to some personal understanding with Mazzini.

"In November, 1863," says Mazzini; "while I was doing my utmost to promote the only enterprise possible at that time, . . . the Venetian enterprise—I received, through the medium of one in personal contact with the king, a message in substance as follows:—'That the king could not understand our constantly conspiring, nor the setting up of a dualism between the Government and the Party of Action, in matters upon which they were substantially agreed; that he wanted Venice as much as I did; that he had faith in my sincerity and honesty of purpose: wherefore then should we not form a compact in furtherance of our common object?' . . . I answered that I would not bind myself by any compact; . . . that I could feel no confidence in any who followed the inspirations of the French Emperor, and foresaw that in case Louis Napoleon should become favourable to Austria, the warlike disposition of the Government would be suddenly frozen by a telegram from Paris; . . . that it was known that I had no idea of raising the Republican banner in Venetia; known that our party, through refraining both through conscientiousness and self-respect from shouting *Victor Emanuel*, and limiting itself to the cry of *War to Austria, help for our brothers*, yet left the choice of the programme to the Venetians themselves, who, needing as they did the army, would be certain to invoke monarchy.

"Did the king really want Venice as much as we did? He had only to leave us free to act, and prepare himself rapidly to seize the opportunity we would go to work to create. The method naturally pointed out by circumstances was *that the Venetians themselves should take the initiative by rising in insurrection, which should be responded to by popular manifestations and bands of volunteers, and the consequent intervention of the Government.* The king, through his agents there, should say a word to the Venetians in the same spirit with ours; should diminish the adverse action of the Government towards us; cease to despatch hostile *cordons* to the frontiers, and to

seize our arms. We, acting with all possible prudence on our side, should hold the army, and—still more important—the navy in readiness; should banish from his mind every idea of French aid for Italy, or Italian aid for France in case of an attempt on the Rhine; should leave Garibaldi the free and independent chief of the volunteers. . . . When I heard of the seizure of arms in Brescia and Milan, I declared 'that I would neither be *mystified* by princes nor others.' . . . Finally, on the 25th May, I wrote: 'It is clear that we cannot understand each other. . . . I was told at first that it was impossible to produce an *external* initiative. I answered that the question was one of *internal* initiative. I was then told that an *anterior* movement in Gallicia was required. I answered that though adverse to this sudden change of scheme and of language with our allies, yet I would endeavour to arrange this. Now a movement in Hungary also is asked; to-morrow it will be Bohemia, the dissolution of the Empire of Austria, before it is attacked. Meantime, by next year we shall have Poland slain; the Gallician movement rendered impossible; the Danish question concluded, and Hungary in the hands of the Party of Conciliation.

"'This is no Italian policy. It is a policy of fear, unworthy of a people of 22,000,000, possessing an army of 300,000 men. It is impossible to treat of questions so vital without fixing some limit as to time. *These things cannot be done*, I am told, *except at the opportune moment*. It is precisely because I believe the moment opportune that I endeavour to seize it. You should have told me the reason why the present moment is inopportune, or have said to me, *We intend to act at such a time*, and not till then. Merely to tell me that arms cannot be allowed to be sent across the frontier, for fear the Venetians should use them, is to throw me back into the indefinite. To tell me *that even if the Venetians rise, we shall be prevented from helping them*, is the same thing as to tell me *the Government has decided to take part with Austria*. . . . I therefore renounce a contact which is useless. I remain free: free from every bond save with my own conscience. On that ground kings and citizens are equal.'"

Our space will not allow us to record Mazzini's apostolate during the succeeding years in detail. The reader can understand that after the war between Prussia and Austria, when the Emperor of France had *thrown another bone* to the king; after the union of Venice to the Crown had united twenty-five millions of Italians into one nation, all true patriots have felt the shame and degradation of that nation's apathetic endurance of the French rule in Rome even more than before; and the reader who has followed us thus far cannot doubt that so long as life lasts, Mazzini will never desist from preaching by word and deed the duty of the Italians to deserve their freedom by driving the foreigner from every inch of Italian soil. *One Italy, and Rome the capital*, the dream of the youthful prisoner at Savona, will be the last word of the venerable exile.

Since the above was written, intelligence has arrived of the arrest of Mazzini at Palermo, and his imprisonment in the fortress of Gaëta. We have no details as to the immediate cause of his arrest, but have no hesitation in affirming that they may all be summed up in the one word—Rome. A. E. V.

*** The writer of the foregoing paper left England for Italy before the movement of the Royal troops against Rome.—Ed. *Con. Rev.*

THE PRUSSIAN STATE AND PRUSSIAN LITERATURE.

MOST of our readers will remember Mr. Carlyle's characteristic reference to the meetings which took place between Mirabeau and Frederick the Great shortly before the death of the latter. During one of those memorable "half-hours," when they met face to face, "the last of the old gods, and the first of the modern Titans," Mirabeau said to the king:—"It is to be regretted that your Majesty has not chosen to be the Augustus of your people as well as their Cæsar." Frederick fixed upon the French Count those eyes of which we have heard so much, "such a pair of eyes as no man, or lion, or lynx of that century bore elsewhere," and replied, "You do not know what you say. By giving to my people free scope, and not intermeddling with their literary concerns, I have done more for the enlightenment than if I had endeavoured to force them on." The reproach implied in the words of Mirabeau has often been repeated; and not Frederick II. only, but the Prussian monarchy, has been blamed for a neglect of German literature. Their admirers can scarcely deny that there is some truth in the imputation. No such traditions of kindly aid to German genius, and munificent patronage of art, belong to the Court of Berlin as those that linger around Weimar and the Court of Saxony. Although Frederick the Great was himself a literary man, and during his reign some of the most eminent names in European literature and

philosophy, among others, Lessing and Kant, were to be found in his dominions, he treated the literature of his country with cold neglect, sometimes indeed with rude scorn. Frederick Schlegel did not speak without some ground when in the lectures which he delivered at Vienna, he inveighed against a king in whose land Lessing, Kant, Winkelmann, and Klopstock lived, but who failed to recognise the greatness which was growing up around him, while he lavished his praise and his patronage upon a foreign literature. It would have been unquestionably better for the fame of Frederick personally had he possessed the fresh insight and sympathy that would have enabled him to do justice to the great writers who lived in his own dominions; although, even with regard to the personal matter, something may be said in behalf of "old Fritz;" for, as Goethe pointed out, a recognition of German literature would have been for him to "lose his years;" and it was not easy for the old king to learn in his age to respect a literature which had yielded so little to satisfy the thirst of his youthful spirit. But however the matter may be viewed as affecting our estimate of Frederick personally, he was in the right when he said to Mirabeau that he had acted in the interests of German culture by permitting every man in his dominions to be literary as well as religious in his own fashion. If he did not patronize the literary men of Germany, he did what was far more important—he formed a great German state, to which literary men came from all parts of the Fatherland, because they found there greater freedom, and an atmosphere more favourable to thought than elsewhere. That no attempt was made to bind these men to the throne of Prussia, and that they were not tempted by acts of gracious condescension to adopt a Prussian-provincial tone, was assuredly a gain for German literature, whatever occasional hardships individuals may have suffered.

The whole subject of "the influence of the Prussian State upon German literature" is admirably handled in an essay so entitled, in Julian Schmidt's recent "Pictures from the Intellectual Life of our Time." No one who reads that essay will be disposed to regard Prussia as the victim of a mistaken literary policy on the part of its Government. The impression which it leaves is, on the contrary, one of surprise at the almost disproportionate number of great thinkers and writers who have lived in Prussia during its short history. In none of the great spiritual or intellectual movements of the last two hundred years is it otherwise than well represented; and in not a few its place is absolutely the foremost. Some of the instances cited by Schmidt will make this evident. The first sketch in his essay relates to what is known under the name of Pietism—the most important movement which has taken place in the Church of Germany since the Reformation. Pietism was in the first instance a protest of

the Christian conscience and of Christian feeling against the unspiritual dogmatism which claimed to itself the name of orthodoxy; and also, and perhaps to a greater extent, a protest against the low standard of Christian morality and devotion which had grown up side by side with this arrogant doctrinal dogmatism. A practical more than a speculative movement, the burden of the teaching was that men ought to be more holy; and, in order to be so, more inward in their religion. Those, however, of the party who concerned themselves with theory, saw clearly enough that the practical ends aimed at could only be fully attained by a freer, fuller, and more spiritual use of the Holy Scriptures than was customary in the schools of the theological dogmatists of the day. In this way a desire after intellectual freedom grew up side by side with longings after holiness. The intellectual part of the movement, it is true, which was from the first subordinate to the practical, soon disappeared, or passed over into other camps; but, as a practical religion, Pietism is still an active and recognised power in the Church of Germany. With the early history of this movement Prussia is intimately connected. It was in the new Prussian University of Halle that the Pietists found a centre, by which they were able to scatter the seeds of their teaching throughout Germany. Driven from Leipsic, Thomasius found refuge in Halle, and, on the founding of the University, was appointed one of its professors. He at once introduced the novel custom of delivering academical lectures in German, discarding the traditionary Latin; and by these lectures, as well as by his numerous writings, carried on a formidable war of wit and argument against the abuses, formalisms, and shams by which the life of the German people was at the time so largely overrun. He especially protested against the employment of torture in judicial processes, and against those trials for witchcraft which were at the time conducted by the State, and advocated by the Church as a needful protection against the wiles of the devil. Franke, in a deeper and more devout spirit, contributed his share to the same regenerative work, chiefly through his sermons, but also for a time by lectures in the University, and always by his admirable life and his labours in the cause of practical philanthropy. These men, along with others, such as Lange and Michaelis, soon rendered Halle remarkable among the universities of Germany. Its young theologians became distinguished by a higher morality, a deepened tone of Christian feeling. and, in some cases, by a more intelligent as well as a more devout theology, at a time when an astonishing coarseness of manners and looseness in morals, combined with an ignorance scarcely less astonishing, were common even in theological circles at the German universities. In the Prussian capital, as well as in Halle, the pietistic influence, in its best form,

was at this time making itself felt. There the leader of the party, the devout and noble-minded Spener, occupied an important ecclesiastical position, for which he had left the Court Church in Dresden.

It was a fortunate circumstance for Pietism that it possessed such a leader, so wise and moderate, as well as devout, and that his high position and his noble and winning character enabled him to exercise great influence over others of the school. He communicated to the movement at its commencement a depth and a sobriety of tone which, however, it did not unfortunately always retain. His manner of dealing with adversaries, in its gentleness and humility, was something very different from that adopted at a later period by some of his followers; for as Pietism hardened into a system, the Pietists began to think it necessary, in order to retain the influence which they had gained, to refuse to others the freedom of thought and of speech to which their own party owed its existence. It is painful, after reading with admiration the account of their own early contendings and sufferings, to find them combining with some of their old enemies to persecute an inoffensive philosopher. The story of the expulsion of Christian Wolf from Halle is a disgraceful page in the history of religious persecution. He had been brought to Halle, through the influence of Leibnitz, as a lecturer on philosophy. A clear and ambitious thinker, and a lecturer who could clothe his thoughts in vigorous German, his crowded lecture-room soon gave evidence of his great popularity in the University. The stately fabrics of demonstration which he built up, and his bold manner of dealing with traditional thought, astonished and delighted his youthful hearers, and gave rise to one of those fevers of metaphysical speculation to which German universities have always been specially subject. Wolf became unquestionably the most influential man in Halle, but this influence was viewed with anything but satisfaction by his brother professors. Emptied lecture-rooms had perhaps something to do with this feeling, but in some cases we cannot doubt it was a genuine and conscientious disapproval of his philosophy which led to the melancholy results which followed. But those who hated his popularity as well as those who disliked his philosophy, were at one in the resolution that, if possible, Halle should be rid of Wolf. Nor did he fail to give occasion which could be laid hold of against him. In an academical oration which he delivered, he praised somewhat ostentatiously the moral system of Confucius, and went so far as to say that a pure ethical system might exist without a pure theology. It was enough. The ecclesiastical batteries were opened upon him, and he was publicly denounced from the pulpits as a heretic and a teacher of error. There might, notwithstanding, have been difficulty in persuading the prosaic Prussian Government to

take active steps in a matter of speculative thought, had not an ingenious enemy of Wolf, who possessed the ear of the king, devised a plan of placing it in an eminently practical light. He represented to his Majesty that Wolf denied the freedom of the human will, and that if such a doctrine got abroad it would assuredly work mischief among the people. For instance, if one of the king's tall grenadiers were to desert, it would be said that the grenadier had been predestined to be a deserter, and his punishment would be regarded as an injustice. Laughable as it may appear, the stratagem had the desired effect; and the corporal-king became thoroughly alive to the danger of having such a philosopher in his kingdom. A cabinet order was at once issued from Berlin, by which Wolf was deprived of his professorship, and commanded to leave the Prussian dominions within forty-eight hours, under pain of the halter. The sentence was carried out in the spirit in which it was given, and Wolf was driven from the University which he had adorned, with a haste and violence which could scarcely have been exceeded had he been a wild beast, or the most dangerous of criminals.

It would have been well for the honour of all parties concerned, had Frederick the Great's policy of non-intervention in literary concerns been on this occasion adopted by his father. As might have been anticipated, the persecutions to which Wolf was subjected only added to his fame, and rendered his philosophy more popular. Expelled from Halle, he found a sphere of labour in Marburgh, from which he was recalled to Prussia by Frederick the Great in the first year of that monarch's reign, who said of him that "a man who seeks and loves the truth ought to be held in honour in every human society." His philosophy became widely popular, and was for long after his death the dominant system of speculative thought in Germany. Even so late as the first decade of the present century, when Hegel began to lecture at Jena, he found Wolfianism respectably represented there, notwithstanding that it had been so long exposed to the powerful light of the Critical Philosophy.

Pietism and Wolfianism are now somewhat forgotten, especially the latter; but the classical genius of Lessing still keeps green the recollection of another school of writers who, in the middle of the eighteenth century, in Prussian Berlin, laboured untiringly, in their own fashion, for the enlightenment. Lessing was not a Prussian, but was attracted to Berlin by the intellectual atmosphere of the place. The newspaper exists to the present day which he edited when there, and much that he contributed to it is classical in German literature. Every question was discussed in its columns—theology, poetry, the drama, and philosophy; and these subjects were handled with a power and unsparing freedom which made the editor of the

Voss'sche Zeitung feared as well as respected. The general attitude of Lessing is too negative to command entire sympathy, and some of his theological writings show that his faith was shaken, not to say destroyed, in much that is highest and best; but even those who deeply disapprove of many of his opinions can scarcely refuse a certain sympathy to the frank and fearless intellect that cleared the ground of dreary shams which at that time in every department choked the path against all free culture and noble life. By Lessing's side, as friend and coadjutor, stood the gifted Jew, Moses Mendelsohn. Nicolai, the well known literary bookseller, Salzer, Ramler, and others, were members of the brilliant circle.

Lessing remained in Berlin a number of years, and at one time it would have been possible to attach him permanently to the Prussian capital by making him a member of the Berlin Academy. After the election, however, the king refused his sanction to the choice, and Lessing left Berlin in bitter anger. We can scarcely wonder at his displeasure; and when we consider in how many points the men resembled one another, the proceeding is not without an element of tragic infatuation on the part of the self-willed king. Lessing, however, owed to Frederick some of those indirect advantages of which we have spoken already. A journalistic freedom such as he could scarcely have elsewhere enjoyed was granted to him in Berlin. Frederick shrewdly observed, "Newspapers cannot be interesting if controlled," and acting upon this maxim, he gave to the press a considerable amount of freedom. To be sure, the sneer of Lessing, that this press-freedom merely meant liberty to flout religion, was not without truth, for in matters political he was by no means quite so tolerant; but on the whole, considering the times in which he lived, and his own well-known peculiarities of temper, he exhibited a fairness of mind and a largeness of view which cannot be contemplated without admiration. Lessing, like all the great writers of his age, sometimes wrote very bitterly of Frederick. Advantage was taken of these sayings of contemporaries such as Lessing, by a writer named Onno Klopp, who in a spirit of bitter hostility, endeavoured to prove that the enthusiasm for Frederick the Great was an artificially rendered product of an after age, and that his own contemporaries knew nothing of it. This led to a more careful examination of what Frederick's contemporaries did really say of him; and this showed clearly that, notwithstanding their occasional words of anger, provoked by the rude and often unreasonable conduct of the king, the greatest of his contemporaries, and Lessing among others, were constantly attracted to the king as by a "magic chain," and that they found themselves unable to desist from trying to "read the riddle of that great human life, and thus to approach nearer to the under-

standing of the riddle of human life generally." As was to be anticipated, Lessing's Berlin circle did not grow in light and wisdom when the master-spirit was removed. They seem to have passed rapidly into that stage of offensive assumption of superiority so fatally easy to those who are critics and nothing more, and bear no part in the work of up-building. Schmidt writes of them thus :—

"This school became ever more one-sided and superficial in proportion as in the rest of Germany a bolder and more unfettered creative genius began to show itself. The Berliners dealt with the enlightenment which had been handed down to them, as if it were the only good for which any public interest could be felt. With complacent scorn they set themselves in opposition to the great movement which Goethe and Herder communicated to German life ; and when unable to rid themselves of the dark feeling that their adversaries were too strong for them, they threw themselves into the arms of the Mystics and Faith-philosophers. This conflict is generally spoken of only in a general way in histories of literature, and few readers care to go to the sources themselves. For this reason, perhaps, and also because Mystics, Pietists, and Ultramontanes have again become troublesome to us, modern writers have often ranged themselves on the side of the much-abused Berliners, as if they had been ill-used persons. I have read through, from beginning to end, the *Berliner Monatschrift*, in which the pioneers of the militant Church congregated, and I can only express a very partial acquiescence in this judgment. It is true that among the Crypto-Calvinists who were chastised in the *Monatschrift* were many miserable creatures—Stark, for example ; also men like Lavater—who could not be acquitted of base equivocation. But the atmosphere in which their persecutors moved is exceedingly unwholesome, their culture is of the most limited description, and their mental powers are narrowed to the barest Utilitarianism ; they have no eye for real and glowing life, and the means to which they condescend are positively objectionable. They are simply inquisitorial, prying without shame into the most private relationships of life ; and I can easily understand how honourable and cultivated men like George Foster should take the part of those so maliciously persecuted, even although unable fully to justify them. A certain unpleasant sycophancy likewise pervades the magazine, in the first place, towards Frederick the Great, and, after his death, towards the new Government. When the celebrated religious edict appeared, one would have supposed that the battle would then have commenced in earnest, since a more tangible, powerful, and formidable foe had appeared, whereas formerly their feuds had been with obscure prophets ; but Messrs. Godike and Viester suddenly became tame."

A less brilliant, but really deeper and more important movement than the Berlin criticism was the philosophy of Königsberg. About the same time that Frederick the Great entered upon the Seven Years' War, a *privat-docent*, named Immanuel Kant, began to lecture in the Prussian University of Königsberg. Men were at once aware that a great teacher was among them, although for some time it was as a mathematician and a physicist that he was mainly known. He was, however, even then slowly thinking out, and in due time he began to teach from his chair, the "Critical Philosophy," which gave to all the fragmentary strivings of the century against

oppressive dogmatisms, their ultimate expression. According to this philosophy, knowledge, in the absolute sense, is beyond the reach of man. Phenomena enter human consciousness, which may be examined and their laws investigated; but how far they correspond with their originals, or whether there are any originals, are questions to which the human reason is unable to give a dogmatic answer, either affirmative or negative. It is easy to see that such a system inflicts a fatal blow on the dogmatist of every school. From Wolf and Spinoza, as well as from the theological dogmatists, the very foundation is removed on which their dogmatic affirmations and negations rest when such a philosophy is accepted. Accepted it was at the time it was made public, more widely probably, and more enthusiastically, than any new doctrine had been since the sixteenth century; and before the old master died, he saw, or rather heard, for he never travelled more than a few miles from his native Königsberg, that almost every philosophical chair in Germany was filled by a Kantian, and that the "Critical Philosophy" dominated the thought of his country, and was exciting lively interest and discussion even in France and in England. We shall greatly mistake if we imagine that Kant was a sceptic. As is well known, some of that which in his system was denied or rendered doubtful by the pure reason, the practical reason restored to mankind. No man more cordially disliked wild and revolutionary theories in politics or in religion than the placid, refined, conservative man whom audacious young theorists would nevertheless, much to his annoyance, persist in calling Master. They did so, perhaps, with better reason than he was willing to allow; for in him too, as in his philosophy, passionate germs lay concealed behind a calm exterior, as indeed there must be in all men by whom great revolutions are accomplished. Regarding the element of passion to be found in Kant, and in all his great contemporaries, Schmidt writes the following true and striking words:—

"So long as German literature runs on daintily, making pretty verses about love and wine, God and virtue, spring and fatherland; so long, indeed, as poetry feels itself whole in its skin, and considers that it has done remarkably well, the whole matter must remain child's play. The greatness of German literature begins with the feeling that all this is empty and hollow, with the hunger after reality, a passionate dislike of mere words, and a wild striving after the true and the beautiful, joined to an iron resolution to gain them. This direction of German literature receives its character from Lessing, Winkelmann, Kant, Möser, Hamann, and Herder. Not without good reason did Hamann give honour to passion, and always return to the thought that in passion lies the true power of man. Without that passion which mounts at times to unreasonable anger, when opposing anything base and trifling, Lessing would be no more our Lessing, and Winkelmann might have been a distinguished philologist, an admirable

connoisseur in art, but he would never have enriched German literature, had it not been for that passionate love for the beauty of the antique which consumed him. In Kant the passion is more hidden; it has a different direction. His nature had not many soft places, it inclines more to conflict, to sarcasm, and to scorn; for in him the humorous vein of our countrymen is somewhat strongly developed. But in him, too, there is something of Frederick the Great. The man who, at the age of twenty-two declared that he had the power and also the purpose to overthrow the previously existing philosophy, and with this intention laboured without intermission until he reached the age of fifty-seven, and then suddenly fought his chief battles, which like the battles of the Seven Years' War, put an end to the old literary *régime*, had in his nature something of violent force, though it might lie concealed under his modesty. The Transcendental Idealism broke through the Wolfian Philosophy, as Prussia broke through the German Empire. It did not destroy it by one stroke, but drove in a wedge, the working onward of which forms, even at the present day, the most important feature of our intellectual life. It was a genuine stroke of Prussian violence to make such short work of all previous questions as to how God can be justified with regard to the happiness of his creatures, as he did when he declared that the world does not exist that all creatures may be happy, but in order that duty may be done, and the highest duty of the rational creature is truth. In Prussia, at the time Kant taught this doctrine, there existed no superabundant amount of happiness, but men performed their duties, if with occasional murmurs. The influence of the doctrine to which Kant gave so sharp a formula was felt in the times of need as an animating power. The race of East Prussia, which in the war of freedom pressed around the Government with offerings of self-sacrificing devotion, was formed by Kant, and inspired by his teaching and by his example."

So long as Frederick the Great lived, Kant was permitted to teach his philosophy in peace at Königsberg. It was not until after the death of the great king, when the famous religious edict was issued under his successor, that the philosopher was molested, and restrictions placed upon his philosophical activity which he felt to be galling. He fully appreciated the toleration which he had enjoyed under Frederick, and expressed his gratitude for it in the words which he wrote:—

"I hear from all sides the cry, 'Do not reason.' The officer says, 'Do not reason, but go through your drill.' The chancellor of the finances says, 'Do not reason, but pay.' The clergyman says, 'Do not reason, but believe.' Only one master in the world says, 'Reason as much as you please, and on whatsoever subject you please, but obey.'"

The permission to think without hindrance was all that Kant desired, and the condition attached, "obey," he looked upon as no grievance; for in his nature conservative instincts, and a desire to walk in old paths, were curiously united with a love of daring, and even revolutionary thought. All he was disposed to ask for was that the realms of thought should be left free: in the world of action he had no ambition to play an original part. But as it is in the world

of action, and not in that of thought, that most men live, he could scarcely justly complain that men of dispositions different from his own, should claim the right of carrying into social and political life the ideas which he had taught them.

Herder was one of the students who gathered around the chair of Kant in Königsberg, and drank in the spirit of the Critical Philosophy. The most important part of Herder's life was spent, not in Prussia, but in Weimar, and we purposely refrain from entering upon the subject of the great development of German literature which took place through the circle of Weimar. But as Herder was a Prussian, and Kant's greatest scholar, a few words may be said of him here. Herder was not one of those thinkers to whom the faculty is granted of casting their thoughts into forms of classical beauty, and leaving their works like a finished statue from a master's hand, which cannot be well appreciated unless seen in its completeness. Thoughts of the highest importance, both original and borrowed from remote sources, Herder contributed to the literature of his country; but, owing to the form into which they were cast, the great part which he played in the highest epoch of German literature is in some danger of being forgotten even by his own countrymen. Schmidt does not exaggerate when he says that Herder, like Kant, did in his own fashion "rule" German literature for a period, and that to all the important movements which succeeded he gave an impulse. His writings on the history of mankind, and on Hebrew poetry, as well as his labours in connection with the early poetry of nations, were all in their several departments "epoch-making" works. The philosophy of history, the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures, and general literature, received impulses from these writings to which their present direction is in no small measure due. Herder lived to see the fruit of much which he himself had sown; but he unfortunately also lived long enough to see his own services forgotten, and his old friends mostly alienated from him. A harder fate can scarcely be imagined for a sensitive and ambitious man, and something of murmuring may be well forgiven to one who had so much to endure. Those, however, who wish to understand fully the historical development of German literature, must study the voluminous works of the Court preacher of Weimar, and they cannot be studied without inspiring respect for their gifted and laborious author.

An entirely new phase of German literature opens upon the student during the Napoleonic era. That school of writers who sprang up between the Peace of Basle and the Peace of Tilsit, usually known as the Romantic School, form perhaps the most interesting group of the era. We shall commit a mistake with regard to this school if we think of them as perseveringly following out one set of ideas, as was

generally the case with the earlier schools of the eighteenth century. The writers of the Romantic School were never able to decide for any very definite programme of ideas. They were a reaction and a protest against the spirit of the eighteenth century, and were all possessed with the thought that life and literature had been robbed of dignity and beauty by rationalism and criticism, and were bent upon recovering the lost good by rekindling among men those strong enthusiastic feelings which had produced in other ages saints and heroes. But they did not agree with one another, nor even with themselves, at different periods, as to what the objects were by which this regenerating feeling was to be evoked. Sometimes they sought for it in the middle ages, in the Virgin-worship of the mediæval Church; while at another time they would endeavour to work themselves up to the proper frenzy by Anacreontic songs of wine and pleasure. Some of them fell at times, it is true, into the deepest and tenderest strains of human feeling, as in the hymns of Novalis, and many of their thoughts have been profoundly suggestive and fruitful; but to no one thought or strain were they constantly faithful, and there are weaknesses in their writings, as in their lives, which makes it difficult for us to render to them the full admiration to which their genius entitles them. A paper in Schmidt's volume, on "Schelling's Life and Letters," places before us, in a very unpleasant light, the weaknesses of the Romanticists, especially as these came out in their lives. They quarrelled sadly, and the harsh judgments the one passed upon the other, combined as these were with an unvarying enthusiasm for the school, remind one, as Schmidt wittily remarks, of the family Dodson, in George Eliot's novel, who considered the Dodsons the first family in the world, although, judging from the remarks they were in the habit of making about their relatives, they had but small regard for any one of the individuals of whom the family was composed. Some of their relations to the other sex, as brought out in Schmidt's essay and elsewhere, strike one in anything but a pleasing light, especially in the case of men who claimed to be the guides and teachers of their generation. Many may be disposed to think that such matters might be well allowed to rest, and that there is no need of in this way marring our enjoyment of the beautiful thoughts of gifted men. Schmidt has anticipated the objection to his paper, and answers it by saying that in the case of the writers of the Romantic School, their lives stand in the closest relationship with that which they gave to the world, and must be studied, that their writings may be understood. He continues thus:—

"They held it to be the highest vocation of poetry to bring forth a work of art in which should be reflected the symbolism and mythology of modern culture and religion, as those of former times were in Homer and in Dante.

Until, however, this master-work of art was reached, the novel, as a preliminary poetical performance, ought to be cultivated, that the art of modern life might be reduced to the laws of order. 'Wilhelm Meister' was hailed as a phenomenon of equal importance with the French Revolution; and with it were connected Jean Paul's romances, 'Lucinde,' 'Sternbold,' and 'Florentine.' The nature of love, the relation of the sexes to one another, were in their creations to be placed in an entirely new light; and if the preachers of the new Gospel, by declaring war against all that was traditional, and also by a certain doctrinaire zeal, gave offence to the small citizens, this was not done with any intention of being immoral either in life or in writings, but rather from the idea that they had discovered a new and more stable principle of morality, calculated to render, if not the whole of mankind, at least its nobler part, worthier and happier. Whether this principle stood the ordeal of trial, is a question which the knowledge of their own life-experiences materially helps us to answer."

Fortunately, in the great crisis of the national history, the writers of the Romantic School caught the contagion of the manlier and better spirit which was abroad, and rose to a moral dignity which they never altogether lost. The year 1806, Schmidt says, made as sharp and decided a separation between the previous and after life and thinking of the writers of the Romantic School, as it did in the life of the nation. The Schlegels and Schleiermacher abandoned their "Lucinden-cultus," and preached morality and patriotism; and Fichte, although he can scarcely be reckoned one of them, who in March, 1806, had declared that the country of the freeman was wherever insight, light, and power were to be found, two years later, after the catastrophe of Jena, in his "Reden," was at pains to show that the preservation of the German people was indissolubly bound up with God's plan of world-government. Never did the literary men of a country act a more important and worthier part than did those of Prussia in the disasters which overtook the nation at the beginning of the century. As we have said, they were, as a class, under no deep obligations to the Prussian throne. They had been treated with neglect, sometimes with contempt; but when the hour of need arrived, and the poor king in his despair exclaimed that the Government could do no more for the people, the people must deliver the Government, no order in the State responded more cordially to the appeal than the poets, philosophers, and preachers. Their songs, speeches, and sermons were one of the great means by which the national feeling of Germany was roused against the invader, and the way prepared for Leipsic and Waterloo. The position of independence, almost of antagonism, which they had previously occupied towards the Court, probably rendered their aid the more effectual, as it certainly was more disinterested.

The Government at Berlin was not insensible to the importance of those spiritual forces brought to bear upon the people during the war of freedom by such men as Fichte and Schleiermacher, and from

this time we must date a somewhat altered relation between the Court and letters. It could no longer be said that the Prussian Court took no concern in the literary concerns of the people. The king is reported to have said about this time, whether it was original or not matters little, that what Prussia had lost through physical inferiority must be regained by means of intellectual superiority. He, as well as his advisers, became thoroughly imbued with the idea that it was needful to educate Prussia to intelligence and skill, in order that it might be able to hold its due place among its powerful and ambitious neighbours. Advised by such men as Schleiermacher, Humboldt, and Fichte, Frederick William III. founded the University of Berlin, and soon after presented to it as its building one of the royal palaces. From that time it became a recognised function of the Government of Prussia to promote education and literature in the realm. It may well be doubted whether this change in policy was an advantage. Politics had something to do with the course now adopted by the Government. Partly by necessity, partly through its own mistakes, Prussia had fallen under Russo-Austrian influences; and in consequence had broken with the patriotic German party, to which it owed its deliverance. This German, or "German-Christian," party was specially strong in the universities, and occasioned to the Government no little anxiety. This led to a policy on the part of the Government to which the king personally, as far as he understood it, was not probably very favourable, but was to be ascribed to his ministers, and specially to the Minister of Education, Altenstein. This minister set himself to counteract the "German-Christian" enthusiasm which had originated in the war of freedom, but was now, as he thought, no longer useful. A real and zealous friend of culture, as he understood it, Altenstein wished to transform Prussia into a state of pure intelligence, where literature, science, and education should reach their highest development. Nationality and patriotism, and all the enthusiasm for Fatherland which had accomplished so much, he looked upon as the relics of a barbarous age, to be got rid of as soon as possible. A system of school education was introduced, excellent in many respects, but, so far as was possible, founded upon a denial and ignoring of the Christian element. The most extravagant hopes were entertained of what schools could accomplish. It was asserted that in every child all human capabilities reside, and that consequently it was possible by wise education to raise every man to the highest platform of culture. It was also said that the school embraced all that was needful for the education of the race, and that there was no need nor place for the Church any more. Nor was Altenstein content with developing his system in the lower schools. By his influence Hegel was brought from Heidelberg to Berlin, and in the

teaching of that illustrious philosopher there was much which was calculated to advance the ideas and the spirit which Altenstein wished to introduce. It is absurd, of course, to ascribe, as some have done, the supremacy of Hegelianism to the influence of Altenstein, although no doubt the minister did all that lay in his power to advance those, whether in the Church or in the State, who adopted the opinions of his favourite philosopher. But Hegel owed the dominion which he exercised for an entire generation over German thought, mainly, if not altogether, to his own speculative genius. During the time of this domination, so complete was it, that an author could scarcely write a book on any subject without endeavouring to show what was his exact attitude towards the philosophy of Hegel. This is now all changed. The intellectual monarch is dethroned, and it is almost a proverbial saying that Hegel's is now an "overcome standpoint." It is an interesting question, but one on which we cannot now dwell, to what the sudden collapse of Hegelianism is to be ascribed. There is still, it is true, a faithful minority who would fain bring back the banished king, and they were preparing to celebrate in the August of this year his hundredth birthday in such a manner as to again challenge the attention of Germany to their neglected master. But the August of this year brought with it events which cast everything else into the shade. And we fear they are still lamenting the stupidity and indifference of the generation who have forgotten and neglected Hegel.

Another ally of Altenstein in his endeavours to substitute intelligence for patriotism and Germanism was the philologist, Professor Lachmann. He set himself against the lately-awakened enthusiasm for ancient poetry and German philology, declaring that the "Nibelungenlied" was simply a chance collection of ballads. Alexander von Humboldt also gave the sanction of his great name to the same party. Altenstein was not unsuccessful in the end for which he had laboured, and Berlin became a new "Mecca of science," as he had desired; while a generation grew up who were strangers to the "German-Christian" fervour to which the war of freedom had given birth. When the new king ascended the throne it seemed likely that a change would come over the policy of the Government. His sympathies were in the direction of the despised Christianity and Germanism; and had he been a man of more wisdom and resolution he might have done much to bring back a better state of feeling. He lived, however, unfortunately for his own reputation, in times when "Prussian politics had become the chief subject of German reflection, as at an earlier period Prussian philosophy had been," and when it was accordingly above all things needful that the ruler of Prussia should be a wise politician. But political wisdom was not

among the many good qualities with which Frederick William IV. had been endowed by nature; and his mediæval dreams and romantic fancies, although they might have been harmless, and even amiable in a private individual, were somewhat out of place in the responsible ruler of Prussia. His friends blame Altenstein and his *régime* for the difficulties which Frederick William IV. found in his Government, and say that a generation had grown up under these influences who could not but dislike a Christian and German king. Some of the attacks made upon Frederick IV. were unquestionably exaggerated, if not unjust. When he was assailed by the English press, and stigmatized as a Catholic in disguise, because he, a Protestant king, had contributed to the rebuilding of the Cathedral of Cologne, and had even spoken at its dedication, those who assailed him evidently mistook his position. He had no sympathy with the modern Romanism which the Council of Trent inaugurated, and Jesuits have spread over Europe; but he wished to show that he had sympathy with the German Catholicism of the middle ages, and saw in it a point of union between the German Protestant and the German Catholic—an idea which recent events have been proving to be less Utopian than it appeared at the time. As he was assailed by the English press from one side, more bitterly was he assailed by the un-Christian and Rationalistic press of Germany, and was termed a "Romantiker" upon the throne, and compared with Julian the Apostate, because he was, it was said, endeavouring by artificial means to bring back Christianity, as Julian had endeavoured to bring back the old heathenism. The same party were as little pleased with the pious speeches and devout wishes to which the good king loved to give expression. But his failure to accomplish much for Prussia, despite his high gifts and noble spirit, must in justice be ascribed not alone to the times and to the men he had to deal with, but also to his own want of political wisdom and manly resolution. It is sad, however, to remember today how great was the unpopularity which he won for himself at home and abroad, and how good and noble-minded he was nevertheless. The present king, with far fewer natural gifts, has fallen upon happier times; and perhaps it ought, in justice, to be added, has some of the qualities which were wanting in his brother. But he, too, had to suffer something at the hands of those who made the life of his brother wretched. But, less sensitive and more resolute, the honest old soldier, like his ancestor, Frederick William I., persevered, amid scorn, obloquy, and opposition, in the great object of his life, which was to give to Prussia a fine army. Writing in the month of September, 1870, who could come to any other conclusion than that King William was in the right, and his opponents in the wrong? The victories of 1866 did much to reconcile Prussia to the

policy of Bismarck and the king, and to moderate the opposition against the military policy. The following words by Schmidt, written in his "History of German Literature," immediately after the victory of Königgrätz, show the spirit in which the national triumph was received by the literary men of Prussia:—

"We stand again at a great turning-point in the history of our literature. For more than a hundred years the ideal striving of our poets and thinkers, consciously or unconsciously, has been to lead out the people from the contracted condition of small-citizenship, to emancipate the popular consciousness, crushed by spiritless Courts and by the contempt of other nations, to inspire into them self-respect, and to introduce them into the ranks of European nations. As far as the literary world is concerned this has been already done; for here, Goethe's poetry was our patent of nobility. But the proud spirit of poets and philosophers proved impotent when the problem was, how could real life be reduced to the rules of Idealism? Sometimes it was an indistinct view of the goal, sometimes infirm purpose, which led to the failure. The past war has put an end to this melancholy position of affairs. It was not the collective will of the nation, but one great and powerful will, which brought about the change. If this thought brings with it a momentary feeling of disappointment, this reflection may bring comfort that, without the co-operation of the nation, the completion of the edifice is impossible, and that the nation wants neither the power nor the capacity for the undertaking is evidenced alike by its past history and its present condition."

The conclusion to which all that we have advanced in this paper inevitably leads is, that while the Prussian State has been a great and beneficent influence with regard to science and literature, it has not been by direct intermeddlings with these concerns, which have often been unfortunate, but by wise government and by the general elevation of the people that it has done its work. We should not therefore be surprised if King William and the "blood and iron" Count, by the victories of 1870, and the consequent revival of all the glorious traditions which a united Germany is calculated to recall, have won for themselves a title to be regarded as great benefactors of their country, even in respect of its literary interests.

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

KNOWING AND FEELING.

PART II.—SOME FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE WILL.

CONSCIOUSNESS, I endeavoured to show,* is, from its first to its last stage of development, a combination of knowing and feeling. The two elements, sensation and judgment (apprehension of relations), are inextricably blended in our simplest perceptions; sensations arising to us in the relations of space and time. The unit of consciousness, if this expression is permissible, is a combination of sensations and a judgment, or apprehension of relations. I say if this expression is permissible, because I have always felt the difficulty there is in speaking of one definite *state* of consciousness, seeing that the consciousness itself is an arena of perpetual change and flux, and that what we should call the movement of thought appears necessary to thought itself. When, in the further evolution of mind, cognition seems to separate itself most distinctly from feeling, as in the labours of the mathematician or man of science, the cognitions with which their thinking is concerned were originally due in part to sensations; and a desire of some kind, curiosity if no other, presides over all that movement of thought which we here call reasoning or acquisition of knowledge. A perception, in becoming a memory, if it is stripped of its sensational character, assumes an emotional character. To think of a past pleasure or pain becomes a present passion. In short, look into the

* See *Contemporary Review* for June, 1870.

consciousness at any moment you will, you find an inextricable complication of the intellectual and the emotional, of passions that grow out of cognitions, of cognitions again that have passions and other feelings for the objects of discrimination and comparison. All our moral truths have pain and pleasure, love and hate, for the very terms of the cognitions they deal with.

But consciousness is not the whole man. He consists of body, as well as mind, or in a union of physical and psychical properties. The connection between these properties, in one remarkable instance, gives us voluntary motion, gives us will. Will, as voluntary motion, is plainly neither exclusively a physical nor psychical property, but a result of their combination. Movement and the force by which one body moves or breaks up another body, are physical properties, thought and feeling are psychical properties; the connection between the two constitutes the will, as matter of fact; the *knowledge* of such connection gives us our sentiment of power, our self-confidence, our belief that to a certain extent we have a command over the future. It converts thought into a purpose, anticipation into a resolve.

Two great facts encounter us on the threshold of life,—the action of the external world on our sensitive bodies, and the reaction of those sensitive bodies on surrounding objects. These two great facts, or speaking from a psychological point of view, these two cognitions enter together into the consciousness. I know my own body and its movements, at the same time that I know the external object and its movement, or its resistance to movement. The two cognitions are needful to each other. I know furthermore that the movements of my limbs follow, to a certain extent, my desires. I know this as a matter of experience, and have learned to trust to it as the invariable order. I know nothing more; or if physiology and metaphysical reasoning have given me any insight into the nature of this connection between desire and movement, it is plain that I am here dealing with some additional cognitions. In psychology, the will is nothing else than a special cognition accompanied by its special class of sensations and emotions.

As to the theories we form of the nature of mind and matter, or of the connection between them, I repeat that we are plainly here on the high road of reasoning or conjecture. To some, the transition from a state of consciousness to bodily movement seems best represented by supposing that the same substance puts forth in succession these two different modes of activity. Others prefer to assign these two modes of activity to different substances, and they represent the one of these substances stimulating and determining the movements of the other. We hear some maintain that all force

is essentially will, that is, it emanates from mind, from the mind of Deity, matter being only the passive recipient of such forces. This last theory claims our respect; all these theories claim our examination; but they are evidently at present in the state of conjecture. What we really know, what every man, woman, and child born into the world really knows, is that desire is followed by movement.

Here some reader may object—But we do not say my desire moves my arm, or desire moves the arm; we say I desire, and I move. Does not the *I move* remit the power at once to the ego, whatever the ego may be? To me it seems that the *I move* is equivalent to *this man moves;* and this man is just the union of the several properties, physical and psychical, that go to the formation of this whole. Both the desire and the movement belong to the man, but the man is nothing but the combination of desire and movement and other properties. His heart, his limbs, his lungs *belong* to the man; that is, they are parts of the whole we call a man. In no other sense do they *belong* to him. This mode of speaking and thinking follows us everywhere, for everywhere we encounter individualities which are but combinations of parts forming a new or specific whole. We say of a dog that *it has* a head, *has* four legs. Abstract the head, or the legs, where is the dog? The dog is a certain whole of many parts and properties, and each one is in its turn referred to that whole. In the I think, I desire, I move, of human speech there is a reference of each of these properties to that whole which constitutes the conception of man, or to so much of that whole as is necessary to give a meaning to the expression *I*, or *this man*. And when we say *I will*, this is a reference to the same whole of that connection between the properties of desire or movement which enters so conspicuously into the composition or individuality of man.

I observed in my last paper that the term will was often applied exclusively to the purpose itself, to the thought or consciousness that precedes motion, and I added that this application to the mental resolve had given rise to a class of questions I could not then stay to examine. I alluded especially to the question we ask about the will, whether it is free or not? If I may venture to trespass so far on the patience of the readers of the *Contemporary*, I would continue somewhat further my discussion of the will, and carry the discussion into this old debate.

I.

It is not difficult of explanation how the term Will comes to be used as synonymous with Purpose; how it happens that we speak indifferently of a man of indomitable resolve, or indomitable will. The purpose of the man is the important element in every human

action. It is to this our blame or praise attaches. The actual movement of body or limb that follows the resolution may often be of the most trivial description, or, through the wonderful education which resides in habit, it may be performed, as we are accustomed to say, almost automatically. If the child at first moves for the very pleasure of movement, from the desire to reproduce the sensations of touch and muscular contraction (the memory and anticipation of such muscular sensations acting, it is supposed, as a repetition of the original stimulus that passed from the nerves of sense to the nerves of motion), it very soon has ulterior objects for its various movements. It clutches at some object of desire, and so well has habit done its office, that the eye seems to direct the hand without a thought being bestowed on the muscle, or on the individual movements of the arm and the fingers. And again, the motives that induce either the child or the man to clutch at an object may be very different. The outward action may be the same where the purposes are in flagrant contrast. A child grasps the neck of the decanter to help itself to some tempting liquid, the nurse grasps the same decanter to prevent the child from drinking what would be deleterious to it. The meaning and nature of the action comes to depend on the thought behind it. A bridge has been carefully, laboriously, slowly built by the subtle power of habit, between the consciousness of the man and the physical world, and now what processions are marshalled on the other side of the bridge! The bridge itself is scarcely considered.

A school-boy moves a pen over a copy-book and produces his array of letters, good or bad. With very much the same action of his hand, an emperor may abdicate his throne. Vastly different actions, and the same trivial, customary movement. Very often the movement that follows a long deliberation or important resolve, has no peculiar relation to the thought or purpose. To a mere spectator, it would be quite insignificant. To descend from our imperial altitude —and to descend gently—let us suppose a member of parliament receiving an offer to join the ministry, to take office as we say, how gravely he might deliberate, with what emotion he might resolve! Yet the resolution made, what does he *do?* Perhaps he rises gently from his seat, touches a bell, and despatches a message, which has no apparent connection with the acceptance or refusal of office. The resolution is all, the ability to act on it is implied, and, therefore, it takes to itself the name of will, which primarily embraced not only the purpose but the external act itself.

More especially to him who *has* the purpose is the ability to act in uniformity with it implied. Purpose includes some anticipated action. It includes the confidence that this bridge lies open

between thought and movement. No wonder the man says *I will* who as yet only *anticipates* action.

But there is another important fact to be taken notice of. A purpose not only goes forth into action; it influences our trains of thought. We think under the influence of a purpose. Purposes once formed, all our thinking, unless it be some idle reverie, is controlled and prompted by them. We are not able here to anticipate the very thought, as we can anticipate the very movement which is next *to be*, but the purpose rouses the mental activity, and keeps it circulating round a given centre. The mechanical inventor, though he may be walking abroad in the fields, where not a wheel or a cog can anywhere be seen, is kept revolving in his mind all manner of combinations of wheelwork by his predominant purpose. Whatever may be our end in view, we are casting about for means for its accomplishment. For this reason it is said that attention is voluntary. We are looking or thinking energetically for some purpose, if it be only to know what manner of thing lies before us, and in what respects it differs from other things of similar kind.

Nor is this thinking for a purpose without its sentiment of power, for although the thinker cannot anticipate the very thought, as he can anticipate the very movement, that is next to take its place in the series of events, he has learnt that there is an influence of desire upon thought, he knows that his *wishing*, here also, will be effective, and will, in some less direct way, lead to the end he has in view. He tells you that he has the power to concentrate his energies upon his subject, and is not without some degree of confidence in the result. The thinker has his sense of power as well as the acrobat, though he cannot tell you so precisely what will be done.

Whether we give the name of will to this control which desire or purpose has over the current of thought, or prefer to describe this control as one amongst the laws of thought, laws that regulate the sequence and permanence of our ideas,—in either case the fact remains that we do marshal our thoughts under the sway of any predominant purpose. This is one sense of self-determination, as when we say that a man has the power of determining his own character.

II.

When science began to teach that all the forces or activities that surround us in space are determined, as to their moment of display, by relations to other forces or activities; that nothing moves alone; nothing originates its own movement or arrests its own movement; that everything acts in a pre-ordained order; nay, that whatever we call thing or individual, is some gathering together of pre-existent

forms and activities, and acts in its individuality only in ordered relation to other individuals—men were prompted to ask, what then of human thoughts and feelings which constitute the consciousness of man? Does the same order prevail here? Do these also come into existence, appear and disappear, according to some established law? And is this individuality which I call myself made up of divers elements, and does it act and live, as such individuality, by strictly ordained relations with the surrounding world of material forms and forces? Look abroad: the river, which lies and flows upon the earth, would not *be* a river without its channel; the earth is upheld by the sun; the smallest atom consists of parts and of divers forces, and has its movements determined by other atoms. As for living things, the plant is not only rooted in the soil, but grows out of air, and water, and heat, and light, and depends on a perpetual interchange of its very substance with the surrounding world. For the animal, does it not feed upon the vegetable, or on some other animal? How self-contained it seems as it darts hither and thither, runs or flies, seizing upon its prey! Yet the creature does not live an instant but by the order or harmony of that greater whole of which it is a part. Is man an individuality of this description? Distinguished as he is from all other creatures, and the last appearance in this region of space, is he not also a part of this wondrous whole? And though we assign to him—to each individual man—the indivisible soul we are all in imagination so familiar with, is not this new entity itself reacted on by the material instruments it is compelled to employ? These nerves, this brain, are its slaves, and its tyrants also. They receive impressions or modifications from the very work they are engaged in, they grow this way or that by their very activity (growth which we call habit), and will at length perform work only of one kind. So the past comes to determine the present. In this, or some other way, man finds out that there is within his own little kingdom of mind, or self, an evolution, in which what *has been* determines what *will be;* determines it to us, to our apprehension, who see only the growth, and cannot dive down to the grower, whether of the plant or the mind.

If this be so, the startling reflection occurs, What becomes of our moral responsibility? Do we not punish this or that scoundrel in the firm faith that it depended on himself, at every moment of his life, whether he would be a scoundrel or not? How can I continue to punish him, or to punish him with the same sense of justice, if I am to believe that he grew into a scoundrel by the laws of nature—laws somewhat more complicate, but of the same kind that grow a tiger or a domestic dog? And, moreover, if I myself am the person punished, in what spirit am I to receive my punishment? Good for the whole, you say. A necessity is imposed on society to punish,

and it is a necessity for me to submit. Perhaps I may profit by it. But what of this sentiment of remorse—of self-reproof? If crime was a misfortune or a misery in some other man, it was but a misfortune and a misery in me.

What contribution have I to make towards a solution of this old difficulty?

I would observe that this teaching of science, at some time or other, came in as a new doctrine, that our passions and sentiments had been adjusted without it, that it is not likely that it should be received and not work some change in preconceived ideas of justice or moral responsibility; but that it is very possible, when the whole truth stands out clear before us, that the modifications made on our sense of justice may be far from pernicious.

The universality of law appeared as a new doctrine. Those who claimed for the human mind an exemption from the sway of law, were also, to a certain extent, teaching a new doctrine. It was not, therefore, on this position, "that man's mind or man's will is free, while the rest of nature is under the bondage of law," that moral responsibility was founded. Such an intellectual position could only be taken up after the teaching of science. But what occurred was this: men looked at the individual before them, saw him capable of self-movement, of self-determination, and felt towards him as if he were the veritable ultimate source of whatever injury or benefit came from the man. They carried their thoughts no further. Reign of law, or exemption from this reign, had not been heard of. Neither, when they contemplated themselves, did they ask whence their desires or purposes; but, conscious of acting from these, rested in the thought that they were the origin of their own deeds; as in some sense they certainly are. With the teaching of science the individual, while retaining his individuality, is shown to be more and more distinctly a part of a greater whole. The individual man is not only part of that entirety we call the world; he is also part of another we call society. The recognition of these truths does and must modify the sentiment of justice that had grown up before their advent; and I add that such modification, so far from being a cause of alarm or regret, is one that takes its place in the order of human progress.

III.

The sentiment of moral responsibility is safe enough whatever betides. Let us look at the facts out of which it springs.

Man is, all his life, from infancy upwards, surrounded by other human beings whose wants and desires conflict or harmonize with his own. He is never free from this environment. He is prompted or controlled at every turn. Just as we move, and attain our power of resistance from the pressure and impact of foreign

bodies, so do we love and hate and attain our sense of freedom or self-assertion from the sympathy, control, and resistance of other human beings. The pressure and stimulant of this social medium is as necessary to the growth of passion and intelligence as the pressure and stimulant of the external world was to animal life itself. It is no exaggeration to compare the two.

The child is, from the hour of its birth, under the control and superintendence of others. Without such superintendence it could not live. But it no sooner begins to move by impulses and desires of its own than it manifests an opposition to the control. The little rebel, who has found that it can move as it desires, refuses to move in any other way, and here, let me observe, is the very origin of our sentiment of freedom. I move as I desire, is power; I move as I desire in opposition to the command or control of another, is freedom as well as power. That sentiment of freedom we have to act upon in relation to our fellow-creatures has a social origin. It did not spring from any theory about the freedom of the will. It sprang from resistance to control.

Submission was good, but rebellion was better. The child learnt self-assertion. Then afterwards, as intelligence and affection are developed, it learns to forego its self-assertion. A mere helpless submission becomes a voluntary obedience. It chooses obedience. The moral sentiment is created.

Strange! Even most intelligent men, like M. Jouffroy and others, in arguing the question of the free will, plant themselves on this fact of Choice, and hence contend for their favourite doctrine. Indisputably we choose. But what is choice? It is manifestly a very conspicuous instance of that combination of passion and reason, of the intellectual and emotional elements, which we say characterizes the consciousness throughout. In what the moralist calls choice the two elements of judgment and passion are inseparably combined. There is comparison, contrast, consequences inferred, and there is that prevailing feeling, whatever it may be, which is the essence of a *preference*. There is no *will* to preside over this choice, but this choice becomes itself will by its going forth into action. It is the passion and judgment of the man that together make his choice. His energy lies in his passion.

My position as a psychologist is clear. If we are speaking of action, will is the relation between thought and feeling, between a state of consciousness and some movement. To describe this relation as being *free* is unintelligible language. By a licence of speech we give the name will to the purpose alone. The purpose alone, before it is connected with action, is a certain combination of thought and feeling. Then, to say that such purpose is *free*, is simply to assert that thought and feeling, that the whole mind of man is free, that is, not included in the

general laws of the universe. Such assertion may be made; but it is a far wider, and very different assertion, than that which the advocate of free will is understood to make.

I was observing that, whether we make such assertion or not, moral responsibility must equally remain. Man is not a solitary being; he grows up, pressed on all sides by fellow-creatures. He loves and hates, and has to rejoice or suffer under the love and hatred of others. This coercion of the society on the individual is inevitable. It is exercised in different manners at different times. The common purposes of mankind vary. Many circumstances arise, modifying this coercion of society; as, for instance, the division of the community into several classes, whose interests, or common purposes, are not identical. Nor are great philosophical truths or doctrines without their influence. They may modify the love or hate we entertain to each other. They may enlighten us on what should be the common purposes of society. Where there is a common purpose, energetic and almost unanimous, this coercion is at its height. But need I say that no society could exist, not the poorest, scantiest hive of human beings, without this control of all on each, and the sentiment of moral responsibility which is the result of it?

IV.

Presuming we have arrived at the conclusion that mind and matter, psychical as well as physical qualities, are all parts of one stupendous scheme, parts of that harmonious whole we ascribe to the Infinite Power, which again manifests itself to us *in* that whole—presuming that some such philosophical doctrine were generally accepted, what would be its influence on our moral sentiments?

I can well understand that a man with very vague notions about desert and punishment might, on first becoming acquainted with such a philosophy, be disposed to extract from it an excuse for self-indulgence. He has offended some one, who threatens punishment, and he pleads the necessity of the case, that "he could not help it"—that, in short, his passions were too strong to be controlled. Some such colloquy as the following might take place:—

"But you *could* help it," the offended man might retort. "You had the two courses of conduct placed before you, and you chose *this*."

"Very true; I chose. But then, as you know, I had certain habits and tastes, and but a certain amount of knowledge. I could not choose otherwise."

"It was your duty not to let such habits and tastes, as you call them, become predominant. It is the first purpose of every intelligent man to form his own character; you had the power to watch over yourself, and to check your self-indulgences."

"True again; but you know as well as I do that I could not exercise a supervision over my own habits and tastes, with a view to the formation of my own character, unless I already had this very purpose of forming a character. My power here is simply an acting or thinking under the influence of such a purpose. Now no such purpose has ever grown up in me, or it has been a plant of an extremely feeble description. I have been chiefly occupied with such chance pleasures—they have been few enough—that came within my reach. You, I believe, have had this solemn purpose of forming a character; I congratulate you upon it; in me it has not been evolved."

Here the offended man will probably break off the colloquy:—"All I can say is this," he will ultimately reply, "that if you do it again I will so punish you that you will choose better for the future."

And if this is an earnest threat it will very likely be effectual, and lead to some better choice on the next occasion. It may also lead our tyro in philosophy to some reflection on the nature of punishment. Based on the past deed, its operation is really prospective. It stands between the past and the future. It is, in short, an instrument of education; a coarse instrument, but indispensable.

Moreover, even the offended man, when his anger has subsided, may gather something from such a colloquy. He, too, will be led to reflect on the nature of vice and its punishment. He knows that in some extreme cases society can think only of self-defence. It either exterminates the criminal or incarcerates him, just as we are compelled to shoot a tiger or shut it in a cage. But these cases excepted, he too will note that punishment is in its nature a mode of education, and a mode not to be resorted to while there are other blander or more effectual modes within reach.

What gain could it be to any individual to relieve him from punishment on the plea that passion and habit were too strong for him, and that he "could not help it?" The more need that society should come to his aid and help him "to help it." What are any of us without the control of society?

Look into the village school. Here is an idle boy who lounges and sulks, and slumbers over his book. In fact he is fat, and lethargic in his temperament. A physiologist will suggest good reasons for his indolence. He cannot help it. Left to himself he cannot. But the schoolmaster comes to his assistance, applies reproof, shames him in the eyes of his fellow-pupils; if need be, applies the cane. The boy struggles through his task. Thus stimulated he becomes intelligent of something beyond marbles and peg-top. Would it have been kindness, would it have been well, for him or the community, if the plea "he could not help it" had been listened

to, and the lethargic temperament left in undisputed predominance? It was predominant, and for that reason, doubtless much to his regret, the schoolmaster was compelled to administer the sharp stimulant of the cane.

The notions afloat in the public mind about punishment or criminal justice may receive some modification from our philosophy, and with considerable advantage. As it is the purpose or intention which is the great element in human action, it is the purpose or intention we mainly look for when we ask the question, whether a man deserves punishment or not. And since we have not been accustomed to proceed further in our inquiries, but have rested at this purpose, we have naturally rested in *this idea of desert*. We leave off with this feeling, that the man deserves the punishment, as he really designed the act and the evil consequences that followed from it. Apart from the consideration of the deterring or educational effect of the punishment, the mind receives a satisfaction from this feeling, that it was *deserved*. It would not shock us to carry out the punishment irrespective of any good results to ensue from the punishment itself. But if we push our inquiries into the origin of this purpose that we punish, we may often find more room for compassion than for anger. We find neglected education, unpropitious circumstances, an inordinate appetite for pleasure, or a pitiful instability, at the root of all. We become more and more awake to the importance of early education, and speculate on the kind of education that might compete with these deleterious influences. But on this account do we forego the present punishment? No; but we administer it for such good results as we hope may flow from it. We make the discovery that a perfect punishment regards the past purpose—punishes *it*—but punishes in order to aid the formation of better purposes for the future. A merely retributive punishment is discarded; it must be also prospective in its character. A perfect punishment, that which is really *deserved*, is that which is inflicted on what is truly a human action, a purposed deed, and inflicted with the design of preventing such purpose for the future. A just punishment stands between the past and the future—the past is *judged;* the character of the act is discriminated, and it is further *punished* for the improvement of the criminal himself, if possible; but, at all events, for the prevention of the recurrence of such acts.

Public punishments, such as are administered by the laws, are administered by the whole society, by the whole community, for its own interest and self-preservation. I have heard it asked, Why should a man be punished *as an example for others*—why should he be sacrificed to the good of society? And thereupon I have heard the querist endeavour to satisfy himself by some eternal fitness

between punishment and crime. The culprit *deserved*, and therefore he was punished. The culprit deserves no punishment at all, unless you can prove, first, that he committed the crime; and, in the second place, that the punishment of it is for the good of society. It is precisely this very element of the good of all that makes the punishment a righteous punishment, that makes it *deserved*, that makes it justice, and not mere revenge. The man punished is one of the *all*. Would he renounce this *solidarity?*

But under our philosophy it is said the criminal will not judge himself so severely as he was wont to do. Men will be apt to be self-indulgent. Remorse will die out. Here, I have to observe that the standard of moral perfection that men propose to themselves must depend on the existing development of intelligence and affection. It can depend on nothing else. Philosophy or science does nothing to check this development. As to this peculiar sentiment of remorse, some modification here may well be admitted. As in punishing a criminal we put ourselves between the past and the future, punish the deed done to secure a *better doing* for the future, so we must desire the criminal also to put himself between the past and the future, to reproach himself for the deed done, and at the same moment resolve on better life for the future. We have no desire that he should inflict misery on himself, that leads to no good result. If it were possible for him to rest wholly in his remorse for the past, the sentiment would be of no avail. Penitence that leads to better life is the noblest of sentiments; but it is noble in proportion as the sad penitent directs his steps to wiser courses. A remorse that shuts a man up for self-torture does not commend itself to us. "You have done wrong; you know it and you feel it; go now and do right; show your sorrow in your better life." That is the language we expect to hear from the lips of intelligent men. Remorse that contemplates any other expiation than the better life for the future leads to superstitious practices. Again and again has society witnessed this spectacle: men and women have had remorse, have expiated their vices by some self-torture, some retributive punishment self-inflicted, and gone back into society ready to reproduce the same vices. There is no expiation for an old crime but a new virtue.

The sentiment of moral responsibility, or the moral sentiment, passes through many phases. At first it is plainly the fear of punishment attached to some voluntary or purposed action. Then the kind of punishment that is feared begins to change; we fear disgrace more than bodily pain. Afterwards the boy or youth undertakes to be himself a judge of others; sees himself less frequently in the place of culprit; delights to put himself in the judgment-seat. He thinks with the multitude, or with some class or body to which he belongs;

he pronounces judgment in their name. Of course he has to commend the same chalice to his own lips that, in the name of such society, he has offered to others. With maturer intellect he comes to understand how individuals grow each in his own environment; he becomes more tolerant of the criminal, less tolerant of the crime; he wants to attack this last in every way imaginable—stifle it, if possible, in its birth. Morality takes the shape of a great desire—desire of excellence in others and in himself—desire of a completed society to be obtained only by the co-operation of each member of it. For such is the nature of the human hive. It forms the individual, yet itself is only an assemblage of individuals, each leading his own intelligent and passionate existence. Add, too, that such desire is sustained by the knowledge that it is shared with other minds around him, who will esteem and love him in proportion as he possesses and acts upon it; sustained also by the knowledge that it is one with the laws of God.

Surely to believe that God has created a world which progresses in part through the progressive purposes of man, will not check the growth of such purposes.

V.

To resume. Will, in its primitive significance, is the relation between the psychical and physical properties of man. Movement and sensation are found blended together. We presume even in the brain, but we enter into a knowledge of this union only through the movement of the limbs; nor can we proceed further back, in our introspection, than the consciousness of our limbs moving at the call of sensation or desire. Endeavouring to trace the earlier stages of the growth of a definite case of will, we assume that at first the infant would move from some sense of uneasiness, by a purely physiological connection between that sense of uneasiness and a given movement; or that there is a direct connection between our organs of perception and specific movements. Some experiences, founded on these physiological facts, must have preceded a definite desire to move, because such a desire implies the knowledge that movement follows our feelings and perceptions. It is an *emotional anticipation* of the movement that directly leads to it. Such emotional anticipation is itself only a combination of thought and feeling; the movement of the limb ensues; the combination of these two is a case of will.

If by any means a conviction is introduced into the mind that you *cannot* move, you will be unable to move voluntarily; because the anticipation of movement is an essential part of the process, and you are prevented from forming the anticipation. Thus a weak or idiotic person might be persuaded by another that he could not move his

arm, and while under that persuasion a voluntary movement of the arm would be impossible. People under the mesmeric influence are said to be reduced to the requisite state of idiocy, and to be capable of receiving such a conviction. I do not speak to this fact myself; I merely observe that, if it be a fact, the explanation of it is at hand. In the mesmeric exhibitions that I have witnessed, the lads who were told that they could not rise from their seats, and were thereupon seen to writhe with unavailing effort, seemed to me to play their parts only too well. Mere immobility, which I presume would have been the effect of such genuine convictions, would have told nothing to the spectators. So the lads grimaced and writhed. But if so much of the old accustomed conviction was left as to enable them to perform such contortions, one suspects they might have carried their movements a little further.

Let us take some complete and finished instance of voluntary motion—say a trained youth in his athletic exercises. He is *putting* the stone. He chooses his position, plants his feet firm upon the earth, and at such distance from each other as to give him the surest support; his back is arched, his chest expanded to afford fullest play to the muscles; he raises the stone in both hands. All these preliminary movements follow each other, or group themselves together, with scarce a thought bestowed upon them. There was a time when they were separate acquisitions, practised with conscious care, and with that degree of *pain* which attends upon new movements, and which enters largely into what is called sense of effort when new movements are being learnt. Now they fall as readily into their place as words in our ordinary language. They are, indeed, a kind of expression of himself, of his thought or purpose. He next fixes his eye on some imaginary spot to which he means to hurl his massive stone, and with one last passionate resolve that contracts every muscle in his frame, he dismisses it from his hands. What next ensues? He sees it flying through the air; he sees it half-bury itself in the earth, or scatter the soil where it falls. Such perception of form, and motion, and resistance overcome, such knowledge of the force which it has displayed, enter rapidly into his mind. That force of the stone is carried back to the arm that propelled it, to the passion that nerved the arm!

But manifestly the passion, and the arm so nerved or stimulated, cannot be separated in the last conception he forms of *what moved the stone.* If in popular language he says it was his *will* that did it, he never, in the term will, separates the psychical property, the purpose, the passion, from the bodily force. He unites the two in this one convenient word, will.

We fall into a mistake if (speaking of voluntary motion) we take

this convenient word will, and express by it some simple and peculiar psychical quality. It was framed to express a union of soul and body—the passion-contracted arm—but the psychical part of the business usurps the name to itself.

This it does very conspicuously when the movement, or series of movements that we perform, is not the main object of our contemplation, or when the action, whatever it may be, is still at a distance. Here popular language applies the term will to the resolution itself. And here it is evident that we can have nothing before us but the elements of thought and passion. Such terms as resolution and determination obtain a peculiar significance from the persistence of the thought and passion, and also from a feeling of opposition to whatever would resist or change it.

A contemplated action can be nothing but a thought. Often the action, so far as bodily movement is concerned, is of a very trivial character. It may be the utterance of a few words, a yes or a no. The resolution of the Christian martyr was to abstain from saying "I recant," or from throwing a few grains of incense before the statue of an emperor. But such abstinence was followed by death. And friends and enemies implored and threatened in order to shake his resolution. But in vain. The martyr had one persistent purpose—to be faithful to his God. In the alternative placed before him he chose death.

What grand things have been said by poets and orators of this unshaken resolve! The man you cannot terrify, or flatter, or persuade, if he really have a great purpose, and power to accomplish it, is indeed one of the sublimest objects we can contemplate. The author of that noble poem, the "Spanish Gipsy," makes one of her characters say—

> "You may divide the universe with God,
> Keeping your will intact, and hold a world
> Where He is not supreme."

The stoic bent on doing what is good and right in defiance of the multitude, in defiance of his own self-regarding passions, attains, it is generally believed, the culminating point of human greatness. The greatness lies plainly in the purpose, the thought and passion of the man.

It is worth a remark that we sometimes expect that the resolution or choice of a virtuous man should be sudden, instantaneous, without a moment's hesitation. On other occasions we demand deliberation, and only approve the choice that follows on deliberation. If a man of honour is asked to tell a falsehood we should be disappointed if he did not at once reject the proposal; we expect that from the settled habit of his mind he will dismiss it at once, not without some feeling

of scorn or anger that it should have been made. But if some arduous and difficult enterprise is proposed to him we expect that he should deliberate before he returns an answer, because a wise man would carefully abstain from committing himself to what might be beyond his power to accomplish, because only light and feather-brained men would rush heedlessly on a difficult enterprise, because the resolution that is expected from him is one that must embrace all the probable dangers ahead. Time for reflection and deliberation there must be in such a case. No fitting resolution could else be formed.

But the choice that follows deliberation, and the choice that is sudden as lightning, are ultimately resolvable into the same elements of judgment and feeling, or, as we popularly express them, of reason and passion.

Do you wish to believe that this ever-varying and progressive movement of thought and feeling wells forth arbitrarily from your own mind? Are you reluctant to be the creature, ambitious to be creator? Do you wish to make these fine lines just quoted—beautiful as poetry—literally true, and have a universe of your own—

> "A world
> Where He is not supreme?"

It seems that all our lines of thought bring us from the natural to the supernatural, bring us to that Absolute Being and Power on which all nature rests. We move and live and have our being in God. We exist as part of His universe. This is what I presume is meant when we say that "in Him we live and move and have our being."

WILLIAM SMITH.

THE WAR AND GENERAL CULTURE.

CONVERSATIONS.

By the Author of "Friends in Council."

I.

THE conversations which I am about to report, took place soon after the early victories of the Germans over the French. I suppose it would have been better if these conversations had been confined to one subject—as, doubtless, Mr. Milverton had originally intended that they should be. But conversation is a thing that no one of the interlocutors can rule; and it will proceed in its own sinuous and eccentric way. The intense interest which every one in England feels in this war makes it almost impossible for any conversation to go on without interruptions arising from a reference to the awful scenes which are taking place in a neighbouring country.

As for me, I am but a mere reporter, and cannot, of course, direct or restrain the conversation to any particular topic. I dare say that my short-hand brethren, the reporters in the House of Commons, would also sometimes like to be able to guide and restrain the debate; but in this respect they are powerless in their sphere, as I in mine.

I think, moreover, that it may interest many of my readers to see how questions relating to war were interwoven in these conversations with questions relating to general culture.

It was at a country-house, and during the recess, that those

persons, who have been called "Friends in Council," met, and thus conversed:—]

Milverton. I have a subject in hand which I have long wished to discuss with you. It has reference to general culture, and especially to the deficiency of information which prevails among those whom we call the best informed classes.

Ellesmere. Is there any burridge in the garden, Sandy?

Milverton. Now, that shows the want of information in certain persons. It is not *burridge*, but borage, derived from the Latin "borago."

Ellesmere. Never mind the spelling. Let this wretched pedant have his way; but do you, Sandy, go and get the borage, and insist upon a large bowl of claret-cup being made, otherwise I, for one, will not assist at any lecture upon culture, and will be content with the paucity of information which I possess.

I thank my stars that I am a humble personage.

Cranmer. Your stars, Ellesmere, must be stars of a very moderate capacity, and very ready to be thanked, if they sanction this appeal to them respecting your humility.

Milverton. Mine is a very ungrateful task. I want to show you all, how very ill-educated we are; and how very few of us can presume to call ourselves men of culture in any liberal sense of the word.

Ellesmere. Now he is going to oppress us with his vast powers of memory. He will make out that everybody is a savage, and only fit to be a cannibal, who does not know fifteen languages, and five and twenty separate branches of science.

This is the kind of thing which Milverton's prodigious memory enables him to say to you: "It was seven years ago, when we were at the end of that gravel walk, and were just going into the greenhouse, that you mentioned to me that I must be an idiot if I believed that, in our time, we should ever have household suffrage. It was on a Tuesday, if you recollect, and you were going up to town early on Wednesday morning." I do not like living with fellows that have such a memory. The pleasant people to live with are those that forget soon. What a memory women have for injuries!

Cranmer. I don't wonder, Ellesmere, you wish to live with people of short memories. Never mind: I forget nine-tenths of the outrageous things you have ever said against me.

Ellesmere. Thank you, Cranmer. I can assure you I very soon forget your piercing sarcasms. I say with Cæsar, let me have men about me who are fat, and can forget things. The British public is a charming public to deal with. Why? Because it is fat, and can

forget things. Otherwise it would fare ill with certain politicians whom I could name, and who always rely upon the splendid forgetfulness of that excellent public. I hate your lean, rememberative people.

By the way, I do not find that Milverton is so prone to recollect those remarks I made to him seven years ago, which have turned out to be quite right.

Milverton. I suppose you will now allow me to commence the consideration of the subject which I wish so much to bring before you. It would, perhaps, be advisable for me, in the first instance, to arrange the subject of culture under the following——

Ellesmere. I do think, Milverton, you are the oddest man in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. At this moment we are all of us thinking, day and night (at least all of us except you), about this dreadful war; but your stoical or epicurean mind suddenly betakes itself to the serene contemplation of culture. I believe you do it for the sake of paradox.

Milverton. What should you say, then, if I were to tell you that the general subject of culture has been revived in my mind by the consideration of this war?

What is the real cause of the late defeats of the French? "Ignorance, my dear madam," as Dr. Johnson once said, "simple ignorance,"—ignorance of topography; ignorance of language; ignorance of what was going on in other nations; ignorance of their own resources.

I do not wonder that Charles V., as a statesman and a soldier, thought so highly of a knowledge of languages, when he said, The man who knows two languages is twice a man. A sort of sublime conceit seems to overcome the French in their study of foreign languages, when they do study them. They can't spell a foreign name rightly; they can't make a quotation accurately. I took up yesterday a work of one of their greatest scholars. He must needs quote Shakspeare after this fashion: "To be, or *no* to be"; and as for proper names, the only two names that I have observed them always to spell accurately, are "London" and "Palmerston." How true that copy-book sentence is, that "Conceit is the mother of Ignorance." There is nothing so dangerous as your supposing you know a thing, when you do not know it. This kind of conceit has been the ruin of theologians, metaphysicians, geographers——

Ellesmere. Historians——

Milverton.——and statesmen. In this particular case I should rather like to turn the word culture into that of information. It is the want of information,—proceeding, however, very largely from a want of culture, which is the ruin of states.

War is a thing which of necessity occupies—I may say absorbs—our attention while it is going on; but observe in history how uninteresting a thing it is for the most part. One war is very like another. Some years hence, if this conversation were to be reported, a reader would hardly know for a time of which war we were talking. To make any use of our study of any particular war, our object should be to get behind or beyond the common topics, and to see what are the true causes of success or failure.

Sir Arthur. And for that purpose, I agree with Milverton, we must come back to culture.

Milverton. Yes; can you doubt, for instance, what will be the groundwork of failure on our part, if we ever do fail in war? Will it not be our defect in organizing—that horrid want of arrangement and of forethought which is to be seen throughout our civil life? For instance, there is a certain great railway station, not very far from London. I see all our Crimean blunders in that station. I contemplate it with awe, considering the immense stupidity of which mankind—British mankind—is capable. Everything is done that should be omitted, and everything is omitted that should be done. Do you suppose that the same want of arrangement, which is visible in that station, and in many others like it, will not be displayed in our arrangements for war? You take such a mean view, Ellesmere, of the word culture. I do not mean exclusively the culture that is to be attained from books. I have shown elsewhere, for example, that organization is a thing that can be taught—that people can be brought up to be good organizers. Why, even the defects of temperament can in a great degree be cured by culture! It is said that in this war their arms of precision have not been made the most use of by the French, on account of their excitability of temperament and their indulgence in aimless rapidity of firing.

Cranmer. I was much struck by what you said, Milverton, as regards the mischief which has been caused to the French by their ignorance of foreign languages.

Ellesmere. Yes; I dare say that a knowledge of those dreadful irregular verbs in the German would have made a difference in the war.

Milverton. I mean something much wider and deeper than that peculiar form of ignorance. What a disadvantage that nation is under of which other nations know much, while it knows but little of other nations. The Greeks were sure to be beaten ultimately by the barbarians, as they called them, because they knew so little of those barbarians.

Sir Arthur. It is a similar disadvantage that we authors, Milverton, labour under in society. Other people know so much about us—

about our most cherished opinions—while we know so little about them.

Lady Ellesmere. If Shakspeare had travelled, would he have been a greater man?

Mauleverer. I think very little of travelling. A fool longs to carry his folly to the uttermost ends of the earth. He does carry it thither, and he brings it all back with him.

Milverton. I am not going to declare that any particular form of culture is the only form, or the chief form. Keeping our discourse for the moment upon culture, as regards war, let me point out to you what a signal proof of culture is to be seen in the wonderful kindness shown to the wounded. What does this indicate? It shows that Christian culture, though it has not succeeded in eradicating war, has introduced a spirit of humanity hitherto unknown. We now feel something of what is the worth of any individual man, looked at in every possible way, as a son, a husband, a father, a cultivator.

Sir Arthur. A possible inventor.

Milverton. The feebleness of the world proceeds from its want of real men. And even the least worthy of men, with the exception of confirmed thieves, hardly ever pass through the world without having done some one good stroke of work for it.

Mauleverer. I am sorry to be obliged so often to come in and check Milverton's enthusiasm, when he rushes into some absurd praise of mankind. He admits that his "Christian culture" has not "eradicated war;" but I really do think it might have done something more than it has done to prevent war. How we smile with contempt at the ancient mode of deciding disputes by "wager of battle" between one man and another. Is this mode of settling disputes made more sensible by many men being engaged in it? Has arbitration made any advance as a means of reconciling nations? I pause for a reply.

Ellesmere. Then you are full of hope for mankind, and are astonished that they do not do better. I thought you held with Byron, that man has ever been a wretched creature, and ever will be. Besides, you know people must be amused, and nothing is more amusing than war.

Milverton. Don't talk in that heartless way, Ellesmere. It might have been true in former days. I really don't know what a baron in olden times had to amuse him but wars and forays. But now there is so much to interest and occupy any man, from kings upwards and downwards—things which we did not appreciate before. Look at the savagery of great towns. Would it not be enough for the fame of any great minister or potent monarch, if it could be said of him, that he found his capital, or any of his great towns, treeless,

colourless, bathless, mudful, smoke-stained, its amusements coarse, the dress of its inhabitants hideous, its food adulterated, its drink pernicious, its crime organized, its infectious diseases for the most part unguarded against, its open spaces gradually being encroached upon—and that he left it a bright, beautiful, well-behaved, healthy city, with honest food to eat, and graceful amusements to amuse it?

Ellesmere. And large spaces for the children and the dogs to play about.

Milverton. This is harder work, too; requiring much more intellect and energy than going to war.

Sir Arthur. I want to revert to our discussion of the present war. Let us keep to that for the moment.

Milverton. If so, there is a remark which I want to make about it.

Our newspapers have received great praise, and justly so, for the immense pains they have taken to keep us well informed about the progress of the war.

Ellesmere. That is their business; it pays.

Cranmer. I believe Ellesmere dislikes to hear anybody praised.

Milverton. But I was going to say that they deserve more praise, and Ellesmere will not grudge it to them, for the pains they have taken to bring out clearly the horrors and miseries of war.

Ellesmere. I believe Milverton has written several of those articles himself.

Milverton. No, I have not. I have a sort of despair of writing anything upon the subject; and if it were not a paradox to say so, I think I feel these horrors and miseries too acutely to write about them well.

Sir Arthur. And then, too, one feels that in addressing the British people, one is addressing that people which requires the least lecturing upon the subject. One feels that they might reply to one by saying, "We know all that, it is no news to us: but what can we do?"

Milverton. It is a curious thing; but, far and away, the best writers who have written books on this subject, are Frenchmen.

I will tell you what would be a famous thing for the world, and that would be, to institute a course of reading for the young of foreign countries in this subject. How I should like to be a Civil Service Examiner in Prussia, France, or Russia, in order to institute such a course.

Cranmer. What would be the nature of it?

Milverton. There would be very instructive bits which I should select from the old chroniclers, from Gibbon, and from some of the histories of Eastern wars, which were singularly cruel wars. Then I should have, as a text-book, one of the best accounts of Napoleon's

Russian Campaign. There are admirable books on that campaign. Then I should insist upon the Erckmann-Chatrian novels as a subject of examination; and, lastly, for the higher classes, I should insist upon Bastiat's great work forming the basis of their anti-warlike studies. These are the French authors I allude to.

Cranmer. I have read other works of Bastiat; but not the one which you speak of.

Milverton. It is excellent. One of the great maxims which I hold to in life is, that the indirect results of any evil are nearly sure to be the most formidable results. This is what Bastiat shows as regards war, and as regards standing armies and large armaments. The measure of civilization in a people is to be found in its just appreciation of the wrongfulness of war. I do not believe that a more courageous body of men exists in the world than that of our fellow-countrymen, or any people who would more delight in the severest physical contests. I cannot imagine a people who would be more fervid when they had undertaken a just war. But it must be just, or they must believe it to be just, or, at any rate, they must hold it to be absolutely necessary, otherwise their conscientiousness would blunt their swords.

Sir Arthur. I think you are right, Milverton. What I complain of in the French, especially in most of their great writers and speakers on this subject, is the low view, comparatively speaking, they take of it.

Ellesmere. I think you are wrong, Sir Arthur. What you perceive and dislike in them, if I read them rightly, is something which pervades their whole course of thought, or, I should rather say, of expression. If it were not an arrogant thing to say, these great writers and speakers ought to have a man like me at their elbow. You have no idea of the use that I have been to Milverton. These Frenchmen are in the habit of using vague generalities of expression which do fatal mischief. They make immense deductions from scanty premises; and, in short, a good deal of their writing and speaking is as the notes of the big-drum. For instance, after a man has enumerated every kind of force which could be brought to bear upon the present emergency, there will come a sentence, perhaps occupying a paragraph, "Behind us all is France."

If you come to analyze this kind of thing you find it contains nothing serviceable.

Cranmer. Don't you mean, Ellesmere, bombast and braggadocio?

Ellesmere. No; I do not.

Milverton. No; he does not, Cranmer. I have often longed to describe the kind of thing that Ellesmere has been endeavouring to put before us. It would require an elaborate essay to do so. I have

perceived something kindred to what Ellesmere means in their greatest writings. They begin with a theory—facts must be made to conform to it. They do not appear to me to have a sufficient appreciation of the odd and strange motives which actuate mankind. When you look into any long course of great transactions you find scores of strange motives actuating the persons who were concerned in these transactions. I have a theory which a little explains this error of theirs, and it is that every Frenchman is more like every other Frenchman, than every Englishman is like every other Englishman.

Sir Arthur. Hence, what is called a great idea, when it once gets into the heads of the French, is more pestilent than it is elsewhere, as it is more supremely prevalent. All the great evils in the world have proceeded from what are called "great ideas" getting into the heads of many men. In fact, as some one has well said, "thinking in mobs" is the most dangerous thing in the world, as it is sure to lead to acting in mobs.

Milverton. Your maxim, Sir Arthur, must really be taken with much reservation. All the great good in the world has proceeded from great ideas getting hold of vast numbers of beings—Christianity for instance.

As we are all laying down maxims at present, I shall venture to propound one of my own—namely, that one of the greatest arts in life, for nations as for individuals, is to know how to make exceptions, and this by reason of the intense lazinesss of mankind.

Ellesmere. And their natural objection to the painful process of having to think out anything thoroughly.

Milverton. Yes; the decadence of nations may be traced to this. I always call it Byzantine. Whenever I see in the present time, or when, reading of past times, I find a nation rushing into one course of thought, taking up rules which they fondly imagine to be principles, I always say to myself, they are becoming Byzantine, and we shall soon see symptoms of decay. You may notice instances of this in the conduct of a dynasty, or of a ministry, as well as in that of private individuals. They come into power with a set of ideas implying a course of conduct; and they do not know when to make the exceptions.

Ellesmere. Exceptivity (I like to coin a new word. It annoys the precise Milverton, and perplexes Cranmer), exceptivity requires so much moral courage, and especially, so much fearlessness as regards the charge which all men dread, more or less, of inconsistency.

Milverton. And the worst of it is, that in the direction of public affairs it is so difficult and so dangerous to be inconsistent on the sly. *Apropos* of this I always think of that story which the poet Coleridge

used to tell so admirably, of his being on the box of a stage-coach with a coachman, who lectured him severely upon the impropriety of throwing halfpence to the beggars who followed the coach. Presently a little ragged boy followed the coach perseveringly for a long way. Coleridge, being afraid of another lecture from the coachman, buttoned up his pockets. Soon, however, he felt some very queer jerks, which seemed to proceed from movements of the coachman; and, watching attentively, Coleridge found that the coachman was with difficulty getting halfpence out of his pocket (you know what a be-wrapped and involved creature a stage-coachman was in those days), and throwing them furtively to the ragged, shoeless child.

You see, the coachman probably knew when to make the exception, and had the courage to make it, though furtively.

Oh! how the moral of that small anecdote might be applied to more potent people than coachmen, to those who drive the great state carriage. You find out a man of remarkable ability; you would like to employ him in the service of the State. But he is over-age, or he does not know Greek, or he has some defect or other which is hit by one of your trumpery rules; and, instead of breaking through your rule, you bless your rule, and magnify it, and say to yourselves, "How good we are to abide by our rules, and not to do what we wish to do, and what we know it would be best to do!" Have the Medes and Persians—those men of such strictness that they have become proverbial for their abiding by laws and rules—lasted as great nations?

Ellesmere. Hurrah for "the Exceptional!" It will take its place, in Sir Arthur's vocabulary, side by side with the Good, and the True, and the Beautiful.

Milverton. Do let me give you one more instance of what I mean. I assure you it is a frequent instance. I do not know that anything has been more prejudicial to the commercial interests of the world, especially to the railway interest, than the system of "qualifications." I always protested against it from my earliest years; and I see no reason to change my opinion. What do you do? You lay down a rule that a man shall not be elected as a governor or director, unless he possesses a certain property qualification, and, moreover, which is still worse, unless he has possessed that qualification for a certain time. By this rule you limit your choice enormously. What you want is a man—a governing man; a man who will do your work well for you from the love of good government, as regards anything which he takes in hand. You will neither secure him, nor stimulate him to any great extent, by insisting on his having a large pecuniary interest in its success. All the best men will work well, if they will work at all, without that. It was the poor man in the

Scriptures whose wisdom saved the city; and probably no pecuniary interest that you could have given him, would have made him do more or less than he did—if anything, less.

Sir Arthur. This is all very true, I daresay, Milverton. Doubtless we and the French, and every other people that I have ever known anything about, have not known how and when to admit the Exceptional. You see, I do not mind Ellesmere's somewhat faded sneer, and am quite ready to join the Exceptional with the Beautiful and the True. But my mind is at present full only of the war, and I am going to say something which will delight the malice that Mauleverer bears against mankind—or rather pretends to bear, when he is with us.

There is one thing I say which this war has fearfully illustrated. We had all known something about this thing before—at any rate, those of us who had read Rochefoucault, and the other writers who write cynically.

Ellesmere. I put in an objection at once. "Cynically," my dear ladies, is a word derived from the Greek for dog, and may be rendered dogically. Now what a shame it is to put upon dogs the meanest aspects of human nature. But what were you going to say, Sir Arthur?

Sir Arthur. I was going to say that the comments upon this war have afforded the most trenchant exemplification that has been witnessed in my time of the base and unjust condemnation which mostly follows failure.

Ellesmere. I must interrupt again. If there is anything which dogs do not delight to do, it is to condemn failure. They never desert their unfortunate master because he is unfortunate. You will say, in your foolish, critical fashion, that they do not understand failure. You little know dogs. If they did read the newspapers, it would make no difference to them. They would always be true to the master who had fed them.

Milverton. You all know that I think little of future fame, and as little of ill-fame as of good fame. I believe that if we are to recognise one another in a future life, increased knowledge will develop a sorrow and a pity that cannot even be imagined now; and that no spirit of the blest will find it in his heart to condemn the most erring of his brethren. But, with all this belief in the toleration and the sympathy that will hereafter be produced by possessing an ampler knowledge of the conditions of humanity, one must confess that one should not like to be pointed out in a future world as the creature who, *when on earth, was always for the strongest.* If there is anything especially and undoubtedly unchristian, it is the worship of worldly success. This is Anti-Christ.

Sir Arthur. Dante has drawn many fearful pictures of what are supposed to be the extremes of human wickedness, many of them representing sins which would fall off from a disembodied creature; but I can faintly imagine what he would have said of the wretch who was always for the strongest; how he would have pictured him as inevitably a denizen of the nethermost hell of all—a hell full of the drainage of all that is execrable from all the other abodes of hell.

Milverton. I almost doubt if there is any such man. There are men who talk as if they were always for the strongest, but in their hearts they sympathise with the weakest. Nevertheless I can image something of a public character, something which should combine the occasional basenesses of many men—something commercial, for instance—which should always be for the strongest.

Ellesmere. Well, there is one comfort, nobody can say this of me.

Cranmer. No, Sir John: your love of opposition prevents your being a victim to this vice. The crowing of the victorious party will always command a counter-crow from Sir John Ellesmere.

Ellesmere. Well said, Cranmer; and put epigrammatically. I don't care if it be a counter-vice that prevents in me this greatest of all vices. At any rate, you believe that I am always inclined to crow out for, I would rather say to bark up for, the beaten party. And so I am. There will always be enough of hired shouting for the conquerors.

Milverton. Yes: and one can appeal to posterity. Do you remember what I quoted to you some time ago from my favourite, Metastasio? It is where Themistocles says, "that future ages will envy him, not so much for his triumphs, as for his misfortunes," one of the truest sayings that I think has ever been said. How dull, too, is the career of an unbroken fortune!

I must, however, recall to you the very words of Metastasio:—

"Invideranno
Forse l'età future,
Piu che i trionfi miei, le mies venture."

Ellesmere. I will give you another noble saying, the nobility of which has not been effaced by its being somewhat hackneyed:—

Victrix causa Deis placuit, sed victa Catoni.

You look up, Blanche, for a translation of the Latin. I can give it you.

The Play was successful: nine newspaper critics went home with the author to supper, and said he was the finest fellow in the world. The Play was damned: the only person who went home with the author was Sir John Ellesmere, and Sir John said, that it was more to the author's credit that the Play had been damned, than it would have been had the Play been saved. Moreover, Sir John added, that

it all depends upon the audience; and hisses from some people are a form of praise more welcome than clapping of hands from others.

Lady Ellesmere. What a wonderful language Latin must be: so few words in it require so many in English to render them.

Ellesmere. The translation, my dear, was large and liberal, but not loose. There are, however, as the Latin passage intimates, very few Ellesmeres in the world. Alas for it! Hence the value of the Proverb, "Nothing fails like failure"—a more significant Proverb, perhaps, than, "Nothing succeeds like success."

Cranmer. I wish you clever people would tell us more what you think about this particular war, instead of dwelling on this particular form of human baseness.

Ellesmere. Yes, both Cranmer and I were aware that failure in the actor educed baseness in the bystander. Even the philanthropic Mauleverer will own that. But tell us what you think about the causes and the consequences of the war.

Milverton. With respect to the real causes of the war, one cannot help having much sympathy with both sides, and feeling that if we had been in the position of either side, we might have acted much as they have done. The unification of our nation is an idea which, if we had been in a similar position to that of the German people, would have been a most stirring idea with us, and would have induced us to do many good things.

Sir Arthur. And many bad things.

Ellesmere. Yes; Unifications, to use Milverton's fine word, are seldom made with rose-water.

Sir Arthur. Nothing is more unscrupulous, or more cruel, than an idea—or rather than the men who once become possessed by an idea.

Milverton. The first Napoleon hated Ideologists, as he called them; and was himself a signal victim to Ideology.

But, to proceed to the motive which actuated the other side. No doubt it was a desire to maintain a military supremacy. Put it as our own case. Don't you think we should be very much inclined to go to war, on any pretext, if our naval supremacy were threatened? Of all things, the thing I like best is to be just if one can, and not only to be just in our dealings, but in our imaginations.

But what I want to talk to you about is not the causes, but the consequences, of the war. Though fully sympathising with the motives that actuate the Prussians, I cannot but view with intense alarm the indirect consequences of their victories. I fear that all European nations, and perhaps the Americans too, will imitate the Prussian military system. Now, that I look upon as decidedly a retrograde movement for the world.

Cranmer. Wait a minute, Milverton. Will not the adoption of this system diminish standing armies?

Milverton. I do not see why it should. I believe we shall have both evils—the evil of large standing armies, and the immense evil, as it seems to me, of any portion of the best part of a civilian's life being obliged to be devoted to military training. Of course I know what is to be said on the other side; but it seems to me a retrograde movement to do away with the division of labour, which the Prussian military system tends to abrogate.

You see, I am one of those persons who think that there is such a great deal to be done in the world, and not one man too many to do it—and, moreover, that to attain excellence (considering the shortness of life), a man's whole time must be given to the subjects in which he is disposed to excel.

The great strides that have been made in civilization have been made in the brief intervals of peace which the world has enjoyed. Now, I do not look upon this as having been made solely, or chiefly, by the material comfort which belongs to a state of peace; but from the time and the thought that have been devoted by individual men to the highest and noblest arts of peace. Come, now; I will bring home to you what I mean by taking particular instances. Would you like to have had some of the best years of Faraday's life directed to military training? Or Wheatstone's, or Sir James Simpson's, or Dickens's, or Thackeray's, or scores more, whom I could mention.

Ellesmere. I could drag on existence if all the eminent men who ever lived had done a little less than they have done.

Milverton. Yes; but, perhaps, they would have done nothing at all, if you had diverted their minds, at a critical period of their lives, from those pursuits which were especially suited to those minds. However, on reflection, I think that it was, perhaps, weak in me to take these particular instances. Do you know, Ellesmere, that agriculture is a thing requiring the whole devotion of a man's mind? You innocently suppose, I dare say, that you could get up agriculture—and so you could, as far as enabling you to hold a brief in some case concerning it; but, I venture to say, that you have not an idea of the close and unremitting observation of nature, which is needful for practical success in agriculture. You would be surprised to find how much knowledge is possessed by farmers and agricultural labourers—knowledge of a kind not to be taught by books, and very much resembling that knowledge which doctors and surgeons acquire by immense experience, and which they cannot impart to you.

Cranmer. I have no doubt this is very true.

Sir Arthur. *Très-bien*, as they say in the French Chambers.

Milverton. To men like you I need hardly take the pains of working my case out further.

Lady Ellesmere. Work it out for us poor women, Leonard.

Milverton. I will, my dear. I have studied chemistry. I know pretty well what books can tell me about it; and I know enough to know that I could never be a great chemist. I see that it takes years to attain that delicate appreciation of minute differences, that intentness of eye, that severity of observation and of thought, which would enable one to do anything in this great science. Another valuable illustration suddenly occurs to me. You think, I dare say, that it is an easy thing to look through a microscope, and to appreciate what you see by its aid; but I tell you that it takes a lifetime, with very peculiar natural advantages into the bargain, to become a good microscopic observer. In fact, you might almost reckon upon your fingers all the great microscopic observers that have existed since the discovery of the microscope.

As regards my own craft, do you suppose that the art of expressing one's ideas tolerably comes by nature, and is not, for the most part, attained by great and constant cultivation?

Again: is there any great artist, any great statesman, who will tell you that he should have been the better artist, or the better statesman, for having given some of the best years of his life to military training?

Ellesmere. As to artists, I do not know; but as to statesmen, it appears to me that any extra knowledge that they might have gained, would have been very useful to them; and that their minds are not so crowded up with knowledge as not to be able to store away a little more.

Milverton. This is only one of your reckless sneers, Ellesmere. All the great statesmen I have ever known have been very laborious men in their own craft, and have found quite enough to do in endeavouring to master that. They read through those Blue Books which I am afraid most of you ordinary members of Parliament only read with much skipping, if you read them at all; and then not more than one in five, I believe, of these excellent works do you reserve for your especial reading.

Ellesmere. One in three hundred!

Milverton. Besides, look what a training in the way of previous acquisition it requires, to be a statesmen. The history, the political economy, the knowledge of the resources of his own country and of other countries, he ought to have mastered. The man who has to govern India, as our Secretary of State for India, had better not have given any of the best portion of his years to military training.

Ellesmere. I suppose you would have us believe, Milverton, that

Cranmer had better have been reading his Adam Smith, which of course he knows by heart, than practising the goose-step, which feat, by the way, he never would have accomplished, and which would not have aided him in acquiring that supreme meanness by which he ever distinguished himself when he was Secretary of the Treasury. I know I never could get him to do anything for my constituents that cost more than three shillings and sixpence.

Milverton. Ah! there you touch me nearly. If statesmen had studied more closely the resources of states and the means of developing them,—if they had thoroughly appreciated the likeness and the difference, especially the difference that there is between the fortunes of a state and of an individual, they would not be guilty of that meanness, which, I must own, may sometimes be justly imputed to them in the present day. It is the want of cultivation, not the excess of it in one direction, that has produced this dangerous disposition which they delight to manifest.

Sir Arthur. You think with me, Milverton, then, that it *is* dangerous?

Milverton. I do. You may think me pedantic in referring so much to History as I do; but I have ever observed that the decadence of a nation has been preluded by a fit of unreasonable economy.

Cranmer. And by a fit of unreasonable expense.

Ellesmere. Very good, Cranmer, very good indeed,—according to my thinking.

Milverton. I am also willing to say "very good." The two things are not incompatible. The pendulum may first swing too much to one side, and then too much to the other. All I maintain is, that there is equal error in the unreasonable inclination to one side as to the other.

What we gain from the study of history is a few great ideas, or rather a few great perceptions. (I mean what the French call *aperçus.*) That man is not a wise man who expects that history will closely repeat itself, as is sometimes said; but there are certain great principles—

Ellesmere. How he changes his word! It is first "ideas," then "perceptions," then "principles."

Milverton. Never mind the word: you know what I mean. Well, one of these principles is, that there must be *continuous development* in a nation. Otherwise it stagnates: otherwise there may be a certain half-dead, half-alive prosperity about it; but it ceases to be a great nation. I contend that meanness on the part of the governors checks development on the part of the governed. New thoughts, new hopes, new aspirations arise amongst the people. These must be favoured; or the nation stands still.

Sir Arthur. And such things cannot be favoured when you have the governing power looking upon the nation as if it were an individual tax-payer. I have heard statesmen say, "I can't consent to this or to that expense. I feel for the individual tax-payer, I throw myself into his position." Now there comes in that notion which Mr. Milverton put forward a little time ago, namely, that a statesman should learn what is the difference between the government of an individual's estate and the government of the estate of the nation.

Ellesmere. Give us an instance, Sir Arthur? I am one of those stupid fellows who never can appreciate abstract propositions. Hurrah for the Concrete! is what I am always saying to myself and other people.

Sir Arthur. I cannot prove that any individual tax-payer, whom you may take at random, is benefited by technical education being favoured by the Government. Very likely his son, or his grandson may be. But one thing I am certain of; and that is, that the whole nation is benefited by an improvement in technical education, which improvement could not be made without Government furtherance. The whole nation will be made richer by this furtherance. If our power of designing, if our chemical knowledge, if our aptitude for wedding art to choiceness of material, is not developed, we infallibly fall behind other nations; and your friend, Cranmer, the individual tax-payer, will in some way or other suffer for that.

Milverton. I think it will puzzle you to find a good answer to what Sir Arthur has just said; but I shall carry his views much further and into humbler forms of detail. If ever this nation is ruined, it will be by a too sedulous attention having been paid to the expenditure of those three-and-sixpences you spoke of, Ellesmere. A great nation's affairs should be conducted with immense promptitude and with a considerable indifference to minute items of expenditure, especially when that expenditure is expended within the country. A man in power, whose whole thoughts should be given to greater things, should not have a moment's hesitation, on the score of expense, as to whether he should send a messenger hither or thither, or whether he should employ an extra clerk, &c., &c. All these expenses are vanishing quantities, when considered with reference to the work which he has to do.

Sir Arthur. I have held high office, as you know, and my experience thoroughly tallies with Milverton's, who has also had great experience. When I was last in office I was pulled up for an expenditure unauthorized, as they told me, of £3, 15*s.*—an expenditure about which there could not be the faintest shadow of a doubt of its absolute necessity. It really sickened me of office that I should have, a year and a half after the transaction had taken place, and when I had

accomplished what I intended to accomplish, to fight a battle for this trumpery expenditure.

It was not always so. I recollect, many years ago, sanctioning a considerable expense without any legal authority, which I believe—indeed, I am certain—saved the country a great number of lives. Instead of being reproved, I was highly praised; but such, I fear, would not be the case now.

Milverton. No: of course it wouldn't. I will tell you something, Sir Arthur, which, with the best intentions, has produced the greatest possible mischief. It is the recent legislation under which the Audit Office acts.

Now nothing is more reasonable than the establishment of such an office, nothing, in practice, can be more injudicious than its being encouraged—indeed, almost compelled—to be a vexatious office. In the first place, though this is a trifling matter in my eyes, comparatively speaking, it has produced great additional expense. This is No. 1 of the evils.

No. 2, which is far more important, is that it occupies the time, and irritates the minds, of those official persons whose minds ought to be occupied in a very different way. One of the high permanent officers of State tells me that, in the midst of the most urgent business, whether writing difficult letters or conducting difficult interviews, he is constantly interrupted by his signature being demanded for the expenditure of 1*s.* 6*d.*

But I am forgetting No. 3, the most important of all. This system of vexatious audit prevents the governing man from having the courage to do that which he would otherwise undertake, and which, perhaps, is the most important part of his functions. It prevents his undertaking those things which are eminently needful for the public service, but which it is not his bounden duty to undertake, and which, unless he is a very brave and enduring kind of person, he will not undertake for fear of botheration—a fear of the most potent kind.

We have heard a great deal of late years about red-tape and circumlocution. By far the worst kind of red-tape is that which takes the form of distrust of subordinates. That creates the red-tape of the mind—the red-tape which prevents the subordinate from doing the most infallibly necessary thing at the right time.

Now take an instance from a very small incident in the present war. A correspondent overhears a party of French cuirassiers, whose horses are tied up in the court-yard under his window, discuss their grievances. They had marched that day ten leagues. The men and the horses are exhausted. The town is full of Government forage and stores of all kinds; but though the poor men have been searching

for the proper authority to furnish them with food and forage ever since four o'clock—it is nine o'clock in the evening when the correspondent overhears the talk—they cannot get either food or forage.

Now, reflect upon this small incident.

Depend upon it, the food and forage were not left locked-up, without any one to superintend them; but the superintendent was doubtless without the requisite authority to serve out the rations. Requisite, do I say? that is exactly the point whether it was requisite; whether the circumstances did not constitute a sufficient requisition; but the superintendent was no doubt afraid to act. It is not routine which is ruinous, it is the fear of breaking through routine.

Sir Arthur. All the mischief proceeds from want of trust. I say always, if you employ me, trust me utterly. As the head of an office, whether political or permanent, do you think I wish to be extravagant? Do you think it would not be a pride and a pleasure to me, to do the greatest possible amount of work with the least possible expense? If I am not that kind of person—if I am not to be trusted, for goodness' sake don't employ me. The service of the State is not such a lovely service, that men who have not their bread to make, or who can get their bread in other ways, should undertake it.

Ellesmere. We are rather overpowered by the official men present; and the one official man, from whom we could hope to hear the other side of the question, is silent.

Cranmer. There is a good deal in what they say; but they should have come to us at the Treasury in their difficulties. I am sure, at least in my time, we should never have been unreasonable in these little matters.

Sir Arthur. Come to you! Come to you in a matter that requires immediate settlement, and about which your lords would have replied to us in three weeks' time, and perhaps with a negative! Eh, Milverton?

Milverton. It is simply absurd, suffocatingly absurd.

Ellesmere. Well, there is one comfort, that when we have Milverton with us we are sure to have sufficiently strong language, although he does pride himself upon being the justest of men.

Milverton. I have yet to learn that justice always uses smooth language.

Ellesmere. It is an awful thing to endeavour to penetrate through official reserve; but with my stupid, commonplace love for the concrete, I should like to know the case (I speak as a lawyer) in which Sir Arthur undertook an expenditure which would now be cavilled at, and which saved many lives.

Sir Arthur. I don't mind telling you. (Here Sir Arthur related, in confidence, the incident in question.)

Ellesmere. Well, supposing your facts to be true—or rather, as I ought to say, your statements to be accurate—I think you have made out a case.

Milverton. Let me go back for a moment to the general question. Sir Arthur has been good enough to approve of what I have said about the difference in the question of expenditure of an individual and of the State. But I don't mind telling you confidentially, that I should almost be satisfied if the State behaved as judiciously in matters of expenditure, as most of the great employers of labour do. The great employers of labour, being mostly men of large minds and extended views, are wonderfully liberal in the recompense they give for good service. They understand the value of a man. They don't take him by examination in classics or mathematics; but they prove their man; and, when he is proven, hold to him. I don't mean to maintain that the State can, in every case, look after the people it employs, as a private individual can; but it ought to aim at its service being at least equal, if not superior, to the service of private individuals. Reckless reduction, carried out with great individual suffering, is a thing which injures the whole of the public service, and damnifies it for a generation to come. The doing away with all prizes that can, by any possibility of screwing, be done away with in the public service, is most injurious to the encouragement of official talent. Of course the same principle applies to all the other services under the Government. In short, economy, to be successful, requires the utmost judgment, the utmost patience, the utmost tenderness; and will never be carried into practice wisely upon sudden spurts, and where the economizing person is bent upon showing that, during his brief tenure of office, he affected such and such signal reforms.

Sir Arthur. One thing I have to remark, and it is this:—They talk of the Manchester school. I suppose they mean the school which represents the trading interests of the country. Now, if there are any people who will be injured by injudicious economical reforms, it is those who represent the great trading interests of this country. I can imagine that some old lady who lives upon an annuity, and has not many years to live, and who is childless, might gain something—a few sovereigns—from injudicious parsimony on the part of the Government; but the trading interests of the country, who thrive by action, and force, and development, will find themselves woefully mistaken, by adopting and furthering the starving system for the public service.

Lady Ellesmere. We ladies have been very silent during this discourse upon economy. I want, very presumptuously perhaps, to revert to the consideration of war. My good brother, Leonard, objects to the Prussian military system. He has shown us what

injury it would produce if adopted here—how you men would all be less clever as lawyers, chemists, doctors, and statesmen, if some years of your life were to be given to military training. Now, I want to know whether he objects to volunteering. I have a personal reason for asking. Our boy, John Leonard, who is, as you know, a tall boy of his age, though only sixteen, is beginning to teaze me about his becoming a volunteer. What am I to say to him?

Milverton. By all means let him become a volunteer.

Lady Ellesmere. But won't this do him injury in his future career?

Milverton. Perhaps so; perhaps not. It may do him good service. Now, you mustn't think I am inconsistent, Mildred; for I really am not, and you would not think that I am, if I could thoroughly explain to you what I mean. I love the volunteers. I think we are immensely indebted to them. I think it is madness on our part not to further and favour them in every way. I am a volunteer myself —an honorary one—and I am proud to say that I was chairman of the committee that formed one of the most distinguished bodies of volunteers. I do not think there is anything I am prouder of than "my volunteers," as I always call them to myself. I admit that I am a very honorary volunteer, for I cannot carry myself—much more myself and a rifle—for three or four miles, without being dreadfully fatigued; but I have promised my corps that I would look after the commissariat, if ever they should be called into real action; and I have my eye upon all the corn-stacks and hay-stacks in the neighbourhood.

Ellesmere. What an outburst of enthusiasm from our daring and energetic friend!

Milverton. But, now to business—to answer the charge of inconsistency I know you will bring against me.

Let those people, I say, volunteer, who have the disposition, the time, the means to do so; and recollect that a young man may, at one period of his life, have the disposition and the time and the means, that at another he has not. As regards John Leonard, he has not his total fortune to make. If John Leonard were the son of very poor parents, and were going to Scotland to learn agriculture from some skilful farmer there, I should be sorry to disturb John Leonard, in a peremptory manner, from his avocation. In fact, without any more talk, there is just that difference, which is pretty nearly infinite, between what is compulsory and what is voluntary. The volunteer suits himself, and in so doing suits the State.

I suppose you will now let me return to the main branch of the subject which I originally intended to bring before you—that of culture. I admit that there has been of late years a general

diffusion of something like culture; but the number of highly cultivated men, of men abreast with all the knowledge of their time, has not, I conceive, proportionately increased.

Ellesmere. There is a very good reason for that, my dear fellow. Knowledge has been so much extended that you cannot expect the individual man to keep pace with it.

Sir Arthur. You forget, Ellesmere, that the means of acquiring knowledge have also immensely increased. Consider, for instance, the aids that there are now for acquiring classical knowledge, and how in former days a classical scholar had to do so much pioneer work which is now done for him.

Milverton. Think also of the number of questions which are settled, or which mankind have resolved not to fash themselves any more about.

Cranmer. At any rate we can take up a practical question which Milverton wants to set before us, and ascertain what a highly cultivated man of the present day might be expected to know.

Milverton. To begin with, there are a certain number of works which if one aimed at being a cultivated man, one would have liked to have read in the original.

Ellesmere. Enumerate them; and, for goodness' sake, do not make the list too long.

Milverton. The works of Homer, Æschylus, Sophocles, Plato, Virgil, Horace, Dante, Cervantes, Le Sage, Molière, and Goethe. I forbear to enumerate works written in the Eastern languages; but, at any rate, one would have liked to have read one's Old Testament in the original. Most of the works I have mentioned are untranslatable. Let all honour be given to the learned and accomplished men who have given us translations of these great works; but they would be the first to admit that these works should be read in the original by any one who aims to enjoy their full beauty.

Sir Arthur. It is worth while I think to remark, that it is not only the ancient works which are untranslatable, in Milverton's sense of the word, but the modern ones are just as much so. For instance, Don Quixote.

Milverton. Being aware of Ellesmere's proneness to object, I made my list a very short one. Of course I could have added twenty or thirty other works, in respect to which nearly the same assertion might be made.

But I want to put before you another part of the subject, which weighs much upon me. It is this—that I cannot call that man a highly cultivated man, in the present day, whose knowledge is only confined to literature, and does not embrace science.

Conceive that there are intelligent creatures going about the world,

highly placed, governing other people, making laws and interpreting them, who have not the slightest notion of the most elementary proposition in pure science; and, what is more to the point, have not the slightest notion of the composition of earth, air, or water; and to whom the simplest properties of matter, or rather the laws which govern matter, are a mystery. To me, it is a wonder that mere curiosity does not lead such men—men, mark you, of the highest intelligence—to make some inquiry for themselves about the things which surround them.

Sir Arthur. Of course this is the result of a most defective education in early life.

Ellesmere. I beg leave to remark, Milverton, that if you choose to make the acquisition of ancient languages so important, if you won't let your highly cultivated man be content with reading his Plato in a translation, you have no right to expect him to be acquainted with science. I do not wish to make such an important discussion as this is personal; but I must remind you again, Milverton, that you are one of those unfortunate persons gifted with an overpowering memory, and this will make you prone to set up an unreasonably high standard for your highly cultivated man.

Milverton. It may be so. I believe, however, that a good memory is not an original gift. It is merely the result of an attention which anybody might give. However, to oblige you, I will give up Greek; and if I do, you will surely agree with me that science ought to take its place. I put aside for the moment the beauty of scientific studies—the exquisite enjoyment to be derived from refined calculations—the delight of dealing with certainties. Looking back in life, I can hardly remember any pleasure so great as that of mastering some scientific problem. Here again, as a mere matter of intellectual curiosity, one would like to know what the supreme thinkers in the world have been endeavouring to think out. I always feel that the greatest intellectual surprise that any man can have, is that which he may experience in reading the first three sections of Newton. He will acquire thereby a higher notion of the possibilities of human attainment.

Ellesmere. Never having tried, can't say; but am willing to believe. I wish, though, you knew something about Contingent Remainders. I think you would see something there, too, as regards the possibilities of human subtlety.

Milverton. But you see, Ellesmere, Contingent Remainders may in some state of human affairs be done away with; whereas Newton's three sections apply to the laws of the universe. Well, now, I am going to say something with which I fear that few of you, except the ladies, will agree. I cannot consider that man to

be a highly cultivated man, who does not know something of music. Here is the only universal language! Here is the language which can even touch the brute creation! Herein are subtleties of concord and discord, equivalent to the utmost refinements in language, and, as I believe, far surpassing the subtlety of Ellesmere's Contingent Remainders. How wonderful a thing music is, may be divined from the rarity of supreme success in it. Great poets are rare enough; but I think you will all admit that great musicians are rarer. And then, as I have said before, the thing is universal. You may plead ignorance of Newton's works, you cannot plead entire ignorance of what Mozart has done; and probably not one of us men here present has the slightest notion even of the theory of music. However, the moment I get any time to spare, I mean to learn music.

(*To be continued.*)

THE EMPLOYMENT OF CRIMINALS.

THE question relating to the employment of criminals is admittedly one of considerable difficulty; it is one also that needs the closest investigation, and will not fail to repay any expenditure that may attend the most searching experiments. That past experiments and bygone investigations have been unsatisfactory, is proved by the fact that no two nations, it might almost be said, no two sets of officials, adopt precisely the same mode of treatment. In former times punishment, rather than reformation, was the object sought, and to this end, prisoners, both civil and criminal, were subjected to all manner of tortures. At the commencement of the present century, when James Nield, Esq., one of the acting Justices of the Peace, visited the State prisons of England, Scotland, and Wales, he found in many prisons both debtors and persons charged with criminal offences, suffering from noisome air, want of water, want of food, want of firing, want of bedding, and want of medical assistance, while slight and hardened offenders were huddled together in a way that was sure to reduce the most moral to the degrading level of his more depraved associates. As an illustration, in Bristol City and County Jail, he found seventeen prisoners confined in a cell seventeen feet in diameter, and eight feet six inches high. To reach the cell it

was necessary to descend by a score of steps. In Kingston-upon-Thames Jail he found two women who had been chained together for a month by a horse-padlock round the leg of each with three feet length of chain, and fastened by another chain at night to two iron staples fixed in the floor. The illustrations are given in proof of the assertion that punishment and not reformation was then thought to be the surest way of preventing defalcation and crime.

Experience has taught us better, and more effective regulations prevail in our prisons. Still, it is admitted on all hands that much remains to be done.

Let any one watch the criminal growth of a moderate-sized town, that is a town sufficiently large to give a fair average of each class of criminals, and not too large to confound your observations, or prevent your obtaining a complete survey of the ground you wish to cover, and it will be found that want of proper industrial training is the most prolific source of crime. Idleness, whether temporary or permanent, is sure to leave its traces in the criminal records of a nation; hence, as a preventative, it is of the utmost importance that there shall be a plentiful supply of remunerative labour—in other words, that willing hands should never be allowed to remain idle. There are at least two ways of ensuring this:—1. By the forced abolition of overtime, and—2. By local employment on district improvements, under the superintendence of local boards. When the divine edict was written, which says, "He that will not labour, neither shall he eat," it was never intended to apply to men forced into unwilling idleness by a dearth of employment. The opportunity to labour was known to be, and is, fully provided for, if man will only use his senses, and avail himself of the bountiful provisions of nature. So long as the idea prevailed that punishment and determent were the chief things to be aimed at by our criminal code, the public mind was closed to a proper consideration of the treatment of our criminals. That idea having been fully exploded, the question is now viewed in its broadest aspect, and improvements are sure to come sooner or later.

With those who, in modern times, have interested themselves in the treatment and disposal of our criminals, it has become a settled idea that their labour should be turned to account, in order, first, that the nation shall not suffer from the consequences of their evil acts, and, secondly, that while in forced confinement and complete control they may be taught to use their physical and mental powers in creative industry. These views have, to say the least, become general, and efforts in this direction have been made in the more civilized nations. All the efforts hitherto made, or nearly all, have

been met with opposition from at least one portion of the community, namely the toiling portion, consisting of those dependent upon labour. There either is or is not good ground for this opposition. Many may feel inclined to say that as it arises from the working class, or from those whose education has been neglected, there is no necessity to inquire farther. It will die a natural death as intelligence widens its boundaries, and gathers labour into its folds. This, as may be shown, is a mistaken idea: there are other and good grounds for the opposition. The opposition, in a word, is against the way in which the products of criminal labour are dealt with, and not against the employment of criminals. It may have been otherwise in the past, but that such is the case now we feel assured. We have heard a deal about the interests of all classes of the community being identical. If this were so, the ignorant of all classes would have joined the opposition, not the ignorant of the working class alone. This fact should have prevented so unsatisfactory a conclusion being so generally arrived at and adopted.

The chief objection now urged, here and elsewhere, is against prison labour being used for the production of articles which, being sold in the open markets of the world, come directly in contact with the products of free labour; and this objection is perfectly valid. First, however, with regard to the identity of interests. There are those who have fixed incomes, and others with incomes derivable from sources which are totally unreliable. To-day they may give forth in abundance, and to-morrow they may be dry. This divergence of interest is proved by the composition of our legislative assemblies. That portion of the community which derives its income from fixed sources has everything to gain and nothing to lose by cheapness, cheap labour, cheap superintendence, cheap capital, cheap everything which goes to make up the consumable article. The incomes of this class are reduced or enlarged just in proportion as the things they consume are dear or cheap. On the other hand, the state of the labour market, and the price paid for labour, is of more importance to the labourer than the prevailing tariff for eatables, drinkables, clothing, and so forth. In proof of this, there is no necessity of looking further than at the prevailing tariffs of various nations. The cost of living in England is far higher than that which prevails in Germany, and there are other places where the cost is greater than in England. The position of the German labourer is, however, by no means better than that of his English brother, as the rate at which labour is paid for in Germany is excessively low as compared with that which prevails here. The converse holds good. In our Australian colonies, house-rent, clothing, and many articles of food

are excessively high, but wages being also high, the condition of the labourer is satisfactory despite the prevalence of the high prices to which reference has been made.

Now if criminal produce is brought into contact with free labour these tariffs are materially affected, and the result is that while the man with a fixed income is benefited, it is at the expense of those to whom the labour tariff is of the utmost importance. There is another source of opposition. In America, for instance, in the great contest now being waged between workmen and their employers in the shoemaking trade, there have been several attempts made, in some instances successfully, to fight free labour with prison labour. This, as might have been expected, has met with the most determined opposition, as may be seen by the following extracts from the draft of an Act passed at the sixth annual session of the New York Working Men's Assembly; it is entitled, "An Act for the better Protection of the Mechanics of the State of New York, by Regulating the Use of Convict Labour in the several State Prisons."

Section 1 says:—

"From and after the passing of this Act, the labour of the convicts of the several prisons, penitentiaries, and the inmates of the house of refuge in this State, shall not be let out or hired upon contract."

Section 2 says:—

"Hereafter such convict labour as may be at the disposal of the inspectors of the several state prisons, penitentiaries, or the labour of the inmates of the house of refuge in the State at the disposal of the managers of the house of refuge, shall be employed in such branches of industry, and such articles thereby produced, as are or may be imported from other countries, or such as may least conflict with the working men and mechanics of the State, and any goods or wares manufactured by the convicts in the several prisons, &c., in the State, shall not be sold in the market or elsewhere at a less rate than their market value at the time of their said sale: provided that nothing in this Act shall be construed to interfere with existing contracts; and provided further, that no convicts employed in the several prisons, &c., shall receive any pay or emoluments for service."

The breaking of this Act upon the part of any official is also to be looked upon and treated as a misdemeanour.

The immediate cause for this action on the part of the operatives may be found in the following extract from *Saint Crispin*, a journal representing the leather interest of Great Britain:—

"Not far from Prospect Park, of the city of Brooklyn, and plainly within sight from the many eminences which command the city and its environs from the sea to the Palisades, is situated the Penitentiary of King's County, a massive castellated building, of granite, whose grated apertures, deep and narrow, lofty walls, and conspicuous watch-towers plainly show that it is a prison. From both sides of the central building extend wings, one for the males, the other for the females. A granite wall, twenty feet high, and four feet thick, surmounted by towers at the angles, encloses a square open space of about five acres, in which is the shoe shop, a two-storey brick building, two hundred and fifty feet long, and fifty deep. Each storey is portioned off into three rooms, making six departments, in which all the various processes of shoe manufacturing are being conducted. For convenience these rooms are numbered from one to six, each governed by a keeper, well armed and vigilant, who enforces the discipline of the prison.

In the upper cutting room (No. 1 shop) the long-term prisoners are employed, the sentences of those working here ranging from three to fifteen years. Although the cutting of stock from patterns is simple enough, experience and judgment must be used to cut a skin or side of leather to the most advantage. All the larger sizes are got out first, the men cutting the various sizes by the case right through. In this room the uppers are cut for all the shoes made in the penitentiary, and also for six hundred or seven hundred pairs per day for the State Prison at Trenton, N.J. Instructors are provided by the company who have the contract. These instructors superintend every operation, supplying material to the prisoners, and taking it away when completed, to be delivered to the sorters, by whom it is marked L., M., or H., as it may be light, medium, or heavy. The sheep linings are also similarly marked, for the purpose of providing a heavy upper with a light lining, and a light upper with a heavy one, thus insuring an apparent average in the finished shoe. The different parts of the uppers are made into bundles, arranged in sizes, and sent to the fitting rooms, shops Nos. 2 and 3.

"In the men's fitting room a number of prisoners are employed in operating sewing machines; and they handle their work as deftly, and make the seams as skilfully, as could be desired. These are also 'long-term' men, sentenced for burglary, passing counterfeit money, highway robbery, and manslaughter. A brace of well-fed, contented-looking rascals, who are running wax thread machines—one of them a darkey—are pointed out as murderers. In the next room (No. 3) forty-four female prisoners are employed on the lighter parts of the fitting work, under the superintendence of three women instructors, who are employed by the company, and are required to be first-class hands in their speciality.

"In the fitting department the machines used in stitching, whether operated by men or women, are run by steam power, making the work pleasant rather than fatiguing, as the nice adjustment of the treadle enables the operator to control the motion by the slightest touch of the foot.

"Next in order comes the sole leather cutting-room (shop No. 4), on the lower floor, where the soles, heel-lifts, and stiffening-pieces are cut, skived, raced, channelled, &c., by machinery, all run by steam power. Shops Nos. 5 and 6 are for bottoming and finishing. Three teams are employed in bottoming, and one team in finishing; from fifteen to seventeen men compose a team. In shop No. 6, where all the nailed and sewed work is done, the boatswain of the emigrant packet ship, James Foster, sentenced about a year ago for seven years for brutal treatment of men at sea, was pointed out to us as the best workman in the Penitentiary. He is a young man, with a keen, bold face; his brawny arms tattooed from wrist to elbow, in sailor fashion. He is operating a cable sewer, a machine for nailing shoes, one of the most difficult things to manage successfully ever invented. The shoe is secured to a jerk and placed under the driver, going through the same process as in pegging, except that this machine is so constructed that different sizes of nails may be used as the shoe goes around, putting in short nails at the shank, and longer when needed.

"No report has yet been made as to the income derived by the institution from the labour of its prisoners in the manufacturing of shoes, but no doubt can be entertained that the undertaking will be very remunerative, although it is not expected that the Penitentiary shall be made self-supporting, as the high salaries paid to the officials and the generally expensive system of management will continue to leave a large sum to be provided by the country.

"This Penitentiary shoe shop is a large and commodious structure, having been built under the auspices of the Bay State Shoe and Leather Company, who have a five years' contract, with four years yet to expire. The same Company have the contracts of the Trenton and Providence prisons. They have supplied the shops with all the latest improved machinery, so that with a small force of men they are enabled to produce a larger quantity of goods than may be supposed, when it is remembered that prisoners work slowly, accomplishing very little more than one-half as much as skilled journeymen outside. About twenty men, instructors and machinists, are employed by the Company at this penitentiary, and power is furnished by one of Todd's engines of twenty-horse power.

The members of the State Shoe and Leather Company had a decided object in entering into the contract by which they obtain their supply of prison labour, and that object was cheapness. This supply of cheap labour, not only enables them to undersell other manufacturers, but it is brought into direct competition with the products of free labour, by being sold to masters in whose shops strikes and

locks-out have prevailed. Unimpressed by the lessons so continuously preached by the disciples of free trade, the New York journeyman mechanic favours protection of home industry, and would lessen the chances of each foreign competitor, by pitting against him cheap criminal labour.

There is this difference between free and prison labour: the free labourer is no tax upon his fellows; it is otherwise with the criminal during his term of imprisonment. He is boarded, lodged, clothed, watched, and guarded at the public expense; and in case of illness or death, he is doctored and buried by contributions from the public funds. Not, it will be argued, if he is caused to labour. Our answer is, partially, if not solely. "Every article manufactured or repaired is charged according to the price which the jail department would have had to pay in the market," says one Prison Report, and this we take it to be the case with the Prisons from whose Reports the following extracts are made. In Bedford, Liverpool, Nottingham, Stafford, Leeds, Wakefield, and York Jails, there are eighty-three prisoners employed at shoe-making and shoe-mending, or rather were in the year 1869, and their joint earnings amounted during the year to £1,075 6*s.* 2*d.*, or about £13 per man. By the last Report of the West Riding Prison, the annual earnings of each employed prisoner (without classifying trades) is £7 17*s.* This, it must be admitted, is but a poor result, and clears our statement from all doubt, for even the larger amount, which it would be exceedingly unfair to take, is totally insufficient to provide for a prisoner's necessities. The average cost, indeed, above the profit derived from a prisoner's labour, may be safely placed as high as £33 per year. Is there an employer in existence who could not undersell his fellows if he had £33 per annum for each man in his favour, furnished by contributions from ratepayers?

Without any fictitious aid of this kind, the consumers are more than sufficiently protected against any extortionate charges, as is proved by the following statement, made at an early date of the present year, by Sir James Lawrence, Alderman of the City of London. He said:—

"Tenpence or one shilling was paid for the making of a pair of slop trousers last year; and now it has decreased to fourpence. Parasols, which last year would cost one shilling to make, were now paid for at the rate of sixpence, and it was impossible to earn more than four or five shillings by working fourteen hours per day for a week. The making of boxes for lucifer-matches was last year paid for at sixpence a gross, and a woman and two children could earn twelve shillings a week by it, now the price was twopence halfpenny per gross, and the same people could only earn seven shillings. In the shoe-trade it was the same. Slipper-making, which was formerly paid for at the rate of sixpence and eightpence per pair, had been lowered forty or fifty per cent.; and a man could not earn five shillings a week by it. In each case *people had now to receive relief from the parish to supplement their miserable wages.*"

It is not necessary to seek the cause of this depression, as the mere

fact of its existence forms a strong and unanswerable argument against the extension of a system which cannot otherwise operate than to still farther reduce the price of labour. The operation of all such supplements from parish funds, as spoken of by Sir James Lawrence, is precisely that of bringing the produce of prison labour into competition with that of free labour. It sustains the master who is not content to give a fair day's wage for a fair day's work in his false and injurious position, and enables him to sell still lower to the injury of his more conscientious neighbour. Yes, the Jew sweater reaps the advantage of all such assistance, for the persons, semi-paupers, thus assisted, rather than remain without employ, reckoning these parochial gifts as a portion of their weekly income, consent to accept a still lower wage, and so reduce others to their level. Let any sane man ask himself if this is fair to the master (whatever his trade may be) who pays a living price for his labour. Why it just amounts to this, that each master so circumstanced, is paying at least a portion of the wages of these underpaid workmen in the shape of contributions to the parochial rates. When twelve hours' labour will not produce sufficient to keep body and soul together, it is far better that we should undertake the responsibility of keeping such unfortunates entirely, than assist them to enable soulless profit-seekers to undersell their fellows, and drag down others to the same poverty-stricken level.

When Bagley, the great market-gardener, was offered half-a-crown a load for cabbages in Covent Garden Market, he went home and ordered his land to be cleared of cabbages, and put the clearings on his dunghill, preferring to produce a scarcity which should benefit other growers, rather than continue to sell at a price that did not pay for carriage, let alone growth. This fact is mentioned in order to show that masters occasionally adopt similar plans to those which the men adopt to protect *their* interests; for what is the difference between the above and a man preferring to strike, rather than work for wages that are insufficient to provide for the most moderate expenses of a home?

The most successful effort yet made with regard to the employment of prison labour is admitted to be in the West Riding prison at Wakefield, Yorkshire. Here, as will be seen, they have adopted a similar system to that employed in the American prison to which reference has been made, and with precisely the same results; only in this instance it is the master and journeymen mat and matting-makers, instead of the shoemakers, who feel themselves aggrieved. A writer on the experiments being tried there, under the signature of "A Stranger in Yorkshire," says—

"A special interest attaches to the West Riding Prison at this moment, in consequence of the attention which has been drawn to the work carried on in it by the prisoners. Certain tradesmen and manufacturers of various kinds of goods have raised the cry that they have found formidable rivals in the great prisons of the country, and a special indictment has been brought against Wakefield, because a steam-engine is employed in the prison, in order to assist in the manufacture of the goods produced here. I do not propose to waste any portion of the space at my disposal in dwelling upon the arguments which have been adduced by the opponents of prison labour. The case against them is so very strong, the grounds upon which remunerative labour should be used in our prisons are so very convincing, that it can require no detailed statement of the case in order to justify those prison authorities who, like Captain Armytage, are endeavouring to lessen the burthen borne by the ratepayers, and to teach the criminals committed to their care some useful occupation. But what is prison labour, and how is it carried on? It is to receive an answer to that question that I have visited the West Riding Gaol this afternoon, and have seen the best modern substitutes for the crank, the treadmill, and the stone-yard.

"It is rather startling, it must be confessed, to find in a prison the activity of a workshop. And yet it must be borne in mind that in the midst of the unremitting labour which one sees going on here, there is no relaxation of the penal character of the institution. Each man works, and works hard; but all the time the prison stamp is upon him, and there is all the difference conceivable between the manner in which he goes through his work, and that in which the lowest class of free labourers perform their daily tasks. Here is a cell occupied by a solitary youth engaged in making one of the cheaper kinds of door-mat. A frame has been erected in the cell, before which the lad stands, and I watch him for a few moments as he twists the fibre in and out between the yarn network which forms the foundation of the mat, and pulls down the heavy beam of the frame for the purpose of pressing each successive knot of fibre home. Work of this kind, carried on in a lonely cell, and with little intermission from morning till night, is at least as severe as that which used to be done at the crank, whilst it has the double advantage of being remunerative in itself, and of teaching the prisoner a trade which, though it may not be very profitable, can at least be turned to when all other resources fail. In the next cell, there is a man busy upon a larger and finer mat than the other man. It is one of those gaudily-coloured mats which are more common in America and the colonies than here, and at this moment its maker is busy with an inscription entreating those who pass over the mat to wipe their feet upon it. Not a word is spoken by the man as we enter or when we leave. There is a half-sulky salute—a mere tapping of his forehead with the knuckle of his forefinger—and then he proceeds with his work, regardless of our presence. He has, indeed, no time to spare, even if he were permitted to remain idle whilst we are in his cell; for, like all the other prisoners, he has a certain daily task assigned to him, which he is compelled to perform under pain of sundry penalties. In one corner of his cell hangs a card, upon which there is a record of the work which he has done, and of that which he has yet to accomplish before a certain fixed day; and the amount of labour expected of him is not such as to allow him much time for dawdling.

"We leave the cell, the warder closing the door sharply behind us, and enter others, where we find the inmates similarly engaged. In no case do we look in upon an idle man. Various are the kinds of mats which are being made, and different the machines by which they are made; but in every case the prisoner is kept hard at work, and so far as his personal case is concerned, has little reason to congratulate himself upon having escaped the days of the crank and the mill."

Having given the above description from an independent source, let us see what the masters and journeymen matmakers have to say in opposition to the mode in which the goods so manufactured are disposed of. From a pamphlet issued by the Association of Weavers and an intimate acquaintance with several of the leading spirits among them, the following are the charges brought against the system prevailing in Wakefield Jail:—The number of free labourers employed in the mat and matting-making in this country is somewhat about 3,000. When the operations of this and other jails were, as formerly, confined to hand labour, the injurious effects were not much felt. It is far otherwise now. By the employment of

machinery the productive powers of the criminal mat and matting-makers have been quadrupled, and the result is that the jail authorities are enabled to supplant the outside masters, and reduce many of the workmen to a condition of forced idleness. The authorities of this jail have been known in times of depression to sell, if not actually below cost price, certainly at prices against which it would be ruin for free masters to attempt to compete. The machinery used, as may be readily imagined, is of the most perfect and expensive kind, so expensive, indeed, as to be totally beyond the purchasing power of the majority of the masters. Agencies, travellers, and other well known means are employed by the prison authorities to dispose of their produce, and the result is that there is scarcely a spot either at home or abroad where the independent and unsubsidized master is not met by the prison authorities or their agents. The subsidy of £33 per head, and the use of machinery, factory, &c., is too much for him to oppose, and he is forced to call a conference with his men in order that he may induce them to work for a lower wage. This has been acceded to, on more than one occasion, and the result is stated to be as follows:—Formerly the average earnings of journeymen mat and matting-makers ranged as high as from 25*s.* to 30*s.* per week; now 15*s.* would be found to be above rather than below the average. The labour-market is over-glutted, and each successive batch passing outward through Wakefield prison doors renders competition more fierce and further reductions certain. What wonder, they say, if many of our members should in turn become criminals, when the chances of earning honest livings at the only trade we have learned are totally destroyed. The following report from the City Prison at Holloway will prove that without in any way placing the labour of convicts in competition with outside labour, better results may be obtained than those so much bepraised at Wakefield:—

"Criminal prisoners committed during the year—1,443 males, 352 females; total, 1,795. Average daily number in custody—298 males, 33 females; total, 331. Recommittals—584 males, 156 females; total, 740. Greatest number of criminals at any one time—333 males, 44 females; total, 377. Total expenditure for the prison, £9,343 0*s.* 6*d.* Average annual cost for prisoners, after deducting the net profit on prisoner's earnings, £20 8*s.* 2*d.*

TABLE SHOWING THE NUMBER OF PERSONS SENTENCED TO DIFFERENT PERIODS OF IMPRISONMENT DURING THE YEAR.

Length of Sentence.	Males.		Females.		Total.
	Adults.	Juv.	Adults.	Juv.	
Not exceeding 7 days	357	34	152	2	545
Above 7, and not exceeding 14 days	167	17	66	1	251
" 14 " " 1 month	364	34	74	2	474
" 1 month " 2 months	186	13	31	1	231
" 2 months " 3 "	172	5	23	2	202
" 3 " " 6 "	97	...	7	...	104
" 6 " " 1 year	70	3	8	...	81
" 1 year " 2 years	44	...	3	...	47
" 2 years	4	...	3	...	7

TABLE SHOWING THE NATURE AND TOTAL VALUE OF PRISONERS' LABOUR, THE CASH RECEIVED FOR IT, AND THE ESTIMATED VALUE OF WORK DONE FOR PRISON USE.

No.	Males.	Cash received.	Estimated value.	Total.
		£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
163	Brick-making, mat-making, and oakum-picking	1599 14 5	...	1599 14 5
4	Carpenters, wood-chopping, and bookbinding	10 19 9	203 12 3	214 12 0
17	Tailors and shoemakers	90 5 4	471 8 8	561 14 0
12	Gardeners and piggery	69 12 6½	61 6 2	130 18 8½
53	Treadwheel pumping water	...	273 15 0	273 15 0
5	Engineers, tinmen, bricklayers, labourers, turners, and coopers	0 18 7½	833 1 4½	834 0 0
9	Washers, cooks, stokers, and whitewashers ...	...	217 19 9	217 19 9
25	Barbers, painters, glaziers, and nurses; cleaning prison, two writers, three storemen, and one in library	...	470 14 3	470 14 3
10	Infirmary and punishment cases			
298	Daily average.	1771 10 8	2531 17 5½	4303 8 1½
	Females.			
7	Oakum-picking	10 15 0	...	10 15 0
8	Washing, &c.	55 16 0	246 12 0	302 8 0
10	Knitting and needlework	...	134 2 10	134 2 10
7	Nurse, cleaning prison, &c.	...	120 13 6	120 13 6
1	Infirmary			
331	Daily average for both sexes.	1838 1 8	3033 4 9½	4871 6 5½

Another objection raised is that the introduction of machinery to perform the hard labour of prisons, is in itself an infraction of the law. The mat and matting-makers do not admit that the labour performed by the criminals is anything like so arduous as described in the foregoing tract.

"Watching a power-loom, stopping the machinery now and then to splice a broken thread or renew a bobbin, is certainly not '*hard labour*' within the meaning of the Act of Parliament. It is, indeed, very *easy* labour. They find the justification for this statement in the 19th section of the Prison Act of 1865, 28 & 29 Vict., cap. 126, where hard labour is described as of two classes—1. Work at the treadmill, shot drill, crank, capstan, stone-breaking, or such other like description of bodily labour as may be appointed by the justices of sessions assembled, with the approval of the Secretary of State, &c., &c."

In answer to a series of letters from the Secretary of the Weavers' Association, Mr. James Adams, Wakefield Jail was stated to be without the pale of Governmental control. Is it, let it be asked, without the pale of the Act referred to?

We cannot give the authority for the following quotation; but we know that it refers to prisons under the control of the City of London:—

"In these prisons the justices may enter into contracts for the employment of the prisoners in any work or trade within the prison, subject to the sanction of the general or quarter sessions. Apart altogether from the objections of those who would not have work introduced for the mere purpose of alleviating the condition of prison life, there have been other objections, urged on the ground that the practice, if general, would tend to diminish the demand for the labour of the honest and industrious classes by competing with it; but this involves the contradictory conclusion, that the well-being of one part of the community depends upon the idleness and criminality of the rest, who can only be supported by taxing the industry of the more deserving. And further, it may be urged that no one can forfeit his right of earning his subsistence by becoming either the inmate of a workhouse or a gaol."

We have no adverse comments to make, our object for introducing it being simply to strengthen our expressed belief, or rather that of

the members of the mat and matting trade, that the authorities of Wakefield Jail are not warranted in the course they are pursuing. One thing, say those now engaged in mat-making, is certain, viz., if machinery worked by criminals is to be allowed to continue, the three thousand mat and matting-makers, working outside the prison walls, must ultimately be driven from the trade; then, they ask, what will become of the argument that prisoners have had placed in their hands a trade by which they in future can earn an honest living? Masters ruined, and the prison authorities possessing a monopoly of the mat and matting-trade, who will remain to give employment to the prisoners who may hereafter obtain their freedom? The advantages derived by the rate-payers from this system is, to say the least, more than doubtful. Suppose that it results in a slight benefit to the rate-payers of the West Riding of Yorkshire, it is far different with the remainder. The mat and matting-makers of other districts, who have been deprived of between thirty and forty per cent. of their earnings, and who may speedily be deprived of the whole, or, to say the least, whose chances of obtaining employment have been very materially reduced, have been robbed of all opportunity of providing themselves against sickness, and the result will be that, whenever this takes places, as it is sure to do, sooner or later, there is no alternative for them but to seek the shelter of the district poor-house. The cost of their keep during their temporary, or may be permanent, disablement is added to the already heavy burdens of every class of taxpayer, and so the slight advantage to the taxpayer of Yorkshire is more than neutralized when the whole of those who bear the burdens of the nation's taxes are taken into consideration.

We gather from the correspondence, to which previous reference has been made, that Mr. Bruce was not aware that the articles manufactured in Wakefield Jail were habitually sold at a trifle beyond cost price. This is somewhat extraordinary. Surely a fact like this should be known at the Home Office, affecting as it does, and that vitally, the incomes of some five thousand masters and men of our population. Perhaps the members of our Poor-law Board are equally ignorant; if so, there is little wonder that pauperism should go on from year to year increasing, until one in every nineteen of the population are in receipt of parochial assistance.

The sooner we come to the conclusion that no subsidized labour shall enter into competition with free labour the better, affecting as it does the interests of all free labourers.

But, it will be asked, is it intended to force our prison authorities back to the old system of compelling the inmates of our jails to perform none but unremunerative labour? Certainly not. Make

prison labour as remunerative as it is possible, but keep all such labour from competing in the free-labour markets of the world. How is it proposed to do this? Simply by employing criminal labour in supplying government, parochial, and prison wants. Not one want, but all. The objection raised to this is, that it would entail no end of expense, and necessitate the building an endless number of new workshops. This objection is easily disposed of. It is not necessary that each prison should be so furnished. Special trades might be allotted to each prison. The Wakefield prison might confine its operation to mats and matting, Bristol and Pentonville to shoemaking, Manchester to weaving, and so forth. So far as the wants of each prison were concerned, these might be supplied by exchanges. By this plan the army, the navy, police, and paupers might all be clothed, and all their requirements met with the least possible interference with the free-labour market, and without unduly over-stocking any particular trade, to the detriment and downfall of its free-labourers. As an instance of what may be done, we may state that the Model Prison at Pentonville is now being enlarged by relays of prisoners. Again, at

"Dunedin, New Zealand, there is and has been for some time a self-supporting gaol. Mr. Caldwell, the governor, in his report for the year ending in March last, not only establishes this fact, but shows how it has been attained. The entire sum voted by the Provincial Council of Otago for the year in respect of the gaol department was £7,572 15*s*. Of this sum only £6,701 10*s*. 8*d*. was expended, leaving a balance of £871 4*s*. 4*d*. in favour of the gaol, and showing a decrease of £683 12*s*. in the expenditure as compared with that in the previous year. If we now turn to the other side of the account in order to see how this expenditure has been repaid to the community of Otago, we find that the total value of remunerative labour performed by the prisoners during the year was £7,117 15*s*. 6*d*., being £416 4*s*. 10*d*. in excesss of the expenditure. What, then, is the nature of the work which has been estimated at so high a value? The prisoners have been employed in the removal of a hill containing 21,944 cubic yards of rock to form a retaining wall in the harbour. They have been employed on board the harbour dredges, upon a jetty extension, and on the erection of a reclamation wall."

We have heard no objection raised to either of the plans above stated, and the reason is plain. In neither instance is the labour thus performed brought into contact with labour existing outside the prison walls. This, taken in conjunction with the text of the draft of an Act framed by the American mechanics in New York, goes far to prove that the only objection to the employment of the inmates of prisons is confined to such conditions as exist at Wakefield—an objection which is well founded, and not to be put aside as the result of ignorance on the part of those who urge it. If the Americans object to the employment of prison labour in a way which affects their labour, there can be little wonder that English workmen should raise the same objection. America has a thousand outlets for her surplus labour. Here, we have few, or as some would have us believe, none at all. The justice of the outcry upon the part of the mat and matting-makers, can easily be realized, if each person opposed to

their views will consent to imagine for one moment that instead of his being a parson, a lawyer, a jeweller, or aught else, he was either a master or journeyman mat-maker: in other words, that the majority of the prisoners confined in a county gaol were taught, when their days of freedom arrived, to underbid him in the trade, profession, or calling, to which his hopes of a livelihood were confined, or that the authorities of the said gaol were willing to perform the labour he at present performs at half the cost. This is not a convincing proof of the justice of their opposition, or of its soundness, but it is assuredly good reason for treating their demands as something more than the outcry of ignorant men. When Sir John Bowring accuses us of wanting to keep criminals from productive employment, he commits an error, and totally misrepresents us; but when he says that there is no difference between labour in prison and labour out, or, to use his own words, that "if the prisoner were a free man, and out of prison, he would bring still more power into the field of competition," he totally ignores the fact that it is not against fair competition that the opposition is raised, but against the sale of productions produced under circumstances that no outside master could for a moment live against, and which would be sure, if extensively indulged in, to ruin the free labourer. In the paper to which Sir John Bowring referred, the following passages occur:—"I would by no means confine prisoners to unproductive labour." Then follows a distinct recommendation that they should be employed in furnishing Government with clothing, and the paper concludes with an enumeration of various productive operations on which it would be advisable to employ criminal labour. Nowhere is it said that such labour is not to be utilized; its use is recommended, but with a qualification, which is found in the following literal quotation:—"No subsidized labour" (and criminal labour is subsidized labour) "has a right to be allowed to compete unfairly with free labour, and that it cannot be allowed to do so without serious injury to the interests of all free labourers." Thus it will be seen that Sir John Bowring was fighting a shadow, that he ignored the most important contents of the document to which he was referring, and built up an argument and levelled denunciation on the author for their supposed absence. Thus the charge of misleading recoils upon himself.

There are others misleading the working classes beside ourselves —or at least, it would appear so, for in an article in the *Standard* for March 26th we find the following passages:—

"The system [of prison production] is carried rather too far when we find convicts in our prisons engaged in manufactures, with the aid of steam power, and actually underselling the honest workman outside the gates.

"Why should the matmaker, humble though he be, have to fight for existence against the privileged industry, the fed and clothed and well-housed labour of a thief in Wake-

field jail? We have testimony that there is unfair prison competition in other respects. Articles are sold that could not be sold at the same price in the general market; the prisoners employed at Wakefield could not, according to the rate of sale, earn per head more than three shillings per week."

There, Sir John, do your notions of Free Trade carry you thus far? Here is a plain fact; by means of having food, clothing, lodging, &c., found him, the labour of an adult criminal for an entire week can be sold for three shillings. Would you have the wages of the outside mat-maker reduced to that level? Can you not make criminals industrious without reducing the honest labourer to the most degrading beggary? It is poor philanthropy which gives to a criminal a trade at which, when free, he cannot earn an honest living. Again, cannot Sir John see the difference of over-stocking and ruining a trade, and making each trade bear its fair proportion. A trade only three thousand strong, like that of the mat and matting-makers, is far too small to absorb the continual outpourings of even Wakefield Jail, let alone others. The educated and reclaimed at least might be taught law and divinity; those of a mechanical turn of mind should be taught the mysteries of mechanics, and so forth. Men of a literary turn of mind might be coached up for literary hacks, and others might be employed in making additions to a slang dictionary. Anything would be better than over-stocking a single trade.

But, banter aside, it is not a question of employment or no employment, but a question of what is the most fitting employment. It is a question of the best mode of employing the criminal class to the greatest advantage to the entire community, and the least detriment to labourers outside our prison walls. If Sir John Bowring, and those who think with him, will turn their attention to this aspect of the question, much good might be done. It would be far better employment than misrepresenting what another has said, and venturing statements that have no basis in truth.

Still the question remains unanswered, How are we to find employment for our criminal population? As a maritime nation, England stands pre-eminent; it is therefore of the utmost importance that her harbours should be not only the most capacious, but the most secure. This, if we are not grievously mistaken, is far from being the case, and the vast number of wrecks continually occurring would seem to bear out the impression. Not only is it true that ships have little or no protection against storms, but it is equally true that our mercantile fleet is exposed to the hostile operations of any enemy. This is peculiarly so in Liverpool, and quite a panic raged there when war was proclaimed between France and Germany. Here then is fitting work for criminals. Similar work has been done by the criminals in Dunedin, New Zealand, and we see no reason

why it should not be done here. Many of our rivers want widening; at Dunedin they have set us an example how this may be done. Let us follow it, and employ our prisoners for this purpose. The fens of Lincolnshire, and large portions of our southern coasts have been clutched from the grasp of the sea, by well-planned operations, is it not possible to find other places and opportunities for increasing the limited number of acres of which England is composed? Spain causes her criminals to work her quicksilver mines, have we no partly-exhausted mines that, while not sufficiently profitable to give employment to free labourers, would yet return to criminals employed therein a better result than three shillings weekly? Are there no military roads required in any portion of her Majesty's dominions? Could not a large number of them be induced to undertake the rough work of our colonies? Are there no waste lands that, while offering no temptation to capitalists, would return a higher rate of labour than that we have mentioned? These are legitimate fields for employment—fields that might be cultivated, not to the advantage of those now living only, but to the advantage of all who shall follow after. Still there would be left a residue. Let us see how this residue can be employed.

We cut the following from the *City Press*:—

"The total staff of the City Police in the year ended 29th September, 1869, numbered, as above stated, 699—viz., 1 commissioner, 2 superintendents, 14 inspectors, 70 sergeants, 560 constables, 40 additional constables, and 12 detectives. The annual total cost of the establishment was £64,391 15*s.* 8*d.*, which is made up as follows:—Salaries and pay, £53,084 14*s.* 9*d.*, allowances and contingent expenses, £52, clothing and accoutrements, £2,447 0*s.* 4*d.*

There is no reason why the £2,447 spent in clothing should not be spent with the authorities of our prisons, or rather of the prisons belonging to the City of London. The raw material for the articles alluded to might mostly be obtained by way of exchange from prisons in the cloth manufacturing districts. By a system of this kind, extending throughout all towns and cities, the criminals confined in the jails might be kept fully employed. The residue of the criminals confined in our county jails and convict establishments might, with equal advantage, be employed in clothing our army, our navy, coast-guard, paupers, lunatics, in-patients of hospitals, and various government officials. Wood turners might be employed in turning policemen's staffs, in fashioning lance shafts; builders and masons in repairing prisons, barracks, &c., printers in preparing governmental statistics, and so forth. Now, it may be advanced that there is no difference, so far as results are concerned, in the modes of employment thus set forth and the mode adopted by the authorities of Wakefield Jail, that the plan or plans recommended would rob the outside labourers of many chances of employment. There is, however, little difficulty in disproving the

asserted identity. In the first place, many of the modes recommended for disposing of jail labour are new, or nearly so, and hence would lead to no displacement; secondly, competition is put an end to; and, lastly, no particular trade is ruined by too great an influx of new workmen. These are assuredly differences sufficient to warrant the distinction made, and as they contain all that we have asked for, there is no good reason why we should not publish them as valid recommendations to our plan for the employment of criminal labour.

GEORGE ODGER.

A FEW MORE WORDS ON THE ATHANASIAN CREED.

I AM as much convinced as the excellent writer of the article on the Athanasian Creed in the August number of this Review, that it is impossible much longer to retain that Creed as part of our services. This conclusion has been forced upon me by the arguments of its recent apologists—men of high worth and ability—even more than by those of its impugners, sincere as is my respect for them. If a composition so weighty and awful, treating of the most transcendent topics in the most distinct language, requires explanations and compromises which destroy reverence and introduce confusion, its worth for our common worship must be gone; just because one honours it and has learnt deep lessons from it, one must desire that it should not be heard in public, that it should be kept only for secret meditation. Believing that that question is practically decided, that the resistance, from whatever quarters it proceeds, is too fitful, faint, and irregular to last, I deem it the duty of every clergyman who up to this time has repeated the Creed in his Church services, to ask himself in what sense he has repeated it. I do not in the least blame those who have adopted it reluctantly, submitting to an authority which they considered it wrong to resist. They have acted on a principle. I can appreciate perhaps still better the principle of those, some of whom I know, who braved any ecclesiastical censure rather than utter words which they considered profane and cruel.

But I cannot claim a place in either of these classes. Having from tolerably early youth known the objections to this Creed, which are now considered overwhelming—having been educated to detest it—I have read it in congregations, a majority of which would probably have wished that it should be omitted, with little dread of interference from the ordinary in case I chose to follow their inclinations. If I have paltered with words, which right or wrong are tremendous, in a double sense, or have pronounced judgment on my neighbours while proclaiming constantly that our Lord has forbidden us to judge, I have committed a sin of which I ought to repent in dust and ashes. To be clear in one's own conscience is the point of chief importance. But as some great principles of theology and morality concerning the whole Church are involved in the question which I have debated with myself, I will endeavour to state the reasons which have induced me to read the Creed in what seems to me its direct and natural sense, although I have a cordial and ever-increasing dislike of anathemas, although I accept literally and unreservedly the assertion of the Apostle that it is God's will that all men should be saved and come to the knowledge of the Truth, although I believe that His Will, however resisted, must at last prevail.

I am aware that there is another temptation besides that of yielding to early prepossessions. There is the temptation of violently resisting them—of flying to the extreme which is the furthest from them. This tendency, as it affects most painfully domestic impressions and associations, so may also be directed towards the age in which we live. To be out of communion with that, to cultivate the habits of a bygone time, is, we all know, a frequent rage among young men; a sign, sometimes, of an independent character—when it becomes confirmed, of an artificial one, or of one given up to self-will. But I think it is a vice which old age, often contracting others, leaves behind it. Most men, I think, learn as they approach their second childhood the interest and value of the first. Most acquire a conservative dislike of mediæval affectations, of every needless departure from the habits of their contemporaries. I can say for myself that those youthful lessons which were directed against the Athanasian Creed have never lost their power over me, and are now more precious to me than ever. I can trace the effect of them upon my thoughts, whatever direction they have taken. I am specially grateful for them, because they cultivated in me a great impatience of all sectarian denunciations, of all formulas which were intended to sever one class of Christians or of men from each other; a vehement passion for unity in its largest possible sense. And this passion for unity, I rejoice to feel, is the passion of this age, more than of any one that has preceded it. I feel myself, while I cherish it, in a strange

sympathy with all the ecclesiastical movements of the time, with those that most clash with each other, even with those which, looked at in themselves, would cause me the sharpest pain. Schemes of Comprehension, declarations of Infallibility, attempts to establish a dry Theism, even the despair of any common education which shall not be Atheistic, alike indicate a deep craving which must somehow be satisfied. One who has pursued the vision "many a weary hour," and who is well convinced that in none of these ways it can be realized, may be pardoned for dwelling on a commonplace which has been to him of unspeakable wonder and comfort—which, since it first came home to him, he has never been able to forget in any discourse with himself, or in trying to preach a Gospel to his fellow-men.

Germans and Frenchmen, who are slaughtering each other; Englishmen, with their lofty isolation and contempt of foreigners; Italians, who boast that they possess the Dogmatist of the universe, are alike baptized into the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost. The richest and the poorest are sealed with this name; it is linked with the names by which their kinsfolk and their playmates speak to them. It has been so for more than a thousand years. Sceptics do not like to deprive their children of the common sign. "It may mean nothing," they say; "then why not yield to the custom? If not nothing, it must mean something rather profound. Why affect to deny that of which we are ignorant?" A few most earnest people refuse the ceremony, only because they are afraid to connect with something visible and external, a truth which they say must be at the very root of our lives.

Heartily do I agree with these last objectors, that no ceremony can be a bond between nations or men. Even more incredible is the notion that some opinion about the ceremony, or the amount of meaning which attaches to the ceremony, can be a bond between them. We know that a single people, speaking the same tongue, living under the same circumstances, are not united by this opinion, but are torn in pieces with controversies about it. But is it incredible that the name itself should contain the secret of their unity? "What!" I hear some one exclaiming, "the doctrine of the Trinity? Surely Christians have disputed about that from the earliest ages downwards as much as about the efficacy or inefficacy of baptism." No doubt they have. But was there any reality for them to dispute about? Is there such a NAME? If there is, it cannot represent a doctrine, it must represent Him in "whom we live, and move, and have our being." Have we not believed that it is so? Have we not believed in Him; only in an opinion about Him? Let us fairly confess that fact; and if God be the God of truth and of peace, and if we are made in his image, we shall need no other

explanation of our wars and fightings with swords and guns, or with an interchange of curses.

When we reach this point in the inquiry it becomes serious enough; trifling must be very dreadful to any one who has ventured even a few steps in such a course of thought. He must begin to ask himself, "How can I repent, how can we all repent, of conduct towards each other which involves such a denial of the God in whom we have professed to believe?" I do not find repentance easy for myself. I do not find it easy to call other men to repentance. I turn to the New Testament that I may learn the way. I find it written, "Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand." So John the Baptist spoke; so our Lord spoke; so his disciples spoke. That was the ground and power of repentance. The kingdom of heaven, the kingdom of God, is not afar off; it is nigh to every one of you. But what kingdom is this? If the Son of God came into the world to reveal the Father, with whom He had dwelt before the worlds were—if, when He left the world, He sent his Spirit to teach men of the Father and the Son, to bind them together as his brethren and as his Father's children—if this was the message which He bade his apostles proclaim to all nations, the New Testament would seem to be an intelligible book, the spread of the Church an intelligible fact. The kingdom of heaven would then be the eternal kingdom of righteousness, peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost. The kingdom of hell would then be the kingdom of evil, hatred, despair. Both would be about every man; both would be kingdoms into which he could only enter by his spirit. Communion with either would be most real and actual, would determine the course of a man's thoughts and acts. To believe in the God of righteousness, peace, truth, to acknowledge Him as the Lord of all, who has redeemed mankind by his Son from the powers of death and evil, who speaks to their spirits by his Spirit, would be to assert a place in the heavenly kingdom: to believe in evil, death, selfishness, as the lords of all, would be to claim a place in the other kingdom. To repent would be to turn from the power of darkness to the Source of Light. Repentance and conversion would always be possible, because He who is never far from any is the giver of repentance, the converter from destruction.

"But this is not what we mean ordinarily by heaven and hell." Alas! it is not. In one of the hymns which are taught to the children of Churchmen and of all classes of Dissenters—one of those which would be called specially "unsectarian"—which, if Lord Russell's suggestion had been followed, would have been sung in all our schools, wherein passages from the Gospels were read—heaven is described as a land where pleasures banish pain,

as a land divided from ours by "the narrow sea of death." It is not nigh, but afar off; it belongs wholly to the future. It has nothing to do with this earth, where pain is certainly not banished by pleasure. So when a child passes from the repeating of its hymn to the reading of the Bible, it must be carefully informed that the kingdom of heaven of which our Lord preached the Gospel, is not the true heaven, not the heaven of Dr. Watts, but only "the Christian dispensation." That phrase is perhaps nearly as intelligible to the child as to the teacher. But when the child has grown to be a man, it is found that he cannot turn to the Christian dispensation for power to repent or for remission of sins. So he must have those "violent motives" presented to him of which Paley speaks. He must be bribed by the hope of future pleasures banishing pain, which are to last for ever. He must be terrified by the dread of future pains banishing pleasure, which are to last for ever. Is not this the most natural way of influencing human beings either to act rightly or believe rightly? Very natural, as the resort to it by Pagans, Jews, Mohammedans, and Christians in all countries proves. Only quite ineffectual, as the experience of Pagans, Jews, Mohammedans, and Christians in all countries proves. And so men, who tried to repent and believe under the power of these violent motives, have come at last to recognise a greater might in words like these, "I will arise and go to my Father." "God has not sent his Son into the world to condemn the world, but that the world through Him might be saved." "The Spirit helpeth our infirmities, because we know not what to pray for; but the Spirit prayeth in us with groanings that cannot be uttered." To those who, in their despair, have been driven to take hold of these messages, the machinery of motives, the promise of endless pleasure without pain, the threat of endless pain without pleasure, seems the most despicable, the most useless, the most godless, the most immoral, by which the spirit of man has ever been mocked and deluded.

But those religious men who are thoroughly possessed by this theory of rewards and punishments, who are fully convinced that they find in the promise of an Elysium, or in the threat of a Tartarus, after death, a grand addition to the mundane arguments of Bentham and Dumont, must see in the Athanasian Creed the most extravagant and outrageous caricature of their maxims. What they assert timidly, subject to a number of qualifications, with plentiful reserves for personal friends or favourite heroes, is here delivered universally, *absque dubio*. Can they help the desire to be "well rid" of such an ugly parody of their own modest propositions? It is right to curse a little—under the breath. It is permitted to say to *some* Unitarians and Tritheists, "There is no hope for you." But this breadth of

assertion—this utter absolute condemnation—has not every sect, every school, a right to cry out, "No, we never used any language so tremendous as that?" Each judge of his neighbour feels himself a little whiter for the contrast of such blackness. He can indulge more comfortably in his own moderate ration of anathemas when he has protested against this inordinate luxury.

But is it a great crime, a terrible violation of common honesty, to have taken the language of a Creed which is occupied from first to last with a declaration of the Name whereinto we are baptized, as if it did refer to our abiding in the eternal God, as if it did speak of the death which consists in alienation from God? Are we bound to say, "This writer who was familiar with the language of the New Testament, who had a great dread of Paganism, *must* have substituted the Elysium of Pagans for the Eternal Life which was with the Father, and which the Son revealed to publicans and sinners; the Tartarus of Pagans for the outer darkness the damnation of hell, which our Lord warned the Pharisees that it was so hard for them to escape?" The question is not that which the Dean of Westminster has discussed, whether a man who deemed it right, as the writer of this Creed probably did, to visit heretics, when he had the opportunity, with temporal death, is not likely to have meant all that was most dreadful when he spoke of everlasting death. Let that question be decided as it may, by those who think they have any historical data for settling it, or who deem it sound criticism to deduce an inference from one particular tendency of a time without taking its other tendencies into account. But the severity or mildness of the Creed is not the point at issue. To me it sounds much more severe, because it appeals much more directly to my own individual conscience, if it says, "Dost thou wish or will to be saved out of the death in which, whatever thou callest thyself, thou wilt, without doubt, abide if thou art alienated from the Eternal Charity? then hold fast by this Divine Charity, believe in Him with all thy heart;" than if it said, "Unless thou hold certain opinions thou wilt assuredly descend into Tartarus after thy death." I say frankly the one kind of speech does make me tremble, for I see that it is meant for *me*, since it opens with a "Quicunque." And I feel that I am in this danger the more near I am to the kingdom of heaven, the more I have preached about it, the more I have learnt all the phrases and distinctions concerning it. Whereas the other does not make me tremble at all. I know nothing about Tartarus. The rhetoricians who talk about it heap up epithets and metaphors which do not bring it at all nearer to me, to which I cannot attach any vital force. It is not therefore a debate about capital or mitigated

punishment; it is not a debate about the amount of offence which may incur this or that degree of punishment; it is not a debate about the probable opinions of an unknown teacher, of some unknown century, upon any of these subjects. It is a debate between two schemes of thought which may have been prevalent, which must have been prevalent, in former centuries, but which beyond all doubt are prevalent in this century; which affect all my thoughts on every subject that can occupy them; which must determine, whether I like it or not, my construction of every Confession that I adopt.

The sentences with which the Creed opens are called its damnatory clauses. Many contend that it would be much improved, rendered nearly harmless, if they were omitted. I think it must strike every one who has read the decrees of the last Roman Council—which has been careful, at all events, to follow ecclesiastical precedents—that its anathemas or sentences of exclusion from the communion of saints here and hereafter are placed *after* the announcement of its dogmas. "Believe this, or such and such consequences must follow." Here we *begin* with the sentences concerning salvation and perishing everlastingly; they ought, one would think, to fix the meaning of the subsequent clauses. If the document is a coherent one, to detach them from it must be to destroy its substance.

Such, I think, will be the effect of withdrawing them. The subject of the Creed is salvation, "Whosoever will be saved." Does that mean whosoever will be saved from future punishment? Of course that must be the meaning of it to all who adopt the theory of rewards and punishments, who think that God holds out certain bribes to us *if* we will believe what He commands us to believe, certain threats if we will not believe. But such persons must also construe the word "salvation," when it appears in the New Testament, according to the same rule. When our Lord says to Zacchæus (Luke xix. 9), "To-day is salvation come to this house;" when St. Paul says (Rom. xi. 11), "Through their fall" (of the Jews) "salvation is come to the Gentiles;" when he says in the eighth chapter of the same Epistle, "We are, or have been" (ἐσώθημεν), "saved by hope;" when he says to the Corinthians (1 Cor. i. 18), "The word of the cross is to them that are perishing" (τοῖς μὲν ἀπολλυμένοις) "foolishness, but to us that are saved" (τοῖς δὲ σωζομένοις) "Christ, the wisdom of God and the power of God;" when he says (2 Cor. vi. 2), "In the day of salvation I succoured thee—behold, now is the day of salvation;" when he speaks in the same Epistle (ii. 15) of being the savour of Christ in the saved and in the lost; when he speaks (2 Tim. i. 9) of God "having saved us and called us with a holy calling;" when St. Peter (1 Peter iii. 21) speaks of "baptism saving us," likening it to the salvation from the flood in the ark—all these passages, in

spite of present and past tenses, in spite of the context which determines them to the past and present, must point to a deliverance from future punishment; for to what else, cries the believer in the power of Paleyan motives, can they point? On the other hand, if, in conformity with the ordinary rules of grammar and construction, and also with his own deepest experience, a man takes these passages to signify that belief in a God who redeemed mankind by his Son, who unites them by his Spirit, *is* salvation—salvation from his own narrowness, selfishness, hatred of his fellows—he must attribute the same force to the word "saved" in the Creed, he cannot give it any other. And if he gives it that force, he must suppose that to keep the catholic faith whole and undefiled, is to keep faith in the God of salvation—the God who has sent his Son to save it, whole and undefiled. If any one says, "that is to put a modern sense on the words," I ask him whether Dante's "Divina Commedia" represents modern theology? or patristic and mediæval theology, even in its grimmest form? Surely no idea is more familiar to the readers of that poem than the idea of the Trinity as the Perfect and Ineffable Charity; the object of contemplation and delight to the spirits in the highest circle of paradise. And if so, to perish everlastingly, or be in the state of everlasting death, must mean to be without God, to be absent from the Perfect Charity.

The historical evidence is therefore in favour of this construction, not hostile to it. Were it otherwise, our duty would still be to read the words in that sense which accords with the use of them in our other services, and in the lessons from Scripture. And if that is the beginning of the Confession, all which follows must be interpreted in the light of it. Take it away, and the other clauses of the Creed do become what they are supposed to be—a series of dry dogmas, wilfully perplexing to the intellect. Retain it, and they become efforts to remove perplexities which occur to every one who tries to worship the Unity, whilst yet he cannot live without the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. The whole and undefiled faith, the simple faith of the little child, is invaded, continually invaded, by these subtleties. The Creed tries to clear them away with a kind of resolute plainness which sometimes (as in the clause, "not three Holy Ghosts, but one Holy Ghost") has grated upon my nerves, has given a shock to my feeling of awe. But here, as everywhere, is a protest against the notion which modern divines encourage, that the faith is split into a number of partial, separate propositions; that it is *not* whole and undefiled.

That the object of the Creed is to vindicate the Unity of the Godhead specially as opposed to Tritheism, the Dean of Westminster has fully acknowledged. He maintains, as Coleridge did, that it contradicts the

Nicene Creed, which affirms so strongly the subordination of the Son to the Father. The necessity of that affirmation, if we are to regard the life of our Lord upon earth as the same with his life before the worlds were—if we are not to be involved in perpetual evasions which destroy our belief in Him as an actual person—I feel more strongly than I can express. But I feel also the want of some direct and solemn proclamation of that absolute oneness, of which it seems (though only seems) to deprive us. I find that assertion here: the protest against that ghastly solitary *singleness* of the Godhead which ends in the acknowledgment of a mere imperial Power removed from all sympathy with his creatures; the substitution for it of that deepest unity which is the ground of unity for all the kindreds and nations of men. Church unity has been separated from this unity. The Church has set itself in opposition to mankind, not recognised itself as a witness for mankind. So inevitably it has become a sect. That it may avoid the appearance of being a small sect, that it may appear to include the world which it denounces, it creates a polity of its own; by a logical necessity it at last exalts some mortal head into a Divinity.

We may denounce the infallibility of a man as we please; but we shall all accept it, and the Roman Bishop will be the most natural depositary of it, if we suppose that the Catholic faith is a faith in propositions. Then it must need a protector, one able to condemn old propositions and to establish new. But if the Catholic faith is a faith in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, how one shudders at the blasphemy of this pretension! What a denial of the Trinity in Unity it involves! With that pretension must perish the claim by any man, or body of men, to pass judgment and pronounce anathemas. Whilst we keep the Catholic faith whole and undefiled, we must leave all judgment of men to God, we must repudiate as a denial of His presence and His authority every scheme which any divines have ever devised by outward or inward tests to ascertain whether a man does or does not believe. The more strong the language in which we affirm that it is eternal death to be without God, eternal life to be in communion with Him, the less we shall dare even to speculate upon the degree in which any man is without that communion or possesses it. And the more absolutely we affirm our belief in a Father, a Son, and a Spirit, the one God, who is not far from any man, who has never been far from any man, the less possible is it to limit that presence within any age or any circumstances. The blessing of the revelation is unspeakable; but if it is a true revelation, that which was kept hidden from ages and generations existed in all those ages and generations. Those to whom in the counsels of an infinite wisdom it has been made known, are bound to

say to men everywhere, "That which has been discovered to us was the source of all good to your forefathers, is the source of all good to you. The God of love and grace whom we worship was their God, is your God. There is no other, there has been no other, there will be no other. When we reverence any grace, manliness, justice, meekness in any man, of any race, of any belief, we confess His image, we reverence the Son from whose fulness that virtue has proceeded. We do not love Him that begets, unless we love whatever in any place or in any time has been begotten of Him."

This reference of all that is limited in us to the unlimited, of all that is measurable to the "unmeasured" (*immensus*)—the Dean of Westminster has called our attention to the epithet—of all that exists under conditions of time to the eternal, is the characteristic of the Creed. Suppose the infinite, the unmeasured, the eternal is a mere power, one who means destruction to his creatures—the whole conception is more frightful than words can express. From such an incubus what human spirit would not cry to be delivered? Have we really endured it so long whilst we have been singing in the *Te Deum* of a Father of an Infinite Majesty, of an honourable, true, and only Son, of a Holy Ghost the Comforter, whilst we have been affecting to praise God for his mercy and long-suffering? If we had intended such blasphemy, the stones of our churches must have cried out against us, the roofs must have fallen upon us. But if we believe that truth, love, justice alone are immeasurable, are alone eternal, alone stand out of the relations of space and time; to speak of the Unmeasured and Eternal Being is to speak of the same Being whom Christ manifested in his life and his death; of Him who is clothed with power, but who *is* righteousness. And then the unmeasured and eternal life must be this life, the life of truth, and love, and justice; the unmeasured eternal death must be the state from which truth, and love, and justice are banished. Either state is out of place, out of time. Applying to it measures of space or time, defining where it is, or how long any man must abide in it, we change its nature. If the man who is dwelling in God wants any security for his continuance in that state but God's own love, he abandons it; if we say that the man who is dwelling in death must continue in it, we say death is stronger than life, the will of the devil than the will of God. All these thoughts, if learnt in the New Testament, I believe may be greatly strengthened by this Creed. I know for myself that whenever I read it I feel that I must give the words eternal and everlasting the same sense in every other clause, as in the clause which declares the Father to be eternal, the Son eternal, the Holy Ghost eternal. I might be told a thousand times over, with shrugs of pity or contempt, that I

was perverting words to a fantastic meaning of my own; I could call God to witness that I was taking them in the only sense which seemed to me compatible with the nature and harmony of the document wherein I found them. The shrugs do not alter that opinion in the slightest degree, though they do help to convince me that the Creed is not likely in our day to be received in the sense which of right belongs to it, and may be received in the directly opposite sense.

That conviction may lead me to desire the banishment of it from our common worship even more than those do who object to it; but I am the more anxious to testify my obligation to it for the warnings which it has given me against habits of mind to which I know that I am prone. "Neither confounding the persons nor dividing the substance" has been a perpetual hint to me of a peril which threatens us all in the study of morals, and in our judgments on the commonest affairs. Dividing where we should have distinguished, mixing instead of uniting; of what chapters in our experience are these the titles! How closely are they associated with tempers which disturb society, and bring stains upon the conscience! If one can trace them to their deepest ground, if one can bring a divine principle to bear upon them, what a number of evil seeds may be hindered from germinating!

Scarcely less important, it seems to me, for those who are engaged in a battle, not with giants of other days, but those that most threaten our own, not with heresies outside of the Church, but with those to which our Churchmanship makes us most liable, are the words "One Christ; not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh, but by taking of the manhood into God." When I read some of those hymns, "ancient and modern," which are intended to glorify the Incarnation, when I hear them sung with fervour by young men and women who cultivate High Church doctrines,—the words of this Creed come with terrible power to my mind. I cannot the least judge the writers of these hymns or those who admire them, but I do believe that they are introducing among us a habit of feeling which must issue in the notion that the Godhead *was* converted into flesh, and so in every possible development of sensuous and idolatrous worship. Some who encourage this temper cling vehemently to the Athanasian Creed as a testimony against Unitarians; will they not hear it when it testifies against themselves?

Its testimonies against ourselves, not against our neighbours, are what we all want. The Dean of Westminster thinks it may have value as an antiquarian document, as a commentary upon opinions and states of mind which were once found in the Church. If I did not find all these opinions and states of mind in myself, if they did not confuse me

continually in the search after truth, interfering with all simplicity of faith and trust, I should not much care to read about those who professed them, or were accused of them, in other days. The interest of ecclesiastical history consists, it seems to me, in its revelation to us of hidden passages in our own intellects and hearts; in the sympathy with which that revelation inspires us for all who have struggled, doubted, adopted any partial opinion, or rejected principles which we find to be most needful for ourselves. And this benefit is inseparable from another: the acknowledgment how immeasurably the Sacrifice which we believe was made for the sins of the whole world, and the Name with which we are sealed, must transcend every conception of ours respecting either. This conviction which the study of the Athanasian Creed has cultivated in me enables me to regard that administration of the Holy Communion in Westminster Abbey by which some have been scandalized with intense sympathy. There, it seems to me, was a true elevation of the Host above all notions and conceptions of our intellects; there was an assertion that the kingdom of heaven is near to all, and that the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost embraces in its perfect unity those to whom the words of either the Nicene or the Athanasian Creed are still dark riddles. When we begin again to preach the gospel of the kingdom of heaven, to tell men what hell actually is, instead of holding out vague promises of a possible heaven, vague threats of a possible hell, the Sacraments will surely come forth in their power and majesty, speaking directly to the spirits of men of truths which are for those for whom phrases and formulas, even the most carefully and wisely chosen, have no significance.

And if some young divine rises up in his wrath and says, "Oh, we know well what that means—it is the modern heresy that opinions are nothing, that acts are all and in all," I should answer him in language which he may perhaps remember is not of modern manufacture,—"And those that have DONE good shall go into everlasting life, and those that have DONE evil into everlasting fire." These are the words which wind up the Creed that has been supposed to make opinions the tests of truth, the great instruments of salvation. They confute utterly that notion; they make any construction of the Creed which involves it untenable. They do more: when compared with the so-called damnatory clauses, they bring out a distinction nearly lost in modern divinity, the distinction between the eternal death which is the state of evil, and the fires by which God purifies those who have fallen into that state; fires which, thanks to Him, must be everlasting, because they issue from the Love which was, and which is, and which is to come.

That this interpretation of the Creed will be equally displeasing

to those who defend it and to those who denounce it, I am painfully aware. It would be a great delight to me to be in agreement with both, with men whom I reverence at a distance for their piety, learning, and eloquence, like Canon Liddon, with those of whose kindness I have had personal experience for many years, like the Dean of Westminster. If I am obliged to be at variance with both, it is a consolation to believe that there is a unity which embraces us all. Through more terrible storms and a thicker darkness than we have ever experienced, ending perhaps for a while in a total eclipse of faith in God, that Unity will, I am convinced, be revealed to the next generation as it has not been to ours.

I must add one word more. I could scarcely have forced myself to write at such a time as this on any topic which I did not believe had some close connection with the groans of dying men, with the agonies of nations. But I have felt, and do feel intensely, how unreal and paltry the promise of "a land of pure delight, where saints immortal dwell," must be to Sisters of Charity watching the wounded on hospital beds; to widows and orphans looking upon faces which they shall see no more; to any who have given themselves up to die in battle. The patient nurse is not calculating what pleasures which banish pain she may win hereafter; she is labouring to alleviate some of the pain which is before her eyes here; her reward is to share His *joy* who endured the cross for his brethren. Sorrowing relations are not trying to "read their title clear," as another hymn has it, "to mansions in the skies;" the same arts which bar adverse claimants to mansions below being needful, it would appear, for those lofty and distant ones; they are asking in anguish whether they must be separated for ever from those that are dearest to them. The men who have stood where they were sent to stand, and have seen their comrades fall because it was their duty to fall, cannot be the better or the happier for considering how they can secure for themselves prizes in another world which those comrades will miss. But what comfort might it be to all of these if they were to hear of a kingdom of heaven which is about them still as it has always been, of a Father who has sent his Son to redeem them, of a Spirit who has never forsaken any one in his darkest, worst ours—what *comfort*, I say, understanding by that word energy to believe, to repent, to act, to endure! A battle-field which bears such seed becomes in very deed God's acre. There may come from it to many a listening, desponding ear, the sentence, "I am the resurrection and the life," with a power and music which they never heard when it was spoken beside the most sacred coffin, when it was echoed through the aisles of the noblest cathedral. It may come as a direct message from one who has conquered death,

spiritual and bodily, who will assert, in ways that we cannot dream of, the might and perfectness of his victory.

That victory gives, indeed, a wonderful force to the words, "And God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes, and there shall be no more death, neither sorrow nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain." They who, amidst bitter pain of their own, or of those to whom they are ministering, take these words home to their hearts, must feel that they are the fulfilment of their feeble efforts for the benefit of human bodies, for the renovation of the earth. They repeat the Apostle's language, that the whole involuntary creation, which is groaning and travailing in pain, shall partake of the redemption of the sons of God. They do not suggest a heavenly land which death divides from ours, but a hope that the land that has been tilled by human hands, and by the cattle and ploughs which men have driven, shall be delivered from the curse of injustice and cruelty, shall be brought under the reign of righteousness and truth. The reward they hold out is not a succession of pleasures which banish pain, but a continuance and accomplishment of every faithful and honourable toil which has been begun in the threescore years and ten of mortal pilgrimage, greater power to achieve whatever blessings have been desired for mankind, clearer insight to discover principles which have been dimly perceived through a glass darkly. The "heavenly land" of the hymn has caused the earth to be despised, that to be called evil which God pronounced very good. The kingdom of heaven which is set before us in the New Testament shows forth its powers in multiplying food for the hungry, in healing the sick, in casting out devils, in delivering some portion of the earth from its plagues.

If in such a war as this a future Elysium of possible felicity looks very pale and watery, the future Tartarus of possible anguish withers away before the sight of actual anguish. Those who in quiet days rest most in its efficacy, are most anxious to dilute it into nothingness. But if the heavenly kingdom of God comes forth clearer and brighter from the dark ground, with what new Sinai thunders are the words charged, "The wicked shall be turned into hell, and all the nations that forget God!" The forgetfulness of the righteous God, the worship of an unrighteous mammon —all the foulness, corruption, vanity, covetousness, which that worship engenders — is not this a hell, a most real and present hell, into which nations are plunging, in which they are trying to abide? It is not a temporal death. It may co-exist for a long while with material prosperity, with the pursuit and possession of pleasure which it is fondly hoped may banish pain. It is in the truest sense a spiritual, an eternal death. But is it, therefore, one

out of which there is no awakening, from which the eternal God is not able to deliver a people? For the sake of France, for the sake of England, let us not cherish that horrible anticipation. Let us rather accept the tremendous discipline which He has appointed for one—some likeness of which may, for aught we know, be awaiting the other—as a sign that his purpose is to restore and regenerate. No punishment of itself can work that end; but if He who sends the fire is ready to send his Spirit with it, He may bring, not a few individual souls, but societies and kingdoms, out of the prison-house. They must assuredly stay in it till they have paid the uttermost farthing; till they have given up all their pride, self-glorification, falsehood. But the old language of the prophet is applicable to them, "I will turn my hand upon thee, and purge away all thy dross, and will take away all thy tin. And I will restore thy judges as at the first, and thy counsellors as at the beginning; afterwards thou shalt be called the city of righteousness, the faithful city." All such passages may be interpreted figuratively, so that city shall not mean city, or nation nation; so that righteousness shall be anything but just and honest dealing; so that the faithful shall be those who expect to be saved in their unrighteousness, not to be saved out of it. But the prophet may have meant just what he said; if he did, he will have spoken words of warning and encouragement to the people in the times of Ahaz and Hezekiah, and to the people in the times of Victoria and Louis Napoleon. And if he bade the former believe in the Name of the God whom they and their priests had forgotten, he may remind the latter that there is a Name with which all the nations of Christendom are sealed; about which, if their priests had believed in it, they would have disputed far less; in which the poorest may trust when their great men go into captivity, when they are famishing with hunger, and fainting from loss of blood. There may come a day when we shall know that the everlasting fires which are burning about us have not been in vain; when we shall own that they have saved the nations from everlasting death, instead of producing it.

F. D. MAURICE.

P.S.—What I said in the beginning of this article in reference to compromises and explanations which destroy the meaning of the Creed, and make the continued use of it in public worship most undesirable, has received an unexpected confirmation from the report of Her Majesty's Ritual Commission. The explanation of the Creed which that Commission has suggested is denounced by some of the ablest divines who belong to it, by some of those who most represent the feelings of the laity. How offensive—how intensely painful

—it must be to those who do not wish to mitigate the warnings of the Creed—who wish that they should bear with all their weight on us the priests who read it, and not on some heretics whom we may suspect of "wilfully" denying certain opinions of ours, I need not say. Agreeing most heartily in the objections of the eminent dissentients from the Report, I should yet be very dishonest if I endeavoured to claim any one of them as a supporter of the position which I have maintained in this paper. I fear that it will appear equally untenable to Mr. Buxton, to Dean Stanley, to Dr. Jeremie, and Dr. Payne Smith. Nevertheless, the more earnestly all their arguments are considered—the more weight is given to the feelings of those who wish to retain the Creed and of those who abhor it—the stronger is my hope that the Church will discover the stability of the old catholic ground, the feebleness of the uncatholic philosophy of bribes and threats which has been appended to it, and which, in our days, has been almost substituted for it. The two cannot subsist together. Almost any shaking of ancient formularies may be welcomed, if it leads to their final separation.



PAST SIEGES OF PARIS.

"PARIS," says Montaigne, "a mon cœur dèz mon enfance, et m'en est advenu comme des choses excellentes. Plus j'ay vu depuis d'autres belles villes, plus la beauté de celle cy peult et gaigne sur mon affection. *Je l'ayme tendrement jusques à ses verrues et à ses tâches.* Je ne suis François que par cette grande cité, grande en peuples, grande en félicité de son assiette, mais surtout grande et incomparable en variété et diversité de commodités, la gloire de la France, et l'un des plus nobles ornements du monde. Dieu en chasse loing nos divisions."

One would have hardly expected the sober Montaigne to have felt the witchery of Paris to this affectionate extent more than three centuries ago. Yet the city has ever possessed a strange fascination for its guests and indwellers, and that since the days of the Emperor Julian. This is no moment, however, for discussing from an æsthetic point of view the attractions and beauties of the capital, which are indisputable—she is now *en toilette de guerre*, ready to launch and to receive the thunderbolt of war, and subject to perils and privations which come but rarely in their lives on any cities, and which some, like our own capital, have never known, and perhaps will never know. It seems more suitable to the crisis to endeavour to see what figure she makes in history at the different periods at which a calamity like that she has now to endure has fallen upon her. A review of the past sieges of Paris will moreover place us in contact with some

of the most salient points of the history of France, at moments when her fortunes were being cast anew into the crucible of destiny.

Leaving aside the attack on the Celtic island Lutetia by Labienus, the lieutenant of Cæsar, and the assaults of Frankish, Burgundian, and other Teutonic invaders, the first siege of Paris which we have to notice was as historically significant as any; since it was owing to the energy and valour displayed therein by Eudes Capet, Comte de Paris and Duke of France, that the Capetian race became distinguished above all the other noble families of France—the prowess displayed by Eudes in defending Paris against the fierce onslaughts of the Normans for four successive years prepared the way for the establishment of the dynasty, which was destined to give to France such kings as Louis le Gros, Philippe Auguste, Saint Louis, Philippe le Bel, Louis XI., and Henry IV., the real founders of French unity. The unification of France and its formation into a separate nationality commenced at the siege of Paris by the Northmen. The nation then first clearly became conscious of its call to a separate national existence. The unwieldy empire of the Carlovingian dynasty, of which France was a mere dependent member, was already in decay and going to pieces. The last Carlovingian Emperor, Charles le Gros, was engaged too much in Italian politics, and his attention too much distracted by the demands upon it of the other constituent parts of his empire, to take sufficient care for this portion of his dominions which were year by year overrun and ravaged by the Northmen, and the necessity of a national and local dynasty for the protection of its interests became daily more evident.

Years had passed by since Charlemagne, with prophetic misgiving, beheld the first Danish fleet, and had a strange suspicion that the sons and grandsons of these sea-pirates would take terrible revenge on the nations of the West and South for the interminable warfare which he had carried on against the worshippers of Odin. Since then the fearless and ferocious Danish Jarls had carried terror with their dragon prows and their black sails into every part of the Carlovingian empire where rivers were navigable to their keels. They had mounted the Rhine and the Moselle up to Cologne and Treves. They had devastated Nantes and ascended the Loire, and the districts of the Garonne and the Rhine also knew them too well. The Seine had for years before their last great siege been a common highway for the Danish rovers. The monks of the great abbey Jamieges had habitually been in the habit of hoarding up a store of treasure from their revenues to buy off the merciless ravages with Danegelt, as they passed under their towers; and Rouen had been sacked again and again by the fierce Vikings. Many were the tales told of the deeds of daring and ferocity done on Frankish ground by such men as Jarl Osker, Regner Lodbrok, Biorn Ironsides, his

son, and Hastings, amid the fierce laughter of the wild seamen over the mead, when the wild light of the blazing logs turned to a ruddier hue the weather-beaten faces of the listeners, as they sat at their long tables in winter in the fir-built halls of Denmark and Norway. On one such occasion Regner Lodbrok boasted before Red Eric, the Ober-king, of his having mounted the Seine and put Paris to ransom; and upon Eric's expressing some doubts as to the truth of his story, he sent two of his men out of the hall to bring in before the drinkers the iron bar of the gate of Paris, and a carved larchen rafter of St. Germain-des-Prés, which he had carried off on his last visit. Indeed, under the effete Carlovingian rule the defences of the island city had fallen into ruin, and Paris was no more than an open city, from which the priests, soldiers, and inhabitants fled at news of the approach of the invaders. In the faubourgs, indeed, the strong, castellated monasteries were more capable of resisting attack than the city itself. On the north side was the monastery of St. Germain-l'Auxerrois, and the yet stronger monastery of St. Denis, from which, however, the monks fled on more than one occasion, carrying off with them to Rheims the body of St. Denis. On the south side there was the once powerful monastery of St. Germain-des-Prés, where Clovis and Clotilde lay buried, whose effigies were on each side the portal of the church. There were also the no less celebrated convents of St. Victor and St. Geneviève. The Faubourg St. Germain, at that time, was the most remarkable part of the environs of Paris, containing not only these great monasteries, visible from afar, but the great hall of the Roman Palais des Thermes, then still standing, and the *vasta ruina*, as it was called later, of the Roman amphitheatre, also rising to a lofty height. During the past year the substructures of this vast edifice, which had been forgotten for centuries, were brought to light by excavations, and the discovery of skeletons under the soil in good preservation, evidently of bodies buried in haste, made it presumable that these were the victims of some one of the many Danish inroads up the Seine. The merciless Northmen, with cold-blooded calculation, slew men, women, and children on their way, in order to paralyze resistance with the terror they struck into the populations. They strung up the bodies of labourers on the trees by the side of the Seine in batches of six, seven, and a dozen at a time, and slew so many of the inhabitants that the Seine rolled down shoals of corpses, and the islands of the river were white with the bones of the natives who had fallen beneath their battle-axes, and were swept along by the current of the river till they were caught on the shores of the many eyots which rise from the bosom of the Seine. It was Charles the Bald, who himself had not ventured to attack the Danes from his strong position at St. Denis, during the capture of Paris in 861, and was even fain to

buy off their retreat by a payment of heavy Danegeld, who restored the defences of Paris. Charles the Bald rebuilt the two bridges which the Danes had broken down, and which, being constructed on strong piles, prevented the ascent of their galleys up the Seine, and from so assaulting the island city on its east side, and he repaired and fortified anew the towers on the borders of the river. The two bridges of Charles the Bald, uniting the city to the northern and southern banks, were fortified further by towers, as *têtes des ponts* on the farther side from the city, and were in later times known as the *Petit Pont* and the *Pont au Change*. These bridges and towers of Charles the Bald did good service in the celebrated four years' siege of the city by the Danes in 885, under Sigurd or Siegfried, in the days of Charles the Fat. Many were the assaults made by their galleys and their fire-ships on the *Pons Pictus*, as the *Petit Pont* was called by the old monkish chroniclers, in order to destroy it and surround the island city. The outer towers of the bridges and the great tower known afterwards as Le Grand Châtelet, had to withstand, too, many a furious attack. The Normans advanced to the assault of the towers of the bridge, under the shelter of *mantelets*, and covered with flights of arrows and crossbow bolts directed against the defenders of the towers, but were beaten off again and again with stones, and their *mantelets* destroyed with burning oil and pitch and wax—the only substitutes for nitro-glycerine and picrate of potash in those times. Primitive, indeed, were the means of assault and defence in those days—on the part of the besieged, one of the chief means of defence on which they relied were processions, with the bodies of St. Germain and St. Geneviève at their head, with prayers and litanies to the saints to help them in the hour of need. There was too a perpetual ringing of bells in the city to sound the alarm, and trumpets blown from the ramparts, to which the Northmen replied with fierce bursts of laughter and cries of derision—they were not accustomed to be beaten back, and felt sure the city would fall, as it had done before, into their hands. But this time they were mistaken. Charles le Gros, the Emperor, was far away, it is true, too busy with his Italian schemes to attend to the cries of distress from Paris; but the valiant Comte Eudes was there, with Robert his brother, and Eblis, Abbot of St. Germain-des-Prés, the nephew of Eudes, whose ability as a marksman was so great that he is hyperbolically said to have been able to kill off seven Danes at a shot. There was also the valiant warrior-bishop Gauzeline, who assisted his flock in their hardest strait—not only with benedictions and maledictions, and the perpetual singing of the litany, "*A furore Normannorum, libera nos, O Domini,*" once universally chanted through the length and breadth of France, and which was intoned in the old Church of Ste. Geneviève even down to the siege of Louis XIII., but with goodly shots of the crossbow and

doughty deeds of the strong arm. The Danes at last, despairing of taking the city by a *coup de main*, retired a little, and fortified themselves in St. Germain-le-Pont, and from there harassed the country all round, and advanced again to the assault of the city, from time to time. Many and many were the supplications of the Parisians to their emperor to come to their assistance. The siege was conducted in such fashion that Count Eudes found time to go to Metz in 887 to supplicate the emperor anew for reinforcement, and to return with a body of German cavalry, with which he cut his way through the Danish ranks into the city.

He announced, moreover, the tidings that Henry, Duke of Saxony, was on the road to their assistance, and that the emperor himself would arrive as soon as he could get into motion. Henry, Duke of Saxony, did indeed shortly appear, but of him the Danes disposed during a sortie, by catching him, horse and all, in a covered pit, like a wild beast, and by putting him to death. Charles the Fat, however, did at last make his appearance with an army at the foot of Montmartre; but he preferred rather to treat with the Danes and to give them another weighty sum of Danegeld, and to divert their forces against Burgundy, then in revolt against him, than meet them in open field—much to the disgust of the inhabitants of Paris, who had been enduring a close and long siege with such steadfastness. This siege is, in fact, as we have said, the initial point of the history of modern France. The neglect of Charles the Fat, Carolus Crassus or Karl der Diche, and his way of treating with the Danes, disgusted the Parisians with the Carlovingian rule; while the valiant conduct of the Count of Paris, and of all his family, not only in this siege, but in two subsequent ineffectual sieges by the Danes, signalised them as the fitting chiefs for the new nationality of France then in process of birth; and the Capetian dynasty may date its reign, indeed, from that very siege. It was an event which deeply stirred all Europe at the time, and lived long in the memories of men associated with romance. An account of it is to be read in the "De bellis Parisiacæ urbis" of Abbo, a monk of St. Germains, and a still more romantic version in the great poem of Ariosto. Ariosto has given a description of the siege as it came down to him, transfigured in the Carlovingian legends of the *Trouvères*. The siege is, of course, put back to the time of Charlemagne, and its assailants are not Danes but Moors; this kind of change is common in all Carlovingian legendary poetry. The besieger of Paris is, in Ariosto's verse, Agramante, son of the Moorish king Troiano.

> "Parigi intanto avea l'assidio intorno
> Del famoso figliuol del re Troiano,
> Et venne à tanto estremitade un giorno,
> Che n'audò quasi al suo nemico un giorno.

E se non che li voti et ciel placorno
Che delago' dl pioggia oscura il piano
Cadea quel di per l'Africana lancia
Il santo Imperio e 'l gran nomi di Francia."

The description of Paris is clearly given, but it is the Paris of Ariosto's own time, and not that of the ninth century:—

"Siede Parigi in una gran piamura,
Nell' ombelico a Francia, anzi nel core
Gli parsa la reviera entre le mura
E corre ed esce in altra parte fuore;
Ma fa un isola prima, e v' assicura
Nella cettà una parte, e la migliore;
L'altre due (che in tre parti è la gran terra)
Di fuor la fossa, e dentro il fiume serra."

The means of attack and defence are also well described:—

"Non ferro solamente vi s' adopra;
Ma grossi massi e merli integri e saldi
E muri despeccati con molta opra
Tette di torri a gram pezzi di spaldi,
L'acque bollente che vengon di sopra,
Portano a' Mori insoppertabil caldi;
E male a questa pioggia si resiste,
Ch' entra per gli elmi e fa acecear le viste,

"E questa piu nocca che 'l ferro quasi:
Or che dé far la nebbia di calcine?
Or che doveano far gli ardenti vasi
Con olio e zolfo e pece e trementine?
I cerchj in munizion non son rimasi,
Che d' ognitorno hanno di fiamme il crine;
Questi, scagliati per diverse bande,
Mettano a' Saracini aspre ghirlande."

A hundred years after these sieges of Paris by the Danes in 958, Otho II., Emperor of Germany, made a defiant march upon Paris, but contented himself with striking its gates with his lance and singing *Alleluia* with all his host on the hill of Montmartre. After which, centuries passed by: the Capetian race were growing in greatness and prosperity. Philippe-Auguste and St. Louis had given new types of royalty to the nation. The astonishing movement of the Crusades had assisted in casting the kingdoms of Europe and society into new moulds; and although the crusading spirit was less active, it still survived, while chivalry, which was of coeval birth and allied to it, was in its richest period of efflorescence, and, aided by the songs of the *Trouvères* and the Troubadours, had developed a new ideal of the noble and heroic, softened and adorned with those tenderer graces of life which have given a distinguishing charm to modern society, unknown to previous ages. The Valois branch of the Capetian race filled the throne of France, and had its title to possession chal-

lenged by the greatest, perhaps, of the few great kings of England —the chivalrous and magnificent Edward III., who had sworn amongst his knights and nobles at Windsor on the heron to conquer France—a vow in which all his subjects took part with such avidity and such quaintness, sometimes of chivalrous conceit, that the Bishop of Lincoln had in his train sundry squires who went about always with a green patch on one eye, because they had sworn never to look on the *dames de leurs pensées* with two eyes until they had done some mighty deed of prowess in France.

The King of France had then become a great king. He received the homage of the King of England for his French provinces. His cousins reigned at Naples and in Hungary. He was the protector of the King of Scotland. The brilliant court of the Valois was the most renowned in Europe for its gorgeous pageantries and splendid tournaments and festivals. It was, indeed, a court of kings. The kings of Navarre, Majorca, Bohemia, and often the King of Scotland, were to be seen surrounding the throne of Philippe of Valois. John of Bohemia, of the House of Luxembourg, whose son was afterwards emperor, under the title of Charles IV., declared he could only live in Paris, which he declared to be the "*séjour le plue chevalaresque du monde.*"

The kings of the Valois race were indeed too *chevalaresque* and too much given to pageantry and display, and all the pleasurable vanities of chivalry, to make them serious antagonists for such a king as Edward III. They led their mighty hosts of nobles and knights to battle as though they were going to a mere tournament, or military *promenade*, as the phrase now is. Edward, on his side, though the chivalric vein was very strong in him, managed to combine the chivalrous spirit with a very close attention to business. He had, moreover, greater military genius than any of the kings and princes with whom he had to contend. He understood the increasing value of infantry in the field. He cultivated for this purpose the goodwill of the burgesses and yeomen of England, enlarged the privileges of the towns and commons, and paid attention to commerce—so that when he took the field against the kings of France, he was able to do so not only with a full exchequer, but with a goodly body of archers and crossbowmen, to whom were mainly due the wondrous defeats which he was enabled to inflict on the splendid chivalry of France. He had, however, to learn his business as an organizer of victorious invasion. His first invasion in 1339 came to no very good end: but Cressy won for him Calais, and Poictiers laid all France open to his incursions.

It was not, however, until 1359 that he made his most serious attempt on Paris. *Jean-le-Bon* was then his prisoner; and the young Dauphin was then in the capital, directing its defence, with the aid

of the famous Etienne Marcel, *prévôt des marchands*, and the leader of the popular movements which had already begun to distinguish Paris as one of the most impulsive and high-spirited of European cities. Indeed, the discord, divisions, and popular revolts which had occurred in the capital when John was in captivity, and under the weak rule of the Dauphin, and which were owing to the intrigues of Charles the Mauvais, King of Navarre, with Marcel and the popular party, had acted as an encouragement to Edward in his invading policy, and contributed largely to his success. He counted on the obstacles which the revolutionary party in Paris would throw in the way of national organization, just as Bismarck has done, but still he never was able to get possession of the city.

Edward III., nevertheless, appears to have landed his army at Cherbourg in 1359 in as thorough a state of organization as the times were capable of. His little host of 30,000 men was, for the age, as completely prepared in every branch and against all contingencies as the Prussian host of this year. Nothing appears to have been forgotten in the way of equipment and for the commissariat, and the force was even fully provided with means of diversion. The English king was, it is said, the first to make use of artillery in the field, and all his weapons and accoutrements were of the newest fashion and in perfect order. Six thousand chariots followed the army with provisions, ammunition, and stores of all kinds, among which were mills for grinding flour, ovens for baking bread, forges for repairing armour and weapons, and all sorts of migratory workshops; the army was even provided with its packs of hounds for hunting, and with little barks—we suppose like Welsh coracles—for catching fish from in time of Lent. Against the perfect organization of the English army, the immense mass of French *grand seigneurs* and knights were a mere brilliant, brave, but thoughtless mob, incapable of common action or of doing anything but throw each other into confusion—so they came to utter ruin at Cressy and Poictiers, and Edward III. could march through France this time just as he would. He did not, however, come straight to Paris; he marched right across France from Cherbourg to Rheims, amid the autumnal mud and the rain. He had a notion of getting himself crowned at Rheims as King of France. He was unable, however, to take that ancient city; so after remaining before its walls for six weeks, he raised his camp and marched by Châlons and Bar-le-Duc to Troyes, and held the duchy of Burgundy to ransom for 200,000 golden crowns. He then piously made his devotions at Easter at Chanteloup, where 1,200 fugitives had taken refuge in a church, and were surrounded and the church set fire to; and where, out of the 1,200 so shut up, only such escaped as jumped out of

the windows, and a good many of these were killed by the English captains, amid much horse-laughter, so that 300 only were saved altogether. From Chanteloup Edward advanced to Bourg-la-Reine. The terror spread by the approach of the English host was so great, that not a living being was to be seen far or near on the march, and as they came on they burnt Montlhéry and Lonjumeau and everything *en route*. Edward advanced and fixed his quarters in the Faubourg St. Germain. This was the portion of the suburbs of Paris which had grown the most since the Northmen's siege of Paris. That southern suburb has, strangely enough, always been the learned quarter of Paris, and its chief accretion took place in the twelfth century, when Abelard and Guillaume de Champeaux settled there, and set up rival schools, which attracted an immense colony of students, so that Abelard may be looked on as the founder of the Paris Faubourg St. Germain. Edward III., however, does not seem to have given any attention to scholastic philosophy, neither did he venture on an actual assault of the city. He contented himself with blockading it, and with sending a defiance to single combat to the Dauphin, with burning the faubourgs and the villages all around, and laying waste the country, so that the trembling citizens from the walls of their capital beheld the smoke of their ruined houses ascending around them on all sides. Paris at this time seems to have numbered about 49,110 inhabitants, and their anxiety about assault was so great that it was forbidden in the capital that the bells should be rung by night in the churches and monasteries for matins, for fear that the enemy might approach the walls at such time unheard. Only the *couvre-feu* was allowed to be sounded at evening from Notre Dame; and in all the churches and convents matins were sung at *couvre-feu* instead of at midnight—a change found so agreeable in some convents that they continued to sing matins at *couvre-feu* instead of at midnight long after the English had departed. The inhabitants, moreover, of Paris, headed by Marcel, the *prévôt des marchands*, and his *échevins*, made a wonderful vow to the Virgin Mary of Notre Dame, if she would bring about their deliverance; they vowed her a taper of the length of the circumference of Paris (then 4,455 *toises*, about six miles), to be burnt day and night before her shrine, with further promise that this monstrous taper should be renewed every year. Whether this vow of the monstrous taper had any real efficacy or no, certain it is that the King of England did depart at last, but not before he had consumed all and wasted all far and near, and reduced Paris to the extremities of famine. He wanted provisions himself, and so broke up the blockade, and soon after concluded the peace of Bretigny, by which he secured Aquitaine and Calais, and got

3,000,000 crowns of gold. The monstrous taper, it must be added, was really purchased for the Virgin of Notre Dame—so she was probably the only gainer in France by the war. Such a taper was kept always alight before her shrine, except during the troubled days of the League, till the year 1608, when M. Miron, then *prévôt des marchands*, substituted a silver candelabrum, with an ever-burning light, for the original taper.

Great indeed were the horrors which twenty years of English invasion had brought with it throughout the length and breadth of France; but as they were infinitely surpassed by those which the country suffered under the more merciless inroad of Henry V., and were necessarily of a similar character, we omit to notice them here. The claim of the Plantagenet king to the throne of France was indeed an unjustifiable pretext for invasion; yet he has some excuse in the arrogant tone assumed by the monarchs of France towards English kings, because they chanced to be their liege men, and in the provocation which he had received in respect of his French possessions, and the chivalrous character of the age, the gallant, loyal, and courteous bearing of the chieftains on either side towards each other, the universal want felt by the leading spirits of those times for some field in which to display knightly accomplishments and virtues, render the story of the contest, as it is found in the pages of Froissart, inferior to none for interest in the history of the world, if we keep out of sight the barbarities which accompanied it, and the suffering which it entailed on the French people. In the story of the burgesses of Calais, towards whom Edward's cruelty relented at the intercession of his queen, and also in that of the generous liberation of Sir Hervé de Leon at the noble remonstrance of the Earl of Derby, the reader rejoices to see the barbarian disappear before the earnest voice of merciful and chivalrous appeal. The aggression of Henry V., however, had little of this chivalrous nature; it was an aggression of ambition and policy and calculation, the aggression of an offshoot of a usurping race, who took advantage of the distracted condition of France to invade her territories for dynastic purposes. The Lancastrian monarch had the brain and the heart of a conqueror, and felt moreover that his family had need of some splendid successes in the realms of France to cast a glory of victory around their throne equal, if possible, in splendour to that which the Plantagenets had won for themselves, in order to become respectable in the eyes of the English nation.

France had, indeed, recovered with marvellous rapidity from the effects of the last English invasion, since the valour of Duguesclin had liberated her soil. Paris, within the fortifications which Marcel had erected round her northern side, beginning with the

Tour de Billy, near the Arsenal, and following nearly the line of the present boulevards up to the Tour du Bois of the Louvre on the Seine, had grown in wealth and prosperity, and increased in population. Its inhabitants already were characterized by that light, gay *frondeur* spirit, yet capable of immense efforts and courage on occasion, for which it has ever since been distinguished, so that Froissart was capable of writing of its citizens about twenty years after the peace of Bretigny—"Il avait alors de riches et puissants hommes armés de pied en cap, la somme de trente mille, aussi bien appareillés de toutes pieces comme nuls chevaliers pourraient être et disaient quand ils se nombraient qu'ils étaient bien gens à combattre d'eux mêmes et sans aide les plus grands seigneurs du monde." Indeed, all the kings of the Valois race held in some dread the rising independence of spirit of the French citizens of that time, who were in constant intercourse with the free cities of Flanders, which they endeavoured to emulate in their aspirations for liberty; and it was as much the suspicion and apprehension which the French kings felt for the criticism of the Parisians in their manner of court life and public and private conduct, as the superior charm and climate of the valley of the Loire, which induced the Valois monarchs to prefer Blois, Chambord, Chinon, and Amboise to their royal residences on the borders of the Seine.

Rapid, however, as had been the growth of French prosperity during the last twenty years, it was now destined, during the period of the second English invasion, to fall into just as rapid a decline, and to descend to such a depth of misery as England has never known in the whole of her history. France, however, has not once, but several times, in the course of her national existence, been the prey of such horrors, in the way of suffering brought upon her by invasion and war and civil and religious discord, that they surpass all power of description, and her rapid recovery from such states of utter desolation show an elasticity in the character of the people such as no other nation can exhibit. Charles V., who as Dauphin had been the antagonist of Edward III., and who had even been on his knees as a suppliant before the Parisians in the person of Marcel, died in 1380, and was succeeded by Charles VI., then twelve years of age. During his minority his three uncles undertook the regency, which, owing to their jealousy and quarrels brought disorder on the country. The spirit of the Parisians was still rising, and in consequence of some fiscal exactions, the Revolte de Maillotins took place, in which the court of Charles VI. capitulated with the people of Paris for a quiet entry into the city.

A reaction, however, took place. The king and his governors made a great display of force, and carried on war against the

Flemings, who then, as later, were ever the allies of the Parisians in their popular movements. The Flemings were defeated by the royal forces at Rosbecq, and the royal party treated the victory as one over the Parisians, and the young king entered Paris lance in hand, as though into a conquered city. The country then was inflicted with a series of calamities which were sufficient for its ruin without the English invasion. The young king was married to the infamous Isabeau de Bavière, whose shameful adulteries and intriguing spirit made her a woman as fatal to France as Eleanor de Guienne. The king himself fell into a state of madness, and continued so afflicted for the greater part of his life. Under a disputed and divided regency the Burgundian and Armagnac parties created factions among the citizens, and contended with ferocity for the possession of the capital. Assassination and massacres became of almost daily occurrence. As the Dauphin grew up a party formed about him also, and then came the famous scene at the bridge of Montereau, in which the great Duke of Burgundy, *Jean sans Peur*, who was suspected of the assassination of a rival prince of the blood, the Duke of Orleans, was himself assassinated before the eyes of the Dauphin, who had invited him to the interview.

That fatal scene at Montereau sufficed, together with the victory of Agincourt, to give Henry V. possession of the kingdom and of the capital; for the Burgundian party not only held the person of the king, but were the ruling faction in Paris. The new Duke of Burgundy, who played much the same part as Charles le Mauvais on the previous invasion, at once, out of enmity to the Dauphin, threw himself into the English alliance, and by the Treaty of Troyes, signed in 1419, by both King and Queen of France,—in which Isabeau de Bavière had the infamy to call her son the *soi-disant Dauphin*, and so throw doubts on his legitimacy,—the heir to the throne was declared for ever excluded from the succession on account of his crimes; and, under its stipulations, the English king found himself shortly after lodged in the Louvre as husband of a daughter of France, and heir to the monarchy.

The victor of Agincourt entered the Parisian capital in state, riding between the poor mad King of France and the Duke of Burgundy, and followed by a suite in which were the Dukes of Clarence, Bedford, and Exeter, and the Earl of Warwick.

Not long, however, did Henry V. enjoy his conquest, for he died on the 31st of August, 1422, at Vincennes; and the mad king, Charles VI., died likewise about two months later—followed to the grave by the tears and sympathy which subjects have ever bestowed on monarchs so afflicted.

The death of the English king, and the assumption, by the

Dauphin, of the title of Charles VII., naturally revived the spirit of independence in France; but during the course of the struggle, which lasted for fifteen years, up to the time of the evacuation of Paris by the English, the miseries of France and the desolation of Paris reached an inconceivable pitch of intensity. In such a theatre of misery as France then became, one figure, however, appears of miraculous purity and heroism, a very incarnation of the spirit of France, the inspired warrior-virgin of Lorraine—of that Lorraine which Prussia would now wholly dissever from France. Jeanne d'Arc, however, never set foot in Paris, although she appeared before its walls. The inspired heroine knew, she said, that her mission was ended when she had delivered Orleans and taken her king to be crowned at Rheims, where she stood with that banner in hand which she said it was right should also share of the glory, since it had had its share of the pain.

She was, however, led to undertake the siege of Paris against her will. She advanced, nevertheless, to the assault with all her old fearlessness, leading the attack at the Porte St. Honoré, where the city was surrounded by a double moat. The outer ditch was dry; this she crossed, and passed over the rampart to the one within, where she stood sounding the water with her lance, and calling for faggots and wood to fill up the trench, regardless of the arrows and cross-bow bolts and insults which English and Burgundians hurled around her from the walls, till she received a shot in one of her legs, and her standard-bearer fell beside her. This was the first check of La Pucelle, and preceded only shortly her captivity at Compiègne, which led to her martyr end at Rouen. This was in 1429, and Paris was not evacuated by the English till 1436, when only 1,500 English remaining as a garrison, under Lord Willoughby, this remnant of the invaders shut themselves up in the Bastille, and the Burgundians, who were still the dominant faction in the town, and who had become disgusted with the English alliance, admitted the troops of the king, under his constable, Richemont. The English garrison were, however, allowed to depart peaceably, the Parisians contenting themselves with a few sarcastic cries at their French dignitaries who attended them.

It would be interesting for an Englishman if he could make to himself some vivid conception of the rule of the English kings in Paris. Henry V. paid frequent visits to his French capital, and held solemn feasts in the Louvre at Christmas and at Pentecost. He sat in great state at table under a magnificent dais, for all the world to see, by the side of his young French queen, and surrounded by English princes of the blood, and by English bishops, nobles, and knights, and as many French ones as he could get to attend him.

The old mad King of France remained in almost complete seclusion and obscurity in the vast Hôtel de St. Paul, wanting even necessities at times, and visited only by old servitors and good burgesses of Paris, who remained faithful in misfortune. The little Henry VI. was brought to Paris in 1431, and it is said that his grandmother Isabeau watched him pass her palace on his way to the Louvre from behind a window, and that the little boy turned round to look at her. The government of the city was carried on by the Duke of Exeter, and the first president of the parliament Philippe de Morvilliers; but it was a government of tyranny and terror; for a single word of censure against English or Burgundian, tongues were pierced and the pillory made use of. But the state of things was so terrible during the last years of the English rule, that death itself was a happy release for most citizens of Paris. The city was in a chronic state of famine, pestilence was rife from time to time, and after 1434 the intensity and length of the winter frosts were appalling; it snowed one winter for forty days and forty nights. In the "Journal d'un Bourgeois de Paris," the writer says he saw boys and girls lying on dirt-heaps in the city, thirty and forty together, dying of hunger and cold, and moaning out together, "Je meurs de faim! Je meurs de faim!" The population of the city was reduced one-half. There were 24,000 abandoned houses in Paris, and the inhabitants pulled them to pieces to make fuel of the woodwork. The state of hunger was such that dogs were dangerous, and dog-killers were appointed, and the poor followed them to catch up such offal as might be thrown to them from the slain dogs, while the denudation of the environs was so complete that wolves invaded the capital by night, and attacked people in the street. Nor were the horrors of the country less fearful. Armies of brigands and undisciplined soldiers —some of them were known by the terrible name of *écorcheurs*— devastated the provinces. Their ferocity was such that they roasted children in the sight of their parents to extort money. Labourers abandoned the spade and the plough, since the whole country was eaten up by bandits and marauding soldiers and wolves, and they could look for no profit from their labour. They therefore turned either brigands in self-defence, or fled to the woods to live in caves with wild beasts, and some in their wild despair sought to make a compact with the demon. The misery of the people was so intense that a strange maniacal dance, accompanied with convulsions, became an epidemic among the populations: it was known as the *Dance de St. Gai*. When it was once commenced, lookers-on became infected with an irresistible contagion, and with shrieks and convulsive contortions joined in the round till they fainted, or died of exhaustion. The dance afterwards known as the *Dance Macabre*, took its origin from this strange malady, and the "Dance of Death" of Holbein, and

that yet to be seen on the bridge of Lucerne, perpetuate the memory of the days of the last English invasion of France, when the population far and wide looked to death as the only sure alleviation of their miseries.

France, however, yet again, with that astonishing elasticity which one never ceases to wonder at in reading her history, speedily recovered from the depth of wretchedness into which she had been plunged by the last English invasion; and Paris, too, started up anew, and increased rapidly in extent and prosperity. Although here we deal only with the sieges of Paris, yet in any account of the secular fortunes of the great city it would be impossible to pass over the intimate sympathy which existed between her and that strange monarch, Louis XI. Paris and Louis XI. thoroughly understood each other, and they lived together on the most familiar terms. Paris, in despite of her love of splendour and display, her capricious moods and her petulant ill-humour, has always had in her generous heart an invincible and steady tendency towards democracy; and Louis XI. was, for a crowned head, the most revolutionary democrat who ever lived. He had thoroughly understood how the feudal system was utterly a thing of the past, and how all the good that it ever contained had gone out of it, and only the bad remained. With the subtlest craft and most indomitable purpose he undertook to reduce once for all into thorough subjection the great feudal chiefs who overawed the crown of France, and whose jealousies, conspiracies, and ambitions were for ever plunging the country into a state of anarchy, and rendering it the prey of a foreign invader. The great contest in which he contrived to send Charles the Terrible to his ruin before the Alps was one instance of the dexterity and tenacity with which he carried on war against the whole system of feudalism; and the crafty and provident monarch foresaw with truly prophetic political genius what part the *tiers état* and burgesses of France were to play in the new order of things. Hence he made friends to himself among the burgesses and townsfolk all over France, and relied on them for appreciation and support of his policy. But nowhere did he pay such court to the people as in Paris. He liked their caustic humour, enjoyed their jokes, and tolerated them with good-humour even when they told against himself. He was a cautious, prudent hard worker himself in his own way, and the good sense of the sober trader and artisan of Paris was more to his taste than the gorgeous airs and fanfaronading demeanour of the great feudal nobles and barons, every one of whom thought himself a *roitelet*, or little king, and a possible competitor for the throne of France itself. For Louis XI. Paris was his refuge, his citadel, his arsenal. "Ma bonne ville de Paris," he said of her, "si je la perdais, tout serait fini pour moi." And he did his best to show he liked them; he dressed just like an ordinary burgess of

Paris, walked with the people, and became good fellow well met with all, and was popular among them as no other other king of France has ever been. He increased their city privileges, called their burgesses to his council, listened to their advice, harangued them at the *halles*, hearkened to their complaints, talked with them, exchanged jokes with them, and told them *salés contes*. He loved, above all, to dine at the Hôtel de Ville with the *prévôt* and the *échevins*, with the magistrates of the parliament, or with some rich trader of the city. He let everybody take him by the hand, and talk to him about the most ordinary business, and stood godfather to crowds of city children. "Compère," the burgess said to him, taking him by the *pourpoint*, and "compère," he replied to the humblest among the artisans. He and the Parisians of that time understood each other thoroughly, and happier had it been for the commons of France if they had had other such sovereigns to look after their interests; for Louis XI., who was remorseless as fate to great ladies on their knees imploring for the head of a traitorous feudal chieftain, but scrupulous to the uttermost in repairing any damage he might involuntarily have caused a poor countryman or country housewife by overrunning their grounds in hunting, or in any other way.

After Louis, however, the princes of the House of Valois returned to their ruinous love of foreign adventures and extravagant court display; none of them loved, like Louis, to stand the brunt of the biting jests of the Parisians, or to run the risk of overhearing their sparkling sarcastic *chansons*, and they preferred, for the most part, to hold their gay courts and entertain their fair mistresses, apart from public view, in their splendid châteaux on the sunny Loire. However, Paris was growing so rapidly in opulence and strength, and absorbing so much of the spirit of the provinces, that it was impossible for royalty to think of neglecting it altogether, or for fixing its permanent seat elsewhere. And, moreover, the terrible conflict between the Catholic and Reformed religions was on the eve of its birth in France. The religious spirit of the country was being sundered in twain, and the schism was destined to involve the whole nation in one of the longest and most terrible struggles to be found in the annals of man; and Paris was, by its very nature, the head-quarters of Catholicism, just as La Rochelle became the head-quarters of the Huguenots.

Paris had grown now to be a city of some 200,000 or 210,000 inhabitants. It was the city of St. Geneviève and of St. Louis, of the Sorbonne, and of the University—the very fount of French orthodoxy; it was the *isle sonnante* of Rabelais—the city of a thousand bells, of eighty churches, of sixty convents, and Catholic to the core. Catholicism was the very soul of the gay city. The festivals and processions and pomps of the ancient Church were more in accordance with the exuberant life of the joyous capital. Solemn,

stately, and severe, Calvinism was too dark and morose a creed for the light and joyous Parisian nature; for there never appears to have been more than about seven or eight thousand Huguenots in Paris —a mere fly on the back of an elephant, as was said in those times. Calvinism was more suitable to the severe and quiet life of the provincial cities, where existence, on account of the general emigration of the more volatile spirits to the capital, had a more sombre and more austere aspect. The Calvinists, moreover, were not a tolerant race; they mocked at the great Catholic festivals, destroyed crosses, insulted and broke to pieces the statues of the Virgin and Saints whenever they had an opportunity, and the Catholics regarded them as infidels and savages. In fact, the partizans of either religion thought it impossible that both could go on side by side in peace and tranquillity. This view of Paris by no means justifies, but it accounts in some measure for the facility with which the awful massacre of St. Bartholomew was organized within its walls, and for the fact that the Parisians soon outstripped, in Catholic fervour, the authors of the massacre themselves—and submitted to the domination of the League, and determined in the terrible siege, which they endured from Henry IV., to perish one and all, rather than run danger of ceasing to be Catholic.

One of the strangest of stories, indeed, is that of Paris under the domination of the League, when the *Conseil des Seize*, composed of the chiefs of the sixteen quarters of the city, under the lead of the Guises, and in combination with the ambassador of Philip II. and the Spanish faction, ruled the fortunes of Paris and swayed the destinies of France. It wanted, indeed, but little that a new dynasty, that of the Guises, should be set up in the capital to replace the Capetian, just as the Capetian had replaced the Carlovingian; and Henry III. on the day known *par excellence* as the Day of the Barricades, since it was the first of the innumerable days of barricades in Paris, must have had no small misgiving when he fled in terror from the city, as to whether the career of royalty for his race was not for ever ended.

The fighting behind barricades, indeed, was but a substitute for an older fashion of fighting to which the Parisians had been accustomed in former times, that of fighting behind chains, which were regularly kept suspended at the corners of the streets, and ever in readiness for this purpose, and which they had used with such effect in the tumultuous days of Etienne Marcel and Charles Le Mauvais. These chains had, in subsequent times, been for the most part removed, but the rapidity with which they supplied their places with barricades in 1588 against Henry III., evinced at once their genius for this mode of city fighting.

Henry III. had some cause to complain of the ingratitude of the Parisians, for he was the first of the Valois monarchs since Louis XI. who had fixed his habitation in Paris, and he loved the city, and had done much for its embellishment. Nevertheless, notwithstanding his self-flagellations with scourges of silk, and his constant processions, barefooted, in the streets, in the robe of a penitent and with little dogs in his arms, and with pearls in his ears, the people of Paris did not believe him to be a sincere Catholic. They had a contempt for the depraved, effeminate monarch, whose character was a medley of Asiatic vices and Italian wiles. They believed that he would, if he dared, make friends with the heretics and establish heresy itself in the capital; and as they were completely won over by the brilliant dashing qualities of the politic Guises, they insisted that Henry should work hand in hand with the Guises for the subjugation of the Huguenots.

The name of Guise had, however, become odious to Henry III., who saw through their ambitious schemes and fully understood the danger of having them for either foes or friends; and he had forbidden the Great Duke all approach to the capital. But the populace were growing wild with suspicion and dread of what dark plots, perhaps a counterpart of the St. Bartholomew, the beloved son of Catherine de Medicis might be hatching against them, as he sat in the Louvre surrounded by his minions and protected by his Swiss guard, and they invited the Guise to come among them. The duke was not slow to answer the summons, and his sudden appearance was the occasion of such a demonstration of popular feeling as it has rarely been the lot of any man to experience. As the hero and darling of Parisian faith rode down the Rue Saint-Denis, flowers were thrown down upon him from windows, where ladies stood wreathed in smiles, saying, "Te voilà, bon prince, nous sommes sauvés;" crowds came round him to kiss his hands, his raiment and his boots; and women rushed forward to rub rosaries and crosses against his horse.

The story of the strange visit of Guise to the Louvre, at the request of Catherine de Medicis, of his marvellous escape, and of the perplexity and indecision of the king, has been told over a thousand times, and we will not here repeat it. It was clear that Paris could not hold Guise and Henry at the same time; the populace feared an attack by Henry on the Hôtel des Guises, now the Hôtel des Archives, in the Marais, on which the escutcheons of the Guises are yet to be seen emblazoned; and so they determined to be beforehand with the king. They broke out into revolt on the Place Maubert, headed by friars and monk-preachers and the students of the university, without whom no revolution has ever been complete in Paris. They descended the banks of the Seine by the bridges, got hold of the arsenal and the

Hôtel de Ville, and then came and erected a barricade right in front of the king, not thirty yards from the Louvre, crying, "Allons chercher le frère Henri au Louvre."

The talk of the people and the Guises, indeed, had long been of shutting Henry up in a monastery, like one of the last of the imbecile Merovingian kings; and the Duchesse de Montpensier, the sister of the Guises, even carried scissors at her girdle, with which she had sworn to give him the *tonsure*. After some hesitation, Henry III. slipped out of the back of the Louvre, on pretence of going to visit the Tuileries, then in process of building; but when once out of the Porte Nouvelle—for the Tuileries were then outside the walls—he mounted his horse and rode off to Chaillot and St. Cloud, taking the road of flight which so many sovereigns have taken after him. He was never destined to enter Paris again, and it is said that at Chaillot he turned his horse round on an eminence overlooking the city, and shook his hand with imprecations against the capital which he had loved and fostered to no purpose.

One of the strangest of revolutions, and one of the strangest of revolutionary crowds were those of the Day of the Barricades. The motley mob which effected it was poured forth from gloomy *hôtels* as solid as castles, from churches and convents, from quaint houses with overhanging stories, from dark cavernous shops, and from filthy lanes of low black wooden houses where the refuse of the poor and the degraded herded together. On they came through the muddy streets in a torrent, composed of nobles, and magistrates, and counsellors, of burgesses, students, soldiers, and rabble, all clothed and armed according to their station, and mixed up with a mass of priests, and monks, and friars, who had their cowls turned back to make way for the helmet, and panted beneath the weight of the corslet under their serge, and the heavy partisan or arquebus which they carried on their shoulders; and this strange mixture of lay and monkish revolutionists held possession of Paris for six years, until the entry of Henry IV. into the capital in 1594.

It was six years of a frenzied existence, marked with the strangest traits of heroism, fanaticism, and folly. The news of the assassination of the Guises by Henry III., at Blois, arrived in Paris during the festival of Christmas, and the whole population took to fasting and signs of mourning, with endless masses and funeral ceremonies in honour of their martyr-chief. The people lived in the streets, the churches, and the Hôtel de Ville, and denunciations of endless war against the king, with sermons, and interminable religious processions, barefoot and with lighted tapers, followed each other day by day. One such procession was composed of all the children of the capital, who went barefoot and with lighted tapers to the portal of

Ste. Geneviève, and when they arrived there dashed their tapers to the ground, crying out, "Dieu éteigne ainsi la race des Valois!"

The Sorbonne indeed met together and declared the king deposed, while the rabble everywhere tore down the royal escutcheons and destroyed all the ensigns of royalty, just as it was our fate to see the imperial ensigns of Napoleon III. destroyed after the news of the battle of Sedan. The *Conseil des Seize* too met together and appointed a provisional government, styled "*Le Conseil de l'Union*," and named for its chief the Duke of Mayenne, the brother of the murdered Guises.

After the assassination of the Guises, Henry III. was then in a measure forced to accept the alliance of his heretic cousin, Henry of Navarre, and the two advanced together to the siege of Paris, and established their camp at St. Cloud, from whence the last worthless Valois is said to have pronounced a threat of extermination over the city where he had been covered with humiliation.

"Ce serait grand dommage de ruiner une si grande ville—toutefois il faut que j'ai raison des rebelles qui sont dedans. C'est le cœur de la Ligue, c'est au cœur qu'il faut la frapper. Paris! chef du royaume, mais chef trop gros et trop capricieux, tu as besoin d'une saignée pour te guérir, ainsi que toute la France de la frénésie qui lui communiques. Encore quelques jours, et l'on verra ni tes maisons ni tes murailles, mais seulement la place où tu auras été."

The knife, however, of Jacques Clement prevented the accomplishment of Henry's vindictive intentions and avenged the Guises. Henry of Navarre, on taking the title of Henry IV., found himself too weak to carry on the siege of Paris. He had to retire and go and win the battles of Arques and Ivry, in which latter fight he so discomfited the forces of Mayenne, that the chief of the League retired to the north with a view of reforming his army, and effecting a junction with Parma, who also was waiting for a favourable moment to interfere in the affairs of France, and prevent the Béarnais from taking Paris.

The success, however, of Henry, at Arques and Ivry, won for him the confidence of the nation, and he found himself at the head of forces again sufficient to march upon Paris, and this time to invest it. The siege began on the 7th of May, 1590, and it is said that Henry, if he had immediately attacked the city, might have taken it at once, as it is also said that if, during the siege, he had not run away from time to time to pay fugitive court to his mistresses, as was the practice of *le vert galant*, he might have brought it to a successful conclusion.

The siege thus lasted three months and seven days; and of all the sieges of Paris, it was the most complete and the most terrible.

The Duc de Mayenne had conferred the chief command of Paris on his step-brother, the Duc d'Aumale, and his cousin, the Chevalier d'Aumale. They had under their orders two companies of men-at-

arms, 200 horsemen of the Sieur de Vitry, 100 mounted arquebus men, 800 French foot-soldiers, 500 Swiss, and 1200 Germans under the Baron d'Eberstein. They had besides 65 cannons on the ramparts. These composed the regular troops; but besides these forces, there was the militia of Paris, which was capable of putting 50,000 men under arms. Henry IV., on his side, had but 12,000 foot-soldiers and 3,000 cavalry; but they arrived before the walls attended with all the prestige of the victory of Ivry, gained only two months before. The enormous disproportion between the forces which then sufficed for the siege and defence of Paris, and those which are at present engaged therein, is apparent enough. Paris indeed has grown to be ten times the size which it then was; but we must probably multiply Henry's forces by twenty to reach the number of the Prussian besiegers of to-day. Everything had been done which could be done by way of provisioning the town, of putting the ramparts in order, and of arming and drilling the militia. And as the power of resistance of the town depended on the strength of its religious and fanatical enthusiasm, the Duchesses of Nemours, Montpensier, and Mayenne, and the Papal Legate, and the ambassador of Spain, left no means unused to excite the people to religious frenzy. The Sorbonne issued a public decree, dated on the very day on which Henry appeared before the walls, declaring that eternal punishment would be the lot of those who might be disposed to range themselves on the side of a heretic monarch, and eternal happiness of those who rejected him to the death. But it was the preachers in the pulpit and the street that roused the popular frenzy to the highest pitch; two Italians, Panigarola and Bellarmino, of the suite of the Legate, though preaching in their own tongue, produced an effect which it is difficult to even account for, and assisted to raise the fanaticism of the populace and their hatred of heretics to a superhuman power of endurance.

Immediately from the commencement of the siege, provisions, not being able to arrive by the Seine, began to rise in price till at last they were not to be bought for money. Henry restrained himself to a blockade of the city, and did not use his artillery, either on account of his deficiency in that arm, or some other cause.

Paris, however, was never quite hermetically sealed up. The cavalry of the king who scoured the country were not numerous enough to prevent peasants with provisions getting through the besieging force from time to time, and braving every danger for the sake of the enormous profit to be gained. The soldiers, too, of his own army were tempted to enrich themselves by allowing the necessaries of life to be smuggled into the town; while the officers, who had all some friend or relative in the city, connived when they could at this contraband commerce, or sent themselves

presents into the city. Even the king, in a gallant way, forwarded from time to time presents of comestibles to his fair enemies, the besieged princesses. On the 26th of May the population of the city was found to be 200,000 in number; but a good many of the wealthier citizens had departed before the siege. The same day an inventory was made of the provisions in store, and it was calculated that there was corn enough for one month, after which time there would remain 7,500 quarters of oats of which bread was to be made. On the 26th of June, the wheat being exhausted, and the poor beginning to suffer severely, while the members of all the religious communities appeared to be in very good case, it was decided that the religious houses should maintain the poor, and that the convents and monasteries should therefore be visited, and an inventory taken of their stores. The ecclesiastical bodies, and especially the Jesuits and Capuchins, did not support this investigation very well. It was found that the Jesuits, says l'Estoile, had more corn left then than would be sufficient to last them for a year, besides having quantities of other provisions. The Capuchins, too, had biscuit in abundance, and no religious house was there but was found to have been extremely provident, and to be furnished with a larder and granary sufficient for six months' longer siege. Of course nearly every family a little rich had a secret store of some kind. Money was in time found to be of no use for the purchase of provisions, and the poorest refused it, and said they wanted bread and not money; there were, indeed, two kinds of poor in Paris—the poor who had money and no food, and the poor who had neither food nor money. Of the former sort there were seven thousand, of the latter five. All the chief persons at the head of the League contributed, so far as they could, to the necessities of the needy. All luxury, all other expense, and, indeed, all manner of work, except that necessary for the preparation of food and for the defence of the city, was suppressed. As long as money was of value the Cardinal de Gondi, Bishop of Paris—who, however, was no Leaguer—kept on selling all the silver ornaments of the churches in order that the proceeds might be distributed to the poor; and the Cardinal Legate made daily distributions, as likewise did the ambassador of Spain. All the ladies and the *seigneurs* of the League likewise put themselves upon strict necessaries, and gave away all they were able to bestow. Soon, however, notwithstanding a momentary alleviation caused by a reinforcement of provisions which Mayenne contrived to introduce by a feigned attack, the stores of the monasteries were exhausted, no corn was left, and the oat-bread was resorted to. All sheep and oxen had disappeared, and no flesh was to be met with at the butchers but the flesh of horses, asses, and dogs, and this was sold at such an excessive price as to be beyond the reach of most of the inhabitants. The people now began to

collect the grass and herbs on the ramparts and open places, and to boil them; then they tried to make bread of bones ground to powder, and even ransacked human graveyards for the purpose of making bread in this fashion, which they called *le pain de Madame Montpensier*. Had they known how to extract a gelatine from the bones of animals it might have given them some nourishment, but this way of making bread of bone-dust, because it looked like flour, affected those who partook of it with dreadful maladies. The skins of animals of all kinds began now to be boiled and eaten, and old leather of all kinds was eagerly sought for the same purpose. The streets were filled with a haggard, scarecrow population, and the cries, "Du pain ou la paix!" came to be daily heard. In order to stay the hunger of the people so far as possible, huge cauldrons, called *les marmites d'Espagne*, were established in the streets, in which soup was made of grasses and weeds gathered in the town and thickened with oat-bran, while the fires for boiling them were made of the timbers of deserted houses. For habitations began to be emptied very fast, 100, 150, and 200 people dying from malady and hunger in one day. Soon the numbers of the dead increased so rapidly that it was found impossible to bury them. The chiefs of the League and the preachers went round to sustain the courage and endurance of the people. The Duke de Nemours and the Chevalier d'Aumale gave them exhortations, and the monks and friars on all sides preached that death by hunger offered a way to the glory of martyrdom equally efficacious with death by the sword, while news of the success of the League in the provinces over the Huguenots, and of the advance to their aid of the Duke de Mayenne, or of the Duke of Parma, and of some promise of the King of Spain, was every day invented to raise the spirits of the besieged.

Up to the 27th of July the Parisians still occupied the faubourgs, from which they were still able to extract some slight provision in the way of herbs and vegetables. On the 27th of July, however, Henry, who up to that day had been employed in taking St. Denis, ordered a general assault along the whole circuit of the attack, and drove the Parisians within the walls. His forces, indeed, had been of late considerably increased by the arrival of the Duke de Nevers with a body of cavalry, and of bodies of *gentilhommes* of various provinces of the north and south. His valorous, loyal, and free-hearted nature, and his successes, began to gain adherents on all sides.

Part of the resources on which the besieged had hitherto existed were thus cut off, and the famine soon grew to be too horrible for details. The Duchess of Montpensier carried a little dog in her arms which she said she had reserved for herself at the last extremity, and the *marmites d'Espagne* grew thinner and thinner in their broth, and were now flavoured with rancid tallow and foul grease,

or anything that could be put into them. In their desperation the populace attempted sorties, but they were driven back. Henry, however, yielded to pity, and allowed 3,000 people to come out of Paris on one day, and 4,000 on another. On one of these occasions the soldiers in the lines imagined those passing out exceeded the prescribed number, and drove about 500 back into the town, which the famished people entered howling with lamentation at the thought of miseries yet to be endured, and which they had imagined were at an end. On the 27th of July, when the Parisians lost the faubourgs, a report was made to Nemours which declared that 30,000 people had already perished; as the siege was continued to the 30th of August, this number may, perhaps, have been doubled—yet we can hardly believe one account which makes the death-total as high as 100,000. The sufferings towards the end of the siege were of unspeakable horror; we read of two children dying, and their mother converting their bodies into food, and then dying herself of insanity; and of men disputing with dogs for the carrion of the streets, which they devoured raw, like unclean beasts.

This siege of Paris was ultimately, as is well known, put an end to by the advance of Parma, after his junction with Mayenne. The forces of Henry IV., however, now consisted of 26,000 infantry and 7,000 horse, and he felt himself strong enough to allow Parma and Mayenne to advance to Meaux, which is only twelve leagues from Paris, before he raised the siege. He knew the city was in such horrible extremity that it must surrender in a few days, and perhaps in a few hours. But on the 30th of August he felt the game was too dangerous to remain, and to expose himself to so able a general as Parma, with his Italian and Spanish infantry, then the finest in the world; so he withdrew from his lines to Bondi two hours before daybreak. At daybreak on the 30th the sentinels on the ramparts perceived that the besiegers were no longer at their posts, and uttered cries of joy which brought nearly the whole population to the walls. The poor people could scarcely credit their sudden deliverance. In a few hours peasants flocked into the city from all sides and brought them some slight alleviation of their miseries.

A solemn procession was instantly organized, with the Archbishop of Lyons and the Duke de Nemours at its head, for rendering thanks at Notre Dame for the cessation of such incredible suffering. It was long, however, before the capital was again thoroughly supplied; the country around was so wasted with war that provisions were got together with great difficulty. On the 31st of August the commandant of the League at Dourdain brought up a few carts, and four days after a thousand waggons came into the city from the country about Chartres; but the Seine was still closed, and provisions still at an exorbitant price. Between the 13th and the 15th of September,

however, corn fell, by increased supplies, at once from twenty-four crowns to six crowns the bushel.

The famine during the siege of Paris by Henry IV. could not fail to present a subject for description to Voltaire in his "Henriade." The lines are not bad if one can get over some false Horatian and Virgilian touches, but they do not rise above very creditable mediocrity.

"Mais lorsque enfin les eaux de la Seine captive
Cesseront d'apporter dans ce vaste séjour
L'ordinaire tribut des moissons d'alentour;
Quand on vit dans Paris la faim pâle et cruelle,
Montrant déja la Mort qui marchait après elle,
Alors on entendit des hurlements affreux:
Ce superbe Paris fut plein de malheureux,
De qui la main tremblante et la voix affaiblie
Demandaient vainement le soutien de leur vie.
Bientôt le riche même, après de vains efforts,
Eprouve la famine au milieu des trésors—
Ce n'était plus ces jeux, ces festins, ces fêtes
Où de myrte et de rose ils couronnaient leurs têtes;
* * * *
On vit avec affroi tous ces voluptueux,
Pâles, défigurés, la mort dans les yeux,
Périssant de misère au sein de l'opulence,
Détester de leur biens l'inutile abondance.
Le vieillard dont la faim va terminer les jours,
Voit son fils au berceau qui périt sans secours.
Ici meurt dans la rage une famille entière;
Plus loin des malheureux, couchés sur la poussière,
Se disputaient encore, à leurs derniers moments,
Les restes odieux des plus vil aliments.
Ces spectres affamés, outrageant la nature,
Vont au sein des tombeaux chercher leur nourriture;
Des morts épouvantés les ossements poudreux,
Ainsi qu'un pur froment, sont préparer par eux—
Que n'osent point tenter les extrêmes misères!
On les vit se nourrir des cendres de leurs pères—
Ce détestable mets avança leur trépas,
Et ce repas pour eux fut le dernier repas."

He is more amusing, as might be expected, when he has to deal with the convent of the ecclesiastics, who were found to be in so good a state of preparation for the siege.

"Ces prêtres cependant, ces docteurs fanatiques,
Qui, loin de partager les misères publiques,
Bornant à leurs besoins tous leurs soins paternels,
Vivaient dans l'abondance à l'ombre des autels."

Henry IV., though assisted by our Queen Elizabeth, had a good deal of fighting yet to do before he could enter Paris. There was a siege of Rouen to undertake, which also he was obliged to raise, and a great deal of marching and countermarching in the rear and in the front of Parma, and retreating across the Seine in face of Caudabec. However, his abjuration made things easier for him. Catholics, and even old Leaguers, were won over at last to the side of the gallant

and blithe-hearted fighter, who never knew when he was beaten, and who never knew fear. He came to have a strong party in Paris itself, and the Duke de Cossé Boisac, a dexterous man, who had a shrewd notion that the Bearnais must win all hearts in the end, and who had a military command under the League, which placed the gates of Paris in his power, came to a secret agreement with the monarch, and by some astute manœuvres contrived to divert the attention and suspicion of still obstinate Leaguers, and to arrange the guard at the gates, so that Henry IV., after a long ride through a dark night of rain and thunder, could enter Paris at four o'clock in the morning by the Porte Nouvelle—by the same gate through which Henry III. had retreated on the Day of Barricades. There was but slight resistance, and that arose from a body of the Swiss Guard in the pay of the Leaguers, who delayed to lay down their arms, and a few of whom were shot. And when Henry IV., before entering the Louvre, rode to render thanks at Notre Dame—which has participated for now almost six centuries in all the joys and sorrows of Parisian life—the populace were loud in their cries of "Vive le Roi!"

Yet this Paris of the reign of Henry IV., for which he fought so gallantly, and which was defended against him so desperately, which even then had a strange fascination for those who knew it, was a very different city from the one we now know; and the accounts we have left of it hardly make us wish to turn the hands of time back three centuries, and to live in its midst. Even while Henry was ruling the city peaceably from the Louvre, crimes of all kinds, assassinations, and duels, and deeds of violence were of daily occurrence. No street was lighted in his time; after sunset the city was buried in profound darkness and quiet, and no good burgesses, much less a woman, dared to move forth from their threshold. The thick doors and heavy swing shutters of the shops were locked up with ponderous bolts and chains, and nothing was heard in the streets at night but the creaking of the heavy sign-boards, as they swung upon their hinges across the streets. In the winter every place of amusement, and all theatres, and even wine-shops, were shut up at four o'clock in the afternoon. Moreover, the streets were hardly paved at all, and the most frequented thoroughfares were as deep in mire and mud, and as foul with dirt, as the streets of some provincial town in Spain at the present day; indeed, if one would know something of what a town in France or England was like three centuries ago, we can very easily form a notion from the most benighted of the provincial towns of Spain of our own time. There were no quays along the river in Henry's time, and inundations of the Seine in the city were frequent; indeed, even up to one hundred and fifty years ago, the Champs-Elysées were often flooded by the river, and at such times you might

go in a boat up to the Invalides. There were, besides, no places for public promenade, and even in walking in the daytime in the streets you were not safe from quarrel or assault. While the susceptible point of honour of the *gentilhommes* made duels of such constant occurrence in the Pré-aux-Clercs, behind the mill of St. Marcel, or beneath the walls of the Chartreux, that in fifteen years four thousand nobles were killed, and seven thousand pardons were granted for homicide—not to speak of the gangs of ruffians and robbers who infested the city, and with whom the numerous prisons of Paris, the Châtelet, the Conciergerie, the For l'Evêque, and others, were always kept tenanted. Every day, too, some of these gentry were either scourged, or racked, or hung up by the neck, while every attempt was made to put down duelling by the punishment of death, but to little purpose.

Henry IV., however, did much for Paris; he built the quarter of the Marais, and the Place Royale; and the visitor to that quarter in the present day will find much to remind him of Henri Quatre, and many a quaint picturesque bit of street scenery such as he will not meet with in the Paris of Baron Haussman. Many of the streets in that quarter were named by Henry, after the provinces, Berri, Pictors, Xaintonge, &c., through which he had ridden so much and battled so long, and where he knew every foot of the roads. And by wandering about near the Marais may be found many a by-street, many a *tourelle*-window, and quaint gable, and sculptured doorway, suggestive even of days before those of Henry IV. Henry IV., too, gave a unity of form to Paris which it had never known before. He erected the two quarters on either side of the Ile de la Cité, with symmetrical streets; and he built the Pont Neuf, where his statue is still to be seen, and around which, in times of trouble, the poor people of Paris used in former days ever to collect, as though they could find comfort in looking even in bronze at his honest hooked nose and his beaming smile.

There has never until now been another regular siege of Paris since the days of Henry IV., though troubles enough have happened there; half-sieges and revolts, insurrections, pitched battles, and foreign invasion have by turns drawn forth the blood of its citizens in its streets and under its walls.

The years went on, yet never again did time or revolution give back to the French people a monarch who cared for them as Henry IV. In his stead reigned in course of time two priests—the pitiless and politic Richelieu; and the subtle and crafty Mazarin; but neither of them gained the affections of the people; and the spirit of the nobility and of the burgesses of Paris, which had been cowed by the terrible rigour of the first Cardinal, ventured anew to break out into revolt, and to claim some of their ancient independence

and privileges under the second. The war of the Fronde was the result—a war which showed, however, that a terrible degeneration in steadfastness of purpose and solidity of character had come over France since the heroic tragic days of the Wars of Religion.

There was something serious at the bottom of that wild war of the Fronde—some vague desire of fixing municipal rights and noble privileges, and of making a stand before the all-devouring growth of arbitrary power; but whatever there was of serious, in the original motives of its best actors, no one appeared in the movement capable of conducting it steadily towards any settled purpose, and the people, who at first took interest in its vicissitudes, stood by at last and looked on in utter indifference, while princes like Condé and Turenne fought now on one side and now on the other. So far as the nobles and princes were concerned, they fought chiefly for the smiles of their mistresses, or for some petty object of ambition. Yet the Fronde, too, had its Day of Barricades on the 27th of August, 1698, at the beginning of the war, when the people of Paris believed in the sincerity of the Frondeurs, and arose to demand the liberation of the Counsellor Broussel, who had been imprisoned for remonstrating with the Court against new and arbitrary taxation. Terrified at the popular outbreak, the Queen-mother fled with her young son, and took shelter at St. Germains in its dilapidated, unfurnished château, and was subject to such privations as we read of in the pages of Madame de Montteville. Paris, too, afterwards underwent a nominal siege for more than three months, but there was little blood shed, and the siege was not serious enough to put much hindrance in the way of supplies. Far more serious, however, was the battle of the Faubourg St. Antoine, fought out between Turenne on the side of the Royalists, and Condé on the side of the Frondeurs, in 1652, when Mdlle. de Montpensier, one of the Amazons of the Fronde, got possession of the Bastille during the fight, and herself directed its cannon against the Royalists, and forced them to retreat. But, as we have said, the whole movement resulted in utter failure, and arbitrary power came out of it stronger than before. As for Paris, its privileges were abolished, its militia was disarmed, what few chains, relics of the old independent spirit of former times, remained, were removed, a royal garrison was settled for ever within its walls, and the registers of the parliament and of the Hôtel de Ville, which recorded the proceedings of this abortive revolutionary effort, were torn by the hand of the executioner. Paris, so far as it possessed any political, municipal, or fiscal rights, had them annihilated in this aimless conflict. The absolute monarchy of Louis XIV. was established, and was to endure till the Revolution. Paris henceforth was regarded with suspicion, and ceased to be the residence of its kings at all, who betook themselves first to St. Germains, and

after to Versailles, and governed France and its capital from their palaces. This state of things lasted one hundred and thirty years, and then the cannon of the Bastille were again heard, but it was to proclaim the fall of the monarchy, and to announce the birth of Revolution.

In 1814 and 1815 Paris underwent two capitulations, but in neither case was there any siege, and only in the first case any fighting. On the 30th of March, 1814, the allied troops were close upon Paris, but the city was unprepared for defence. The first Imperial Government, in this respect a true prototype of the second, had allowed the Parisians to remain in complete ignorance of the real situation of affairs up to the time that the enemy was at the gates of the capital. Whatever, however, could be humanly performed at so brief a notice, was effected; and a battle—one of the most brilliant in history, although obscured in the immense blaze of military glory, or the military carnage, of the Empire—was delivered under the walls of the city, before Belleville, by the marshals Marmont and Mortier, against the allied armies. The two marshals had but about 22,000 or 23,000 men to oppose to 170,000, of whom 100,000 were actually engaged against them. They withstood this enormously disproportionate force for an entire day, and put 12,000 of their enemies *hors de combat.* Marshal Moncey at the same time defended the *barrière* de Clichy, at the head of a detachment of National Guards, against overwhelming numbers—a feat of arms which has been commemorated in a picture of Eugène Delacroix, and by a statue erected on the theatre of his exploit, which statue, strangely enough, was only completed and uncovered on the day when the news of the defeat of Wissembourg arrived in Paris. By a strange coincidence of destiny, a prince who entered Paris in the train of the allied sovereigns fifty-six years ago, supported by armies numbering about 700,000 men, is now engaged again in hostilities before the capital, and submitting it to a siege of unprecedented magnitude. What may be the results of this immense military enterprise, it is impossible to foresee. Paris may yet organize and discipline the forces at present within her walls so as to be able to meet the Prussians in open field; and if France is not degenerate to an incredible degree, she has in her provinces millions of men and indefinite resources for organizing forces far superior in numbers to those which Germany now has in the field, and with which she can march to the relief of the capital. We can, however, speak with certainty of the past, and say that the stately and unrivalled capital of France has as yet behaved in a way worthy of her splendour and her secular renown; and that the fortitude and concord of her citizens in this her hour of adversity have hitherto disappointed her enemies, and equalled the expectations of her friends.

WILLIAM STIGAND.

THE ATHANASIAN CREED.

POSTSCRIPT TO THE ARTICLE IN THE "CONTEMPORARY REVIEW" OF AUGUST, 1870.

IT may be desirable to add a few remarks to the article on the Athanasian Creed contained in the August number of the *Contemporary*, because since its publication strong confirmations of the positions contained in it have appeared from two different quarters.

I. One was the interesting paper published under the title of "A Few More Words on the Athanasian Creed," in the October number of this Review. It is not our intention to enter into any personal controversy on this subject, least of all with one who bears the honoured name of the writer of that essay. But it may be well to point out how singularly it supports the conclusions arrived at by those eminent theologians who, from Chillingworth down to Bishop Lonsdale, have condemned the use of the Athanasian Creed. We do not mean by this merely the fact that Mr. Maurice, with his usual candour, expresses his conviction "that it is impossible much longer to retain the Athanasian Creed as part of our services, and that if a composition so weighty and awful, treating of the most transcendent topics in the most distinct language, requires explanations and compromises which destroy reverence and introduce confusion, its worth for our common worship must be gone." This acknowledgment, however valuable, might be considered as reluctantly extorted from a generous adversary. It is more important to observe that the grounds of that reluctance — the grounds on which the revered

author of that essay tells us that he himself admires the Creed—are such as more than establish the conclusions at which he has arrived; that "just because one honours it and has learnt deep lessons from it, one must desire that it should not be heard in public, that it should be kept only for secret meditation."

These grounds are that by tracing the ideas of the Creed behind its outward form into the inner source from which they spring, and by tracing back the meaning of its words as they occur in the Creed to the meaning which they have in the Bible (so far as they occur there at all)—a true and valuable sense may be found both for its dogmatical statements and for its condemnatory clauses. The sense which Mr. Maurice finds is far more spiritual and exalted than that ascribed to the Creed by its usual advocates. But on this very account it may be taken as the most favourable specimen of the endeavour to affix to an ancient document a meaning entirely different from its ordinary, and, as far as we know anything of the matter, its historical sense. What that ordinary and historical sense is has been already indicated in our original article. But it may be useful to take this occasion of pointing out that the like process might be applied to almost every serious document ever put forward by any Church in Christendom, and that in spite of any such possible interpretation such documents have nevertheless been discarded as unfit for public use.

1. We would take two examples. One is "the Solemn League and Covenant." Whatever may be said of the original adoption of the Athanasian Creed by the French or Spanish Church, it can hardly be said at any time to have been consciously adopted as the expression of the faith of the English nation. But the Solemn League and Covenant may truly claim the credit of having, alone of all British Creeds, received the deliberate assent of the whole Legislature, and the ardent welcome of the whole kingdom. Its very title is a history of the profound conviction and general acceptance with which it was adopted. It is "the Solemn League and Covenant for Reformation and Defence of Religion, the Honour and Happiness of the King, and the Peace and Safety of the Three Kingdoms of Scotland, England, and Ireland; agreed upon by Commissioners from the Parliament and Assembly of Divines in England, with Commissioners of the Convention of Estates, and General Assembly in Scotland; approved by the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, and by both Houses of Parliament and Assembly of Divines in England, and taken and subscribed by them, *Anno* 1643; and thereafter, by the said authority, taken and subscribed by all Ranks in Scotland and England the same Year; and ratified by Act of the Parliament of Scotland, *Anno* 1644: And again renewed in Scotland, with an Acknowledgment of Sins, and Engagement to Duties, by all Ranks, *Anno* 1648, and by Parliament 1649; and taken and subscribed by King Charles II. at Spey, June

23, 1650; and at Scoon, January 1, 1651." No other Confession of Faith in any time of our ecclesiastical history—certainly not the the Thirty-nine Articles, still less the Creed of St. Athanasius—has been accepted with such an overwhelming weight of moral enthusiasm, as that which was exhibited when the Solemn League and Covenant was signed with tears and blood in the Greyfriars' Church at Edinburgh, or when it was read to both Houses of Parliament and to the Assembly of Divines from the pulpit of St. Margaret's Church in Westminster, "with an audible voice article by article, each person standing uncovered, with his right hand lifted up bare to heaven, worshipping the great name of God, and swearing to the performance of it." And most assuredly it would be quite as easy in its case, as in the case of the Athanasian Creed, to discover a true Biblical sense in the sacred words which it uses, and a Christian significance which may be wrapped up in its strange statements and bitter denunciations. Its damnatory clauses are almost as dogmatic and almost as unsparing as the Athanasian anathemas. Its subscribers are pledged to "the extirpation of Popery, Prelacy, (that is, church-government by Archbishops, Bishops, their Chancellors, and Commissaries, Deans, Deans and Chapters, Archdeacons, and all other ecclesiastical Officers depending on that hierarchy,) superstition, heresy, schism, profaneness, and whatsoever shall be found to be contrary to sound doctrine and the power of godliness, lest we partake in other men's sins, and thereby be in danger to receive of their plagues; and that the Lord may be one, and his name one, in the three kingdoms;" to the "discovery of all such as have been or shall be incendiaries, malignants, or evil instruments, by hindering the reformation of religion, dividing the king from his people, or one of the kingdoms from another, or making any faction or parties amongst the people, contrary to this League and Covenant; that they may be brought to public trial, and receive condign punishment, as the degree of their offences shall require or deserve, or the supreme judicatories of both kingdoms respectively, or others having power from them for that effect, shall judge convenient;" and to "the securing and preserving the purity of religion against all error, heresy, and schism, and namely, Independency, Anabaptism, Antinomianism, Arminianism, and Socinianism, Familism, Libertinism, Scepticism, and Erastianism." No doubt here (as possibly in the Athanasian Creed) there may have been a ground in the circumstances of the time, or in the nature of the opinions and things denounced, for the fierceness of these denunciations. No doubt, even at the time, qualifying statements and "explanatory notes" were adopted by those who signed it. "The word 'League' was put into the title by Sir Harry Vane as thinking that it might be broken sooner than 'a Covenant,' and in

the first article he inserted that general phrase of reforming 'according to the Word of God.' When Mr. Coleman read the Covenant before the House of Lords in order to their receiving it, he declared that by 'prelacy' *all* sorts of Episcopacy were not intended, but only the forms therein described. Thus the wise men on both sides endeavoured to outwit each other in wording the articles."* A whole catalogue of "salvos" were drawn up, by which those who were discontented with it might "take it in their own sense." And, in fact, most of "the episcopal divines who made the greatest figure in the Church after the Restoration did not refuse it;" nor did the gay Charles II., nor did the chivalrous Montrose, nor the politic Elector Palatine, nor the holy Leighton. All ministers, old and young—noblemen, gentlemen, common councilmen, officers in the army—all pressed or were constrained to take it. One voice from amongst the dominant party resisted the general enthusiasm or the general compulsion. It was the same voice that afterwards was raised against the damnatory clauses of the Athanasian Creed. "Mr. Baxter," we are told, "kept his people from taking the Covenant lest it should be a snare to them."† It is evident that whatever explanations are applicable to the Athanasian clauses would, if it were still in use amongst us, be applicable to the Covenant. A staunch Episcopalian could have used the denunciations against Episcopacy with a similar "Explanatory Note" to that which enables a charitable or inquiring divine to use the Athanasian Creed. And had it seemed good to the Church of England or to the Church of Scotland (as it has still seemed good to that small section of the Church of Scotland which prides itself on being the only true representative of that body) to preserve and recite this document amongst its standards of faith, a devout and philosophical Churchman might have found reasons for doing so, as now for the Athanasian Creed.

Yet, in spite of these reasons for retaining this solemn Confession, thus grandly inaugurated, it has, in the Church of England, been suppressed altogether, and in the Church of Scotland been reduced to that condition in which the Athanasian Creed, according to the proposal of a distinguished living prelate, ought to be reduced in the Church of England, namely, relegated to the close of its authorized formularies, without any binding obligation for its general use. One only echo remains of that which was once the voice of the United Church of Great Britain. The sect of the Cameronians, or, as they call themselves, "the Reformed Presbyterian Church of Scotland," still subscribe and still recite the Solemn League and Covenant. In the north of Ireland, where they are cut off from the

* Neal's "Puritans," iii., 58—62, 370; Stoughton's "Church of the Civil Wars," i. 324.

† Neal's "Puritans," 67.

more civilizing influences of the mother country, they rehearse the articles of this dogmatic Confession with all its damnatory clauses in their full original strength, and with their most direct application to those whom it denounced. Every celebration of their Communion is ushered in by the solemn recital of the Covenant, with a distinct and separate excommunication, first of the Queen and of all the Royal Family, and then of the several Churches of England and Scotland, Established and Free alike, as breakers of the Covenant. In the small remnant which lingers in Scotland the strength of the denunciations which invoke "condign punishment on all malignants" is somewhat explained away. But with these qualifications, like to those which even the most rigid advocates of the Athanasian anathemas adopt in regard to the Greek Church, the Solemn League and Covenant still drags on an obscure and innocent existence—an exact sample probably of the manner in which the Creed of St. Athanasius would be kept up in a few High Church congregations, after it has been dropped in the nation at large by an assent as general as that which has consigned to oblivion the Creed of Henderson and Philip Nye, of Charles II., Montrose, and Leighton.

2. Another case shall be cited, which, perhaps, may come nearer home. From the year 1662 till the year 1859, three services, drawn up and authorized by Convocation, were ordered by the Privy Council to be read in churches on the 5th of November, the 30th of January, and the 29th of May. These services contained, after the manner (*mutatis mutandis*) of the Athanasian Creed and the Solemn League and Covenant, severe denunciations against the "cruel, bloody, and violent men," "the malicious conspiracies and wicked practices" whereby the Long Parliament and the founders of the Commonwealth were supposed to carry on their designs in the Civil Wars, and "against the secret contrivances and hellish malice," "the cruel and bloodthirsty enemies," that were concerned in overthrowing the liberties of England in the reigns of the first and the second James. These services, until the time of their abolition, were, by many good men, as highly prized as the Athanasian Creed is now.* As the Athanasian Creed is made the subject of a well-known poem in the *Lyra Apostolica*, so those services are made the subjects of three, not the least beautiful, poems in the *Christian Year*. Many excellent men clung to them with a tenacity exactly similar to that now shown towards the *Quicunque Vult*,—sometimes from a mere fear of change,

* It should be observed that one circumstance, which does not apply to the Athanasian Creed, somewhat broke the unanimity of the High Church party in regard to the Political services. Sincerely attached as they were to the Services for the Martyrdom of Charles I. and the Restoration of Charles II., they had always a secret repugnance to the commemoration of the Revolution of 1688, in the Service of the 5th of November.

sometimes from a belief that they embodied important doctrines, sometimes from a genuine admiration, as the case might be, for the character of Charles I. or of William III. Time after time, when the question was raised in Convocation or elsewhere for their removal, as unsuited for public worship, it was met by determined opposition or quiet resistance. Here, as in the case of the Athanasian Creed, it was not difficult to find excuses for retaining them. The fierce feeling which breathed through them, however distasteful its expression to the large mass of Churchmen, must yet, by all candid men, be acknowledged to have had some ground in the vehemence of resentment excused, if not justified, by the sacredness of the cause, whether of hereditary monarchy or of constitutional and religious liberty, which those services commemorated. Qualifications similar to those which are offered of the damnatory clauses consigning to everlasting perdition those who confound the Persons or deny the Double Procession, might be applied to the savage denunciations which these services launched respectively against the Puritans and the Roman Catholics. As it may be argued that the Athanasian curses, in truth, smite those whom their advocates intend to spare, and pass over those whom their advocates intend to condemn, so here Puritans might fairly argue that the description of Cromwell and Milton, as "cruel men," "sons of Belial," in the services of the 30th of January and the 29th of May, was, at least, equally applicable to the Cavaliers who advocated "killing no murder;" and Jacobites might plead that the description of "secret conspiracies," in the service of the 5th of November, could be used as a description of the Rye House Plot, no less than of the Gunpowder Plot; and of the invitation to the Prince of Orange, no less than of the machinations of James II.

Yet in spite of the arguments for retaining these interesting historical services, they excited generally the same kind of antipathy as the Athanasian Creed. Like the Athanasian Creed (till within the last forty years),* they lingered only in college chapels or cathedrals, and from time to time the aversion to them made itself heard in the protests of individuals. Arnold more than once agitated for their removal. Dean Milman, on the few occasions in which he appeared in Convocation, in vain endeavoured to induce his brethren to take some steps for the abolition of so grievous a scandal. Another ecclesiastic, who has always advocated no less eagerly the relaxation of the use of the Athanasian Creed, made a

* In confirmation of what was said in the August article of this Review, as to the comparatively recent date of the revival of the use of the Athanasian Creed, its writer has been told by a venerable dignitary, now far advanced in years, that when he first entered clerical life more than fifty years ago in a western diocese, the Creed seemed to be fast dying out. It was not used in ten churches of the diocese besides the cathedral, and he himself never had occasion to join in it.

point, on every 30th of January for several years, to write to the newspapers calling attention to the needless continuance of these emblems of extinct political controversy. At last their hour came. The same distinguished nobleman who has taken a chief part in the conflict of the last two years in endeavouring to remove the stumbling-block of the Athanasian Creed, succeeded by a like union of conciliation and perseverance in removing from the Prayer-book the blot which, next to that unhappy Confession, was the one most keenly felt by the true friends of the Church of England. In 1858, Earl Stanhope moved in the House of Lords an address to the Queen for the withdrawal of the Order in Council which had hitherto enjoined the use of these ecclesiastical war-cries, and the two Houses of Parliament gladly concurred* in removing the indirect sanction which the celebration of this ancient party rancour had received from the Legislature. In those days, happily, the notion that every Act for the amelioration of the Church must pass through the intricate ordeal of the four houses of Convocation, had not occurred either to the Government or the clergy; and accordingly it came to pass that these services, which alone of all the services of the English Church had been drawn up and sanctioned almost exclusively by Convocation, and which had been defended by Convocation to the last, were withdrawn from public use, without the slightest reference to the Convocations either of Canterbury or York, and, it may be added, without the slightest murmur from those venerable bodies, at this contumelious rejection of their work, and absolute indifference to their claims. Here and there a solitary lament arose at the loss of what was deemed a national recognition of past mercies. A respected Professor of Divinity from Oxford lifted up a warning voice against the removal of this time-honoured landmark, as doubtless he would again, in the case of the removal of the Athanasian Creed. But, as a general rule, the three services have passed away without leaving a scar behind; and there is probably not a single clergyman throughout the country who would not now regret to see them restored. So will it always be with religious services which are the expression of sentiments that have ceased to live, and which are therefore only kept up as badges and symbols either of party strife, or of some idea which, however much

* The three services most inaccurately called "State services," had never received the sanction of Parliament, either during their composition or afterwards. Parliament had only enjoined that the days should be kept holy, but without specifying in what manner. The services themselves were strictly "Convocation services." The two for January 30 and May 29, were compiled, and that for the 5th of November revised, by Convocation in 1662; and though they were appended to the Common Prayer-book, and sanctioned (with some very slight subsequent alterations) by Orders in Council, they never received the sanction of the State in Parliament, and were, therefore, emphatically "Church services" in the most limited sense.

it may be found by ingenious or charitable minds beneath their surface, does not obviously belong to them, and therefore cannot be pleaded for their retention.

It can hardly be urged that the attachment felt towards the Athanasian Creed is of a wider range or of a deeper root, than that formerly shown towards the Solemn League and Covenant or even the service for the 30th of January. But it is by seeing how the arguments used in favour of the Athanasian Creed may be equally used in favour of other documents of a totally different character, that we are best able to appreciate their utter futility at least for all practical purposes. And the entire disappearance of the Solemn League and Covenant from the formularies of the Church of England, and its almost entire disappearance from those of the Church of Scotland; the removal of the services for the Political Anniversaries, although touching Convocation in its tenderest point, are samples of the mode in which, when the proper time arrives, ecclesiastical documents which have been the very apple of the eye to eager theological disputants—for which those disputants have even fought and bled—may be laid to sleep for ever by any one who has the courage to try the experiment.

II. This leads us to the new aspect of the subject brought out by the Report of the Ritual Commission, which had not appeared when our previous article was written, and to which, therefore, no direct allusion could then be made.

It may be worth while here to give at length the exact results of the Report, as bearing on this Creed, disentangled from the extraneous matter in which they are of necessity mixed up in the Report itself.

Of the twenty-seven Commissioners who have signed the Report, eight, as far as appears, have been content to leave unaltered the rubric enforcing the use of the Creed, but on the condition of adding an explanatory note to the effect "that the condemnations in this Confession of Faith are to be no otherwise understood than as a solemn warning of the peril of those who wilfully reject the Catholic Faith."

On the other hand,* nineteen of the Commissioners have expressed their desire, in terms more or less direct, that the Creed shall cease to be enforced in public worship, and have in most instances given their reasons in detail.

* The reason of the apparent contradiction between what is called in the Report the decision of "the Commission," and that which in fact is the decision of the majority of the Commission, is easily explained. The decision of "the Commission" was made in a meeting in which the real majority of the Commissioners were absent, from illness and other causes, and had therefore not the opportunity of expressing their dissent till after the completion of the Report framed by what was in fact a small minority of their body. It should be added that two out of the whole number abstained from signing any part of the Report.

1. The Archbishop of Canterbury:—

"Respecting the Athanasian Creed, while I rejoice that the Commissioners have thought it right to append a Rubric explanatory of the sense in which 'the condemnations in this Confession of Faith' are to be understood, I cannot feel entirely satisfied with this course.

"The adoption by the Commissioners of this explanation seems to me to admit two things,—

"1st. That it was within the power of the Commission to deal with the use of the Athanasian Creed:

"2nd. That the use of the Creed in public worship was liable, from the wording of these clauses, to objection.

"I should, therefore, have deemed it a wiser course had the Commission decided that the Creed in question, valuable and most important as are its direct doctrinal statements, should not retain its place in the Public Service of the Church." (Report, p. viii.)

2. Earl Stanhope:—

"In the course of our deliberations the propriety of retaining the Athanasian Creed in the public Services was frequently discussed, the objection being felt more especially as regards its so-called damnatory clauses. It seemed to very many among us that these clauses are both a blemish in our beautiful Liturgy and a danger to our national Church. However they may be explained to the satisfaction of learned men conversant with the terms of scholastic divinity in the Greek and Latin languages, it is certain that they are a stumbling-block to common congregations; forming a service which is wholly misunderstood by some persons, and in which it is observed that others decline to join.

"Various proposals were made in our body to meet the general and growing objections which these clauses in the Athanasian Creed, and consequently on them the entire Creed, have raised. It was moved that in the preceding Rubric the word 'shall' should be changed to 'may.' It was moved to omit the preceding Rubric by which the use of that Creed is prescribed. It was moved to limit the use of that Creed, and that permissive only, to our public Services in collegiate and cathedral churches. It was moved to enjoin it for only one Sunday in the year. To several of us it would have appeared a still preferable plan, which, however, was not formally brought forward, to declare in a new Rubric that although the Church retained this Creed as a confession of our Christian faith, the Church did not enjoin its use in any of its public Services.

"It was found, however, upon divisions, several of which took place at divers times in the course of our proceedings, that no one specific proposal could commend itself to the approval of a majority among us. We have, therefore, left untouched and without any suggestion for discontinuance in the appointed Services a Creed which, nevertheless, so far as regards its popular effect upon others, I imagine that scarce any Churchman contemplates with entire satisfaction. Nor am I at all satisfied with the note which our Report proposes to subjoin. Under these circumstances, which I most deeply regret, I altogether dissent from the very anomalous state in which, to my judgment, this question has been left." (Report, p. viii., ix.)

3. Lord Portman:—

"I concur in the opinions above expressed." (Report, p. ix.)

4. The Earl of Harrowby:—

"I assent to the statement of facts in regard to the Athanasian Creed put forward by Lord Stanhope, and agree generally with the opinions he has expressed.

"I only disagree so far, as that I do not dissent from the conclusions come to by the Commission.

"In spite of the objections which I entertain to the language of certain clauses of the so-called Athanasian Creed, and to its use in public congregations, I have felt it my duty to concur with the majority of the Commission in retaining it as it now stands in the Prayer Book, on the ground that it seemed to me to be beyond the purpose of our Commission to remove a Confession of Faith from the position of authority, in which our Church has hitherto placed it." (Report, p. ix.)

5. The Bishop of Winchester:—

"I am not satisfied with the explanatory note appended to the Athanasian Creed." (Report, p. x.)

The same Prelate also "called attention to the question of placing the Creed with the Articles of Religion at the end of the Book of Common Prayer." (See Report, p. xvii.)

6. The Bishop of St. David's:—

"I protest against the compulsory use of the Athanasian Creed, as not only an evil, on account of the effect it produces on many of the most intelligent and attached members of our Church, but a wrong in itself. It may be impossible to ascertain the extent of the evil, or the proportion of those who are offended by the Creed, to those who acquiesce in it, or even find themselves edified by it. But this appears to me a point of comparatively little moment. The important question is, whether those who are offended by the Creed have just and reasonable ground of objection to it. I think they have. It appears to me that, in adopting such a document, the Church both overstept the bounds of its rightful authority, and exercised the usurped authority in an uncharitable and mischievous way. Nothing, as it seems to me, could have warranted such a step, but a special revelation, placing the Creed on a level with Holy Writ. It may be possible for Theologians to show, by technical arguments, that it is a legitimate development of doctrine implicitly contained in Scripture. But this, however fully admitted, would not justify the Church in exacting assent to their conclusions under the penalty of eternal perdition. This was in fact creating a new offence against the Divine Law, and introducing a new term of salvation, on merely human authority. Looking to the period when this innovation was first imposed on Christians, we may find much excuse for its authors. But viewed in the light of the fundamental principles of a Reformed Church, it appears to me, as forming part of our public services, utterly indefensible.

"I strongly disapprove of the Explanatory Note which has been appended to the Athanasian Creed. I believe not only that it must fail to serve the purpose for which it was adopted, but that it will aggravate the evil it was designed to remedy. If the 'condemnations' have hitherto been generally misunderstood—which I do not believe to be the case—it is too late for any Commission, even if it could speak with authority, to correct the error of public opinion on this head; and if this was possible, it could not be

effected by an explanation which is vitiated by the ambiguity of the term 'wilfully,' on which the whole meaning depends. The unsuccessful attempt will I believe be generally regarded as the admission of an evil, which ought to have been treated in a different manner, or left untouched." (Report, p. xi.)

7. Lord Ebury "desires to concur in the above protest." (Report, p. xi.)

8. Mr. John Abel Smith, M.P., "desires to concur in the above protest." (Report, p. xi.)

9. The Bishop of Carlisle :—

"With regard to the Athanasian Creed.—It may be doubted whether the consideration of this subject was within the limits of your Majesty's Commission ; but the Commissioners having determined so to regard it, I regret that it was not found possible to arrive at a more satisfactory solution of the difficulty which many persons feel, than the addition of a note, which, I venture to think, is incomplete as an explanation, and insufficient to meet the scruples of those who object to the public recitation of this Confession of our Christian Faith." (Report, p. xiii.)

The same Prelate proposed that the use of the Creed should be prohibited in parish churches, but permitted, though not enforced, in cathedral and collegiate churches. (See Report, p. xvii.)

10. The Right Hon. Spencer H. Walpole :—

"The note appended to this Creed or Confession of Faith furnishes to my mind the strongest proof that, however valuable such a document may be as an historical exposition of the Church's views, the enforced use of it as a symbol of faith in Public Worship is most unadvisable. It seems to me to be very objectionable that a congregation should be required to affirm and profess the articles of their Creed in language which obviously and in its natural sense means one thing, when the interpretation put upon it says that it means another." (Report, p. xiii.)

11. The Right Hon. Sir Joseph Napier :—

"With reference to the annotation proposed to be made in explanation of the penal clauses of the Creed commonly known as the Athanasian Creed, I humbly submit that we were not authorised by your Majesty to suggest any alteration in this or any other part of the services set forth in the Book of Common Prayer, and least of all by the imposition of a meaning of which the words are not susceptible." (Report, p. xiii.)

12. Sir Travers Twiss, the Queen's Advocate :—

"I humbly submit to your Majesty, that evidence has been given before your Majesty's Commissioners, that this Confession of Faith is in practice disused by many of the Clergy, partly from personal repugnance to its language, partly from deference to the repugnance of their Congregations. Petitions have also been addressed to the President of Your Majesty's Commission from Clergy praying for relief, as regards the use of this Confession of Faith. Under these circumstances, if the occasional use of this Confession of Faith is still to be sanctioned, it seems to me that it would be in accordance with the spirit of your Majesty's instructions, that the Rubric, by which its use is made imperative on certain Festivals, should be modified. I consider it to be beyond the province of your Majesty's Commissioners to

interpret the language of this Confession of Faith, and to put a construction, as proposed, by authority upon the so-called damnatory clauses, which is at variance with their plain and grammatical sense." (Report, p. xiv.)

13. Mr. Charles Buxton, M.P.:—

"I desire humbly to express to your Majesty my deep regret that the Royal Commission has not recommended such changes in the Rubric before the so-called Athanasian Creed as could have put an end to its use as part of the Services of the Church of England; because—

"(1). It seems to me that there is great presumption in the attempt made by that Creed to give a precise definition of the nature of the Supreme Being;

"(2). The assertions it makes as to the nature of the Supreme Being are nowhere to be found stated in such terms in Holy Writ: but they are the deductions drawn from Scripture by the theologians of the period in which it was written. Now I cannot think that a Christian Creed ought to consist of inferences (however logical) drawn from Scripture, but only (like the Apostles Creed) of the very statement of Scripture itself, given in its own words.

"(3). Its declaration, that those who do not accept its statement of the Christian Faith, without doubt will perish everlastingly, is generally acknowledged to be false, and nothing can be less fitting than to invite the people to make a solemn asseveration of that which it is not even wished that they should believe.

"(4). It commits the Church of England to the doctrine, long since exploded, that error is a crime, punishable with horrible torments.

"I object to the Note that it is proposed to append to the Athanasian Creed, because, in my opinion it affirms that which is clearly contrary to the fact. The Athanasian Creed was written at a time when all men firmly believed that erroneous doctrine would be punished with everlasting perdition; and it was undoubtedly intended as a denunciation of such perdition against all those who did not hold that statement of doctrine which it sets forth. Accordingly, it precedes the statement by the words, 'which faith except every one do keep whole and undefiled, without doubt he shall perish everlastingly; and the Catholic Faith is this,'—it concludes the statement by saying, 'This is the Catholic Faith, which except a man believe faithfully he cannot be saved.' The meaning of this declaration at the beginning and ending of its statement of the Catholic Faith does not surely admit of any doubt whatever. Were there any such doubt, it would be altogether extinguished by the additional words thrown into the middle of the Creed. 'He therefore that will be saved must thus think of the Trinity. Furthermore it is necessary to everlasting salvation that he also believe rightly.' . . . . . I consider, therefore, that it is only by perverting the obvious meaning of the above words, that we can aver, in the language of the Note, that they 'are to be no otherwise understood than as a solemn warning of the peril of those who *wilfully* reject the Catholic Faith.'" (Report, p. xvi.)

14. The Dean of Westminster.

"I desire to express my conviction that it was the duty of those who served on Your Majesty's Commission to recommend the relaxation of the use of the Athanasian Creed in the service of the Church of England. This might have been effected either by the substitution of 'may' for 'shall'

in the Rubric, or by the omission of the Rubric altogether, according to the two proposals of Lord Stanhope; or by forbidding its use in parish churches, whilst permitting but not enforcing it in cathedral and collegiate churches, according to the proposal of the Bishop of Carlisle; or by leaving it to be used alternately with the Apostles Creed, according to the conditional proposal of Mr. Perry; or by 'calling attention to the question of placing it with the Articles of Religion, at the end of the Book of Common Prayer,' according to the proposal of the Bishop of Winchester. Any one of these recommendations would have relieved the consciences of those who are burdened by its use without depriving those who are attached to it of the advantage which may, in their judgment, be derived from the retention of the Creed in the formularies of the Church.

"I deeply regret that a change, proposed with such evident endeavours to conciliate the scruples of those opposed to it, should have been rejected; and I beg to offer the following reasons for that regret:—

"1. Because the Creed was received and enforced in the Church of England when it was believed to be 'the Creed of St. Athanasius,' whereas it is now known to be the work of an unknown author, not earlier than the fifth century, perhaps as late as the eighth.

"2. Because its exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity is couched in language extremely difficult to be understood by a general congregation, in parts absolutely certain to be understood in a sense different from what was intended by the original words; as, for example, 'person,' 'substance,' and 'incomprehensible.'

"3. Because it is never recited in a mixed congregation in any other Church than our own.

"4. Because the parts of the Creed, which are at once most emphatic, most clear, and most generally intelligible are the condemning clauses which give most offence, and which in their literal and obvious sense are rejected by the Explanatory Note which is now proposed to be appended to them.

"5. Because the use of anathemas in the public services of all Churches has been generally discontinued.

"6. Because these condemning clauses assert in the strongest terms a doctrine now rejected by the whole civilized world, viz., the certain future perdition of all who deviate from the particular statements in the Creed.

"7. Because they directly exclude from salvation all members of the Eastern Churches; to whom, nevertheless, the clergy and the bishops of the Church of England, at various times, and especially of late, have made overtures of friendly and Christian intercourse, entirely inconsistent with the declaration that they 'shall without doubt perish everlastingly.'

"8. Because the passage commonly quoted from the Authorized Version of Mark xvi. 16, in their defence is irrelevant; (*a*) as being much more general in its terms; (*b*) as being of very doubtful genuineness; (*c*) as being in the original Greek much less severe than in the English translation.

"9. Because the use of this Creed, and of those clauses especially, has been condemned by some of the most illustrious divines of the Church of England, such as Chillingworth, Baxter, Bishop Jeremy Taylor, Archbishop Tillotson, Archbishop Secker, Dr. Hey, Dr. Arnold, Dr. Burton, Bishop Lonsdale.

"10. Because the use of the Creed arouses scruples in candidates for ordination which can only be overcome by strained explanations.

"11. Because it has been rejected by the Protestant Episcopal Church of the United States of America, which is in full communion with the Church

of England, and whose clergy are authorized by statute to minister in our churches, being yet under no obligation to use this Creed.

"12. Because it is a stumbling block in the way of almost all Nonconformists.

"13. Because the public use of the Creed as a confession of Christian Faith, being, as it is, the composition of an unknown author, and not confirmed by any general authority, is a manifest violation of the well known decrees of the Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon.

"14. Because the recitation of the Creed had in many English Churches become obsolete, till it was revived some thirty years ago.

"15. Because many excellent laymen, including King George III., have for the last hundred years at least, declined to take part in its recitation.

"16. Because so far from recommending the doctrine of the Trinity to unwilling minds, it is the chief obstacles in the way of the acceptance of that doctrine.

"For these reasons I consider that the relaxation of the use of the Creed, whilst giving relief to many, ought to offend none. It has, no doubt, a historical value as an exposition of the teaching and manners of the Church between the fifth and ninth centuries. It has also a theological value, as rectifying certain erroneous statements; and as excluding from the essentials of the Catholic Faith the larger part of modern controversy. But these advantages are quite insufficient to outweigh the objections which are recorded above, and which, even in the minds of those disposed to retain the use of the Creed, have found expression in an Explanatory Note, tantamount to a condemnation of it.

"With regard to the Explanatory Note, whilst acknowledging the benefit derived from the indirect but unquestionable discouragement which it inflicts on the use of the Creed, I would humbly state the reasons why it appears to me to aggravate the mischief which it is intended to relieve.

"1. Because it attempts a decision on a complex dogmatical and historical question which the Commission is not called to offer, and which it has not attempted in other instances, equally demanding and more capable of such explanations, such as the Baptismal Service, the Ordination Service, and the Visitation of the Sick.

"2. Because this dogmatical decision was carried by a small majority in a Commission of reduced numbers; whereas in order to have any weight it ought to have received the general concurrence of those most qualified to pronounce it.

"3. Because the words in the Creed which it professes to explain are perfectly clear in themselves, whilst it leaves unexplained other words, such as 'person,' 'substance,' 'incomprehensible,' which are popularly understood in a sense different from their original meaning, and which as so understood mislead the mass of the congregation and even preachers into some of the very opinions so terribly denounced by the condemning clauses.

"4. Because the statement which it implies is historically false, viz., that 'the condemnations in this Confession of Faith' do not apply to the persons to whom they evidently were intended to apply.

"5. Because the main statement which it contains is either extremely questionable or a mere truism, or else so ambiguous as to be only misleading.

"6. Because, after well considering a similar explanation given in 1689, Archbishop Tillotson thus expressed himself:—'The account given of Athanasius' Creed appears to me nowise satisfactory. I wish we were well rid of it.'

"7. Because, in most instances, it will give no ease to those who are offended by the use of the Creed in public services.

"8. Because, whilst virtually condemning the use of the Creed, it still leaves the Rubric enjoining that use.

"9. Because it will have the effect of increasing the existing burden by seeming to state that in the view of the Commission it is a sufficient remedy.

"10. Because it is one of several proposed explanatory notes which appear in the Minutes, and which are manifestly inconsistent with this and with each other.

"11. Because (in the language used by our chairman, in putting it to the vote), it is 'illogical and unsatisfactory.'" (Report, pp. xvii., xviii.)

15. The Dean of Lincoln (Regius Professor of Divinity at Cambridge):—

"I am unable to recommend that the Rubric which prescribes the use of this Creed should be retained:—

"Because an Exposition of Faith, containing a series of subtle definitions on the most abstruse points of doctrine, may be fitly placed among the Articles of Religion, but is ill-adapted to be 'sung or said' in the public worship of the Church.

"Because the condemning clauses which precede and follow those definitions, when understood in their obvious sense, cause extreme distress of mind to many men of unquestionable piety, who unfeignedly believe all the Articles of the Christian Faith.

"Because, however desirable it may be to present an authoritative interpretation of the Creed, the Commission has no authority to interpret doctrinal statements; and the Note, which it is proposed to add, seems rather to attest the fact than to diminish the force of grave and serious objections.

"Because the Church has omitted the anathematizing clauses at the end of the Nicene Creed, as it stood originally; and the principle thus applied to a Creed which was sanctioned by a General Council might, with at least equal propriety, be applied to a Creed which was composed at a later age, and by an unknown author.

"Because the Protestant Episcopal Church of the United States of America, which has not only rejected the use of the Athanasian Creed, in its public services, but even omitted all reference to the Creed itself in the Eighth of the Articles of Religion, is not the less cordially acknowledged to be in full communion with the Church of England." (Report, p. xix.)

16. The Rev. Canon Payne Smith (Regius Professor of Divinity at Oxford):—

"I object to the note appended to the Creed commonly but erroneously called the Creed of St. Athanasius, for the following reasons:

"I. Because the Commission possessed neither the right nor the authority to put an interpretation upon any of the formularies of the Church.

"II. Because the note explains the anathemas of the Creed in a manner contrary to their plain grammatical sense, and thereby introduces into the Prayer Book the principle of the non-natural interpretation of the Creeds and Formularies of the Church; a principle fatal to the maintenance of any standard of doctrine whatsoever.

"III. Because the note gives no ease or relief to the consciences of those who are offended by the recitation of this Creed at Public Worship.

"I venture further humbly to express my opinion that this Creed ought not to be publicly recited in the Church, for the following reasons:

"I. Because the recitation of a Creed so intolerant is contrary to the right spirit of public worship, as being destructive of that calm and reverent frame of mind in which men ought to approach God. The anathema appended to the Nicene Creed is by the general consent of the Church never recited at public worship.

"II. Because the anathemas of the Athanasian Creed are not warranted by Holy Writ, exclude apparently the whole Eastern Church from the possibility of salvation, and require men to believe, under pain of perishing everlastingly, not merely the plain statements of Holy Scripture, but deductions gathered from it by human reasoning.

"III. Because the recitation of this Creed is a violation of Church principles, and condemned in the severest terms by the highest ecclesiastical authority. For the Church of England professes to receive the four first General Councils as next in authority to Holy Scripture, and accordingly the bishops of the whole Anglican Communion at the recent Lambeth Conference affirmed that they received the faith as defined by these Councils. But the Council of Constantinople in its seventh Canon, and that of Chalcedon in the Definition of the Faith appended to its Acts, expressly forbid 'the composing, exhibiting, producing, or teaching of any other Creed.' For this they give a sufficient reason, namely, that the Nicene Creed as finally settled at Constantinople 'teaches completely the perfect doctrine concerning the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, and fully explains the Incarnation of the Lord.' To guard more carefully against the imposition of new creeds they command that every bishop or clergyman so offending should be deposed, and every layman anathematized. It was only after long and patient deliberation that these Councils themselves made additions to the simpler Creed of the Primitive Church; and not merely is their sentence justly deserved, but the principles which guided them violated, when we are required to recite at public worship a highly complex and elaborate Creed, the statements of which have never been discussed at any Council or Synod of the Church, and which in so many particulars goes beyond the Definition of the Faith as settled in the four first General Councils.

"As embodying, nevertheless, that particular explanation of the doctrine of the Trinity in Unity, gathered from Holy Scripture chiefly by the logical mind of St. Augustine, I think that this Creed ought by all means to be retained among the authoritative documents of the Church of England, mainly because of the general assent given to it by the whole Western Church; but only until such time as both its several clauses, and also the question of its general imposition in the face of the contrary decision of the Undivided Church, shall have been considered, if not by a General Council, at all events by a Synod representing all Christians in communion with the English Church." (Report, p. xx.)

17. The Rev. Henry Venn (Secretary of the Church Missionary Society) "is unable to concur" in the retention of the existing Rubric and the Explanatory Note affixed to it. (Report, p. viii.)

18. The Rev. W. G. Humphry, Vicar of St. Martin's:—

"I disapprove of the note which has been appended to the Athanasian Creed in the Schedule, for the following reasons:—

"1. It is not within the province of the Commission to put an interpretation on one of the formularies of the Church.

"2. The note appears to me to put an interpretation on the condemning clauses of the Creed which is at variance with their plain and obvious meaning. For according to the note the condemnations of the Creed are intended only for those persons who '*wilfully reject* the Catholic Faith;' whereas the Creed declares that except every one do *keep* the Catholic Faith *whole and undefiled*, he cannot be saved; and again, 'This is the Catholic Faith, which except a man *believe faithfully*, he cannot be saved.' The terms of condemnation, as expressed in the Creed, are manifestly far more comprehensive than the note represents them to be.

"3. It appears to me that the chief effect of the note, if placed in the Prayer Book, will be to offend by an unsound explanation the consciences of many who at present acquiesce in the recitation of the Creed.

"With regard to the recitation of the Creed in public worship, I concur generally in the opinions expressed by the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Bishop of St. David's, the Dean of Westminster, and Professor Payne Smith." (Report, p. xxi.)

19. The Rev. T. W. Perry:—

"Having regard to the various and conflicting representations which were made to the Commissioners, they could not well avoid discussing the Rubric prefixed to the Athanasian Creed, although it cannot be pretended that any doubt exists as to its *meaning*, whatever may be thought of the fitness of the Rubric itself. But it appears to me that the terms of our Commission do not authorize us to make any recommendation to alter the prescribed use of this Creed, nor do I think they warrant our making a Note explanatory of the meaning of any part of the Creed. If there had been anything like a general unanimity of opinion among us as to the desirableness of some change in the Rubric, I think we might with some propriety have indicated that opinion, stating also that we were only precluded from making it a *recommendation* by the limitations which the Commission imposed upon us. It is true that in a very few instances we have altered Rubrics of whose meaning there is also no doubt, and so may have somewhat exceeded the strict letter of our Instructions: but these changes, while desired by some, are not likely to be objected to by others; whereas the serious opposition which would be made to any *recommendation* from us to put the Athanasian Creed in a position of inferiority to the other Creeds, could not but be materially strengthened by the knowledge that the Commissioners had thus transgressed their powers.

"I do not consider it necessary to make any remarks upon the language of the Note itself, because it seems to me that no explanatory Note is likely to satisfy those who object to the use of this Creed in the Public Service of the Church; but if it were desirable to furnish an explanation for the sake of others, I think the wording of this Note would need some alteration." (Report, p. xxiv.)

Mr. Perry proposed (under these circumstances) that permission should be given to use the Apostles' Creed instead of the Creed of St. Athanasius on the appointed days. (See Report, p. xvii.)

Such is the result of the most deliberate discussion which has ever taken place in the English Church on the Athanasian Creed.

Out of a body of twenty-seven, specially appointed to consider the question, the large majority, consisting of nineteen, have expressed

their opinion, with various degrees of force, that the use of the Creed should no longer be made obligatory. Amongst those who have thus condemned its use, are the Primate and three distinguished Bishops, one of them confessedly the most learned of the whole Episcopal bench; four Peers and three Members of Parliament, representing the most various phases of political opinion; two eminent lawyers; the two Regius Professors of Divinity at our Universities; and three parochial clergymen of large experience, each representing a distinct school of thought in the English Church. On the other side are a small minority, apparently of eight,* who are willing that the Creed should be continued if accompanied by an Explanatory Note. But that Note, whilst it has been condemned in strong terms by the large majority of the Commissioners, is an acknowledgment, even by the minority, that the Creed, in the sense in which it is ordinarily used, ought not to be read. "How offensive, how extremely painful," such an explanation must be to the more high-minded advocates of the Creed, it needed not the burning words of Professor Maurice to express.† How useless to imagine that it will satisfy any scruples, or have any other effect than covering the Confession itself with contempt, has been set forth in the weighty sentences of the Bishop of St. David's, in terms to which nothing need be added.

* As these eight Commissioners had not the opportunity of stating their reasons for their course, it seemed more respectful to them in this essay not to record their names.

† It may be worth while briefly to indicate the difference between Mr. Maurice's interpretation of the Creed, and that contained in the "Explanatory Note" or other like qualifications. Mr. Maurice's principle is substantially that set forth in Mr. Wilson's very able Lectures on "the Communion of Saints," in which he lays down (in reference to that article of the Creed) that "the sense of formularies founded on the Scriptures must be sought in the declarations and history of Scripture rightly understood, and interpreted according to the best lights of those who in each age are responsible for their judgment upon it" (p. 33); and it is obvious that this specially applies to cases where, as in the Athanasian Creed, the words used are actually taken from Scripture, such as "salvation," "Father," "Son," "Holy Ghost," and the quotation from Matt. xxv. 41, 46. The difficulty of applying this interpretation (over and above the general considerations suggested in the first part of this article) is, first, that several of the most important words in the Creed, such as "substance," "person," "Trinity," "Catholic Faith," "uncreate," "conversion," "confusion," either do not occur at all in Scripture, or occur only in senses so remote as to be hardly recognisable; and, secondly, that those which do occur in Scripture are in the Creed so dislocated from their original context (except, perhaps, in the case of the quotation of Matt. xxv. 41, 46) as to make it inconceivable that to the author or the ordinary hearers of the Creed they should have conveyed their original meaning. Still, this mode of defending the Creed proceeds on a definite principle; and of however little avail for practical exposition, has a legal and theological value which ought not to be lightly disparaged. But such an interpretation as that affixed on the Creed by the "Explanatory Note," has no such justification. It is an alien and arbitrary sense attached to the words, almost avowedly in contradiction to their obvious meaning; and, moreover, pronounces a fresh judgment not contemplated in the Creed, and endeavours to explain what is in itself clear by a phrase so obscure and ambiguous as to introduce new elements of difficulty and deception.

The unanimity of the decision for practical purposes is as remarkable as its substance. Nineteen members of the Commission are against enforcing the public use of the Creed of St. Athanasius; the remaining eight have implied that it ought only to be enforced under conditions which most of its adherents would probably admit to be impossible. And this unanimity is the more impressive from the variety of elements which have been brought to bear on the subject. There is here no difference between Bishops and Presbyters. The Archbishop of Canterbury, and the humblest parochial incumbent in the Commission, appear on the same side of relaxation. Nor is it a question of political opinion. The Conservative legislators and lawyers, Earl Stanhope, Mr. Walpole, and Sir Joseph Napier, agree on this point with Lord Portman, Lord Ebury, Sir Travers Twiss, Mr. Buxton, and Mr. John Abel Smith. Nor is it a concord only of one ecclesiastical party. Not to speak of others, it is interesting to observe that, however wide their differences on ceremony and doctrine, we find, in this cause of charity, justice, and common sense, Mr. Venn, the venerable champion of the Evangelical school, on the same side with Mr. Perry, the indefatigable champion of the Ritualists. Nor is it a question between Oxford and Cambridge, or between the academical and the practical sections of the Church. The two Universities each speak through the mouths of their chief Professors of Divinity, and both agree with the long-tried pastoral experience of the Bishop of Carlisle and Mr. Humphry.

On many other points the natural divergences of opinion within the Church, as reflected in the Commission, have prevented a common conclusion which might serve as a basis for action. But on this point the union between otherwise discordant opinions is so strong and so general, as to make the decision one of the most important at which the Commissioners have arrived.

In the face of this decision, the question which Dean Prideaux addressed to the Convocation of his day may with still greater weight be addressed to our ecclesiastical rulers now—"*And must we always be necessitated to pronounce all damned that do not believe every tittle in Athanasius' Creed, which so few do understand?*"

It is obvious that if, at the present time, this question is seriously asked, whether by the State or the Church, whether by individual laymen or by individual clergyman, there can be but one answer.

A. P. Stanley.

CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION.

THE inefficiency of existing law on the subject of trade disputes is easily shown. By the 5th of George IV. chapter 96, justices of the peace may either arbitrate or appoint arbitrations in certain cases of agreement between masters and workmen. But, first, the Act is restricted to certain trades and certain subjects. Secondly, whatever might be done or attempted under the general language of the first section, the statute has little favour. Thirdly, it is confined to existing disputes, giving no power as to those that are contingent and future. Fourthly, it contains a proviso, withholding from magistrates all authority "to establish a rate of wages, or price of labour or workmanship, at which the workman shall in future be paid, unless with the mutual consent of both masters and workmen." Fifthly, the province of justices is strictly limited as to time: in disputes about materials, to three weeks; in other complaints, to three days. The magistrates might well be prohibited from fixing the rate of wages; for, besides considerations arising out of the nature of work and the fluctuations of trade, neither can the master be compelled to find work, nor the man be coerced into doing it when found.

It is often easier to say what is desirable than to show how it may be attained. We want an apparatus by means of which the rate of wages would accommodate itself to the varying state of all the

circumstances affecting trade, whether from the capital or from the labour side of the question. Such a miracle would supersede trades' unions, strikes, and lock-outs, and would make superfluous both conciliation and arbitration. The thing may not be utterly impossible, entirely chimerical. Yet we cannot afford to wait till it falls from heaven into our hands. By the stress of circumstances we are driven to the adoption of the likeliest, cheapest, speediest method by which an attempt can be made to diminish the number of disputes between masters and men, to conciliate between the parties when such disputes arise, to arbitrate upon those where a mutual arrangement is found impracticable, and to guard against their recurrence and multiplication.

The venerable Lord St. Leonards made a well-meant and well-aimed endeavour to deal with the subject by way of Bill in Parliament. He proposed in the House of Lords a measure to establish "Equitable Councils of Conciliation and Arbitration." These were to be formed under license of the Secretary of State for the Home Department, issued in compliance with a petition from masters and men in any trade or place, based upon the resolution of a popular meeting called for the purpose. The petitioners were to choose the first Council, and succeeding Councils were to be chosen by registered members of the trade, masters and men, licensed by the Council, resident six months; and, as to men, of seven years' standing in their trade. The chairman of the Council was to be unconnected with the trade. The quorum was to be three; to consist always of the chairman, one master, and one man. These were to have power to hear, adjudicate, and award. But a Committee of Conciliation was provided for, to be appointed by the Council; which Committee, consisting of two, a master and a man, was to sit, in the first instance, upon all questions referred by both parties to the Council, and to endeavour to reconcile them. Failing reconcilement, the matter in dispute was to go back to the Council, and be disposed of as a contested point in regular course. The Council was to have all the authority granted to arbitrators and referees under the Act above described, and was to adjudicate upon and determine any case submitted to it by mutual consent, securing the fixing of future rates and prices; and its awards were to be enforced according to the Act.

This Bill, it is obvious, distributed among three men the offices of conciliation, arbitration, and umpirage. The master and the workman were to be conciliators; they, with the chairman, arbitrators; and he, in the event of their disagreeing, umpire.

"The defect," remarks Mr. Rupert Kettle, "in the system of Lord St. Leonards is, that it does not make obligatory to settle *future* disputes by the means provided in his Bill. His Lordship had no doubt some good

reason for confining his system to the settlement of existing disputes; but it is remarkable that the general law, as to the binding effect of agreements to submit future disputes to arbitration, has been finally settled by that most able judgment of his, given in the case of Dimsdale *versus* Robertson, when he was Lord Chancellor of Ireland."

The chief obstacle to the success of Lord St. Leonards' mode of dealing with trade disputes was foreseen in reluctance, from sheer indolence or from the inertness natural in reference to what men are not accustomed to, to take the necessary steps for calling this Act into force. Not only must one party move, but both parties must unitedly move, must agree to move, must mutually acknowledge that a court under the statute is desirable for their trade, must meet, and must join in a petition to the Queen for the required license, and, even when the request is granted and fulfilled, must agree to refer their disagreement to the court for settlement. When the Act was but a Bill in Parliament, it was suggested as an improvement, that, instead of the consent of both parties being necessary, the application of one party, of either party, should be enough to set in motion the Committee of Conciliation. This, it was urged, would have a direct tendency to stop disputes at the beginning, and prevent them from degenerating into open and general quarrels, thus bringing on a strike and a lock-out. The Committee, it was pointed out, would have nothing to do but to apply to the other party, who would then give their view of the case as the applicants to the court had already given theirs. This would make the Committee as surely acquainted with the whole merits of the question as if both had consented to the application. The applicants, it was shown, would be in a position very different from that of a deputation of workmen sent up to remonstrate with their employers; they would apply to the court as persons legally authorised. The members of the deputation might be marked for early dismissal, perhaps receive a week's notice on the spot, and a strike would follow as a thing of course. But the applicants to a court created by law would be under the shield of the law; and few masters, it might be supposed, would, under such circumstances, proceed to extremities. The Committee of Conciliation, by its name and nature, would exclude those acts of an employer or those words of a foreman or an overlooker which might engender ill-feeling and widen the breach. The improvement in the Bill suggested would, it was submitted, insure to the complaining men that coming face to face with the masters which is not always attainable, but is always most desirable, being, in fact, the only way in which misrepresentation can be corrected, and misunderstanding rectified or prevented. It was recommended as having the further advantage of obviating, or at least calming down, excitement on either side, and

yet of placing the men, as applicants, in a position to cast off fear of offence, and to advance freely those claims which might seem to themselves both just and equitable. Under this arrangement, far more certainly than as the Bill was drawn, the two parties would come before a Committee of Conciliation; which, while conveniently composed of but two members, would combine the advantages of consisting of persons who, one as master and the other as workman, could grasp every circumstance of the case, yet who would both be free from the prejudices which might affect either party; of persons, moreover, to whom both would be bound to listen. The alteration appeared to those who urged it upon the noble and learned author of the Bill almost essential to confer upon it, as a statute, a principle of executability. Of what use were Courts of Conciliation and Arbitration upon paper or upon parchment? They would be of no use unless called into being and actual force. The mutual application made necessary was like proposing agreement before discussion, instead of discussing first and agreeing afterwards. Invariably, the party in a dispute who thinks he can carry the day is against all interference from without, call it arbitration, conciliation, or by whatever name you will. It is Utopian to begin with what amounts to reconcilement; but it is practical wisdom of the highest order to take up a dispute with a view to reconcilement at the earliest stage of its existence. The Bill brought in by Lord St. Leonards was before Parliament from 1860 to 1867: on the 15th of August, 1867, it received the Royal Assent. In how many instances has it been brought into operation?

In any observations on the subject of conciliation and arbitration between masters and men, the Conseils des Prud'hommes of the French are entitled to a prominent place. The readers of the *Contemporary Review* require neither Frenchman nor Englishman to explain the meaning of the words. *Prude*, however, as dictionaries say, means with the French, not *prudish*, as with us, but grave, sober, discreet. A *prude homme*, or *prud'homme*, is therefore a man who can be relied upon for moral worth and soundness of judgment. In short, *prud'hommie* is equivalent to *probity*. A *prud'homme*, according to M. Surenne, is "overseer at a seaport;" and a *Conseil des Prud'hommes* is a "trades' union." The history of the words corroborates the learned "corresponding member of the Grammatical Society of Paris." At the French ports, which, in old times, were not much more than fishing-places, the fishermen used to choose the best of their fellows to keep order; and to these, whom they styled *prud'hommes* (= experts), they submitted every question, instead of applying to the ordinary tribunals. But the *Conseils des Prud'hommes* are an institution of the present century. The first was appointed by desire

for Lyons only; but, four years later, they were established more generally in France. Their province was, to settle, by conciliation, differences between employers and employed, masters and apprentices, and, within certain limits, to decide without formality or cost between them, when the parties could not be brought to a good understanding. Their jurisdiction, however, is special and exceptional. They are formed where manufactories or workshops are numerous and numerously attended; but they take no cognizance of what happens outside their prescribed limits. Nor can they decide between one master and another: only between masters and men, or between workmen and workmen. Each Council belongs to a certain branch or branches of trade, and is confined to cases arising in trades called upon by the authorising Minister of State to confide in it. If, for example, in the instrument appointing a Council, the carpenters were not expressly named, no case between master and man of that trade could be brought before it, but any such case must be referred, if publicly investigated at all, to the ordinary tribunals. The Councils are not obliged to try cases between one master and the workmen of another; nor between any master and his workmen, except so far as the dispute bears upon the trade in which they stand engaged to each other. Within their peculiar province, they may try any case, whatever the amount in issue. To the extent of a hundred pounds, their judgments are final, and without appeal. Beyond that limit, an appeal lies to the civil court. But the Councils are not to proceed to judgment in any case, great or small, without having first exhausted in vain all means of conciliating the parties. In point of fact, the cases are few in which judgment is called for. Moreover, their jurisdiction is equitable rather than legal. They are to counsel parties to observe the general principles of justice, to have regard to the real interests of society, and to the customs of the country; and, instead of "the utmost rigour of the law," they are to give full effect to the moderating influence of circumstances. The Councils have power to preserve order, and punish breakers of it, in the workshops, to inflict fines upon unruly apprentices, and to sit in secret at discretion. But they cannot imprison without appeal; and the lapse of a year between offence and accusation precludes proceedings before them; nor, when proceedings have been taken, and sentence passed within the year, can judgment be executed after the lapse of two years from the trial.

The Councils are of two kinds and degrees—the Council of Conciliation, which must sit at least once a week, and consists of two members, a master and a workman; and the Council of Arbitration, which must sit at least twice a month, to decide in cases that could not be conciliated, and in which there must be four masters and four workmen to make a quorum: and it is worthy of notice that, notwith-

standing the previous endeavours to effect a reconciliation between the parties, in the Court of Arbitration, styled General Bureau, the president is bound, before passing sentence, to make a last attempt to bring the parties to agreement.

The Councils have some attributes quite foreign to the present subject. It is important, however, to note (especially under the circumstances of the passing time), that, in 1848, the masters, till then a majority in the Councils, were reduced in proportion; foremen, as members, made independent of their employers; and their workmen fairly represented. They consist, in Paris, of masters and men in equal numbers, and may not contain fewer than ten, nor more than twenty-six members. The electors are masters, foremen, and workmen, of twenty-one years of age and upwards, and six months resident in the circonscription. The candidates must be able to read and write, and have resided a whole year. Foreigners are ineligible, as also bankrupts and persons of bad character. A master must be a householder, and employ one or more workmen. As to the business transacted by them, it appeared from a Report, dated 1844, that sixty-six towns contained them; that, from 1830 to 1839, there were before them 135,730 cases, 128,319 of which were amicably settled, and 3,573 abandoned; and that, of the 3,838 judgments given, not more than 155 were subjects of appeal.

The Prefect has a large hand in the elections. The masters and the workmen are convened separately by him, under the presidency of the Assistant-Judge of Peace; the latter under that of the Chief Judge of Peace. Each annually chooses by ballot three times as many candidates as can be finally elected. The lists thus nominated are sent to the Mayor of the district, to be posted up. A week after, the masters and workmen are again called together for the real election. This time the masters choose the workman moiety of the Council, and the workmen the master half; the ostensible object being to counteract class influence. Foremen are eligible among the masters; but they must have first appeared in the list of candidates chosen by the masters. Every Council has a president and a vice-president, alternately master and workman, and elected every quarter; the masters electing the workman-president, and the workmen the master-president. Those who have already served are ineligible; and the president has the casting vote. There are other provisions, but of a secondary nature.

Before quitting the Conseils des Prud'hommes, it is desirable to advert to certain facts and circumstances. The right of combination was not conceded in France till the year 1864. What have been the consequences? In 1867, when the present Earl of Derby was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, he received a report from Mr. Fane,

in which it appeared that the workmen of France had been enabled, under the new law, to obtain a rise of wages, and that the masters denounced that law as subjecting them to a tyrannical coercion. The men, said the masters, extort from us an increase of wages when we have large contracts on hand; and the end will be, that the trade of France will pass into the hands of foreign manufacturers. This cry has been raised more than once in Great Britain. It has been heard likewise in other countries. Supposing it to be well founded, whither will manufactures be driven? At this rate, they seem destined to follow in the track of Dr. Faustus of the nursery rhymes, and to pass from land to land until no land remain to give them refuge. But stay: the forced peregrinations of Dr. Faustus ended, we recollect, in his "coming back again!" The free exercise of the workmen's conceded rights, in country after country, will but gently constrain masters of every land to come into measures of conciliation and arbitration.

In connection with these references to the Conseils des Prud'-hommes, and to matters of trade in France, it will seem ungrateful not to acknowledge the valuable contribution of a French Prince in exile to the cause of conciliation and arbitration. Than the Count of Paris, no other man, Englishman or foreigner, has taken more pains in collecting facts, or shown more fairness in drawing conclusions from them. He stands by trades' unions as "an application of the prolific principle of association," which, among other benefits, is "helping to remove the spurious and fatal notion that the interests of capital and labour are opposed." He, on the contrary, expects the masters to "regain all their influence by a happy alliance." Accordingly, in an admirable chapter devoted to considering "the Remedy for Strikes," the Prince reviews the great things that have been accomplished by Mr. Mundella, Mr. Kettle, and others, and fixes, with just discrimination, as one tribute to the efficiency of voluntary arbitration, upon the influence which it exerts even upon masters who have not openly joined in giving it authority.

"For," says his Highness, "if one of them offered his workmen wages below the rate adopted by the other manufacturers, the latter, instead of, as formerly, coming to his assistance, and believing themselves bound to do the same, take side with the workman, and reduce him to helplessness by finding employment for the men who have left him on account of the unreasonable reduction. So that, in fact, masters and men, united by a common interest, form one association, which is enlightened by the discussions and governed by the decisions of the Board."

No man is better entitled to respectful, trustful, and even grateful attention on these matters than is Mr. Mundella, Member for Sheffield, manufacturer at Nottingham, and in his origin a working man. He, as all even cursorily informed on the subject are [illegible]

founder of the Nottingham Board of Arbitration for the hosiery trade. After an experience of seven years (1861—8) from the date of its institution, it could be said of this Board that disputes between masters and men had been thereby prevented. Mr. Mundella begins his testimony on the subject with adverting to the remedial defectiveness of both the French Conseils des Prud'hommes and Lord St. Leonards' Act. No remedy, he contends, is complete and perfect that does not provide for prospective action. With respect to conciliation, there is no room for misunderstanding that. What, he asks, is meant by arbitration? It is an arrangement for open and friendly bargaining. Arbitration, however, seems to be something more positive and absolute than this. It, first of all, implies an arbiter, one who goes to a place in the character of a seer, a hearer, a witness. The arbiter arbitrates when, between two parties, he pronounces sentence according to equity and the best of his judgment. But he must be authorised to treat the matter in dispute according to his own will. The declaration of that will is an arbitration, and is final. Hence the meaning of authority beyond appeal attached to the epithet arbitrary.

Mr. Mundella is one of those who have no faith in arbitration by persons who know nothing of, and have no interest in, the particular trade with which the question submitted may be connected. "Arbitration," he contends, "to be effective in preventing disputes, must be the result of a system of open and friendly bargaining, in which masters and men meet together and talk over their common affairs openly and freely. Engineers cannot legislate for tailors, nor tailors for engineers; each industry must legislate for itself." Having thus distinguished the position which he takes in that particular from that taken, as will be seen, by Mr. Rupert Kettle, Mr. Mundella gives us the benefit of his actual experience. We need not go back with him to the beginning of the eighteenth century. It will be enough to join him at the end of the first twenty years of the nineteenth. "From 1820 to 1860," he observes, "offences against person and property diminished; but combinations were better organized, and strikes increased." But let this sentence be connected with that in which he bears witness that "the leaders of trades' unions have been among the most energetic advocates of Courts of Arbitration and Conciliation." The unions, then, need no further defence than this: first, that they have put an end to injuries of person and of property; secondly, that they have been foremost to call for conciliation, and, that failing, to submit to arbitration.

In 1860, some at least of the Nottingham masters became weary of contention, and persuaded that lock-outs were not a remedy for strikes. After a century of feud, they desired an era of conciliation. First communicating with their brother masters, they brought them into the same mind. A resolution was passed, and a handbill issued.

In fact, the masters invited the men to meet them with a view to some arrangement. The invitation was accepted, and, at the end of three days' discussion, the existing strike came to a close by mutual concession. But this was not all. It was further agreed that, to prevent strikes for the future, "strikes so disastrous to employers and employed," a Board of Arbitration should be at once formed. It was to consist of six masters and six workmen. To it all questions relating to wages were to be referred, and its decisions were to be final and binding upon all parties. No sooner said than done; only, by mutual agreement, nine a side were substituted for six. The nine workmen were chosen by the universal suffrage of their own trades' unions; the nine masters, at a general meeting of their own body.

The Board met on the 3rd of December, 1860. They had neither rules nor precedents. The scheme was not universally approved by either masters or men. Some distrusted it even to suspicion; others assailed it with ridicule and sneers; a third portion (of the masters) doubted the practicability, if they did not disdain the thought, of masters meeting men on terms of perfect equality. However, the experimenters had with them a majority of the masters, and perhaps the bulk of the intelligent men. The result shall be stated as nearly as may be in the founder's own words. "Whenever men meet together with the honest desire to aim at the truth, and to do justice to each other, a good understanding is almost sure to follow." The working-men delegates proposed a master as president; the masters, a workman as vice-president—precedents which have been invariably followed. The rules originally made have never been altered. Brief and simple, they provide for arbitration on any questions relating to wages, and for conciliation in any disputes that may arise; and they entrust to a committee of four members (two, it is assumed, on each side) inquiry into cases referred to it, with instructions to settle the disputes, or, if unable, to remit them to the whole Board. This, therefore, is, after all, an example of "settling their disputes among themselves." Not only is no stranger called in, but no umpire, no chairman even, is appointed beyond the members of the Board, who, as has been seen, choose their own president and vice-president from among themselves. Experience, however, has convinced Mr. Mundella and the Board, that it impairs the influence of the individual and of the Board when, as has happened to himself, the president gives a casting vote. "I consider it undesirable," he observes, "that one side should even appear to have the least preponderance over the other; and the employers intend, at the annual meeting, to propose the abolition of that privilege, and to substitute for it, after the example of Leicester, the vote of some gentleman acquainted, but not connected, with the

trade, in whose honour and justice both parties shall have full confidence."

Mr. Mundella does not pretend that there have been no difficulties, no mistakes; but he distinctly states that every question submitted for seven years has been successfully adjusted. "We have had instances," he admits, "where employers have acted contrary to the decisions of the Board, and two where workmen have refused to accept those decisions; but the steady adherence of the majority of both parties to our decrees has always, sooner or later, brought the recalcitrants (the kickers, in fact) back to our side." The Nottingham Board now governs the hosiery trade of Nottingham, Derbyshire, and North Leicestershire; and the number of persons employed cannot be less than sixty thousand. It is very rarely that the price originally proposed by either masters or workmen is the price ultimately agreed to. Some alterations or concessions are generally made on both sides; and the price, once fixed, is considered mutually binding. But a month's notice must be given before any change of prices can be discussed. Most questions are settled in committee. The two seceders from the Board were readmitted at their own request. For three years and a half (the latter portion of the seven) the Board have arrived at all their decisions without even voting. The Board is open to receive delegations from out-of-doors, a practice which has had a very wholesome effect; the general result being, that, by coming into friendly contact with each other, mutual confidence takes the place of former mistrust, and the full force of facts and arguments on one side comes to be acknowledged on the other.

"In fact," says Mr. Mundella, "the less the workman is kept in the dark, the better it is both for himself and his master. On the other hand, the insight which the master obtains into the circumstances and views of the workman, tends greatly to develop his sympathies and to improve the workman's condition. And we feel that labour demands more consideration at our hands than iron, or coal, or cotton, or any dead commodity."

Who, then, are the workmen that have seats at a Board which is producing all these beneficial effects? "In almost all cases," answers Mr. Mundella, "they are the prominent leaders of trades' unions;" and, he adds, "I have found among them as much wisdom, tact, moderation, and *self-denial* as the best of us who are employers can show." It has been seen, in former papers of the present series, what trades' unions are, and what are the relative consequences of strikes and lock-outs. We now learn what, according to Nottingham experience, has been the effect of conciliation and arbitration in relation both to unionism and conflicts between capital and labour.

"Since the 27th of September, 1860," says Mr. Mundella, "there has not been a bill of any kind issued. Strikes are at an end also.

Levies to sustain them are unknown; and one shilling a year from each member suffices to pay all expenses. This, not a farthing of which comes out of the pockets of the masters, is equivalent to a large advance of wages. I have inspected the balance-sheet of a trades' union of ten thousand three hundred men, and I found the expenditure for thirteen months to amount to less than a hundred pounds."

Mr. Mundella, who had given close attention to the subject, did not anticipate success for Lord St. Leonards' well-meant endeavours. The Act of the British Parliament, like the Conseils des Prud'-hommes of France, was defective in not authorising the Councils to be created under it to establish a rate of wages. Their action could only be retrospective, whereas no remedy would be efficient which should not provide for a future scale of wages based upon mutual agreement; and, in Mr. Mundella's view, such mutual agreement cannot be brought about by force of legislation, but only by suasive action upon the good sense and the good feeling of masters and men.

As another, and, if possible, more independent, witness, Mr. Smiles may be called forward. This gentleman, in his readable little book on "Workmen's Earnings, Strikes, and Savings," makes out the strongest case that he can against combinations of the men to raise wages. But, on that very account, his testimony on one or two points is the more emphatic.

"The masters," he remarks, "though comparatively powerless in combinations to reduce wages, are strong in their resistance to combinations of workmen either to reduce the hours of labour or to raise the rate of wages. They are a small and compact body; and, when driven to act in concert by a common danger, they are strong in defence. But the sacrifices they must necessarily make during such contests—with their capital locked up in buildings, machinery, and materials, yielding no profits—must at all times necessarily render them most averse to the last resort of a lock-out."

Let the words stand as they are found. Without the alteration of one, they are quite enough, as they stand, to show that masters have as much interest as men in the submission of questions of dispute to conciliation and arbitration. They are the words, too, of a writer who has told the men unpleasant truths, or what he deemed such, with as much plainness and directness as any censor they ever had. Yet from him we have this declaration:—

"Frankness and cordiality will win working men's hearts; and a ready explanation will often remove misgivings and dissatisfaction. Were there more heart and greater sympathy between classes, there would be less disposition to turn out on the part of men, and a more accommodating spirit on the part of masters."

Stronger still are the words which Mr. Smiles borrows from the late Lord Ellesmere, and with which he closes his book. While other coal-owners were at loggerheads with their colliers, between his lordship and those who worked in his pits at Worsley there

existed the most perfect harmony. To an address, in which they expressed to him their feelings of attachment, he thus replied: "It cannot be too widely known how liberally the working classes of this country are disposed to reward with their good-will and affection those to whom, rightly or wrongly, they attribute similar feelings towards themselves."

What Mr. Rupert Kettle has said on the subject of conciliation and arbitration between masters and men is the more worthy of attention because, besides his general and particular qualifications as a judge in such matters, he has plainly said, "Establish arbitration, and every reasonable objection to unions vanishes." To the objection that the ordinary tribunals of the country are open to all, and there is, therefore, no need for novel kinds of judicature, he answers that by public process you can neither define nor enforce contracts, except, indeed, you take yourselves into Chancery. By summons under the Masters and Servants Act, by conviction at Petty Sessions, or by a plaint in the County Court, you can procure the infliction of punishment or obtain damages for breach of contract. A delinquent workman may be made to suffer deduction, by way of fine, from wages due, or may be sent to prison, with or without the addition of hard labour; and either party, according to the judgment of the court, may or may not get damages, enforceable by distress. But such remedies are both vexatious and inconclusive; exasperations rather than cures. Moreover, their inequality, as between master and man, condemns them. The master breaking contract may register a Deed of Arrangement, or, at the worst, go through the Bankruptcy Court; the man may, perhaps must, go to the treadmill.

But might not masters and men "settle their disputes between themselves?" Not always; not often; nay, very seldom. Is it a matter of fact?—it is denial against assertion. Is it one of meaning?—each of the parties stands upon his own interpretation. In either case they want a daysman betwixt them that might lay his hand upon them both. Without some reference of the kind, you might as well, says Mr. Kettle, compose a jury of parties and witnesses, and lock them up till they agree. You want one, or more than one, to mediate, or, eventually, to arbitrate; hearing, sifting, and weighing evidence; listening patiently to argument answered by argument; acquiring a clear knowledge of the contract in issue; putting a true, reasonable, and unbiassed interpretation upon it; noting its ambiguities, if any, and its unreasonablenesses, if any; and, besides, determining justly and wisely the actual point of dispute; so reframing, as it were, the agreement out of which the general quarrel came, as to fix its construction for the future beyond the power of self-interest, craft, or cupidity to wrest it from its fair meaning.

Such an arrangement, as Mr. Kettle usefully shows, would help to get rid of the endless inconveniences accruing from mere customs, usages, understandings, and verbal contracts. The agreement between the parties, being clearly ascertained and authoritatively fixed, would be reduced to writing. Writing not simply remains; but it is unalterable as well as uneffaceable, placed above defectiveness of memory, and proof against prevarication. Moreover, parties less unequal even in personal respects as master and man, as knowing and ignorant, as straightforward and crooked, would stand upon a level of advantage where the whole question turned upon a contract reduced to writing, and especially upon one that, beyond being understandable, "cannot be misunderstood."

Where this excellent gentleman fails to meet the case—if, indeed, he does fail to meet it—is in looking outside the circle within which the question lies, and in going to arbitration at one step, instead of stopping at the stage of conciliation. He asks for some intermediate power, to which either party might, without pride or shame, freely appeal at the outset of a disagreement, and thus prevent it from becoming an open quarrel; and he contends that this mediatorial functionary must be no vain master of ceremonies, no mere conciliator, nor even a peacemaker only, but that he must have power—power to decide, as well as to hear; and, in fine, while christened as you please, be clothed with all the attributes of an umpire.

The more familiar, simple, and easy the method adopted for settling trade disputes, the better it would be likely to succeed. If masters and men cannot always, or often, settle their disputes among themselves, are they not the most likely to assist each other in such settlements? Experience has knowledge of two styles of arbitration—arbitration by mere lawyers, and arbitration by experts in the affairs submitted for arbitrament. Nothing is avowedly more trying to patience, more costly, or more unsatisfactory, than the process and the results of arbitration by lawyers; nothing confessedly more expeditious, cheaper, or more satisfactory—as much so, at least, as any case of dispute settled more in favour of one party than the other can be hoped to be—than investigation and award by plain men, but having a thorough knowledge of the subject submitted to them. The principle involved applies with its utmost force to disputes betwixt masters and workmen, provided always that the mode of arbitration comprises special information, with an equal representation of conflicting interests.

It may be true that a verbal agreement to go to arbitration and be bound by the award is enough in law. But it is better to insist upon everything being reduced to writing. For the very reason that the reference must be mutual as between the parties, so must both be

holdable to an agreement placed beyond question or dispute. Equally necessary are those general rules and those special contracts which belong to the issue. Take, for example, compositors in the printing trade and their employers. The "scale" is mutually acknowledged, and of itself precludes a vast amount of otherwise possible, nay, almost certain dispute. In some colliery districts, again, they insert at the end of the rules printed under the Inspection Act, their own special rules, giving a copy of both to each man when hired. Add to the special rules an arbitration clause; and the giving and accepting of the book containing all would hold perfectly good as a submission to arbitration in matters of subsequent dispute. It were as well, however, to bear in mind the suggestion of Mr. Kettle, that, "when either party is illiterate [that is, unable to read], it is necessary that the rules be read over and fairly explained to him; and, if the private contract be in writing, it is proper for the party who reads and explains to sign his name as a witness."

All that is needful to secure the legality of the contract having been done, the next step is to gain the assent and consent of a whole trade in a given district to the rules, including arbitration. Here, perhaps, one cannot do better than narrate the way in which the building trades of Wolverhampton went to work, and with what result. In 1865 there was reason to apprehend a strike. The Mayor called a meeting of the trades to avoid it. This issued in the appointment of six delegates from the masters to meet six delegates from the men. They met, and pitched upon the same man for chairman. He requested from both sides their own list of prices and trade scales, with like information from other places. Thus furnished, he took the chair, and business began. Those rules on which all agreed were first adopted; the rest separately discussed. Through free debate, full explanation, and the pains taken by the chairman to understand everybody, and that everybody should be understood by the rest, dissension became concurrence; but for one exception, virtual unanimity. The division in that single instance gave a majority against the proposition; so that, notwithstanding the equal representation of masters and men, the chairman was not required, even in that case, to interpose his casting vote. From the minutes of the first meeting, he framed the formal rules; which, at a second meeting, were finally approved. Three copies, signed by the trade delegates and the chairman, were placed one in the hands of the chairman, one in those of the master delegates, and one in those of the men delegates. These rules were then printed, and copies put up in every workshop; they having been accepted by both masters and men as the terms of contract between them. For half a year there was unbroken harmony. Then a question arose between a master

and his carpenters as to the right construction of one of the rules. The point was referred to the chairman, who became acknowledged umpire. Calling together the twelve delegates,—who had, by the operation of their individual contracts of service, become in law the arbitrators in this dispute,—he invited two men who represented the workmen to state as plaintiffs their case, and then the master to give as defendant his view of the matter. This done, he requested the workmen delegates, one by one, to express their opinions, and the master delegates, one by one, to express theirs. He then, as umpire, decided; his decision being that the men had put the right construction on the rule. He offered to make an award that might be legally enforced; but the master avoided that course by cheerfully accepting the judgment given, and at once paying the men accordingly. In this they readily acquiesced; otherwise, a precedent would have been established for the enforcement of awards made under like circumstances.

The case described was one of construction. Had it been a matter of fact, it would have been decided according to evidence. Testimony on both sides would have been taken, premises perhaps viewed, measurements made, or whatever else might have been needful to ascertain the exact truth. Both sides fully heard, parties would have retired, and the court would have considered the whole matter, and declared an award, either by a majority of votes, or, these being equal, by the casting vote of the umpire. The course would have been similar had the question been one of damages or compensation, amounts not agreed upon.

The Wolverhampton arrangement is instructive in relation to changes of rules. The rules adopted were to be in force from May to May, tenders for building work being usually called for in the spring. It had been agreed that, if either masters or men desired any alteration, notice should be given by the party desiring it to the other party in January. It so happened that both parties desired alterations in the same year. Of this the umpire had notice according to rule, such notice stating specifically the alterations desired, which embraced a rise in wages, half-holiday on Saturday, and other important points. The Court of Arbitration met; and, after but one adjournment, every point submitted was settled by the unanimous vote of the twelve delegates. What has been hitherto stated relates to the carpenters and joiners only. The plasterers, seeing the happy consequences, followed their example.

In the instance narrated, the award of the umpire was accepted on the spot. But it is possible that parties might not always be thus content. If, then, an award is to be legally enforced, how can it be easiest and cheapest done? By one of two methods. The first is by

plaint in the County Court of the district in which the defendant lives; the second, under the thirteenth section of 5 Geo. IV. c. 96; for, in the opinion of Mr. Kettle, that section is "quite sufficient for the purpose." The second mode has the advantage of being even quicker than the first. The learned gentleman, to whom we are indebted for this exemplification, finishes with suggesting that the Legislature would give willing attention to proposals for any needed amendment of the law, and that neither masters nor men need hesitate to ask any neighbour who deserves their mutual confidence to take upon him the office of chairman and umpire.

Well, then, the day of strikes and lock-outs has come to an end, and the epoch of conciliation and arbitration has set in. Of the success with which the system, in one form or in another, has been put into practice a number of gratifying instances might be adduced. Let one of the latest be taken—that of the iron-workers in the West of Scotland. In the spring of this year the puddlers of Blochairn felt themselves driven to a strike anent the mode and manner of working. On one side were the double furnaces; on the other, the less productive sort. The men connected with the latter complained of the badness of the yield. Moreover, when "cobbles" were made, no matter from what cause, they were sent back to the puddlers. Now, it has been affirmed, that broad Scotland does not contain a set of iron-works at which the men have wrought with more satisfaction to their employers and to themselves than had the good men of Blochairn. But there came one Charles Blaydon, and, with him, Abraham Burtt. Had William Smilie remained, things would have continued to go on well; but, from the time that Burtt took his place under Mr. Blaydon, dissatisfaction seems to have sprung up. It soon grew into a strike; and, unfortunately for the Company, the strike was met with a lock-out. Of course, the men suffered as well as the masters. The case of the former took the shape of an appeal from the puddlers for the removal of alleged grievances, and for an advance of sixpence on the ton. Upon this the Messrs. Hannay addressed themselves to the other employers, calling upon them to lock out their men, in order to stop them from supporting those on strike at Blochairn. The consequence was, a general war between masters and men.

At this stage of affairs, Mr. John Kane, a member of the Board of Arbitration and Conciliation for the North of England Iron Trade, appeared upon the scene. His sympathies, as a man and not a master, might have been supposed to be on the side of the men rather than the masters. Both, however, have learned, in retrospect at least, to hail his advent as that of an angel from heaven. At any rate, he brought the olive-branch of peace. "The good

sense of the Scotch iron-workers was displayed, and the confidence of the masters excited," declares an impartial on-looker, "the moment Mr. Kane made his appearance with proposals of conciliation and peace. Those proposals were eagerly accepted; and, from that moment, will date the abolition of strikes in Scotland." Although the iron-workers had been regarded as the least reasonable and most violent in their demands, they have been the first, in their own country, to adopt the principle of arbitration. They gladly accepted Mr. Kane as their referee; and the masters not less willingly put themselves into the hands of Mr. David Dale, a name well known in Scotland. Visiting district upon district, and holding meeting upon meeting, Mr. Kane put before the men seven propositions which seemed to him to embrace their whole case, and recommended them to submit those propositions to the masters as the basis of a mutual settlement. The men of Blochairn were to resume work, and the masters were to withdraw the general lock-out. The men at each works were to make out in writing a statement of their claims, and to put them before their respective employers, signed by the workmen, each for himself. A representative meeting of masters and men, consisting of one master and three men from each establishment, was to assemble in Glasgow, to investigate the points in dispute, and, by conciliatory means, as far as possible, to settle them. Any question left undecided was to be submitted, by agreement between parties, to an independent referee. His decision was to be accepted by both parties as final, for at least a specified time. Pending the inquiry by representative meeting, and until the appointed referee should announce his award, the hands were to continue at work as though masters and men were not at issue on any point. The decision of the referee was to take effect from the date at which the men should resume work.

On Saturday, the 18th of June last, these proposals were accepted by the men, and submitted to the masters, with the names of two men from each of the works attached. The masters were requested to give answer on the next Monday night. That day passed off in mere rumours of the temper prevailing in certain firms. On Tuesday, however, the masters met by delegation, and, with one exception only, put in a written answer. The sum of them all was a unanimous agreement to accept of the proposals made by the men, and to communicate that agreement each master to his own men. The result will be, if it has not happened already, a permanent Board of Conciliation and Arbitration for the Iron Trade of the West of Scotland.

The name of David Dale must not be suffered to pass without a brief digression justified by his own words and indicated by the

strong-expressed opinion of other men. One of the first advocates of settling trade disputes by arbitration, he was chosen first chairman of the Board of Arbitration and Conciliation for the manufactured iron trade of the North of England. From a deep and general conviction of the value of his services in this position, an address was publicly presented to him in the Central Hall of Darlington, on the evening of the 16th of September last. It has the concurrence of no fewer than two-and-twenty great companies or large firms, being signed by a representative employer and a representative operative attached to each, as well as by the vice-president and the secretaries of the Arbitration Board. The address acknowledges the valuable services which Mr. Dale has rendered to all connected with the trade, and to the public generally, in maintaining peace and promoting prosperity. "With great administrative ability, tact, and judgment," say the subscribers, "you have brought to bear upon the proceedings and discussions a truly conciliatory spirit, enabling us on all occasions to bear and forbear with each other; and, as a necessary result, we trust that the relation of employer and employed will be henceforth of a thoroughly harmonious and satisfactory character."

In presenting this remarkable address, the Vice-President stated that, of the fifty-seven meetings held by the Board, Mr. Dale had presided at fifty-five, that peace and plenty were the happy results, and that the masters were no longer afraid of going into the markets, knowing, as they now did, what wages they would have to pay for a long time to come. The meeting did not end without a practical result. On the motion of Mr. Backhouse, the Member for Darlington, seconded by Mr. John Kane, a resolution was carried, setting forth the experience in the present instance, as "sufficient evidence that the establishment of Courts of Conciliation tends to improve trade and commerce, to promote confidence and trust in each other, and, above all, to prevent the wilful waste of the accumulated wealth of employers and workmen by strikes and lock-outs." In making this motion, Mr. Backhouse declared that he had found the working men to be as sensible as other men, and only requiring the production of the facts showing the real state of the trade, in order to acquiesce in a reasonable adjustment. "The interests of the masters and the men," said Mr. Backhouse, "are identical; and, in proportion as they realise this, in that proportion will they be mutually benefited. These views were corroborated by Mr. Kane, speaking from the stand-point of the employed. Arbitration, he affirmed, was invariably satisfactory in its results, as would be seen clearly when they should become more thoroughly masters of the system. He pointed out, as one great practical recommendation of the system, that, during

the arrangement of any difference, the works to which it related were never allowed to stand still; nor, while saying this, did the independent speaker shrink from asserting, as an indisputable condition of success, the maintenance of organization among the men on terms of equality with the masters; for "the workmen," he contended, "always benefited from the discipline and good government that followed, and were better dealt with than when they were fragmentary." Finally, he expressed his regret that the ironmasters and the iron men in Staffordshire were so tardy in perceiving the advantages of the new system, and persisted in adhering to the wastefulness and irritation of the old.

The great feature of this happy meeting was, Mr. Dale's reply to the Address. It is not practicable on this occasion to recapitulate the topics on which he touched. For two years, during which the malleable iron trade had been idle (1835—6), arbitration had now given it two years of uninterrupted progress. He advocated the appointment of an umpire year by year, instead of one for each time; since, although, on the only two occasions when this choice had been necessary, it was unanimous, it was obviously better to have at hand an umpire who had not been chosen during any excitement about the question on which he was called in. He also recommended the adoption of time bargains on Mr. Kettle's principle. He had no hesitation, he observed, in saying that a master might offer five per cent. higher wages for a twelvemonth's bargain, than when uncertain how wages might rise or fall. Such time bargains as had been already made had been faithfully observed. As to the working of their conciliation machinery, in no case had the standing committee failed; and the Board had been confined, in the exercise of its functions, to general questions of wages or of rules, affecting the whole trade. With respect to the two instances in which an umpire had been called in (in the first, Mr. Kettle; in the second, Mr. T. Hughes, M.P.), an imperfect apprehension of facts lay at the root of the difficulty. But this was got over without any such disclosure of the affairs of individual firms, either to their own or to other men, as had been conjured up in the imaginations of some sensitive employers. The questions turned upon the price of iron, its advance, and the extent of that advance, and the comparison of the wages paid in one place with the wages paid in other districts. The employers, Mr. Dale explained, extracted from their books the net average prices for the two periods under consideration. From these extracts the secretaries framed a table of averages, which, and which only, was laid before the Board. The umpire alone had sight of the details, with leave to verify them by comparison with the respective books. As to the rate of

wages, the secretaries obtained authoritative and official information, and, by this simple process, prevented "a series of most conflicting and most inconsistent statements on either side." To the men, Mr. Dale, in conclusion, gave good advice as to the concurrent election of their best men to represent them, and acquiescence in decisions come to by them at the Board in the exercise of their best judgment upon ascertained facts; while to the masters he observed, that they might depend upon it the day for feudal, or, if they pleased, patriarchal relations, had gone utterly and for ever by.

A fair example of the views entertained by the men with respect to Courts of Conciliation and of Arbitration is presented in the draft of a scheme for that purpose which the operative builders of Liverpool have recently laid before the Associated Masters. It is proposed to be applied to all master builders, tradesmen, and operatives connected with the building trade in any of its branches. The court to be constituted is to be extra-judicial. It is to consist of employers and employed in equal numbers. The members are to be chosen at a yearly meeting of each body electing. Each branch of the trade is to return six masters and as many men. At the first meeting of the persons thus authorised to act, they are to choose a president, and also a vice-president, to take the president's place in his unavoidable absence. The whole Court, being constituted, is to be divided into three sections. The first will be a Court of Conciliation, consisting of one employer and one workman, each belonging to the branch of the trade in which the dispute to be conciliated shall have arisen; the second will be a Court of Arbitration, composed of six employers and as many workmen, all pertaining to the particular occupation to which the question to be decided relates; the third is designed as a Special Court, and will consist of the president, and of one master and one man from each branch of the whole trade. The province of the Court of Conciliation will be to conciliate parties in any concern in which small differences may have arisen, referring the matter, if parties cannot be conciliated, to the second court. The Court of Arbitration is thus to serve as a Court of Appeal from that of Conciliation, and also to settle disputes arising in any particular branch of the trade. The Special Court is to be a Court of Final Appeal from the second, and is to take action for the settlement of differences affecting the whole trade in all its branches. In questions brought before the Court of Conciliation, the parties are to appear in person, but the employer may send his foreman to represent him; and, should the dispute have arisen with the foreman, the proceedings are to be private. The Court of Arbitration and the Special Court are to be in all cases public; and, before them, parties may appear either in person or, as in the County Courts, by counsel or by attorney. The

Courts are to take notice of all differences arising; but, in cases affecting the future rate of wages or the future hours of work, their decisions are to be held binding for six months only. In all cases, the majority is to decide; and, should the votes be equal, the president is to give the casting vote.

The efforts that have been made by law or with consent—in the former way with little success, but in the latter not without much encouragement—to bring about a better understanding between masters and men, are in themselves a proof that the time had come for ending the long, irritating, wasteful, and, for any good purpose, fruitless war between capital and labour. Trades' unions could not but exist under a state of the law which left individual rights freely to express, assert, and associate themselves. These unions, no doubt, appeared formidable to an unpleasant degree when associated in apprehensive minds, and even in fact, with strikes, if not with outbursts of temper scarcely consistent with submission to that very law which gives the right of association for a common legal purpose. The principle of unionism had its fullest and most powerful expression in the levies of aid from a whole trade to those of that trade engaged in a limited strike. During the stage of passionate excitement, the masters, thus foiled, could perceive no one kind of combination more suitable or more effective than that of a lock-out put in force against the sympathisers. This was naturally productive of hot wars, the duration of which depended, like that of wars in general, on the means of endurance possessed by the combatants.

But, in the waging of these wars, the masters, if they did not quite lose the Gallican notion of their own infinite superiority, learned, at least, to look upon their antagonists in the field with different eyes from those which had before taught them to despise where they ought to have respected. They discovered that the trades' unions, whether good or bad things, were led by men in whom there dwelt an animating spirit very different from that which possessed the Luddites and the rick-burners of former years. The working men, under this new order of leaders, had ceased to do evil, and learned to do well. The vile and stupid outrages of the times of ignorance gradually and all but universally disappeared. Reason took the place of passion, and patience of perversity. In one word, the captains of the united hosts began by frowning down brute force and sheer resentment, and then proceeded to unfurl a flag inscribed with nothing more sanguinary or terrible than "Conciliation and Arbitration." If, with any promptitude, the masters have responded to the call, and to whatever extent they may have honestly and heartily done so, let them receive free, full, and stintless credit. Happy day, when, as one of the foremost conciliators on the side of

the men expresses it, both sides shall confess fighting to be worse than useless, and both anticipate a material gain from laying down their arms together!

Perhaps, indeed, a better form of considering the subject the facts of which have in preceding pages been succinctly, but, it is hoped, lucidly, summarised, cannot be devised than that which the intelligent and clear-headed writer alluded to has set before us.

What, then, is the form of arbitration to be preferred?

Might one form be more suitable for one trade, and another for another trade?

Ought the awards of voluntary Boards to be made legally binding, or should they be left to their chance of voluntary fulfilment?

Would it be advisable to give power to the Boards to assist, by inquiry and judgment, in the formation and settlement of rules for the trades which they respectively represent?

Can such systems of arbitration as have been declared by law be so assimilated to the practice of voluntary Boards as to strengthen the principle and increase its usefulness and success?

There can be no present doubt that the system of voluntary arbitration has been preferred, and deserves to be preferred, to the systems laid down by law. The Masters' and Servants' Act is not wholly inoperative; but it is altogether ineffective. The Act of Lord St. Leonards, with perfect respect be it said, is a dead letter. The method that is to succeed must neither confine itself to the present nor let the present grow unmanageable before it interferes. The conciliators or the arbitrators must not be to seek because they are wanted in an emergency; but they must be at hand, lest an emergency should arise. A hasty choice is almost certainly a bad choice. The fire-engine must be ready before the flames burst forth, or the house will be burned down. Without an established Board, there would be a temptation on masters and men to take advantage of each other; but, a tribunal being in existence which both have helped to form, and concur in supporting, they are deterred from asking what mere selfishness might dictate, or from refusing what plain justice might demand. When the relations of capital and labour are friendly, then is the time for instituting a Court of Arbitration, to which the representatives of both will loyally submit, and which, in the working of it, shall inspire confidence and command respect.

The experience of France and that of England, so far as they have run in the same channel, combine to prove the superiority of a flexible and elastic scheme of arbitration over one rigorously defined and restricted. Trade is trade, no doubt; but one trade differs from another. Many circumstances of different kinds are easily conceivable as demanding for success in this direction or in that a pliant

system susceptible of adaptation to occasions. To the unpractical eye, a Board armed with legal powers may seem to carry with it positive advantages; but what a voluntary Board may lose, if it do lose, in that direction, is made up in freedom from those forms and trammels which put the statutory arbitrators into a strait-jacket. Young David looked in Saul's armour as fierce as any knight in Lord Mayor's Show; but then, he could not even move under it. There must be in conciliation or in arbitration the utmost liberty for the play of all those influences which determine the character of a trade dispute, bring out facts in exact form and in full light, and overpower the prejudice and the passion which may have been introduced into the question, by the dispassionate expression and suasive application of that special knowledge which both sides are ready to endorse when free from those agitations of the spirits which interfere with a judgment according to knowledge.

The question, Ought the awards of voluntary Boards to be made legally binding? has been really opened, if not decided, by Mr. Kettle, without putting it in precise logical form. The principal thing is, that the arbitration should begin well. The Potteries' Board ask masters to join in one written statement of the case. Such a case might seem to be self-settled. But those who agree upon the facts, may still dispute upon deductions from them. However, a statement of the kind named must greatly simplify and shorten the work of conciliation or of arbitration, as the case may be. The rule, nevertheless, is not of universal application. The practical efficiency of a Board will depend a great deal upon ease of access to it; and some workmen, if not a few masters, are not particularly good hands at written statement. Equality of represenation on the Board is a very main thing. It should be strictly preserved on the occurrence of individual absences. This is one of the discoveries which experience has revealed to the Nottingham Board, besides that mentioned by Mr. Mundella about the inexpediency of a casting-vote in the hands of a member of the Board. This error, corrected at Nottingham, was avoided in the Potteries and in the Iron Trade; and nothing can be better than the plan pursued at Wolverhampton.

It is certainly necessary to the highest utility of Boards of Arbitration, that the awards for which they have been asked with consent of both parties, should be faithfully carried out. None but very foolish men and very short-sighted masters could wish it otherwise. Let both parties know that the award will carry force, and they will then see sense in having a Board; but which of them, in their right minds, would come before a Board that might pronounce an opinion indeed, but had not the power to settle anything? We agree, therefore, with Mr. Kettle, that the award should be carefully given, under such

circumstances, and in such a form, as the ordinary tribunals of the country would recognise to be binding. It is certain that decisions come to by such men, and under such circumstances, have the strongest moral claims to our recognition, limitation of time and other circumstances always being borne in mind.

For the same reason that a Board of Arbitration ought not to be precluded from prospective questions, even to the extent of dealing with the rate of wages, it should not be prohibited from taking up questions of trade rule. The way to avoid particular disputes is to elicit general agreement; and general agreement, when elicited, can be in no way recorded so advantageously as in the adoption of rules which embody and formalise it. To hand over this power to any mere court of law, though created by Lord St. Leonards' Act, would be a great mistake; but it might be safely entrusted to arbitrators who are the sympathising representatives of both parties interested, and who pretend to no other authority than that of truth, reason, and persuasion. These are not mediating or judging between parties that may never meet again, but between members of the very industry to which both the Board and the parties before it all belong. Unless, indeed, the Board have leave to consider the whole subject of trade rules, the benefit of their wisest and justest awards might be confined to the parties immediately before them; whereas, in nearly every instance, they are adapted to be as useful to the whole trade as to the contending litigants.

If the view taken by Mr. Kettle be sustained, it would seem doubtful whether voluntary arbitration, as practised in the recent form above mentioned, would gain much or anything by the addition of aught contained in Acts of Parliament. The greatest success of voluntary Boards has been in the doing of that in which both those Acts failed. The last meeting of the Nottingham Board, it was once remarked, was occupied with a discussion upon the rate of wages to be paid in future. The last important meeting of the Iron Trade Board was to settle the price of labour for the next twelve months. At the last meeting of the Potteries Board, a question of prices with a view to the future was examined and settled. Each of these three voluntary Boards, in their unfettered freedom, did acts which no form of arbitration known to the law would have allowed to be done. The unlimited scope given to the voluntary Boards is, next to their impartiality, their grand recommendation, because they can take up and deal with any questions whatever of interest to masters and workmen in their respective trades.

GEORGE POTTER.

THE CHRISTIAN MINISTRY NOT A PRIESTHOOD.

THE Apostles of our Lord Jesus Christ having received from him a divine commission, with full power and authority to found and organize the Christian Church, our first consideration respecting the Christian Ministry must be to learn from the New Testament what they ordered or sanctioned for this important purpose; and the opinions or practices of later times must be approved or condemned according as they harmonize with the apostolic institution, or are irreconcileable with it.

The Christian Ministry then, in the New Testament, appears in two distinct forms; one of which probably had, at any rate in some places, an earlier existence than the other, though both for a while stood as it were side by side, until the former gradually passed away, leaving the other still in force to become a permanent institution in the Church.

These two forms may be called, "The Ministry of Gifts," and "The Ministry of Orders."

The Ministry of Gifts comes first. It belonged to the Apostolic times alone, when preternatural or spiritual gifts (χαρίσματα) were abundantly shed abroad in the Church. In the earliest part of this period it was exercised the most extensively, and probably in some places exclusively, before the ministry of the other form was sufficiently matured.

Some of the spiritual gifts then bestowed were specially adapted

for congregational use, and the edification of religious assemblies; and they seem to have been given for the express purpose of supplying what must have been a pressing want,—sound instruction, impressive exhortation, and fervent but enlightened prayers, in the newly gathered Christian congregations.

It is evident from the circumstances mentioned by St. Paul in connection with the Church at Corinth (1 Cor. xi.—xiv.) that the public worship there was not conducted by one or two persons expressly chosen and appointed to the office; but any one who possessed a χάρισμα available for general edification, was at liberty either to pray or to prophesy,—to address words of exhortation, instruction, or encouragement,—and, in short, to exercise his gifts with the full sanction of the apostolic authority, and without any other restraint than a conformity to such general admonitions as—"Let all things be done unto edifying," "Let all things be done decently and in order."

Much more might be said about this Ministry of Gifts, which it is unnecessary to dwell on here; as it was, from its very nature, only for a time. It was liable to obvious abuses, and it did not contain the elements of order and sobriety in sufficient strength to make it suitable for a permanent institution.

The Ministry of Orders, which gradually superseded it, and with which we are now especially concerned, was exercised by men selected for this purpose, and ordained, or solemnly appointed by ecclesiastical authority to minister in Christian churches.

This ministry may possibly in some localities, as at Jerusalem, have been contemporary with the earliest labours of the Apostles; in other places it may have been introduced at a later date; but long before the end of the apostolic age it had become a generally received and ordinary institution throughout the Churches. And as doubtless many of those who were thus formally ordained were also possessors of spiritual gifts, the earlier ministrations, which these gifts supplied, must commonly have passed into the later form without difficulty, or any painful change, until at last they were quietly merged in its permanent establishment.

It is one of the marked and significant *omissions* of the New Testament, that no account is given of the first appointment of ordained men to minister in church offices. But after a time, the two orders of Elders (or Presbyters, πρεσβύτεροι), and Deacons, διάκονοι, appear as well-known titles, and in the later books of the New Testament their functions are alluded to as already familiar in the Church.

The first occasion on which Christian presbyters are mentioned is in Acts xi. 30, when the collection made for the relief of the

Christians in Judæa against the predicted famine was "sent to the *elders* by the hands of Barnabas and Saul." Not long after this the same Paul and Barnabas, on their first apostolic journey in Asia Minor, "ordained elders in every church" which they were enabled to establish in those countries; and the office is frequently referred to in other parts of the New Testament.

The first mention of Deacons (διάκονοι) by name as a distinct Order in the Ministry is found in St. Paul's Epistle to the Philippians; and the title only occurs again in the Apostle's pastoral injunctions in his First Epistle to Timothy. That the order of deacons is so seldom expressly named is perhaps owing to the circumstance that the title of elder or presbyter is sometimes used as a general appellation for church officers, including the inferior order of deacons; as it sometimes embraced also the higher office of the Apostles. Thus St. Paul gives directions to Timothy for ordaining elders and deacons, while in similar directions to Titus he names elders only. Whether deacons are alluded to at a much earlier date is a question which cannot be decided with positive certainty. The seven, who were selected to superintend the daily ministration of the tables spread for the poorer Christians, were generally looked upon as deacons by the early post-apostolic Church, which considered their appointment as the first institution of the diaconate; and from the number appointed on this occasion some churches,—for example, the Church at Rome in the third century,—confined themselves to seven deacons, and when a larger number was required the later office of *Sub-Deacon* supplied the want. The Council of Neo-Cæsarea, A.D. 315, expressly directed that this number should be maintained in all churches, on the ground that it had been so ordered in the history of their institution. But it must be observed that these seven are never called deacons in the New Testament; that they were officers selected entirely from the Hellenistic Jews to look after the interests of the poor belonging to that class, in consequence of some alleged neglect, in connection with which they are incidentally mentioned; and that if they were deacons, there must have been Hebrew deacons appointed before.

The *duties* which belonged to these ministerial offices are nowhere formally laid down in the New Testament. But in the case of the presbyters in particular, they may be gathered in some detail from the scattered notices which here and there occur.

As men appointed by the Apostles, under the direction of the Holy Spirit, and holding a sacred office approved of by the Divine Head of the Church, they were charged "to feed (ποιμαίνειν) the flock over which the Holy Ghost had made them overseers." It was their duty to exercise a general superintendence in religious things over

the body of Christians among whom they ministered, and whom they were to tend after the similitude of a shepherd's care. In this, their pastoral office, therefore, they had an authority given to them, not as lords or masters over their respective congregations, but as those who were to be their guides and leaders, their pattern and example. They were to hold fast themselves, and to teach others, all divine truths, revealed in the Scriptures or imparted by the Apostles,—to warn or rebuke the unruly, to support the weak, to bring back the wandering, to build up the faithful, to convince gainsayers and opposers, and to animate and encourage all in godliness of living. Of their special duties in the assemblies for Christian worship no account is given. But as a presbyter was required to be "apt to teach," to "labour in the word and doctrine," and generally to take the lead of the congregation, he doubtless led the devotions of the people, delivering to them those expository addresses or practical exhortations which were comprised under the head of "prophesying," and were the originals of our modern sermons; and administering all public ordinances for the edification of the Church.

In close conformity with this view of the presbyter's ministerial duties, is the account given of them in the solemn address in our Ordination Service to those who are admitted to the "Order of the Priesthood" in our Church.

The duties of deacons, which are, however, very scantily noticed in the New Testament, appear to have been to render a general assistance to the presbyters in a subordinate capacity; and to perform such services as were needful in a well-ordered Christian community, without being immediately connected with religious teaching or divine ordinances. At the same time, since deacons were required to be men "holding the mystery of the faith in a pure conscience," and by using the office well "acquired great boldness"—or rather freedom of speech, παρρησίαν—"in the faith which is in Christ Jesus," we may infer that they also took some part in the work of instruction and the propagation of Christian doctrine. If the seven, mentioned in Acts vi., were really deacons, it would follow that one special duty of this Order was to attend to the wants of the poor, and to superintend the disbursement of the contributions for their relief. And in the post-apostolic times this was generally considered to be the case; whence deacons are called by Jerome, "attendants on tables and widows."

In these times also, especially after the third century, it was their duty to look into the morals and behaviour of the people, reporting particular cases to the presbyters or bishop. And in connection with public worship, they had charge of the sacred vessels used in administering the Lord's Supper, and at the celebration of this

sacrament they received the people's offerings, and presented them to the officiating minister. In the second century, as mentioned by Justin Martyr in his "Apology," they distributed the Eucharistic bread and wine to the communicants; but afterwards they were not allowed to do so if a presbyter was present. They acted also, in the fourth century, as directors of the prayers of the congregation, whence they were termed "sacred heralds" (Ἱεροκήρυκες), telling the people when to pray, and what to pray for, and keeping order in the church. On some occasions the deacon appears to have been a special or confidential attendant on the bishop, and so have gained great power and influence in the Church.

There is no intimation of any such duties as these being discharged by deacons in the New Testament; but in the absence of express injunctions of apostolic authority, it was competent for any church at any time to alter or add to the functions of these or of any other officers in its service. In our own communion the duties of the diaconate are *in theory* not very different from those which were most usually attached to it in the early Church, as appears from the description of them in our Ordinal. But *in practice*, at the present time the services of a deacon differ very little from those of a presbyter; and the office is commonly regarded as a mere stepping-stone to the higher order.

In connection with the ancient diaconate, it will be sufficient to mention with the greatest brevity that in the Apostolic Church there were deaconesses as well as deacons; Phœbe, who is named in Rom. xvi. 1, being a deaconess of the Church at Cenchrea. This office continued for a considerable time in the Church; but after the middle of the fourth century it was thought to be undesirable that deaconesses should be formally ordained with imposition of hands; in consequence of which the office appears to have received less consideration than before, and was gradually laid aside altogether; disappearing in Western Europe earlier than in the Eastern Church, where traces of it were still found at the end of the twelfth century.

It is nowhere intimated in the New Testament that the Christian sacraments were, or ought to be, administered exclusively by ordained ministers, or that their efficacy at all depended upon such administration. Nevertheless, as a matter of order and solemnity, it is highly probable that it became the customary practice that they should be so administered; although in cases of emergency lay baptism was always considered valid, even in the most sacerdotal periods of the Church.

In order to obtain a correct view of the Christian ministry in its primitive state, it is necessary to distinguish clearly between what

the apostles themselves established in the Church, and what was afterwards found to be expedient, as a further development of their polity. That, which may justly claim to be a legitimate and beneficial extension of apostolic order, must not on that account be confounded with ordinances of apostolic institution. I have therefore thought it necessary to omit all notice of Episcopacy in considering the offices of presbyters and deacons. These were established in the Churches by the Apostles themselves; while the episcopate, in the modern acceptation of the word, and as a distinct clerical order, does not appear in the New Testament, but was introduced into the Church at a later period.

That it was perfectly lawful for the post-apostolic Church to adopt the Episcopal form of government, cannot be reasonably doubted by any one who believes the Church itself to be a lawful society sanctioned by Christ and his Apostles. That the establishment of Episcopacy was a good thing in its effects and influence, and may therefore so far be said to be of divine origin, because, as Richard Hooker affirms, "of all good things God himself is the author," and "all things are of God which are well done," may be indisputably asserted. But, unfortunately, not contented with such reasonable and indisputable sanctions, writers on Church matters in all ages have too often evinced a tendency to represent the regulations of their own time as precisely those which were made at the beginning; and to insist on referring to the actual institution of the Apostles all the existing ordinances of their own Churches. And thus, after the general establishment of Episcopacy, it was often asserted that this ordinance emanated directly from the Apostles, or even from Christ himself; and the more the powers of bishops were enlarged, the more boldly was a direct apostolic constitution claimed for their position and authority.

Such assertions put forth in the early centuries of Christianity have been often repeated even by learned men in later times without any sufficient examination of their correctness; and the unlearned have commonly taken it for granted that such assertions have been fully proved.

The assertions themselves, however, as they appear in writers of the second and some following centuries, are sometimes obviously incorrect in matters of fact very easily ascertained—sometimes mere suppositions, more or less extravagant, of their respective authors; and the only attempted *proof* is a reference to lists of bishops in different churches, beginning with the names of Apostles, or those who were said to have been placed there by them, and reaching down to some later date. But these lists are of little or no historical value, and cannot be relied upon for the earliest names. If any one Church

had possessed an authentic catalogue of this kind, we might justly expect to find it in so important a Church as that of Rome. But the lists of the early Roman bishops exhibit so many variations and contradictions, as they are recorded by different writers, that they are evidently of no authority whatever: and the archives of Churches, supposed to have been kept from the beginning, were nothing but oral traditions, most doubtful when most confidently affirmed.

The argument put forward in more modern times for proving the Episcopate to be an apostolic institution from the Apostles themselves having been (as it is alleged) the first bishops, has more appearance of truth and validity, but in reality helps to establish the very contrary conclusion. For as the Apostles possessed all, and more than all, the authority which legitimately belonged to the Episcopal office in after ages, not only were there no bishops then, but there was not even any need or room for their appointment.

If we turn from such questionable arguments to take our stand upon solid ground, I venture to think that the following conclusions are supported by as strong historical evidence as such a subject can well demand.

I. *First*, that the only bishops mentioned in the New Testament were simply presbyters, called indifferently by these names; the same person being a bishop or overseer, from his "taking the oversight" of a congregation; and a presbyter or elder, from the reverence due to age.

II. *Secondly*, that Timothy at Ephesus, and Titus in Crete, were delegated by St. Paul to perform for him what we should now call Episcopal functions; but they are never called by any name which might indicate a special order or ecclesiastical office. Their commission was evidently an exceptional or temporary charge, to meet some special wants in those places during the absence of St. Paul; and there is no intimation that such appointments were needed, or were made, or ought to be made, in any other Churches of the time. Nevertheless, the authority thus delegated to Timothy and Titus, may justly be considered as the pattern which the Churches followed when they found it desirable to establish an Order superior to that of presbyters. And if it be thought that this in fact supplies an apostolic origin to the Episcopal order, it may be so far admitted in this limited sense:—an apostle having suggested the idea, and the Churches afterwards on their own authority having embodied it in their ministry.

III. *Thirdly*, that there is evidence of the most satisfactory kind, because unintentional, to the effect that Episcopacy was established in different churches *after the decease* of the Apostles who founded them, and *at different times;* some Churches being considerably later

than others in adopting this form of government. Thus there was evidently no bishop over the Church at Corinth, when Clement wrote his Epistle to the Corinthians some time after the death of St. Paul. If there is any truth in the tradition alluded to by Clement of Alexandria, that St. John, after his release from Patmos, established bishops in different Churches in the neighbourhood of Ephesus, it proves that at the very end of the first century, when that Apostle in all probability alone survived, the Asiatic Churches which he visited had not yet been placed under Episcopal superintendence. In the time of Ignatius, at the beginning of the second century, there were many Asiatic bishoprics. But several years later, when Polycarp wrote his Epistle to the Philippians, there was apparently no bishop over that Church; and later still, in Justin Martyr's account of Christian worship in his time, only two orders of ministers are seen, with no allusion to any other.

Before the end of the second century, however, the Episcopal form was probably established by general consent in all the Churches of the Roman Empire.

The cause of this change in the form of the Christian ministry is not doubtful, or far to seek. The want of united action among different presbyters of the same Church, when they were all of equal authority; the disputes and divisions which consequently arose; and the want, increasingly felt, of a centre of union to draw and bind together in one harmonious body the different members of each Christian community, led naturally to the wise and wholesome practice that one presbyter was to have a superiority over the rest; and the name of bishop, which had been common to them all, was then restricted to the superior authority. This cause and origin of Episcopacy is indeed expressly acknowledged by patristic testimony even in the fourth century, when there was so strong a tendency to magnify the bishop's office. Thus it is distinctly affirmed by Jerome (Com. in Tit. i. 7) "that a presbyter was the same as a bishop; that Churches were at first governed by the common advice of presbyters; that contentions among them made it necessary to place one of them over the others; and that the custom of the Church, rather than any ordinance of the Lord, made bishops greater than the rest."

I need not here trace the progress of the Episcopal office from the simple priority of its original state to the culmination of its authority in the Church. Yet it may be well to notice that at first the Church in every town had its bishop, with a body of presbyters and deacons under him; the Church consisting of a single congregation meeting in one place for public worship, the bishop himself performing all the functions of a presbyter among them, and having a personal acquaintance with every member of his flock. So that the condition

of each Church, and the relations of its ministers to one another, was very much like what is seen in one of our larger parishes in the charge of an incumbent, with several curates working under him, and with him, in it.

But as the numbers of Christians increased, and were spread abroad more widely, separate congregations were necessarily formed and multiplied; and bishops appointed presbyters to take charge of them; until by degrees the episcopal office was fully occupied with the ordination and general superintendence of the clergy and other special duties, without any longer taking an active part in parochial ministrations. And thus the episcopate became quite distinct from the office of the presbyters; and was naturally regarded, as, indeed, it then was, a separate order in the ministry.

The Christian ministry, in its two orders instituted by the Apostles, and in its subsequent episcopal developments, has been so far considered as it appears in the New Testament, and in the period immediately ensuing; but there still remain some particulars connected with it too important to be omitted.

The simple account of the public functions of Christian ministers, which is given by Justin Martyr towards the middle of the second century, shows that very little deviation from the apostolic usage had then taken place; but by the beginning of the third century this simplicity began to be marred by the assumption of a more ostentatious style of ministration, and a more imposing authority; which, having invested the Christian minister with the name and office of a *priest*, culminated at last in the overbearing pretensions of the priesthood in the Church of Rome. In our own Church the attempt was made at the Reformation to bring back the presbyter's office as nearly as might be to the apostolic model, without making more violent and sudden changes than were absolutely necessary. The noble-minded Church reformers in the reign of Edward VI., in this, as in other portions of their work, faithfully followed the light of the New Testament, as far as that light gradually shone in upon their minds with increasing clearness; but they did not continue long enough to complete their labours. And their efforts never having been subsequently followed up in a similar spirit, some blemishes, which they failed to notice, or could not then remove—some expressions which savour more of the Romish errors, which they desired to eliminate, than of the apostolic truth, which it was their object to restore—have not yet disappeared from our formularies.

In order, therefore, to a right appreciation of the true nature of the ministerial offices in the Christian Church, and of the ministrations essentially belonging to them, it is necessary to inquire more parti-

cularly what the Apostles really intended their Church officers to be, and to do; and what they purposely and altogether excluded from the sphere of their authority and duties; and so to arrive at a just and sober judgment respecting the claims and assertions of post-apostolic times.

And herein, with a view to being as distinct and clear as possible, I will at once state that the thesis, which I undertake to prove from the New Testament, and from the teaching and practice of the Apostles there recorded, is, that—

The Christian ministry is not a priesthood—is not invested with any sacerdotal powers—and has no sacerdotal functions to perform.

I am aware that the English word "priest" is probably only the word "presbyter," abbreviated in its passage into our modern language; and, were it not for the equivocal meaning of the term, there could be no objection to our thus using it to designate the truly apostolic office of the πρεσβύτερος, or elder, of the New Testament. But I here use the words Priest and Priesthood only in their other and more common sense, as the equivalents of the Greek ἱερεὺς and ἱερατεία, and as they are used, for example, in the Epistle to the Hebrews. A priest, in this acceptation of the word, is one whose office it is to offer acceptable sacrifices to God for sinful man, and act as a medium of communication between God and men in sacred things—presenting the prayers of the people to the Most High, and imparting to them, by the power of his official acts, the grace or blessing which God is ready to bestow. And in this sense it is that I undertake to show that the Christian ministry is not a priesthood.

I. The first evidence which I adduce in proof of this proposition is supplied by a consideration of the source from whence the form and shape (so to speak) of the Christian ministry was derived—the model which the Apostles saw fit to imitate in the offices which they instituted in the Church.

As the Christian religion rose up out of the very depth and essence of Judaism, following it as its fore-ordained end and consummation, it might reasonably be expected that such forms and regulations of the Jewish Church as were not inconsistent with the principles of the Gospel dispensation would be retained and adapted to its use. And the Apostles, being men deeply imbued with Jewish feelings, must have been inclined to deviate no further from the customary observances of their law than their Divine Instructor taught them to be absolutely required. And they must have felt that it was wise to give their new religious life and worship as little innovation and strangeness to Jewish minds as possible, by continuing whatever could consistently be continued of their accustomed rule and order.

But when we proceed to trace how far these anticipations were

realized in the apostolic ordering of the Christian societies, we meet with a peculiarity in the Jews' religion which must be clearly apprehended before the retention or rejection of Jewish ordinances in the Christian Church can be rightly understood; but which, when clearly apprehended, throws great light not only on the origin of the Christian ministry, but also on all the powers and functions which were given to it at the first, or could ever afterwards be legitimately ascribed to it.

The religious life of the Jews in its outward practice and operation at the commencement of the Christian era, and for at least several centuries before it, exhibited a remarkable *Dualism*—a twofold system—each part of which was quite independent of the other, although they co-existed in harmonious action and combined effect.

These two parts were respectively centred in—

The Temple—and—*The Synagogue.*

The religious system of the Temple, with all its services, was altogether of Divine appointment, and no one had authority to alter or add to them.

The religious system of the synagogue, with all its services, was of human appointment, and might by man's authority be altered.

In the Temple was the priest, consecrated according to a precise regulation and a sacerdotal succession, laid down by God himself, with the altar and the sacrifices at which he officiated, the incense which he burned, the holy place into which none but he might enter.

In the synagogue was the reader of the Scriptures, the preacher or expounder of religious and moral truth, the leader of the common devotions of the people, not consecrated by any particular ceremony or restricted by any rule of succession, with a reading-desk or pulpit, but with no altar, sacrifice, or incense, and no part of the building more holy than the rest. And without attempting now to dwell upon all the remarkable contrasts herein displayed, it may suffice to say that the Temple exhibited, in a grand combination of typical places, persons, and actions, God dwelling with man, reconciling the world unto Himself in the person and work of Christ; and pardoning, justifying, and graciously receiving those who came to Him through the appointed Saviour: while the synagogue exhibited a congregation of men, already reconciled to God, assembled as devout worshippers for prayer and praise—for instruction in divine knowledge, and edification in righteous living. And these two systems—the one divine, the other human; the one gorgeous and typical, the other simple and real; in the one, God drawing near to man, in the other, man drawing near to God—never clashed or interfered with each other, were never intermingled or confounded together. "In the Temple there was no pulpit, in the synagogue there was no altar."

Now it was the Temple system, with its striking and æsthetic services, its associations of awe and mystery, and not the simple and unexciting worship of the synagogue, that naturally appealed to the imagination and feelings of men. And, accordingly, from the beginning of the third century, portions of this system began, and continued unceasingly, to be introduced into the Church; and in particular, the idea of the Temple service was imported into the worship of Christian congregations; the Christian ministry was regarded as a hierarchy—bishops, presbyters, and deacons became high-priests, priests, and Levites; the form and arrangements of the buildings for public devotion were assimilated as much as possible to those of the Hebrew sanctuary; and a system of sacerdotalism grew up, and became so inveterate in the Church, that it still lingers to some extent even amongst ourselves, purified, indeed, of its grosser superstitions, but not altogether removed by the happy influence of the Reformation.

Not so, however, was it in the Apostles' days, or with any of their ordinances and institutions. They retained and adapted to Christian use some Jewish forms and regulations, but they were taken altogether, not from the Temple, but the synagogue. The offices which they appointed in the Church, and the duties and authority which they attached to them, together with the regulations which they made for Christian worship, bore no resemblance in name or in nature to the services of the priesthood in the Temple; but they did correspond in a most remarkable and unmistakable manner with the whole system of the Jewish synagogue.

It would take too much space for me to enumerate here all the particulars of this similarity. They may be found at length, with the whole subject exhaustively discussed in a spirit of great fairness, in Vitringa's treatise "On the Synagogue." It will be sufficient for me to observe that the Jewish synagogue had its presbyters or elders, its deacons or ministers; the former being sometimes called bishops or overseers, from the nature of their office, and both degrees being sometimes called elders, distinguished as "ruling only," as in the case of the deacons, or "ruling and teaching," as the presbyters did; and these offices, together with their suitable ministrations, the Apostles transferred to Christian Churches. The Apostles, therefore, having chosen the official arrangements of the synagogue, and not of the Temple, as their model for the institution of Church officers, plainly indicated by this circumstance that no priestly powers or duties were attached to their ministrations.

II. Another distinct proof that the office-bearers appointed to minister in the Apostolic Church were not, and could not be, priests, or perform any sacerdotal duties, is seen in a condensed form in the

Epistle to the Hebrews, and is found at large in the whole of the Old and New Testaments, of which that Epistle, as far as its subject reaches, is so valuable an epitome. We there learn that from the very nature of the priestly office, it is necessary for those who hold it to be specially called and appointed by God, either personally by name, or according to a divinely-instituted order of succession; and that only two orders of priesthood have ever had this necessary divine sanction granted to them. These two orders are the *Order of Aaron* and the *Order of Melchizedec.* The priests of the former order belonged to the Jewish dispensation only, and have indisputably passed away. The only priest after the order of Melchizedec is our Lord Jesus Christ, the "Priest upon his throne," without a successor in his everlasting priesthood. In a secondary and spiritual sense, indeed, all those who are in Christ partake of this priesthood, and in Him are "kings and priests unto God." But a priesthood claimed by Christian ministers as a separate office in the Church, necessarily involves either the daring assumption that they are *successors or vice-gerents of Christ Himself*—a claim which no one, I believe, but the Pope of Rome has ever ventured to make—or else the fatal admission that they are priests of some other order, unknown to the Scriptures of either Testament, and unsanctioned by any divine authority.

III. A third argument, which lands us in the same conclusion, is deduced from the equality of privilege, or spiritual standing-ground in Christ, ascribed in the New Testament to every true Christian. It was a truth clearly proclaimed by the Apostles, and received with undoubting and joyful confidence by the Church in their days, however it has often unfortunately been obscured or kept out of sight in later times, that every believer has himself an unrestricted access to Christ, and through Him unto the Father. That Jesus and his finished work—Jesus the Son of God and Son of Man, with his atoning blood and justifying righteousness—Jesus living on earth, dying, rising again, ascending into heaven, sitting at the right hand of the Father, and ever living to make intercession for us—is all that any man requires for coming boldly, so to speak, into the immediate presence of God, to receive the fulness of his favour and blessing. The rent veil of the Temple at the death of Christ indicated that the "Holiest of all" was no longer closed against sinful man. Nor is there the slightest intimation in the New Testament that besides Jesus Christ and Him crucified there is any more need of any priest, or altar, or sacrifice, or mediator, or intercessor, or propitiator, or any one of whatsoever office, name, or service, to stand between men and God, to present their prayers at the throne of grace, or to bring back a blessing from above. Is there any room here for thrusting in another priest? Is there anything defective in the

priesthood of Jesus Christ, that we should attempt to supplement it with the miserable intervention of a poor, weak, sinful fellow-creature like ourselves?

IV. Besides all this, there is yet a fourth and final proof of my assertion to be found among the remarkable *omissions* of Holy Writ. In nothing is the speaking silence of the New Testament more complete and significant than in the fact that never *there* are Christian ministers of any degree called priests. Neither the Apostles themselves, nor any office-bearers whom they appointed, are ever spoken of as having sacerdotal powers or sacerdotal duties committed to them. In no single instance is any one of the words which describe the priesthood and its work, such as ἱερεὺς, ἱερατεία, ἱερατεύω, ἱερουργέω, θυσία, θυσιαστήριον, assigned to the office of the Christian ministry, or to its ministrations. Familiar as the Apostles were with the striking ceremonial of the Temple worship, and sometimes deriving from it a figurative language of the greatest force, they never employ terms of priestly import in any manner which countenances the supposition that they, or the presbyters of their Churches, were acting as priests in the congregations of Christian men. And when it is considered that before this time neither the Apostles nor any one else had even so much as ever heard of a religion without a visible priesthood and its necessary accompaniments; and that, after the Apostles were gone, the Church turned back again to this conspicuous element of all other religions; I am justified in asserting that this negative argument from the omissions in the New Testament proves as strongly as any historic evidence can demonstrate, that in the Christianity which the Apostles preached and taught, there was no priesthood or priestly ministration but that of Jesus Christ himself—the one great and sufficient high-priest of the whole Church of God.

I am well aware that a single expression in the Epistle to the Hebrews, "We have an altar," is sometimes put forward as opposed to what has just been said;—the altar is then taken to mean the communion table—the eucharistic elements laid upon it are represented as a sacrifice—and the officiating minister, a priest. But such a meaning is inconsistent with the context, violates the principles of sound exegesis, and is at variance with the words themselves as they actually stand. For let us take them in their most literal and matter-of-fact statement, and what do they declare? "We have an altar." Yes. The Jewish Church had *an altar—one altar*—not an altar in every synagogue—but one, only, divinely-sanctioned altar in the Temple, on which acceptable sacrifices were placed; and we in the Christian dispensation have *an altar—one altar*—not ten thousand altars—not an altar in every church—but one, only, divinely-

sanctioned altar—the Cross of Christ, on which the one, full, perfect, and accepted sacrifice was offered once for all for us: and thus the assertion, "We have an altar," confirms instead of invalidating the preceding proof.

And these four proofs, each one by itself complete and conclusive, must be taken together in their accumulated force, in considering the question whether the Christian ministry is a priesthood or not:—

The proof from the origin of the Christian ministry—the synagogue.

The proof from the two orders of priesthood alone authorized in the Scriptures.

The proof from the position and state of Christians in general.

The proof from the silence of the New Testament.

But this is not all: there is other collateral or secondary evidence by no means void of weight, though not bearing so directly on the subject as the preceding proofs.

Thus it is a significant fact that neither presbyters nor deacons were *anointed* like the Jewish priest, to consecrate them for their ministerial work; but they were admitted to their sacred offices by a solemn but simple form of *ordination*. And a brief consideration of the nature of this ordination—of the persons from whom it was received, and what was conferred by it—will still further illustrate the design and character of the Christian ministry in the Apostolic Church.

I. There are no rules prescribed, nor any precise directions given, in the New Testament as to the form or manner in which ministers were to be ordained. But in Acts xiii. it is recorded that Paul and Barnabas were ordained to the office of apostles by the imposition of hands, accompanied with prayer and fasting. And doubtless this simple ceremonial, which sufficed for assigning the highest place of authority in the Church, was used with appropriate variations in the ordination of presbyters and deacons. And this mode continued to be used in the post-apostolic Church, as is evidenced by the directions and the forms of prayer for ordinations in what are called "The Apostolic Constitutions."

II. The persons who ordained Christian ministers were at first naturally and necessarily the Apostles. But when fresh ministers were ordained in an already constituted Church, the presbyters there present took part in an apostle's ordination, by laying their hands with him on those who were ordained—a custom which has been retained even to our times, in some slight respect, in our own Church. And it was evidently not by an apostle's hands alone that sacred orders could be conferred. The authority to appoint Church officers was, and is, inherent in every duly-constituted Church, as the

natural right of a lawful and well-organized society. And as presbyters might be joined with an apostle in ordaining, so might they without an apostle give this sanction of ecclesiastical authority in the ordination of any minister in their Church. And thus, not only Timothy and Titus, who were specially delegated by St. Paul, ordained men at Ephesus and in Crete; but "certain prophets and teachers" at Antioch, without any such apostolic delegation, were competent to ordain even an apostle. When Episcopacy was fully established, it became the rule that bishops only should ordain. But this was from no divine law or apostolic prescription. And the Article of our own Church is most scriptural, when, without any allusion to bishops, it declares those to be lawfully ordained "who are chosen and called by men who have public authority given unto them in the congregation to call and send ministers into the Lord's vineyard."

A Christian minister (whatever inward call he may require) needs no other outward appointment than the authority and commission of the Church in which he ministers. And the visible Church, "being," as Richard Hooker truly says, "the original subject of all power" in such matters, may make such appointments in any mode which may be deemed most expedient, amenable only to the general law of decency and order.

III. What is conferred upon a minister by his ordination is commonly said to be a certain *power*,—a power ecclesiastical or spiritual, or both,—communicated by divine appointment through the hands of him from whom the orders are received. And this power has been variously interpreted according to the respective tenets of individuals or of Churches.

But with all the deference and respect due to the antiquity of such opinions, and to the Churches and theologians who have held them, I must, with the New Testament in my hand, venture to affirm, that according to its divine teaching it cannot be shown that ordination confers *any power at all;* and from what we can gather from its pages respecting the nature and work of the Christian ministry, it may be confidently concluded that ordination confers, not spiritual power, but *ecclesiastical authority* to perform the duties of the clerical office.

The words "power" and "authority," though very distinct in meaning, have often been confounded together; and much confusion of thought and language has ensued. When the distinction between them is borne in mind, and the erroneous idea of the ministry being a priesthood is eliminated, there will not be much difficulty in seeing that *authority*, and not *power*, is given by ordination.

To assist in substantiating this, I appeal to the words used in the

New Testament to denote ordination; and I ask, what inference may be deduced from them? The word "ordain" occurs very often in our English version, and is used for any kind of appointment or regulation, being applied indifferently to persons and to things. It is given as the translation of no less than twelve Greek words of very different force and meaning, but all implying some kind of causation, appointment, or selection. Of these twelve words, five are used of persons appointed to some office; but only two of these, καθίστημι and χειροτονέω, are spoken of the ordination of Christian presbyters. The former of these two, καθίστημι, is a word of very wide and general meaning, and signifies "to set up," "constitute," or "place in a position," in any way, or for any purpose whatever. The other word, χειροτονέω, and its corresponding substantive, χειροτονία, were used in post-apostolic times for "ordination" in the strictly ecclesiastical sense; but as the word, in both the places where it is found in the New Testament, means simply selected, chosen, or appointed,—as in Acts x. 41, to be witnesses of Christ's resurrection, and in the other, 2 Cor. viii. 19, to convey the contributions of Gentile churches to Jerusalem,—there is no ground for supposing that it has any special or different meaning when applied in the other passage to the ordination of presbyters.

Neither of these words, therefore, implies anything more than that presbyters and deacons were in a regular, orderly, and becoming manner appointed to their offices, and were authorised to act as ministers in their respective churches, without expressing, or even intimating, that any special *powers* were thereby given, or anything conveyed to them, except the *lawful authority* which office-bearers in a well-constituted community must be expected to possess.

I further observe that all spiritual power is a gift from God. And power of various kinds was thus given in the apostolic age, and usually through the Apostles' hands, in the χαρίσματα, or spiritual gifts, which characterized that period. But these gifts were bestowed upon men and women without any connection with sacred orders, and there is no intimation that ordination conferred them.

Doubtless some of these spiritual gifts, and the powers which they imparted, were possessed in those days by ordained men, and it is quite possible that such gifts were sometimes given them at the time of their ordination; but it was not *by their ordination* that they received them, but by the same means as they were given at other times. The only passage in the New Testament which *seems* to countenance the contrary supposition is the well-known verse in 1 Tim. iv.: "Neglect not the gift that is in thee, which was given thee by prophecy, with the laying on of the hands of the presbytery." This gift no doubt was a spiritual power. But this was given to

him by prophecy, *i.e.*, by express divine direction; and although it was probably given at the time of his ordination, yet it was given not "*by* the laying on of the hands of the presbytery," but "*with*," *i.e.*, *together with* this imposition of hands, μετὰ τῆς ἐπιθέσεως τῶν χειρῶν, the presbyters joining in the ordination, but the gift being bestowed by the hands of Paul, as in other cases:—a fact which he himself mentions in his second Epistle (2 Tim. i. 6), when he says, "Wherefore I put thee in remembrance that thou stir up the gift of God, which is in thee *by* the putting on of *my* hands,"—διὰ τῆς ἐπιθέσεως. It is indeed indubitable that such powers were given only by the Apostles, and therefore, if they *did* accompany *their* ordinations, they must have ceased to do so when the Apostles were no more; and as to any power specially imparted by the act of ordination independently of such gifts, there is not in the New Testament the slightest evidence of its existence, much less of its continuation from age to age.

We are therefore brought again to the conclusion that ordination gave, and still gives, *ministerial authority*, and not power; authority to use gifts or powers for the benefit of the Church, as its recognised office-bearers, but not itself conferring them. Hooker, indeed, has said that "no man's gifts or qualities can make him a minister in holy things, unless ordination do give him power." But gifts and qualities *do give power;* what they do *not* give is *authority* to minister in the congregation, which authority ordination supplies.

Hence it is that those amongst ourselves who contend for the admission that a spiritual power is given by the act of ordaining, if they are not merely misusing the word, are driven to the assumption (which, to say the truth, they are usually not backward to acknowledge) that this power is the power of conferring divine grace through the sacraments, of giving absolution to repentant sinners, and other similar functions; thus making the effect of the sacraments to depend upon something in the administrator, instead of the ordinance of Christ; and consciously or unconsciously adopting the notion of a priestly office, which the Apostles, as before shown, did not institute in the Church. And as the Apostles established no priesthood, so neither did they teach that the efficacy of Christ's ordinances had anything to do with the power or status of those who administered them; so neither did they command any man to confess his sins to them or to the presbyters of his Church, though it might be desirable sometimes for Christians to "confess their faults to one another." It may still be good for a perplexed or burdened conscience to seek relief or guidance, by making known its secret troubles to some experienced and sympathizing Christian brother—and such a one a Christian minister may well in many cases be—but

no such confession is in any case commanded, nor is there any advantage in making it to a presbyter, rather than to any other enlightened and prudent Christian friend.

As to the "grace of absolution," presumed to be given by Christian ministers to those who confess their sins, there is not the slightest trace of it in the New Testament. The Apostles, indeed, proclaimed most plainly forgiveness of sins to all who would receive their word—to all who had "repentance towards God, and faith towards our Lord Jesus Christ." It was the office and duty of the presbyters to do the same. It is still the duty and the privilege of Christian ministers "to declare and pronounce unto Christ's people that God pardoneth and absolveth all them that truly repent, and unfeignedly believe His holy Gospel." But neither Apostle nor presbyter in the primitive Church, as far as we know, pronounced absolution upon those who had confessed their sins, for the purpose of conveying to them what otherwise they would not have had; nor is there anything in the New Testament to show that the declaration of God's forgiveness to the repentant and believing has any greater efficacy from the mouth of an ordained presbyter than from that of any ordinary Christian.

And thus, again, by this consideration of the nature and effects of ordination in the primitive Church we are brought back to the same conclusion as before—that the Christian ministry is not a priesthood, has no priestly powers committed to it, nor any priestly acts to perform.

And, if this be so, then several other results of greater or less importance, but all of them affecting the ministerial position and duties, will follow as corollaries from the preceding proposition.

I. As Christian ministers we have no altars in our churches, and no sacrifices to offer upon them. When the idea of a priesthood was brought into the Church in the third century, the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper was changed into a sacrifice, and the Lord's Table into an altar; and that sublimely simple service of the apostolic age was gradually debased into a grievous superstition. From this our Church was at the Reformation happily delivered. In our Communion Service the word "altar" has been carefully and purposely excluded; nor is any other notion of a sacrifice therein allowed but that which is common to all devotional services, the spiritual sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving; while, in the homily "Of the worthy receiving of the Sacrament," it is expressly declared that "we must take heed lest of the memory" (*i.e., a memorial*) "it be made a sacrifice." And we are thus brought back to the truly primitive Church for our use and apprehension of this holy ordinance.

II. There being no separate order of priesthood in the Chur

every Christian having free access to God the heavenly Father through Christ as his only priest, the Christian ministry was not appointed to perform any spiritual functions of such a nature that none else could perform them, but to maintain the solemnity, good order, and regularity essential to a legitimate and permanent religious society. There was, and is, no spiritual action requisite for the Church of Christ on earth, which, *considered in itself*, might not be done by every individual Christian; but it was absolutely necessary that all things should be done decently and in order; nor, when such order has been established, is it lawful for any one lightly to disregard its authority. That there were in the apostolic age no duties attached to the clerical office which might not also (with a due regard to order) be discharged by the laity may be distinctly proved from the New Testament; but to set forth this proof would necessitate my trespassing too long upon your time.

III. The clergy, not being a priestly caste or order of men invested with sacerdotal powers to stand between God and the Church at large, but functionaries appointed for the maintenance of order and the general edification, are the representatives of the Church to which they belong, and derive their ministerial authority from *it*. And to express what I have to say in more forcible words than my own, I will quote those of Archbishop Whately, who remarks:—

"That the clergy are merely the functionaries of the particular Church of which they are members; that it is in that capacity only that they derive their station and power from Christ, by virtue of the sanction given by Him to Christian communities; that their authority therefore comes direct from the society so constituted, in whose name and behalf they act as its representatives, just to that extent to which it has empowered and directed them to act."—*The Kingdom of Christ delineated*, p. 256.

IV. The dogma of the so-called "apostolical succession" falls to the ground, together with the notion of sacerdotal powers possessed by Christian ministers. Such a succession, or something of a very similar nature, would indeed be necessary for a continued line of priests; but the priesthood, and such a transmission of priestly powers, must stand and fall together. The doctrine of the "apostolic succession" may in itself be shown by Scripture and experience to be unsound, but it is sufficient for me here to notice its rejection as a natural consequence of the abandonment of sacerdotal claims.

I venture now with all respect to commend the arguments which I have here endeavoured to set forth to the serious consideration of my clerical brethren. "For the clergy," writes the archbishop lately alluded to, "are under a peculiar temptation to lean too favourably, and with too little of rigorous examination, towards a system which confers the more elevation and grandeur on *them* in proportion as it

detracts from the claims of the entire community," and which "derives our Church's authority rather from *them* than theirs from *it*."

But let us endeavour to exalt Christ alone, and seek for no other place in his service than He has appointed for us. And when stripped of the false glare of sacerdotal assumptions, and restored to its apostolic simplicity, though less imposing then in the eyes of men, how truly dignified is the office—how solemnly important is the work of the Christian minister! How great is the honour laid upon him that he should be a fellow-worker with God himself in the world—an ambassador of Christ to men—a dispenser of divine truth to his people! And when grace and wisdom from above, earnestly sought and freely given, have enabled him effectually to do the work of his ministry, and by the words which he speaks, by the ordinances which he administers, and by the life which he lives, to bring God's truth home to men's hearts—to win souls for Christ—to convert the sinful—to build up believers in their holy faith—to reclaim the backsliding—to instruct the ignorant—to support the weak—to comfort the sorrowful—then, oh! then, how immeasurable are the joy and blessing which crown his successful ministrations!

G. A. JACOB.



THE WAR AND GENERAL CULTURE.

CONVERSATIONS.

By the Author of "Friends in Council."

II.

IN our last conversation we left off suddenly, music being the topic that was about to be discussed. But Mr. Milverton was called away to attend some justice business; an opportunity which was seized upon by Sir John Ellesmere, who, I think, hates long discussion of any kind, to propose a country walk. "It's no good waiting for Milverton," he said. "These men of mighty culture are always very weak about the legs. For my part, I like a man to be developed in all directions. What's the use of working your brains to that extent of dizzy confusion that you are afraid to look down from a height? And show me any learned man who can play well at hockey. Look at that sweet dog. She knows, as well as possible, that I am proposing to go out for a walk, and that Milverton won't go; and every movement in her body expresses the misery of divided allegiance. But pleasure will prevail over duty, as it has, before now, once or twice, at least, in the course of the world's history. Our pretty Fairy will come with us, wagging her tail in a slow remorseful way, as she passes the room where Milverton is indifferently administering—very indifferently—country justice." So we went for our walk, leaving Mr. Milverton at home.

When we met next day for the purpose of renewing our conversa-

tion, Mr. Milverton and I could not for some time commence where we had left off. On this occasion it was Mr. Mauleverer's fault, who had been put into a great rage by a speech he had just been reading of an important politician. For Mr. Mauleverer to be in a passion, is a rare thing. He has, in general, an air of serene and unctuous contemptuousness. The conversation thus began:—]

Mauleverer. I declare solemnly——

Ellesmere. Please don't, Mauleverer. I never hear those words but I am sure that something very rash and very abusive is to follow.

Mauleverer. Nonsense, Ellesmere. I declare solemnly I would emigrate if I were a little younger. This country will not be worth living in, if such people are to become powerful. Nowadays any fellow may say anything, however injurious to a large class of his fellow-countrymen, with the chance of its being well received, if he can express himself well, and make a tolerable speech "to split the ears of the groundlings," as Shakespeare has it.

Milverton. It all proceeds from want of culture.

Cranmer. I really don't see that. Surely it requires some culture to make a good speech.

Milverton. Want of general culture is what I mean, Cranmer. If more people were more highly cultivated in this respect, so that the power of making good speeches was more generally diffused, the exorbitant influence now possessed by the few who can speak well would be diminished. Besides, if there were more general culture, there would be fewer "groundlings" having ears to be split, or, as I should say, tickled, by mere ability in speech-making. I say this, much against my own interest, for if there is anything in the world I can do, it is to make a speech. In fact, as you know, I never write anything, but always speak what I have to indite.

Ellesmere. Yes; I often think what a blessing it has been for the world that you never were in parliament. There would have been one more fellow there who could talk for any given time on any given subject. And we have quite enough of them already. If I were the Sovereign I would never call any statesman to my councils who had not shown that for some one session he could be totally silent.

Sir Arthur. It is a beautiful thing—silence—Sir John. Let us show that we estimate the fulness of its beauty by indulging in long "flashes of silence" while Milverton resumes his discourse upon culture.

Ellesmere. I cannot promise to do anything of the kind. I cannot hear all manner of fallacies and exaggerations put forward, and neglect my duty by not contradicting, or controverting them at the

time. I don't make speeches. I only make judicious interruptions and crushing rejoinders. Crushed herbs are sweet, we know; and, if Milverton has anything to say worth hearing, his lucubrations must be capable of developing sweetness when subjected to the slightly crushing process caused by my poor and feeble objections.

Lady Ellesmere. Please don't be so modest, John; anything but that.

Ellesmere. Instead of sneering at me, you ought to be thankful to me; for you would all be overpowered by those two authors, Sir Arthur and Milverton, if there were not some person representing the outer world, some *extern*, as the Catholics would say, to keep them a little in order. But go on, Milverton. Where were we?

Milverton. I was endeavouring to incite you all to learn music, having told you that it was the only universal language—that even the brutes understood something of it, and rejoiced in it; that the deepest subtleties of composition and expression might be displayed by it; that it was a universal solvent; that it could move men sooner than anything else to pity, sorrow, joy, or indignation; that it formed one of the finest and most delicate means of sympathy; above all, that it was a most valuable kind of education, and that it evolved humility.

Ellesmere. Good gracious! I never heard a word of this. I should have protested vigorously if I had. I suppose Milverton fired off all these fine things at the poor woman who came to complain that her husband had beaten her black and blue (no doubt she deserved it). And how astonished she must have been when Milverton, in his musical frenzy, told her that if she had known how to play one of Sebastian Bach's fugues in E sharp, this evil thing would never have befallen her. But to maintain that music evolves humility is coming it a little too strong. What on earth are you young women laughing at? I declare, the longer I live, the more convinced I am that my little friend, Master Henry Spoffell, aged nine years, is one of the wisest of human beings.

Cranmer. Who is this infant prodigy, and what wisdom has he taught Sir John? I don't perceive that the wisdom of people of riper age produces much effect upon Ellesmere's obdurate nature.

Ellesmere. Young Henry is a son of a friend of mine at our Bar. I went down to Brighton some time ago, and took the boy out for a treat on a Sunday afternoon. But I must describe him to you. He is a very little fellow with a very big head, on which he wears a very big hat. He has a tail-coat and carries a stick. In short, he is as like his papa as a gherkin is to a full-grown cucumber. We walked up and down the pier discoursing about many things, including the great question as to whether modern toffy is equal to ancient toffy—that is, to the toffy of my time. Suddenly he changed the

subject, and said to me, "Do you like the girls?" Now this would have been an embarrassing question to some people; but I dashed off an answer at once, "Yes, I rather like them, Harry; they are very well in their way." "I don't," he said; "they giggle so." Doubtless some of the girls, as they passed us on the pier, had been moved to giggling by the droll appearance of the little man. But, upon reflection, I perceive the full force and depth of his remark, taken generally. What was there in anything I said just now to provoke my wife and Mrs. Milverton to this intemperate fit of giggling? The men were all as grave as mustard-pots.

Lady Ellesmere. It only shows their ignorance. Who could help giggling, as you call it, Sir, at hearing such nonsense talked about music?

One of the pleasant remarks which John often makes to me, with a magisterial air, is, "Never talk about things, my dear, which you do not thoroughly understand. Nod your head one way or the other, but do not say anything." It would have been well if John had nodded his head, instead of talking about a musical composition in E sharp. There is no such thing.

Ellesmere. I have no doubt there is such a thing; but such elevated composition has not yet reached your half-tutored ears. For my part, I am resolved never to compose in any key but E sharp.

Lady Ellesmere. By the way, are you quite sure, John, that when the girls giggled as they met you and little Henry on the pier, it was only at *his* droll appearance that they giggled?

Ellesmere. I know that it is only the wife of one's bosom who would think of making such an ill-natured suggestion. But never mind her nonsense, Milverton. How, I ask, does music evolve humility?

Milverton. One of the first things to encourage in mankind is reverence. One of the most likely things to promote reverence, is an appreciation of the immense differences that exist in the capacities of different individuals. Now there are but few people who have the requisite knowledge to appreciate the enormous difference between Newton's capacity and their own. But there are many who have some means of appreciating the difference between a Beethoven, or a Mozart, and themselves. They must be aware that there are heights of the capacity for musical creativeness, which they can only look up to, but can never hope to climb. Hence the study of music promotes reverence—and thus promotes humility, in a larger extent, perhaps, than any other form of culture, inasmuch as the knowledge of music—at least of what has been accomplished in music—is more widely diffused amongst all classes than a similar knowledge in any other department of science. I have no doubt that the culture of music

amongst the Germans has been of immense service as regards the general cultivation of the Teutonic mind.

Ellesmere. We practical English can do without so much of this musical cultivation.

Milverton. Well, I will return to what you call practical things. Nobody has a greater contempt than I have for some of the conclusions that so-called political economists have come to; but it is only because they have not known how to wed political economy to real life—a marriage which, like many other marriages, might be very felicitous, but is not so. I can hardly look upon an English gentleman as a cultivated man who has not read his Adam Smith. Then metaphysics—then theology. What great works there are in these two branches of knowledge.

Ellesmere. Knowledge! Should we not rather say guess-work?

Milverton. Have it as you like: bring me always down to the practical. Don't you think it would be well if some of us men, who pretend to be cultivated, knew a little more about physiology? Don't you think we should govern ourselves and other people a little better? I think I have noticed that those men who know something of this subject, have an extreme objection to leaden pellets being propelled into the human body, of the delicacies and beauties of which they understand something.

Maulevcrer. I should like to say a word for astronomy.

Sir Arthur. And I for mechanics.

Ellesmere. Dr. Johnson makes Rasselas exclaim, "I see that it is impossible to be a poet!" So I say it is impossible to be one of Milverton's cultivated men.

There is an injunction in one of Lord Chesterfield's letters, which I have learnt by heart. Indeed, I may say I have learnt it by carrying into practice most of its requisitions. Lord Chesterfield orders his son to be "well-bred without ceremony, easy without negligence, steady and intrepid with modesty, genteel without affectation, insinuating without meanness, cheerful without being noisy, frank without indiscretion, and secret without mysteriousness; to know the proper time and place for whatever you say or do, and to do it with an air of condition." I flatter myself that I have entirely acquired the art of doing everything with an air of condition; but even I have not yet attained the perfection of behaviour inculcated by the politest of peers. Much less can I hope, in this short and transitory life, vexed by many bores, by obscure telegrams, by London dinner-parties, and London evening parties, to become the man of perfect culture, according to the lines laid down for constructing that admirable creature by our exacting friend and host. I give it up entirely.

But that is no reason why the rest of you should not hear and give good heed to what Milverton will tell you.

Cranmer. Oh, don't be so down-hearted, Sir John. Seeing how successful you have been in acquiring all the arts of politeness, I think you need not despair of becoming a well-informed man, even although Milverton should make his standard a very lofty one.

Ellesmere. Not merely lofty—inaccessible—at least for a poor fellow like me, subject to all these interruptions I have spoken of, and also being very married.

But, to descend to particulars. Here am I, as ignorant as Fairy of the first principles of science; and how can you expect me, at my time of life, to master any branch of science? It is impossible.

Milverton. That I deny. Now, for instance, what time do you suppose it takes to learn something—something well worth knowing—of chemistry? I don't mean to be able to perform delicate experiments; but to ascertain something of the nature of the things which surround you, and to appreciate the exquisite exactitude of the physical laws under which we live.

Ellesmere. Three years?

Milverton. Three months. I do not mean to say that a boy would do this in three months; but a man, practised in the art of learning, would.

Ellesmere. How fond you ought to be of competitive examination.

Milverton. As you well know, I am not at all fond of it; and one of the strongest reasons for my dislike of it, is, that it tends to prevent cultivation. By it, you insert into a youth's mind, not the idea that knowledge is a beautiful thing in itself; but, that its main use is for self-advancement. You throw the acquisition of knowledge into the domain of business. You disgust the young with knowledge. Often as it has been quoted, I quote again for your edification, what Lord Bacon says.

[I cannot find the passage which Mr. Milverton quoted, and I do not like to ask him about it, as he is deeply engaged on some work which occupies his whole mind. I recollect that the passage was something of this kind:—that knowledge was not this, and not that, and not the other—that, for instance, it was not a terrace for a vain man to pace up and down upon; but that it was something for the glory of God, and the relief of man's estate. I am certain of those last words—"the relief of man's estate;" and they probably will recall the passage to the minds of any of my readers who may be versed in Bacon's works.]

Do you perceive in that passage any signs of approval of competitive examination? The man with a real love of knowledge delights, as Bacon did, in the idea that all men should know what

he knows. He revels in the sympathy of men of knowledge. He wishes everybody to be able to aid him in discovering the "open secrets" of nature. He pits himself, not against his fellow-labourers, but against nature.

Ellesmere. I should like to work this question out with you a little. Do I understand you, that you object to examinations generally as a means of ascertaining the qualifications of an individual?

Milverton. No: but I object to making them competitive; or rather, to speak accurately, I object to making them too severely competitive.

There is a common metaphor, which I always make use of when talking on this subject. It is the putting up of a bar for men or horses to leap over. Put up your bar if you like. In other words, settle a standard of qualification; and say that it shall be needful for a youth to come up to that standard before he is permitted to enter the Army, the Navy, or the Civil Service; but do not pit one youth against another individually. I object very strongly to the Cambridge system by which you endeavour to give every man his exact place; this must make competition very fierce. There will always be sufficient competition in the world: we need not increase it artificially.

Now look what an evil the competitive spirit is, when carried to a great excess. We have resolved to allow, and whether we had so resolved or not, we cannot help allowing the present war to be fully in our minds at the present moment. What is the cause of that war —the *vera causa*, as Lord Bacon would have said? It is that a people cannot be content with saying to a neighbouring people—"we are very brave; you are very brave: we are very powerful; you are very powerful: let us agree to respect one another, and to keep our hands off from one another." But no: it must be ascertained, absolutely ascertained, by competitive examination, which is the braver and which is the more powerful.

As I have often ventured to say to you, there is nothing so much wanted in the world, as for a man, or a body of men, to be content to be second. I need hardly point out that such a contentment would fulfil one of the noblest aims of Christianity.

Sir Arthur. I also think, Milverton, and in this I know you will agree with me, that this contentment would insure a greater amount of knowledge and proficiency.

Milverton. Yes; if you carry competition to its uttermost, you inevitably destroy individuality.

Ellesmere. Big words; but I do not exactly see what they mean.

Cranmer. Nor I.

Milverton. I suppose you will admit that, for almost everybody,

there is something in which he could especially excel. If you press competition to its uttermost, you never allow sufficient time or thought to be given for the development of each man's peculiar aptitude. He must know what others know. There is no subject which he can afford to neglect, and no subject to which he can afford to give peculiar attention.

Now, as regards another matter, I suppose you will also admit, that envy is one of the worst things in the world.

Envy mostly enters where close competition leads the way. The greater men, it is true, escape this vice. One of the sure signs of greatness is freedom from envy. But as regards the mass of mankind, they will have envy developed in them, almost in the same proportion that you encourage individual competition.

Sir Arthur. There is nothing probably of which people are so envious, as of fame.

Returning to war, I always think what an apt illustration it is, of the accidental way in which fame is gained, to see how the name of some insignificant village suddenly becomes a renowned historical name because it has been in or near the scene of battle.

Ellesmere. We generally read that the village is in flames.

Sir Arthur. Yes: not only is fame an accidental thing, but mostly an unfortunate thing.

Mauleverer. Very good, Sir Arthur. To speak the language of the mathematicians, fame is chiefly a function of misfortune. You can hardly point out any very famous man in history, whose latter days have not been clouded with misfortune, unless indeed, like Cæsar, he has been assassinated in the full flush of his good fortune.

Milverton. I could:—but how about the eminent men in literature?

Mauleverer. Oh! they only write because they are miserable—miserable for themselves or for others—except those who write for money, and surely they are miserable enough!

Ellesmere. I wish to interrupt this dolorous discourse, and to say something which has nothing whatever to do with the subject, but which has just come into my mind. You see our dog, Fairy. Please regard her with admiration.

Cranmer. Why? we always regard Fairy with admiration, but why to-day especially?

Ellesmere. Because Fairy, like all the rest of the good animals, makes use only of those weapons of offence and defence which nature has gifted her with. And her pretty teeth she only tries upon boys. Don't you, Fairy? It is only ourselves, and the rest of the simious tribe, who carry arms or make use of missiles. The monkeys, you know, will throw down cocoa-nuts at you. If I had been consulted, I do not think I should have given hands to any of the animals, man

included—at least, not until their heads had been better trained to make good use of such a potential thing as a hand.

Milverton. Putting aside Ellesmere's ill-natured remark——

Ellesmere. Suppose wasps had hands, what a life they would lead us.

Milverton. Putting aside Ellesmere's ill-natured remark, I revert to the subject we were discussing. What a different thing is the desire of knowledge from the desire of fame! It always surprises me, that men can go through the world—clever men—who seem to have no desire to understand what they see about them. Now here is a safe passion—the passion for knowledge—which you might encourage in mankind to the uttermost; and it is an unenvious passion. Here is Ellesmere, who knows nothing of Arabic; but his mind is set on attaining the first place at the Bar. What will that profit you hereafter, Ellesmere? whereas one can hardly imagine the soul divorced from its knowledge.

Ellesmere. This is all very fine; but the body objects exceedingly to being divorced from the utmost amount of pounds, shillings, and pence it can accumulate.

Sir Arthur. To use a witticism, which was much current last year, the most obdurate metals will melt, you know, Ellesmere, in that place to which most of the eminent lawyers are hastening.

Ellesmere. It seems to me that those persons who delight so much in polite culture, can be very rude.

But how about women, Milverton? Would not a little competition be good for them? Milverton is very discreet, not to say cunning, in all that he has ever said about women's claims, women's rights, women's education, and the like, which we hear such a din about nowadays.

Milverton. You are quite right, Ellesmere; not cunning though —discreet. When I write, or talk about anything, I have always a strong wish, perhaps a stupid one, to bring people over to my way of thinking; so I generally avoid needless controversy as much as I can. But I have no objection to enter upon this subject. I will begin with an axiom—that is, with something which is an axiom in my mind. Women are in many things our superiors, in many things our inferiors—our equals never. I hold with Coleridge, that there are souls masculine and souls feminine. If I were suddenly asked to give a proof of the goodness of God to us, I think I should say that it is most manifest in the exquisite difference He has made between the souls of men and women; so as to create the possibility of the most comforting and charming companionship that the mind of man can imagine.

Ellesmere. What will your friend John Stuart Mill say to all this?

Milverton. I admire John Mill amazingly as a human being; and,

though I see but little of him, I feel very much attached to him. But I do not always agree with his views. Now, I will take one point of difference which affects this question. He would say, I believe, if he were here, "you speak of women as they are, not as they might be, if they were properly cultivated."

I believe that careful investigation would furnish a complete answer to this argument of his. I will take a particular case. For one man who understands the rudiments of music, there are, at least, three or four hundred women who do so. Do they create in it? Where is there a Frau Beethoven, a Frau Mozart, a Signora Bellini, a Signora Rossini, a Madame Auber? It is a most audacious thing for me to say, but I feel as certain of it as that I am here; that if I knew as much of music as most of the ladies of my acquaintance, I should assuredly use that knowledge for invention. I could not go on, playing other people's ideas. This is one of the marked differences between men and women—the exceeding audacity of the one, the exceeding sweet timidity and prudence of the other. I don't believe that this difference will be essentially altered by any change in the "regiment of women."

Ellesmere. I must interrupt, and say that as to audacity——

Milverton. Now don't talk nonsense, Ellesmere. Was it a woman, do you think, who first constructed a boat? or, what is still more audacious, first set foot in it upon the water?

Ellesmere. As to that, I admit that probably it was not a woman who first eat an oyster.

Sir Arthur. Milverton is right, according to my judgment.

Lady Ellesmere. But let us hear, Leonard, about those things in which we are superior.

Milverton. You know them, my dear, as well as I do. Everybody knows them. It is talking common-place to talk about them. You are superior in quiet endurance, in niceness of demeanour, in proprieties of all kinds, in delicate perceptions of all kinds—especially of character—in domestic prudence, in constancy; and, what is greatest of all, in not allowing your affections, or your admirations, to be dulled or diminished by familiarity. Really I do not think there is anybody who admires women more than I do.

Lady Ellesmere. That is a prelude, Blanche, I have no doubt, to his commencing the chapter of our inferiorities.

Milverton. Yes it is, my dear. You are inferior to us in the sense of justice, in daring, in originality, and, generally, in greatness. You have minor defects too. You are not so pleasant to one another as men are. The art of nagging, and of being generally disagreeable, when you choose, are yours in perfection. Decidedly you are more unforgiving than we are.

Ellesmere. What about their reasoning powers?

Milverton. These are very great.

Ellesmere. This is a new theory.

Milverton. Why you really don't suppose, Ellesmere, that women can't reason quite as well as men?

Ellesmere. I may be very foolish, but I had always supposed something of the kind.

Milverton. Oh no; it's quite a mistake. Some of the finest reasoners that have ever lived have been women. What you perceive in them that makes you think they cannot reason as well as men, is this, that they decline to abide by the decisions of reason. They introduce the affections of the soul, when we, in our poor, creeping way, are content to abide by the conclusions of logic. You argue with a woman. I can tell you, she appreciates all your arguments; and, at the end of your discourse, is frequently wont to repeat her original opinion in exactly the same words as she first used in stating it. But this is because she does not choose to be convinced.

Ellesmere. Well, I do believe there really is something in what you say, but it makes them out to be inferior animals, which is all that I care to prove.

Milverton. No, it does not. Altogether it is a most beautiful arrangement, showing again the wisdom of Creation. I will tell you why.

Women were made inferior to men in physical strength. If they had been made exactly amenable to our ways of reasoning, they would have had too little hold upon us. Whereas now, being really resolved to rule, as all we men are, at least in serious matters, we are obliged to guide and govern women—when we do guide and govern them—

Ellesmere. It is well to put in that proviso.

Milverton. To guide and govern them, when we do guide and govern them, through their affections, so that we are obliged perpetually to pay court to them, which, as I intimated before, is a very beautiful arrangement.

Ellesmere. I see. The irrationality of women is another proof of the wisdom and goodness of Providence. That is, according to the Milvertonian view of the matter.

Sir Arthur. I think the Milvertonian view, as you call it, is a very charming view, and I believe it to be a correct one.

Mauleverer. It may be true, but it gives one a very miserable notion of the construction of human society: namely, that we are to live with creatures, and to be immensely dependent upon them (almost all cookery is thrown into their hands), with respect to whom we are to encounter the perpetual fatigue of winning their affections, if we

are to persuade them to act reasonably,—that is, according to our view of reason, which may be a most imperfect one.

Lady Ellesmere. I am thoroughly puzzled. I do not know whether to accept this view of the question, or not. There seems to be a great deal of truth in it, but yet it places us upon a lower level.

I could have said exactly a similar thing for our side. I know that when I want to persuade John to do anything which I am certain the right rules of reason should compel him to assent to, I am often obliged to coax him a little; which I suppose corresponds with that process which Leonard calls winning the affections, and which is so tiresome and fatiguing, according to my husband and Mr. Mauleverer.

Ellesmere. Mauleverer said nothing about "tiresome." That is the way in which these women always contrive to introduce something foreign to the discussion. Notwithstanding Milverton's assertion as to their powers of reasoning, the power of keeping to the point is not one which they manifest.

Cranmer. We shall never agree upon this matter. We may differ considerably about war; but, at any rate, there is more chance of our coming to agreement about that, than there is about our agreeing in any conclusions respecting the rights, claims, privileges, immunities, and intellectual merits of women. It is very ungallant of me, perhaps; but, should I ever come back to office, I do not wish to have them as clerks in the Treasury; for, unfortunately, I am not a man skilled in guiding or governing anybody by the affections. I resign that form of guidance to the supreme suavity of Sir John Ellesmere.

Sir Arthur. I have not read the news in to-day's papers. And it is dangerous to talk about the war, without having read the morning's news; for, otherwise, one may put forth the most intelligent and carefully-considered opinions which are flatly contradicted and shown to be absurd and irrelevant by the latest telegrams.

Milverton. The news to-day is most remarkable. It is not that it chronicles any great event of siege or battle; but it shows what wonderful powers of arrangement and what prevision have been brought into action by the Germans. It appears that there are, at least, 650,000 of them on the soil of France, at a considerable distance from their base of operations; and yet all these people are amply provided with food and ammunition, and the horses with forage. It is an immense triumph of forethinking organization.

Sir Arthur. While we are talking about war, I will tell you one thought which I have always had about it,—a very presumptuous thought you will probably say, but it is one to which I hold most strongly. I think it is nonsense to talk of any especial military

talent. I am not alone in this view. One of the most eminent of modern statesmen holds it also.

Cranmer. I don't understand exactly what you mean.

Sir Arthur. I mean that I object to the common notion that a great military commander possesses certain qualifications peculiarly fitting him for the conduct of military affairs, and that these qualifications are seldom possessed even by the most distinguished men in civil affairs. It appears to me, on the contrary, that all business, military as well as civil, should be conducted much in the same manner, and requires much the same qualifications to conduct it well. If there is anything special required for military command, it is apprehensiveness. I think you will find that all great commanders have possessed this quality in a high degree. It is the want of this quality which has led to so many of the French defeats.

Milverton. I quite agree with your notion, Sir Arthur, that there is no wonderful difference between the qualities that make men excel in military command and those which make them excel when placed in power as civilians; except, perhaps, that there is something required in action—on the day of battle, for instance—which requires some especial qualifications in a commander.

Ellesmere. I do not see this. I know what you mean;—rapidity of decision upon change of circumstance. This quality is wanted in civil life too. It is needful to make a great debater, a wise councillor, a good lawyer. I think you are right, Sir Arthur, in challenging anybody to maintain that generalship requires extraordinary qualifications.

Sir Arthur. Well, this emboldens me to say something which I should not otherwise have ventured to say, even to such intimate friends as you are. You know I am the least military of mortal men, being merely a student and a politician: but I declare to you, (don't laugh at me), that I think I showed this military talent, which Milverton calls apprehensiveness, in considering the present campaign. Like the rest of the world, I took down my maps when the war began, and looked at them carefully. I made up my mind that there was immense danger to the French from the possible movement of the Prussians through the Vosges. I should instantly, if I had been in command of the French, have provided against that movement. You may laugh if you like, but I assure you this is not an afterthought. My little daughter, if she were here, would tell you that "Papa was always talking about the Vosges."

Milverton. I quite believe you, Sir Arthur; and I have no doubt that you were not alone in this apprehensive thought, but that hundreds thought the same.

Ellesmere. It ought always to be remembered, but is very frequently

forgotten, that the Great Napoleon was not a Frenchman. He seems to me to have been an apt representative of the genius of the Italians.

Milverton. Quite true, Ellesmere.

By the way, there is not anything so important for a nation as to be well aware of its peculiar characteristics, and to guard against the defects which its specialities lay it open to.

I must tell you an anecdote, which I think singularly illustrates one of the characteristics of the French. Our friend, George Lewes, told it to me years ago; and I wish I could tell it to you as well as he told it.

An intelligent Frenchman came to pay him, or some friend of his, a visit. In the room there was a large map of Europe over the chimney-piece. The Englishman and the Frenchman sat down before the fire. After some ordinary talk, they began to look up at the map, and to comment upon it.

Now, you know, in any map of Europe, how Russia seems to overhang the rest of Europe, like a great thundercloud. The Frenchman made these extraordinary remarks, "At first sight, no doubt, the movement would appear likely to come from there." Thus saying, he pointed to huge Russia.

"*Mais non!* it seems to me evident that the movement must come from there;" and, as he spoke, he pointed to small France.

Now, if the friends had been considering anything else but a map; if it had been a French book, or a French work of art, or a speech in the French Chambers, there might have been some "discourse of reason" in remarking that, "from France must come the movement which shall dominate the world."

But the map!—but of all things else, the map. How could any rational being discern in the map that "the movement" must come from France?

I have often thought over this anecdote, which was passed on to me when it was quite warm, when the conversation had just taken place. And I have thought what a remarkable difference it indicates between English and French nature. I suppose that there is not an Englishman in the world, who, looking at the map of Europe, does not feel somewhat appalled by the relative smallness of his own country, and astonished that "the movement has ever come from his small island."

To use the expression of our friend Carlyle, "the imagination of a Frenchman seems sometimes to be divorced from fact."

Lady Ellesmere. All you gentlemen seem to do little else than philosophise about this war, entering deeply into national character, and matters of that kind; but you seem to lose sight of the horrors

of it, and these are the things which oppress our poor feminine minds the most. But then we are so "deficient in greatness," you know.

Milverton. If I am to dwell upon the horrors of the war, I must adopt an astronomical illustration, which I have tried on you before.

Ellesmere. Now don't go into abtruse calculations. "My education was completed," as the late Lord Derby used to say, "in the prescientific period." I wish I had been brought up as a national schoolboy. You hear them asked some such question as this: 2375 yards of taffety, at 3*s.* 6½*d.* a yard? The clever little wretches at once advance forward, stretching out their arms like pump-handles, to show that they can answer the question, if their master will only allow them to do so. Whereas I keep thinking all the time, what a difficulty it would be for me to answer the question at all, even with the assistance of my wife and my clerk; and yet you must admit I am rather a clever fellow, as you all have reason to know.

Milverton. Want of culture, you see:—want of early culture. But now to proceed with my astronomical illustration. What I wish to show is, that there are hardly any of us who properly appreciate figures.

When, on an unclouded night, Ellesmere, you look up into the heavens, how many stars do you see?

Ellesmere. Do you remember what Charles Lamb said when the schoolmaster asked him whether he had ever made any calculation as to the value of the rental of all the retail shops in London?

If, he said, he had asked me what song the sirens sang, or what name Achilles assumed when he hid himself among women, I might have "hazarded a wide solution." And so say I on the present occasion. Not but that I have some statistical ideas. If you were to tell me of any "long, unlovely street," as Tennyson says, in which there are seven hundred and fifty-three married men, I could tell you pretty accurately about the relations of domination that exist between them and their wives. There are six hundred who are entirely managed by their wives; there are one hundred and fifty foolish ones, who are always wrangling and jangling for the mastery; and there are only three who manage their wives without beating them. But then these three are nearly always away from home, being captains of vessels. I am a dab at some kinds of calculations, you see; but, as regards the stars, I have no skill in estimating their number, or anything else about them.

Milverton. But try, Ellesmere; think over it, and try.

Ellesmere. Well, if I must say something, I should say, that on such a night as you describe, I see 157,283 stars. I make it odd numbers, because that looks scientific; but I suppose it is hundreds of thousands.

Milverton. The utmost you ever see is three thousand.

Ellesmere. Oh, that is the sort of thing one might tell a young woman, when one is making love to her on a moonlight night, and when she will believe anything one says. That time of facile credence however soon passes away, according to my experience. But you must not try such a preposterous statement on us middle-aged men. I know I see more than three thousand.

Milverton. No, you don't. What you do not know is, what a large number is three thousand. You have really no idea of three thousand. Am I not right, Mauleverer, about the stars?

Mauleverer. Yes.

Sir Arthur. I speak with all submission, in the presence of you scientific people; but I am, for once, entirely of Ellesmere's way of thinking, or rather of imagining.

Milverton. Let us give them, Mauleverer, a proof of what we have been saying. I forget the exact figures, but I will take care to overstate them, rather than the contrary. There are, at the utmost, only five thousand nine hundred stars which are visible to the naked eye. Now I suppose you will admit that you can only see at one time one hemisphere; and, supposing the stars to be equally distributed, you can only see two thousand nine hundred and fifty.

Three thousand is your maximum; but you have so poor an idea of three thousand, that you can hardly believe this.

Ellesmere. I am silenced, but not convinced. I am quite feminine in this matter. I disdain facts and figures, and hold to my own opinion still.

Milverton. Now having appreciated, to some extent, how large a number three thousand really is, imagine a dead or wounded man in the place of each one of those stars. It would be a good many wretched beings to mourn over. Now imagine that you could travel from hemisphere to hemisphere of different worlds, and see, one after another, a hundred hemispheres of these horrid constellations of dead and wounded men. Thus you might attain to some notion of the injury to life already caused by this war. I made a calculation, some little time ago, of the room those who are entirely *hors de combat* would take up; and, if I recollect rightly, I found that you might pass along a line of them, arranged on both sides of the road in beds three feet wide, without any interval, from London to Dover. It is worth while, I think, sometimes to go into these somewhat fanciful modes of illustrating the enormous evils and sufferings caused by war.

Cranmer. I saw the other day that some one had made a calculation of the agricultural losses occasioned by this war, and they amounted in money to £170,000,000.

Sir Arthur. It is a great advantage to us, that we have Milverton as one of our company, because he always starts us with some one subject that is predominant for the time in his mind; and, as everybody must have noticed, when you have one subject before you, much of what you see, or hear, or read, seems all at once to have an unaccountable reference to that one subject.

Ellesmere. Oh yes! It is a great advantage to have Milverton boring-on upon one subject, because it is so delightful to make excursions from it, and to diverge into a hundred other things. There is all the pleasure of naughtiness in this divergence. It has the sweetness of forbidden fruit.

Cranmer. I don't like it at all. I like to keep to one subject, and to work that out well. But I know that to attempt this is hopeless when certain persons are with us.

Ellesmere. Why not say at once, a certain person?

Sir Arthur. What I am going to say now, touches nearly the two great subjects we have been discussing—namely, Culture and War.

I suppose we have all read our newspaper lately with an eagerness and intentness unknown to us before. We have already said something about newspaper writing; but I mean to say something more. Milverton began our conversation with an intimation that he was going to dwell upon our deficiency in culture. I think that our newspaper-writing is an astounding instance to the contrary. You easily see how this doctrine of mine bears upon the question of the present war. I declare solemnly, to use Mauleverer's favourite expression, I declare solemnly that I think that the misfortunes of the French are to be attributed more to their bad newspaper-writing than to bad generalship, insufficient preparation, or to almost any other cause that you can name.

Now, look at our own newspapers. Do you not feel as certain as possible that if our statesmen were to put forth false intelligence, inflated manifestoes, wild proclamations, or to conduct themselves in the most unseemly and unpatriotic manner in their assemblies, the newspapers, as at present constituted, would be down upon them in a moment?

Nay more, if our chief literary men were to write as wildly as some of the chief literary men in France have written at the present crisis, our newspapers, instead of backing them, would ridicule them and keep them in order.

Cranmer. I don't love newspapers, for they are always so hard upon us official men; but I think you are right, Sir Arthur, in what you imagine about them, and that they really would curb extravagance of every kind.

Milverton. I must own, Sir Arthur, that there is a great deal in

what you say. I was thinking, however, when I introduced the subject of culture, of individual culture. But, to return to newspapers. I think I fully appreciate the wonderful things done by the daily press, as, for instance, the goodness of the articles, evidently written in the small hours of the night after a debate in the House of Commons. But what astonishes me most is the weekly press. The quantity of thought expressed in it is amazing. I will show you what I mean. Sandy, just give me that paper which is on the table.

Now let me enumerate the subjects it treats of. First there is an article on "The War," which seems to me to be very good. Then there is a thoughtful article upon "Italy and Rome." Then one upon "The German Conditions of Peace," which appears to give a very fair view of the case.

Now take a single sentence in it. "Victor Hugo and Michelet shared with Béranger and Thiers the guilt of exciting two generations of Frenchmen to repeat the crimes of the empire by the robbery of the Rhine." Is not that a true statement, and a very significant one? Then there is an article on "The Ministry and the Democrats." Then an article entitled "Sir Henry Bulwer on Mediation." Then one on "The Future Constituent Assembly." I would not say that I agree with everything in these articles; but I must admit that there is a great deal in them. Then comes an article upon Mr. Bruce. I do not think that this is a just article, whatever may be its merits as a clever piece of composition.

Sir Arthur. I suppose you will admit with me, Milverton, that the man has not yet been born who can for any long time fill the appointment of Home Secretary with satisfaction to the murmuring public.

Milverton. No; that phœnix has not yet arisen in the world.

Ellesmere. I tell you what, my fine fellows, you don't know what it is to be Attorney or Solicitor-General. Those unhappy functionaries have to be acquainted with all earthly and heavenly affairs, and to be ready at a moment's notice to give a sound legal opinion upon them.

Milverton. Those potent personages are not so much before the world as the Home Secretary is. Their great functions are rather dark: his are conducted under that "fierce light" which "beats" upon the Home Office, as it does upon the Throne.

But you must let me resume my description of this newspaper. I don't care if it fatigues or bores you. Its very length will prove the truth of what I say. After the cruel usage of Mr. Bruce, comes an elaborate article on "The War of 1870," written, I should guess, by a learned soldier. Then come what are called the social articles, any

one of which would have delighted and astonished our ancestors, accustomed to weak *Tatlers* and verbose *Ramblers*.

Ellesmere. Astonished, probably.

Milverton. These articles are headed "Good Advice," "Popping the Question on the Stage," and "Village Politics in France." With regard to the last-named article, I do really believe that there is more knowledge shown in it of the French peasantry than almost any literary man in France could produce. I say literary *man* advisedly; for George Sand seems to me to have a profound knowledge of peasant life. Now I will read you a bit from this article:—

"The peasant is nowhere an easy person to become really acquainted with, and the French peasant is the least easy of all. He is far pleasanter to talk to than his English namesake, but he is just as distrustful. He has a sort of animal secrecy and wariness; and in the presence of men of better station and education than himself, although he is quite ready to display a democratic consciousness of equality, which would be odd on this side of the Channel, he has all the caution and reticence of intuitive fear. Books help us very little indeed. Nine out of ten French novels never stir beyond the Parisian boulevards; and the few that do, with one illustrious exception, either confine themselves, like Balzac, to country towns, or invent imaginary scenes of country innocence and repose. Perhaps the one person who knows the French peasant best is the Englishman who wanders from village to village with knapsack on his back."

Then there is an article, showing great research, upon "The Protests against the Vatican Degree;" then "Army Organization" is discussed; then comes an article of antiquarian research; then "Pawnbroking" is elaborately discussed; then "The Drama;" then there are several reviews of English books. Finally, there is an elaborate review of French literature, in which thirteen or fourteen French works are carefully considered.

We are accustomed to this kind of thing, and hardly realize the astonishing nature of it. This is but one of the weekly productions. It happened to be the one on the table. There are others, in their way, quite as astonishing.

Sir Arthur. And do you not admit, Milverton, that if our statesmen were to deviate into folly and excitement, these fellows would do their best to keep us right?

Milverton. Yes: but there is something to be said on the other side; namely, that so much good writing, which of course mainly takes the form of criticism, always tends to check vigorous action on the part of those who have to act.

Mauleverer. Very true, Milverton; very true: you cannot develope any one form of human thought and endeavour, without somewhat injuring all the rest.

Ellesmere. Pleasant creature, this! Goldsmith's Croaker was an encouraging fellow when compared with him!

Mauleverer. You all go on so fast, you seem to me always to have your thoughts at the tip of your tongues, so that I have no chance with you. When I do get in a few words, I am obliged to make them pretty strong. As for Milverton, I am positively ashamed of him. Something is said, which hits him very hard, or which at least ought to hit him very hard, and which he ought to feel; and, instead of rejecting it, he receives it with the utmost placidity, just because it enables him to say something friendly and encouraging about the progress of human affairs. If the French press is noxious, at any rate the English press is admirable, according to him and Sir Arthur.

Ellesmere. So somebody gets some credit, which must be very painful to you, Mauleverer.

Mauleverer. Allow me to change the subject a little, only a little, and to make a statement of facts as they exist at the present moment, in which doubtless these praisers of mankind, Sir Arthur and Milverton, will discern something that is very wonderful and very beautiful.

Ellesmere. Don't include me. I didn't say the English press was very astonishing or very beautiful.

Mauleverer. Please, Sir John, have the goodness for one five minutes to let me have my say without interruption.

There is a town, the second in the world as regards size, the first in the world as regards beauty: noble in architecture (if there is such a thing as good architecture in the world); rich in art, as far as man's poor efforts in art can go; abundant in works of literature, whatever merit that abundance may have: bright, clear, joyous; adorned with gardens, statues, fountains; the home of pleasure; the home of Milverton's beloved culture; distinguished for science, as well as for literature and art—not to have seen which is not to have seen anything of the world. And this great city is beleaguered by a host of armed men; and, at this moment, we are dubious whether its temples, its towers, its palaces, its vast abodes of hoarded literature and art, its pleasant gardens, its light-reflecting lovely streets, may not be welded into one hideous mass of destruction by the shot and shell of the invaders. Here is your triumph of civilization: here is an example of the progress of human affairs: here is one of the conquests of Christianity! This is what it all comes to: and you can sit in your armchair, and praise mankind.

Ellesmere. (*Aside to me in a whisper:* "He is very awful when he breaks out in this way; isn't he, Sandy? These quiet, fat men always are.")

Mauleverer. (*Continuing.*) And things have been brought to this pass by two nations, highly civilized. Oh, yes! highly civilized!

For the invaders have gone down into the depths of things. They know exactly what are the bounds of human knowledge. They have gone deeper than Locke ever did. They have not only discovered that it is impossible for the same thing, at the same time, to be and not to be; but they know all about innate ideas, and thoroughly understand the doctrine of contradictory inconceivables.

Milverton. While you are about it, Mauleverer, you may as well say, for you will say truly, that there is no branch of human knowledge to which this laborious and truth-loving people have not added much. What then!

Mauleverer. And, looking on, being perfectly aware of the danger, there have been the other wise nations of Europe—this Europe, with its Reformation, and its Art of printing, and all the fine things it has done and suffered since St. Peter came, or did not come, to Rome—with all their knowledge, and all their wisdom, not being able to prevent this culminating horror!

Milverton. As to "horror," I agree with you; but you have put it upon totally wrong foundations. I don't care about art, or science, or literature, when you are considering human suffering. The horror would be quite as great to me, if the beleaguered city did not contain one work of science, literature, or art. A human being—any human being—is a far more beautiful production than the finest work of art.

Sir Arthur. No, no, Milverton, this is going a little too far. The human beings may be replaced, but the works of art cannot.

Milverton (rather excitedly). I am astonished at you, Sir Arthur. Just think for one moment of an agonizing night of suffering passed by any one wounded man left on the field of battle. I declare I would purchase exemption from suffering for that one human being by the destruction of the finest work of art in the world.

Ellesmere. Really, Milverton, there are too many of us upon the ground, at least of us men, for there cannot be too many women.

Milverton. How can you talk such cruel nonsense, Ellesmere! Go to your Shakespeare. Learn there what a human being is, or may be. "How noble in reason! how infinite in faculty! in form and moving how express and admirable! in action how like an angel! in apprehension how like a God! the beauty of the world! the paragon of animals!"

Mauleverer. The fewer human beings, the fewer miserable fools, hoping inane hopes, wishing impossible wishes, endeavouring inconsistent endeavours—always duped from their cradles to their graves—the serfs of passion, the slaves of circumstance, at best the tyrants of their fellow-men. I prefer a great work of art.

Lady Ellesmere. Really, Leonard, even I think you make too much of human beings. There is a something in a divine work of art which would compensate——

[I do not like to continue the account of this conversation, for Mr. Milverton, goaded on all sides, got into one of those tremendous passions in which he sometimes, but very rarely, indulges, and said the most violent things against all of us. At last he got up and went out of the room, feeling, I suppose, that as a host he had rather exceeded the reticence which a host should practise, having said the strongest things in the strongest language. Certainly he went out making a playful remark; but it was bitter and severe in its playfulness. He said, "I will not stay any more with you wretches. You only put me into a rage, which I know is very unbecoming. I will go and talk with old John the gardener; and I do declare I believe that, in that somewhat sour, crabbed old man, vexed with rheumatism, but whose nature has not been lowered by an effeminate care for works of art, I shall find nobler and juster notions than in all you demi-semi-cultivated people. You put me in mind of the patricians of Rome, who could jeer and joke and bet about the gladiatorial shows, unconscious of the infinite cruelty and hideous indifference to human suffering they were manifesting."

There was an awkward silence for a minute or two after Mr. Milverton left the room. Mrs. Milverton also went away, evidently to soothe her husband. Sir John Ellesmere broke the silence.]

Ellesmere. Well, we have "been and gone and took and done it," as the vulgar say. He is a dangerous fellow to deal with, is Milverton. You never know when you are touching him to the quick. At last I did not dare to joke, or I might have asked him whether I was worth the "Venus de' Medici," and which of the two, for the world's good, he would rather save from destruction.

Sir Arthur. I am very sorry; but you know he does deceive us. In general he bears so serenely with your sarcasms, Ellesmere, with my fastidiousness, Mauleverer's misanthropy, and our general impertinence and opposition, that one is not prepared for these outbursts.

Ellesmere. Oh, you wicked Sandy! *Et tu Brute!* You surely ought not to have told the truth—namely, that you thought the books in the Paris Library more valuable than some of the human beings. I am ashamed of you!

Johnson. He never was cross with me before.

Ellesmere (*imitating Milverton*). "I am disappointed with you, Johnson. There is an absence of that generosity of sentiment which becomes the young. From these hardened men of the world, what can one expect but hardness? But I did think better things of you." That was what he said, was it not?

Now, I am the most unlucky of all of you; for I really agreed with him.

Cranmer. Oh, oh!

Ellesmere. Upon my word I did; and, if he would only have had patience, I should have come round to his side. I don't care much about works of art. To tell the honest truth, I like dogs and horses better.

I will tell you what we will do. Milverton is always abjectly humble and civil after one of these outbursts. We will boldly renew the conversation at or after dinner.

Mauleverer. After dinner. There is a chance of our having blackcock for dinner. Mrs. Milverton told me that some virtuous Scotch laird had sent them some blackcock—the first of birds. If the discussion should wax warm again, it will spoil our dinner.

Ellesmere. This explains that whispering in corners, of Mauleverer and Mrs. Milverton, which I noticed this morning, and thought it boded ill for Milverton's domestic peace. If he were here, poor fellow, he would dilate upon it as an instance of the effect of culture. Mauleverer is the most knowing man in culinary science; and all the women fear him, and look up to him accordingly. When he is coming to dine with us, Lady Ellesmere is more fussy than if she was about to receive seven dukes with their respective duchesses. She even condescends to consult me about the soups. And let me tell you I have invented a soup for these great occasions, about the composition of which I will hold forth to you some day. But now we must think of making our peace with Milverton. It shall be *after* dinner, as Mauleverer suggests, that we will resume our wicked talk. Our fearlessness in renewing the conversation will show Milverton that we have not been hurt by all he has said. I shall go over to his side; for I assure you I am of his way of thinking; and it will all end as happily as the third volume of a novel. Only you must not give way too much, or too soon, but must hold for a time to your wicked opinions touching the supremacy of art, science, and literature, and the insignificance of human beings. Otherwise he will see through our device.

[What a kind-hearted fellow Sir John Ellesmere really is! He was quite unhappy, as I found afterwards in a walk I had with him, at Mr. Milverton's having been put out in this way. Sir John Ellesmere did contrive that the conversation on this topic should be resumed. It happened, just as he had prognosticated; and the conversation proceeded in the most playful way, Mr. Milverton, however, protesting that all of us, except his good friend Ellesmere, did not make enough account of human beings. He concluded, I remember, by a quotation from a Scotch song, which has these words in it,—"And sair she lightlies me." "Ah!" he said, "you sairly lightly the ineffable worth, and the 'potentiality,' as Dr. Johnson would have said, of any human being, a creature not made of stone and paint, that is to live for ever and for ever."]

III.

[THE following chapter is very brief; but I think it furnishes more materials for thought than any one we have lately had; and, although it deals chiefly with war, and especially with the present war, it certainly furnishes an illustration of that subject, for which Mr. Milverton and I have, from the beginning of these conversations, in vain endeavoured to get an uninterrupted hearing—namely, general culture.

Nothing surprises me more—for I am, comparatively, an ignorant and ill-read young man—than to find how subjects connected with the events of the present day, may always meet with illustration and enlightenment from the labours of some of the great writers of the past.

However, I must not take up the time of my readers by lucubrations of my own, but must proceed at once to set before them the result of my notes of this conversation, which began thus:—]

Milverton. There is a question, in reference to war, which I should greatly like to discuss with you. Without, however, wishing to say anything rude or impertinent, I hardly think that you will appreciate the full importance of this question. Some of you, for instance, Ellesmere, will only make fun of what I say; and I do not think that any of you, except perhaps Sir Arthur, will enter into the subject heartily. If a certain excellent Florentine gentleman, who was born about four hundred years ago, were alive and in this room, I cannot imagine a greater intellectual pleasure than discussing the question with him. He, too, would have delighted in such discourse; would soon have taken the main part of it out of my incapable hands, and would have woven it into one of his own discourses of transcendent sagacity.

Sir Arthur. I suppose that this "excellent Florentine gentleman" is no other than Niccolo Machiavelli.

Milverton. The same—the man who has, pèrhaps, been more misrepresented than any other man that has ever lived.

Ellesmere. Doesn't he (I mean Milverton, not Machiavelli) love a paradox?

Mauleverer. I am with you, Milverton, before hearing what you have to say; for Machiavelli is a great friend of mine. I have not read much of him; but what I have read, convinces me that he had penetrated into, and thoroughly understood, the depths of human baseness.

Milverton. And the heights of human goodness.

Cranmer. I know nothing about Machiavelli; but I have always understood that he was most manifestly an emanation from the Evil-one; and, for my part, I have seldom found that the universal opinion of mankind is a wrong one. I have heard, but I dare say it is a mere popular theory, that our expression, "Old Nick," was derived from Niccolo Machiavelli.

Ellesmere. I propose something. Before entering upon the Machiavellian subject, which Milverton, with a sublime conceit, intimates that we are hardly worthy to discuss, let us hear something about Machiavelli himself from Milverton, his chief admirer and friend.

Milverton. I am quite willing to endeavour to make you appreciate, as far as you are capable of appreciating, the merits of this extraordinary man.

Now, when any one is very strongly convinced that he is right in any matter, even if he is not a sporting man, he is very prone to offer a bet upon the subject, as the most undoubted way of showing his sincerity. Now I will bet you, Ellesmere———

Ellesmere. What shall we bet? I vote it shall be a new collar for dear Fairy. Her present one is very shabby; and I know she feels ashamed of it.

Milverton. Good. I'll bet you, that if you will give me ten minutes' time to look over my copy of Machiavelli, I will produce a number of passages from his writings which will compel you, if you are a just man, to admit that they have the most clear bearing upon the present state of the war between the French and the Germans, and that these passages are pregnant with wise suggestions to both sides.

Ellesmere. Done!

Milverton. And, mark you, I am not prepared for a bet. I had not been thinking of Machiavelli till this conversation began, and I have not looked into his pages for two or three years. Give me the book, Johnson.

[Hereupon Mr. Milverton took his Machiavelli, and went out of the room. The conversation, during his absence, was of a desultory kind, being chiefly enlivened by Ellesmere's saying that, after all, he had a great sympathy with Machiavelli, as many other great and good persons had been grievously misunderstood and calumniated—for instance, he himself, Sir John Ellesmere, the Count von Bismarck, Nero, Henry VIII., and last, not least, Lucrezia Borgia. It must not be imagined that Nero's name, being mentioned immediately after Count von Bismarck, was intended for an uncomplimentary allusion, for Sir John Ellesmere has always maintained, and in this he has been supported by Mr. Milverton, that Nero has been greatly

calumniated, and was, as he says, not a bad sort of fellow. Then Mr. Milverton entered the room.]

Milverton. I feel quite confident that I shall win. I will tell you what I propose to do. I will merely read the headings of some of his chapters. Then, if you wish it, I will give extracts from any chapter that may seem to you to bear closely upon the subject of the controversy.

"*Se le fortezze, e molte altre cose che spesse volte i principi fanno, sono utili o dannose.*"

"Whether fortresses, and many other things which princes frequently make, are useful or hurtful."

"*I danari non sono il nervo della guerra, secondo che è la comune opinione.*"

"Riches are not the sinews of war, as according to the general opinion they are supposed to be."

"*Che gli uomini che nascono in una provincia, osservano per tutti i tempi quasi quella medesima natura.*"

"That the men who are born in the same province, preserve throughout all time nearly the same nature."

Hitherto the headings of his chapters have been somewhat general in their application. We are now coming to close quarters.

"*Come un capitano prudente debbe imporre ogni necessità di combattere ai suoi soldati, e a quelli degl'inimici torla.*"

"How a prudent general ought to impose every necessity for fighting upon his own soldiers, and to take away necessity for fighting from the soldiers of the enemy."

Cranmer. Don't be angry with me for interrupting, Milverton; but I don't understand.

Milverton. Nor did I thoroughly until I glanced into the chapter while I was in the other room. It means—Always have somewhat of the pressure of necessity as an impulse to your troops when you make them fight, and as a reason for your doing so. And especially, do not give your enemy the advantage which arises from that ultimate form of necessity, despair.

Is not this good advice? If you could but see how he works it out, you would certainly say so. I feel though, I have not done justice to this chapter. Let me try again; he means, let there be a reason for your fighting—manifest to your own troops—a convincing reason of necessity why you should fight then and there. In short, always have necessity on your side. Observe how the contrary course of conduct has acted upon the French troops during the present war. There have been innumerable marchings and counter-marchings: no reason why the battle should have been here and not there; now and not then. That is what demoralizes troops, as Machiavelli per-

ceived. Observe how large his maxim is: what a number of cases it would comprehend. It is getting those emphatic words "you must" upon your side; and contriving that the enemy is not driven into a corner; but has every opportunity for vacillation; that there should be no "you must" for him to say to his troops.

Again, "*La cagione perchè i Francesi sono stati, e sono ancora giudicati nelle zuffe da principio più che uomini, e dipoi meno che femmine.*"

"The reason why the French have been, and are now, accounted in warlike contests to be at first more than men, and afterwards less than women."

Sir Arthur. Pardon me, Milverton; but I do not think it very generous of you to quote this chapter. Are *you not*, too, inclined to lean to the strongest?

Milverton. No, my dear Sir Arthur, I am not. I never would have quoted the heading of this chapter, at least at the present time, unless I had found in the body of the chapter that Machiavelli had maintained of the French that, "with ordinary skill, the French ardour in war might be kept up to the end in the same measure as at the beginning:"

"*Ma non è per questo che questa loro natura, che li fa feroci nel principio, non si potesse in modo con l' arte ordinare, che la li mantenesse feroci infino nel l' ultimo.*"

Now I come to the best of all, at least to the most applicable at the present moment.

"*Ai principi e alle repubbliche prudenti debbe bastare il vincere; perchè il più delle volte quando non basti, si perde.*"

"Prudent princes and commonwealths ought to be satisfied with victory; for most times when victory does not suffice, it is lost."

Sir Arthur. This is very good indeed. I can imagine, even from my little knowledge of Machiavelli, what an excellent chapter he would write on this heading.

Ellesmere. I don't rely upon imagination: let us hear some of it. The thing certainly promises well.

Milverton. It is indeed a wonderful chapter. He shows, by examples, how unwise it is for the victors to make too much of their victory; for the vanquished, to make too little of their defeat. I declare——

Ellesmere. Say "solemnly," after the fashion of Mauleverer.

Milverton. Well, then, I declare solemnly I believe that if Count von Bismarck and M. Jules Favre, who are probably rather busy men just at present, would, for only one day, forsake all other business, and shut themselves up to study this chapter of Machiavelli, it would be the best thing for the world that could happen.

Ellesmere. But give us some of the examples, Milverton.

Milverton. I will try to do so; but I feel keenly how poorly I render into English his consummate Italian. However, I will give it in the most literal manner I can. "Hannibal, after he had routed the Romans at Cannæ, commanded his orators at Carthage to announce the victory, and to ask for supplies. It was argued this way and that, in the Carthaginian Senate, as to what should be done. Hanno, an old and prudent citizen of Carthage, counselled that this victory should be used wisely; namely, to make peace with the Romans, it being possible for the Carthaginians to have peace now, as he said, with honourable conditions, as they had gained a battle; and that they should not wait to have to make peace after another battle, which might be a defeat. *For the object, he argued, of the Carthaginians should be to show the Romans that they were able to deal with them;* and, having gained a victory, they should have a care not to lose the benefit of it, merely for the hope of gaining some greater battle."

Now, my good friends, just recollect what a defeat Cannæ was! I think the foregoing passage might be of use to Count von Bismarck. Now, for M. Jules Favre.

Machiavelli takes the siege of Tyre as an instance of the folly of refusing terms of peace offered by the prevailing side—the inhabitants of that city having most unwisely refused the conditions of peace which Alexander the Great had offered to them. The following is the passage:—

"Therefore, princes cannot commit a greater error when they are attacked (and when the assault is made by assailants who are far more puissant than they are), than to refuse all terms of accommodation, especially when these terms are offered by the enemy; because never will such low terms be offered to them, which may not be in some respect advantageous for the party which accepts these terms, who will thus be sharers of the victory gained over themselves."

How profound those last words are! I have paraphrased rather than translated. He writes with such fearful brevity and compression, that one is sometimes obliged to do so. I will give the words to you in the original:—"*e vi sarà parte della sua vittoria.*" You see that the prince who is wise enough to accept the first terms offered to him, has, according to Machiavelli, a part in the victory gained over himself. Now I want to be allowed to give you another passage which seems to me singularly applicable to the present state of affairs. I am afraid you are getting tired of Machiavelli.

Sir Arthur. Not a bit. I could listen to these extracts and your comments on them for a very long time. They interest me exceedingly.

Ellesmere. I could not listen for a very long time, but I am quite willing to hear one or two more.

Milverton. I will not molest you with more than one; here it is.

"*Che lo assaltare una città disunita, per occuparla mediante la sua disunione, è partito contrario.*"

"That to besiege a disunited city, in order to occupy it by means of its disunion, is an unwise course."

You will admit, I believe, that it is probable that not a little wisdom bearing upon the present siege of Paris may be extracted from this chapter. Machiavelli gives several examples to prove the truth of his assertion, and concludes by adducing the contests of Philip Visconti, Duke of Milan, with the Florentines, in which contests he always relied much upon their disunion. At last, grieving over these military undertakings of his, he exclaimed that the factions of Florence had made him expend uselessly "two millions of gold." I suppose he means two millions of ducats.

Ellesmere. Come here, Fairy. No: you needn't kiss me so much. I am not proud of being kissed, even by the most charming of dogs. She shall have a new collar, she shall; and without any expense to her master. I must own, Milverton, that this Machiavelli of yours appears to be a very fine fellow, and that his writings, as is the case with the writings of all the greatest men, have a perennial meaning and application. Now, I have given up handsomely, have I not? Your success in this bet has made me anxious to hear the question which you were about to put before us at the beginning of this conversation, but which you thought we were scarcely worthy to hear, and which you longed to discuss with your beloved Florentine.

Milverton. No; I decline to do so now. It has really been a great exertion to me, in this short time, to renew my acquaintance with Machiavelli; and to make up my mind, without a moment's hesitation in each particular case, as to what passages I should give you, to prove the point I desired to prove. I believe, if we looked into the causes of our fatigue on any given day, we should find that it depended more upon the number of decisions we had come to than upon all the rest of our work.

Ellesmere. Milverton cannot be tired, but he must fatigue himself still further by finding out good reasons why he should be tired. For my own part, I am always tired of severe discussion, and am ready for muscular exercise. I am a muscular Christian, if I am worthy of the name of Christian at all. How I wish we were at Eton again, Milverton! and could go leaping over Chalvey ditch with long poles, as we used to do when we had exerted our minds to the utmost stretch by writing splendid copies of verses upon the theme—

"Dulce ridentem Lalagen amabo,
Dulce loquentem."

Men are such fools not to keep up their boyish sports. However, Fairy and I are just as lithe and lissom as we were when we were both young puppies—are we not, Fairy?

[So saying, Sir John leaped out of the study window, followed by Fairy, and neither of them was seen any more until dinner-time. And thus the conversation ended; for none of us ever attempt to keep up continued conversation when the provoking Ellesmere has left us, whom Mr. Mauleverer, delighting in culinary similes, always likens to first-rate Ceylon curry-powder, which, as he says, "can give significance and flavour even to the poorest and most contemptible of edible animals—the domestic rabbit."]

ON THE FORMATION OF COAL.

THE lumps of coal in a coal-scuttle very often have a roughly cubical form. If one of them be picked out and examined with a little care, it will be found that its six sides are not exactly alike. Two opposite sides are comparatively smooth and shining, while the other four are much rougher, and are marked by lines which run parallel with the smooth sides. The coal readily splits along these lines, and the split surfaces thus formed are parallel with the smooth faces. In other words, there is a sort of rough and incomplete stratification in the lump of coal, as if it were a book, the leaves of which had stuck together very closely.

Sometimes the faces along which the coal splits are not smooth, but exhibit a thin layer of dull, charred-looking substance, which is known as "mineral charcoal."

Occasionally one of the faces of a lump of coal will present impressions, which are obviously those of the stem, or leaves, of a plant; but though hard mineral masses of pyrites, and even fine mud, may occur here and there, neither sand nor pebbles are met with.

When the coal burns, the chief ultimate products of its combustion are carbonic acid, water, and ammoniacal products, which escape up the chimney; and a greater or less amount of residual earthy salts, which take the form of ash. These products are, to a great extent, such as would result from the burning of so much wood.

These properties of coal may be made out without any very refined appliances, but the microscope reveals something more. Black and opaque as ordinary coal is, slices of it become transparent if they are

cemented in Canada balsam, and rubbed down very thin, in the ordinary way of making thin sections of non-transparent bodies. But as the thin slices, made in this way, are very apt to crack and break into fragments, it is better to employ marine glue as the cementing material. By the use of this substance, slices of considerable size and of extreme thinness and transparency may be obtained.*

Now let us suppose two such slices to be prepared from our lump of coal—one parallel with the bedding, the other perpendicular to it; and let us call the one the horizontal, and the other the vertical, section. The horizontal section will present more or less rounded yellow patches and streaks, scattered irregularly through the dark brown, or blackish, ground substance; while the vertical section will exhibit more elongated bars and granules of the same yellow materials, disposed in lines which correspond, roughly, with the general direction of the bedding of the coal.

This is the microscopic structure of an ordinary piece of coal. But if a great series of coals, from different localities and seams, or even from different parts of the same seam, be examined, this structure will be found to vary in two directions. In the anthracitic, or stone-coals, which burn like coke, the yellow matter diminishes, and the ground substance becomes more predominant, and blacker, and more opaque, until it becomes impossible to grind a section thin enough to be translucent; while, on the other hand, in such as the "Better Bed" coal of the neighbourhood of Bradford, which burns with much flame, the coal is of a far lighter colour, and transparent sections are very easily obtained. In the browner parts of this coal, sharp eyes will readily detect multitudes of curious little coin-shaped bodies, of a yellowish-brown colour, embedded in the dark brown ground substance. On the average, these little brown bodies may have a diameter of about one-twentieth of an inch. They lie with their flat surfaces nearly parallel with the two smooth faces of the block in which they are contained; and, on one side of each, there may be discerned a figure, consisting of three straight linear marks, which radiate from the centre of the disk, but do not quite reach its circumference. In the horizontal section these disks are often converted into more or less complete rings; while, in the vertical sections, they appear like thick hoops, the sides of which have been pressed together. The disks are, therefore, flattened bags; and favourable sections show that the three-rayed marking is the expression of three clefts, which penetrate one wall of the bag.

The sides of the bags are sometimes closely approximated; but, when the bags are less flattened, their cavities are, usually, filled with numerous, irregularly-rounded, hollow bodies, having the same kind

* My assistant in the Museum of Practical Geology, Mr. Newton, invented this excellent method of obtainin thin slices of coal.

of wall as the large ones, but not more than one-seven-hundredth of an inch in diameter.

In favourable specimens, again, almost the whole ground substance appears to be made up of similar bodies—more or less carbonized or blackened—and, in these, there can be no doubt that, with the exception of patches of mineral charcoal, here and there, the whole mass of the coal is made up of an accumulation of the larger and of the smaller sacs.

But, in one and the same slice, every transition can be observed from this structure to that which has been described as characteristic of ordinary coal. The latter appears to arise out of the former, by the breaking-up and increasing carbonization of the larger and the smaller sacs. And, in the anthracitic coals, this process appears to have gone to such a length, as to destroy the original structure altogether, and to replace it by a completely carbonized substance.

Thus coal may be said, speaking broadly, to be composed of two constituents: firstly, mineral charcoal; and, secondly, coal proper. The nature of the mineral charcoal has long since been determined. Its structure shows it to consist of the remains of the stems and leaves of plants, reduced to little more than their carbon. Again, some of the coal is made up of the crushed and flattened bark, or outer coat, of the stems of plants, the inner wood of which has completely decayed away. But what I may term the "saccular matter" of the coal, which, either in its primary or in its degraded form, constitutes by far the greater part of all the bituminous coals I have examined, is certainly not mineral charcoal; nor is its structure that of any stem or leaf. Hence, its real nature is, at first, by no means apparent, and has been the subject of much discussion.

The first person who threw any light upon the problem, so far as I have been able to discover, was the well-known geologist, Professor Morris. It is now thirty-four years since he carefully described and figured the coin-shaped bodies, or larger sacs, as I have called them, in a note appended to the famous paper "On the Coalbrookdale Coal-Field," published at that time, by the present President of the Geological Society, Mr. Prestwich. With much sagacity, Professor Morris divined the real nature of these bodies, and boldly affirmed them to be the spore-cases of a plant allied to the living club-mosses.

But discovery sometimes makes a long halt; and it is only a few years since Mr. Carruthers determined the plant (or rather one of the plants) which produces these spore-cases, by finding the discoidal sacs still adherent to the leaves of the fossilized cone which produced them. He gave the name of *Flemingites gracilis* to the plant of which the cones form a part. The branches and stem of this plant are not yet certainly known, but there is no sort of doubt that it was closely allied to the *Lepidodendron*, the remains of which abound in

the coal formation. The *Lepidodendra* were shrubs and trees, which put one more in mind of an *Araucaria* than of any other familiar plant; and the ends of the fruiting branches were terminated by cones, or catkins, somewhat like the bodies so named in a fir, or a willow. These conical fruits, however, did not produce seeds; but the leaves of which they were composed bore upon their surfaces sacs full of spores or sporangia, such as those one sees on the under surface of a bracken leaf. Now it is these sporangia of the Lepidodendroid plant *Flemingites* which were identified by Mr. Carruthers with the free sporangia described by Professor Morris, which are the same as the large sacs of which I have spoken. And, more than this, there is no doubt that the small sacs are the spores, which were originally contained in the sporangia.

The living club-mosses are, for the most part, insignificant and creeping herbs, which, superficially, very closely resemble true mosses, and none of them reach more than two or three feet in height. But, in their essential structure, they very closely resemble the earliest Lepidodendroid trees of the coal: their stems and leaves are similar; so are their cones; and no less like are the sporangia and spores; while even in their size, the spores of the *Lepidodendron* and those of the existing *Lycopodium*, or club-moss, very closely approach one another.

Thus, the singular conclusion is forced upon us, that the greater and the smaller sacs of the Better Bed and other coals, in which the primitive structure is well preserved, are simply the sporangia and spores of certain plants, many of which were closely allied to the existing club-mosses. And if, as I believe, it can be demonstrated, that ordinary coal is nothing but "saccular" coal which has undergone a certain amount of that alteration which, if continued, would convert it into anthracite; then, the conclusion is obvious, that the great mass of the coal we burn is the result of the accumulation of the spores and spore-cases of plants, other parts of which have furnished the carbonized stems and the mineral charcoal, or have left their impressions on the surfaces of the layer.

Of the multitudinous speculations which, at various times, have been entertained respecting the origin and mode of formation of coal, several appear to be negatived, and put out of court, by the structural facts the significance of which I have endeavoured to explain. These facts, for example, do not permit us to suppose that coal is an accumulation of peaty matter, as some have held.

Again, the late Professor Quekett was one of the first observers who gave a correct description of what I have termed the "saccular" structure of coal; and, rightly perceiving that this structure was something quite different from that of any known plant, he imagined that it proceeded from some extinct vegetable organism which was peculiarly abundant amongst the coal-forming plants. But this

explanation is at once shown to be untenable when the smaller and the larger sacs are proved to be spores or sporangia.

Some, once more, have imagined that coal was of submarine origin; and though the notion is amply and easily refuted by other considerations, it may be worth while to remark, that it is impossible to comprehend how a mass of light and resinous spores should have reached the bottom of the sea, or should have stopped in that position if they had got there.

At the same time, it is proper to remark that I do not presume to suggest that all coal must needs have had the same structure, or that there may not be coals in which the proportions of wood and spores, or spore-cases, are very different from those which I have examined. All I repeat is, that none of the coals which have come under my notice have enabled me to observe such a difference. But, according to Principal Dawson, who has so sedulously examined the fossil remains of plants in North America, it is otherwise with the vast accumulations of coal in that country.

"The true coal," says Dr. Dawson, "consists principally of the flattened bark of Sigillarioid and other trees, intermixed with leaves of Ferns and *Cordaites*, and other herbaceous *débris*, and with fragments of decayed wood, constituting 'mineral charcoal,' all these materials having manifestly alike grown and accumulated where we find them." *

When I had the pleasure of seeing Principal Dawson in London last summer, I showed him my sections of coal, and begged him to re-examine some of the American coals on his return to Canada, with an eye to the presence of spores and sporangia, such as I was able to show him in our English and Scotch coals. He has been good enough to do so; and in a letter dated September 26th, 1870, he informs me that—

"Indications of spore-cases are rare, except in certain coarse shaly coals and portions of coals, and in the roofs of the seams. The most marked case I have yet met with is the shaly coal referred to as containing *Sporangites* in my paper on the conditions of accumulation of coal (*Journal of the Geological Society*, vol. xxii. pp. 115, 139, and 165). The purer coals certainly consist principally of cubical tissues with some true woody matter, and the spore-cases, &c., are chiefly in the coarse and shaly layers. This is my old doctrine in my two papers in the *Journal of the Geological Society*, and I see nothing to modify it. Your observations, however, make it probable that the frequent *clear spots* in the cannels are spore-cases."

Dr. Dawson's results are the more remarkable, as the numerous specimens of British coal, from very various localities, which I have examined, tell one tale as to the predominance of the spore and sporangium element in their composition; and as it is exactly in the finest and purest coals, such as the Better-Bed coal of Lowmoor, that the spores and sporangia obviously constitute almost the entire mass of the deposit.

* "Acadian Geology," 2nd edition, p. 138.

Coal, such as that which has been described, is always found in sheets, or "seams," varying from a fraction of an inch to many feet in thickness, enclosed in the substance of the earth at very various depths, between beds of rock of different kinds. As a rule, every seam of coal rests upon a thicker, or thinner, bed of clay, which is known as "under-clay." These alternations of beds of coal, clay, and rock may be repeated many times, and are known as the "coal-measures;" and in some regions, as in South Wales and in Nova Scotia, the coal-measures attain a thickness of twelve or fourteen thousand feet, and enclose eighty or a hundred seams of coal, each with its under-clay, and separated from those above and below by beds of sandstone and shale.

The position of the beds which constitute the coal-measures is infinitely diverse. Sometimes they are tilted up vertically, sometimes they are horizontal, sometimes curved into great basins; sometimes they come to the surface, sometimes they are covered up by thousands of feet of rock. But, whatever their present position, there is abundant and conclusive evidence that every under-clay was once a surface soil. Not only do carbonized root fibres frequently abound in these under-clays; but the stools of trees, the trunks of which are broken off and confounded with the bed of coal, have been repeatedly found passing into radiating roots, still embedded in the under-clay. On many parts of the coast of England, what are commonly known as "submarine forests" are to be seen at low water. They consist, for the most part, of short stools of oak, beech, and fir trees, still fixed by their long roots in the bed of blue clay in which they originally grew. If one of these submarine forest beds should be gradually depressed and covered up by new deposits, it would present just the same characters as an under-clay of the coal, if the *Sigillaria* and *Lepidodendron* of the ancient world were substituted for the oak, or the beech, of our own times.

In a tropical forest, at the present day, the trunks of fallen trees, and the stools of such trees as may have been broken by the violence of storms, remain entire for but a short time. Contrary to what might be expected, the dense wood of the tree decays, and suffers from the ravages of insects more swiftly than the bark. And the traveller, setting his foot on a prostrate trunk, finds that it is a mere shell, which breaks under his weight, and lands his foot amidst the insects, or the reptiles, which have sought food or refuge within.

The trees of the coal forests present parallel conditions. When the fallen trunks which have entered into the composition of the bed of coal are identifiable, they are mere double shells of bark, flattened together in consequence of the destruction of the woody core; and Sir Charles Lyell and Principal Dawson discovered, in the hollow stools of

coal trees of Nova Scotia, the remains of snails, millipedes, and salamander-like creatures, embedded in a deposit of a different character from that which surrounded the exterior of the trees. Thus, in endeavouring to comprehend the formation of a seam of coal, we must try to picture to ourselves a thick forest, formed for the most part of trees like gigantic club-mosses, mares'-tails, and tree ferns, with, here and there, some that had more resemblance to our existing yews and fir-trees. We must suppose that, as the seasons rolled by, the plants grew and developed their spores and seeds; that they shed these in enormous quantities, which accumulated on the ground beneath; and that, every now and then, they added a dead frond or leaf; or, at longer intervals, a rotten branch, or a dead trunk, to the mass.

A certain proportion of the spores and seeds no doubt fulfilled their obvious function, and, carried by the wind to unoccupied regions, extended the limits of the forest; many might be washed away by rain into streams, and be lost; but a large portion must have remained, to accumulate like beech-mast, or acorns, beneath the trees of a modern forest.

But, in this case, it may be asked, why does not our English coal consist of stems and leaves to a much greater extent than it does? What is the reason of the predominance of the spores and spore-cases in it?

A ready answer to this question is afforded by the study of a living full-grown club-moss. Shake it upon a piece of paper, and it emits a cloud of fine dust, which falls over the paper, and is the well-known Lycopodium powder. Now this powder used to be, and I believe still is, employed for two objects, which seem at first sight to have no particular connection with one another. It is, or was, employed in making lightning, and in making pills. The coats of the spores contain so much resinous matter, that a pinch of Lycopodium powder, thrown through the flame of a candle, burns with an instantaneous flash, which has long done duty for lightning on the stage. And the same character makes it a capital coating for pills; for the resinous powder prevents the drug from being wetted by the saliva, and thus bars the nauseous flavour from the sensitive papillæ of the tongue.

But this resinous matter, which lies in the walls of the spores and sporangia, is a substance not easily altered by air and water, and hence tends to preserve these bodies, just as the bituminized cere-cloth preserves an Egyptian mummy; while, on the other hand, the merely woody stem and leaves tend to rot, as fast as the wood of the mummy's coffin has rotted. Thus the mixed heap of spores, leaves, and stems in the coal-forest would be persistently searched by the long-continued action of air and rain; the leaves and stems would gradually be reduced to little but their carbon, or, in other words, to the condition of mineral charcoal in which we find them; while

the spores and sporangia remained as a comparatively unaltered and compact residuum.

There is, indeed, tolerably clear evidence that the coal must, under some circumstances, have been converted into a substance hard enough to be rolled into pebbles, while it yet lay at the surface of the earth; for in some seams of coal, the courses of rivulets, which must have been living water, while the stratum in which their remains are found was still at the surface, have been observed to contain rolled pebbles of the very coal through which the stream has cut its way.

The structural facts are such as to leave no alternative but to adopt the view of the origin of such coal as I have described, which has just been stated; but, happily, the process is not without analogy at the present day. I possess a specimen of what is called "white-coal" from Australia. It is an inflammable material, burning with a bright flame, and having much the consistence and appearance of oat-cake, which, I am informed, covers a considerable area. It consists, almost entirely, of a compacted mass of spores and sporecases. But the fine particles of blown sand which are scattered through it, show that it must have accumulated, subaërially, upon the surface of a soil covered by a forest of cryptogamous plants, probably s.

As regards this important point of the subaërial region of coal, I am glad to find myself in entire accordance with Principal Dawson, who bases his conclusions upon other, but no less forcible, considerations. In a passage, which is the continuation of that already cited, he writes:—

"(3) The microscopical structure and chemical composition of the beds of cannel coal and earthy bitumen, and of the more highly bituminous and carbonaceous shale, show them to have been of the nature of the fine vegetable mud which accumulates in the ponds and shallow lakes of modern swamps. When such fine vegetable sediment is mixed, as is often the case, with clay, it becomes similar to the bituminous limestone and calcareo-bituminous shales of the coal measures. (4) A few of the under-clays, which support beds of coal, are of the nature of the vegetable mud above referred to; but the greater part are argillo-arenaceous in composition, with little vegetable matter, and bleached by the drainage from them of water containing the products of vegetable decay. They are, in short, loamy or clay soils, and must have been sufficiently above water to admit of drainage. The absence of sulphurets and the occurrence of carbonate of iron in connection with them, prove that, when they existed as soils, rain-water, and not sea-water, percolated them. (5) The coal and the fossil forests present many evidences of subaerial conditions. Most of the erect and prostrate trees had become hollow shells of bark before they were finally embedded, and their wood had broken into cubical pieces of mineral charcoal. Land-snails and galley-worms (*Xylobius*) crept into them, and they became dens, or traps, for reptiles. Large quantities of mineral charcoal occur on the surface of all the large beds of coal. None of these appearances could have been produced by subaqueous action. (6) Though the roots of the *Sigillaria* bear more resemblance to the rhizomes of [illegible] plants; yet,

structurally, they are absolutely identical with the roots of Cycads, which the stems also resemble. Further, the *Sigillariæ* grew on the same soils which supported Conifers, *Lepidodendra*, *Cordaites*, and Ferns—plants which could not have grown in water. Again, with the exception perhaps of some *Pinnulariæ* and *Asterophyllites*, there is a remarkable absence from the coal measures of any form of properly aquatic vegetation. (7) The occurrence of marine, or brackish-water animals, in the roofs of coal beds, or even in the coal itself, affords no evidence of subaqueous accumulation, since the same thing occurs in the case of modern submarine forests. For these and other reasons, some of which are more fully stated in the papers already referred to, while I admit that the areas of coal accumulation were frequently submerged, I must maintain that the true coal is a subaërial accumulation by vegetable growth on soils, wet and swampy it is true, but not submerged."

I am almost disposed to doubt whether it is necessary to make the concession of "wet and swampy;" otherwise, there is nothing that I know of to be said against this excellent conspectus of the reasons for believing in the subaërial origin of coal.

But the coal accumulated upon the area covered by one of the great forests of the carboniferous epoch would, in course of time, have been wasted away by the small, but constant, wear and tear of rain and streams, had the land which supported it remained at the same level, or been gradually raised to a greater elevation. And, no doubt, as much coal as now exists has been destroyed, after its formation, in this way. What are now known as coal districts owe their importance to the fact that they were areas of slow depression, during a greater or less portion of the carboniferous epoch; and that, in virtue of this circumstance, mother earth was enabled to cover up her vegetable treasures, and preserve them from destruction.

Wherever a coal-field now exists, there must formerly have been free access for a great river, or for a shallow sea, bearing sediment in the shape of sand and mud. When the coal-forest area became slowly depressed, the waters must have spread over it, and have deposited their burden upon the surface of the bed of coal, in the form of layers, which are now converted into shale, or sandstone. Then followed a period of rest, in which the superincumbent shallow waters became completely filled up, and finally replaced, by fine mud, which settled down into a new under-clay, and furnished the soil for a fresh forest growth. This flourished, and heaped up its spores and wood into coal, until the stage of slow depression recommenced. And, in some localities, as I have mentioned, the process was repeated until the first of the alternating beds had sunk to near three miles below its original level at the surface of the earth.

In reflecting on the statement, thus briefly made, of the main facts connected with the origin of the coal formed during the carboniferous epoch, two or three considerations suggest themselves.

In the first place, the great phantom of geological time rises before the student of this, as of all other, fragments of the history of our earth—springing irrepressibly out of the facts, like the Djin

from the jar which the fisherman so incautiously opened; and like the Djin again, being vaporous, shifting, and indefinable, but unmistakably gigantic. However modest the bases of one's calculation may be, the minimum of time assignable to the coal period remains something stupendous.

Principal Dawson is the last person likely to be guilty of exaggeration in this matter, and it will be well to consider what he has to say about it:—

"The rate of accumulation of coal was very slow. The climate of the period, in the northern temperate zone, was of such a character that the true conifers show rings of growth, not larger, nor much less distinct than those of many of their modern congeners. The *Sigillariæ* and *Calamites* were not, as often supposed, composed wholly, or even principally, of lax and soft tissues, or necessarily short-lived. The former had, it is true, a very thick inner bark; but their dense woody axis, their thick and nearly imperishable outer bark, and their scanty and rigid foliage, would indicate no very rapid growth or decay. In the case of the *Sigillariæ*, the variations in the leaf-scars in different parts of the trunk, the intercalation of new ridges at the surface representing that of new woody wedges in the axis, the transverse marks left by the stages of upward growth, all indicate that several years must have been required for the growth of stems of moderate size. The enormous roots of these trees, and the condition of the coal-swamps, must have exempted them from the danger of being overthrown by violence. They probably fell in successive generations from natural decay; and making every allowance for other materials, we may safely assert that every foot of thickness of pure bituminous coal implies the quiet growth and fall of at least fifty generations of *Sigillariæ*, and therefore an undisturbed condition of forest growth enduring through many centuries. Further, there is evidence that an immense amount of loose parenchymatous tissue, and even of wood, perished by decay, and we do not know to what extent even the most durable tissues may have disappeared in this way; so that, in many coal-seams, we may have only a very small part of the vegetable matter produced."

Undoubtedly the force of these reflections is not diminished when the bituminous coal, as in Britain, consists of accumulated spores and spore-cases, rather than of stems. But, suppose we adopt Principal Dawson's assumption, that one foot of coal represents fifty generations of coal plants; and, further, make the moderate supposition that each generation of coal plants took ten years to come to maturity—then, each foot-thickness of coal represents five hundred years. The superimposed beds of coal in one coal-field may amount to a thickness of fifty or sixty feet, and therefore the coal alone, in that field, represents $500 \times 50 = 25{,}000$ years. But the actual coal is but an insignificant portion of the total deposit, which, as has been seen, may amount to between two and three miles of vertical thickness. Suppose it be 12,000 feet—which is two hundred and forty times the thickness of the actual coal—is there any reason why we should believe it may not have taken two hundred and forty times as long to form? I know of none. But, in this case, the time which the coal-field represents would be $25{,}000 \times 240 = 6{,}000{,}000$ years.

As affording a definite chronology, of course such calculations as these are of no value; but they have much use in fixing one's attention upon a possible minimum. A man may be puzzled if he is asked how long Rome took a-building; but he is proverbially safe if he affirms it not to have been built in a day;—and our geological calculations are all, at present, pretty much on that footing.

A second consideration which the study of the coal brings prominently before the mind of any one who is familiar with palæontology is, that the coal Flora, viewed in relation to the enormous period of time which it lasted, and to the still vaster period which has elapsed since it flourished, underwent little change while it endured, and, in its peculiar characters, differs strangely little from that which at present exists.

The same species of plants are to be met with throughout the whole thickness of a coal-field, and the youngest are not sensibly different from the oldest. But more than this. Notwithstanding that the carboniferous period is separated from us by more than the whole time represented by the secondary and tertiary formations, the great types of vegetation were as distinct then as now. The structure of the modern club-moss furnishes a complete explanation of the fossil remains of the *Lepidodendra*, and the fronds of some of the ancient ferns are hard to distinguish from existing ones. At the same time, it must be remembered, that there is nowhere in the world, at present, any *forest* which bears more than a rough analogy with a coal-forest. The types may remain, but the details of their form, their relative proportions, their associates, are all altered. And the tree-fern forest of Tasmania, or New Zealand, gives one only a faint and remote image of the vegetation of the ancient world.

Once more, an invariably-recurring lesson of geological history, at whatever point its study is taken up: the lesson of the almost infinite slowness of the modification of living forms. The lines of the pedigrees of living things break off almost before they begin to converge.

Finally, yet another curious consideration. Let us suppose that one of the stupid, salamander-like Labyrinthodonts, which pottered, with much belly and little leg, like Falstaff in his old age, among the coal-forests, could have had thinking power enough in his small brain to reflect upon the showers of spores which kept on falling through years and centuries, while perhaps not one in ten million fulfilled its apparent purpose, and reproduced the organism which gave it birth, surely he might have been excused for moralizing upon the thoughtless and wanton extravagance which Nature displayed in her operations.

But we have the advantage over our shovel-headed predecessor—or possibly ancestor—and can perceive that a certain vein of thrift

runs through this apparent prodigality. Nature is never in a hurry, and seems to have had always before her eyes the adage, "Keep a thing long enough, and you will find a use for it." She has kept her beds of coal many millions of years without being able to find much use for them; she has sent them down beneath the sea, and the sea-beasts could make nothing of them; she has raised them up into dry land, and laid the black veins bare, and still, for ages and ages, there was no living thing on the face of the earth that could see any sort of value in them; and it was only the other day, so to speak, that she turned a new creature out of her workshop, who by degrees acquired sufficient wits to make a fire, and then to discover that the black rock would burn.

I suppose that nineteen hundred years ago, when Julius Cæsar was good enough to deal with Britain as we have dealt with New Zealand, the primæval Briton, blue with cold and woad, may have known that the strange black stone, of which he found lumps here and there in his wanderings, would burn, and so help to warm his body and cook his food. Saxon, Dane, and Norman, swarmed into the land. The English people grew into a powerful nation, and Nature still waited for a full return for the capital she had invested in the ancient club-mosses. The eighteenth century arrived, and with it James Watt. The brain of that man was the spore out of which was developed the steam engine, and all the prodigious trees and branches of modern industry which have grown out of this. But coal is as much an essential condition of this growth and development as carbonic acid is for that of a club-moss. Wanting coal, we could not have smelted the iron needed to make our engines, nor have worked our engines when we had got them. But take away the engines, and the great towns of Yorkshire and Lancashire vanish like a dream. Manufactures give place to agriculture and pasture, and not ten men can live where now ten thousand are amply supported.

Thus, all this abundant wealth of money and of vivid life is Nature's interest upon her investment in club-mosses, and the like, so long ago. But what becomes of the coal which is burnt in yielding this interest? Heat comes out of it, light comes out of it, and if we could gather together all that goes up the chimney, and all that remains in the grate of a thoroughly-burnt coal-fire, we should find ourselves in possession of a quantity of carbonic acid, water, ammonia, and mineral matters, exactly equal in weight to the coal. But these are the very matters with which Nature supplied the club-mosses which made the coal. She is paid back principal and interest at the same time; and she straightway invests the carbonic acid, the water, and the ammonia in new forms of life, feeding with them the plants that now live. Thrifty Nature! Surely no prodigal, but most notable of housekeepers!

THOMAS H. HUXLEY.

MR. GLADSTONE IN TRANSITION.

MR. GLADSTONE'S famous "Chapter of Autobiography" had a very remarkable blank, and one which it is quite possible to supply. The leading object of that striking contribution to literature was to relieve the disestablishment proposed by the Liberal party "from the odium of baseness, and the lighter reproach of precipitancy," on the part of its leader. It started from the admission, "Ille ego qui quondam: I, the person who have now accepted a foremost share of the responsibility of endeavouring to put an end to the existence of the Irish Church as an Establishment, am also the person who of all men in official, perhaps in public life, did, until the year 1841, recommend, upon the highest and most imperious grounds, its resolute maintenance." The change was admitted—the change of opinion, and the consequent change of action. And while it was pointed out that in a peculiarly progressive stage of a nation's history, change of opinion must be looked for to a considerable extent on the part even of its leaders, Mr. Gladstone refused to accept this general consideration as a sufficient answer to the difficulty caused by the "great and glaring" revolution in his own course. "In theory at least, and for others, I am a purist with respect to what touches the consistency of statesmen." Change of opinion in its leaders is an evil to the country, though a much less evil than persistence in error. It is not perhaps always to be

condemned. But it is always to be watched and criticized, and there are abundant signs by which to distinguish between honest and earnest change on the one hand, and manœuvres on the other, which destroy confidence and entail dishonour. "Changes which are sudden and precipitate—changes accompanied with a light and contemptuous repudiation of the former self—changes which are systematically timed and tuned to the interest of personal advancement—changes which are hooded, slurred over, or denied"—all defence of these he repudiated, while he set himself to show, with regard to his own conversion, that it was open and candid, as well as earnest and deliberate.

In this personal defence, however, Mr. Gladstone confined himself almost wholly to one line of argument. He pointed out that the doctrine of "The State in its Relations to the Church," originally published in 1838, and a fourth edition of which, greatly enlarged, appeared in 1841, was not a general defence of Establishments, but a defence of them on a specific ground. The Church, that volume argued, is only to be maintained for its truth—truth, of all possessions the most precious to the soul of man; and on this principle alone can its establishment be properly and permanently upheld. As Mr. Gladstone put it in a speech on the Appropriation Bill in 1836, a Church establishment is maintained for the sake of its doctrines, not of its members—*they* have no right whatever to an advantage over other subjects of the State. This was his position, but scarcely had his book issued from the press, when he found that there was no party, and probably no individual, in the House of Commons who was prepared to act upon it. He was "the last man on a sinking ship," and he resolved to go down with it. In the course of the year 1844 he became a member of the Cabinet of Sir Robert Peel, and as President of the Board of Trade was at the centre of the most interesting operations of that Government. Just then his chief made known to him his opinion that it was desirable to remodel and increase the grant to Maynooth. Now this question of Maynooth Mr. Gladstone had always treated as a testing question for the foundations of the Irish Established Church, and the proposal was absolutely inconsistent with the grounds on which he had advocated that establishment. It does not appear, indeed, that now, in 1844, he had the clear opinion on these practical questions which he had entertained a few years before. On the contrary, "I never entertained the idea of opposing the measure of Sir Robert Peel;" and he declined overtures made to him by those who actively resisted that measure. The sole object of his resigning his place in Sir Robert Peel's Cabinet when this scheme was brought forward was "with a great price" to obtain freedom; as he expressed it at the time in Parliament, "to

place myself, so far as in me lay, in a position to form, not only an honest, but likewise an independent and an unsuspected, judgment" on the matter. And on this resignation his whole apology is founded: "I respectfully submit that by this act my freedom was established; and that it has never since, during a period of nearly five-and-twenty years, been compromised."

But if, during the succeeding twenty-five years, the freedom so acquired was not compromised, it would appear from the "Chapter of Autobiography" that it was also little used. The notes of warning which Mr. Gladstone founds on as given from time to time during that long period were not very loud, nor very clear, and they were exceedingly few. He *privately* asserted his freedom on the question at the epoch of the formation of Lord John Russell's Government in 1846. He declined to give a pledge to his Oxford Committee, in 1847, that he would stand by the Irish Church; but we may be certain that his Oxford Committee did not publish that fact. When speaking on the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, in 1851, he said that "we cannot change the profound and resistless tendencies of the age towards religious liberty." But the years flowed on, and, so far as the Autobiography records, nothing fuller or more distinct was publicly uttered; and during all this time when motions of inquiry into the Irish Church were made in Parliament, "when I voted, I voted against them,"—on the ground, as is explained, that they were partial and unsatisfactory. He told Sir Roundell Palmer, in 1863, that he had made up his mind the Irish Establishment should go; but this was a dead secret between the two illustrious friends. The sole occasion on which, as would seem from the Autobiography, anything was publicly said was so late as 1865, when in a speech in Parliament Mr. Gladstone declared that present action was impossible, that at any period immense difficulties would have to be encountered, but that this was "the question of the future." This speech was immediately attacked by Mr. Whiteside as hostile to the Irish Establishment, and Mr. Gladstone was obliged to write a letter to the Warden of Trinity College, in Scotland, stating that he considered the practical question as remote, and apparently out of all bearing on the politics of the day. And so the matter rested till the hour struck, and in 1867 the successor of Lord Palmerston, in the full but deeper allegiance of the Liberals, pronounced, amid the enthusiastic cheers of his suddenly consolidated party, that the time had at last come when the Irish Church should cease to exist as an establishment.

Clearly, this is not quite satisfactory. The Autobiography gives, in the first place, no sketch of the progress of the writer's own mind on the question. The great sacrifice of place in 1845, and those few and slight indications that, thereafter, he held himself free, which

we have already touched, are the only things narrated. That part of the chapter which is expressly autobiographical is wholly external, and gives no light whatever on the progress by which a mind at once so energetic and so massive—a personality which "moveth altogether if it moves at all"—must have worked itself into a position practically the opposite of that which it once held. The pamphlet, indeed, on coming so far, leaves "personal vindication," and goes on to the wider question, what the direction of the public sentiment and the general march of affairs has been on these subjects since 1838. And in this, indeed, may be gathered, though incidentally, some reasons which probably did influence the mind of the writer to fall in more with that course of public administration. Yet, even here, it is only Mr. Gladstone's present opinions that are given. It is not said when or how he came to adopt them. Except the one statement of Sir R. Palmer, there is no evidence laid before the reader that they may not be the product of the tempestuous working of a fervid mind during, say, the short interval succeeding the death of Lord Palmerston. The failure of an autobiography to be autobiographical, to reveal the writer's internal as well as external course, is an awkward thing. But still more is the failure to present external evidence, if it may be had, that the writer had practically used and asserted the freedom he had won, and that long before recent events. For the leading purpose of the *brochure* was not to be biographical, and to give interesting details to sympathizing readers. Its leading purpose was to be apologetic—to give to incredibly dull and foolish opponents, such as those from whom the foul-mouthed Berwick proclamation is quoted, absolute proof that they had wronged this statesman in accusing him either of baseness or precipitancy. The defence as to baseness is conclusive. The vindication from the charge of precipitancy is, as we have seen, not so satisfactory. During those five-and-twenty years Mr. Gladstone, on his own showing, seems not to have used his freedom in the way of publishing any exposition or avowal of a change of sentiments. And even now, when he stands formally on his defence, we are unable to gather at any point how early the change had taken place, or how far it had extended.

And yet this omission was quite unnecessary—seems, indeed, to have proceeded from mere inadvertence. Sixteen years before the publication of his "Chapter of Autobiography," long ere one half of the five-and-twenty years that succeeded his resignation of office had run themselves out, Mr. Gladstone had published his general views on this very subject in an eloquent and earnest pamphlet, and these views had been accepted at the time by political opponents as conclusive proof that the author of "The State in its Relations with the Church" had veered round to a position wholly opposed to that

which he held when his book was published. It is difficult to account for the neglect into which the "Letter on the Functions of Laymen in the Church" * has fallen, so as to have been quite unnoticed during the recent controversy upon the consistency of the Liberal statesman; and, of course, it is still more difficult to account for his having neglected to appeal to it himself. It was written by Mr. Gladstone in December, 1851, at the paternal residence of Fasque, in Kincardineshire, and addressed by him, in his capacity of a member of the Episcopal Church in Scotland, to Dr. Skinner, Bishop of Aberdeen, and then Primus of that body. It was published at the request of Dr. Skinner and others, who had perused it in manuscript, and before the end of the year 1852 it had passed through three editions. Last year, having long been completely out of print, it was reprinted by Messrs. Longmans, with a preface by the Rev. Malcolm MacColl, M.A. The value of this publication itself, and its bearing on many questions of present importance, will appear in the course of our review; but its interest as another chapter of (in this case) unconscious autobiography, and its absolutely conclusive bearing on the question which the *Apologia pro Vita Sua* of 1868 left rather unanswered, come out at the first glance.

Indeed, it has not been left to criticism eighteen years after the date to discover this. Among the bishops of the Episcopal Church in Scotland is Dr. Charles Wordsworth, relative but not biographer of the poet, who for many years has occupied himself with the incessant production of earnest appeals in every possible form to that stubborn northern people to acknowledge the divine right of Episcopacy. It does not appear that these representations have had much effect in the way of persuasion, the implied unchurching of their own communions in these letters producing a revulsion in the Scotch Presbyterians more than equal to any attraction exerted. But Bishop Wordsworth has always kept his eye upon another object—the national sin of the Scotch Presbyterian Revolution of 1688, and of that Treaty of Union by which England bound itself to defend Scotland for ever against any aggressions from its own Episcopalianism. Of course all this implies a quick eye for State duties in relation to the Church. In 1852, Dr. Wordsworth was Warden of Trinity College in Glenalmond, Perthshire, an Episcopalian training institution with which Mr. Gladstone has always been closely associated; and the publication of the "Letter on the Functions of Laymen" drew forth from the Warden a prompt and powerful criticism. In entering his "protest against the new doctrine of Religious

* A Letter to the Right Rev. William Skinner, D.D., Bishop of Aberdeen and Primus, on the Functions of Laymen in the Church. By the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M.P. for the University of Oxford. Third Edition. London: John Murray, Albemarle Street. 1852. (Reprinted by Longmans in 1869.)

Freedom, falsely so called, upon which the whole structure of Mr. Gladstone's argument has been made to rest," Dr. Wordsworth made a proclamation which surely reads more like 1868 than 1852.

"You have pronounced upon the moment when the game which has been played by all the wise and good in Church and State for so many ages must be thrown up; when the ship which has weathered so many storms can hold out no more, and it becomes the captain's duty to quit her and to leave her to her fate. You have pronounced upon the moment when the citadel, which has been so long under siege, but hitherto stood out so nobly, must surrender at discretion; when the Church, as an establishment, must fall a helpless and unresisting prey into the hands of her unnatural and ungodly foes. . . . You have veered from one extreme quarter of speculation to its opposite, and the splendid edifice of philosophical reasoning which you once so ably and so elaborately raised, you now, with something of a childish recklessness and impatience, cast down and destroy. . . . And all this you have done (I well know) from the best and holiest motives, from a regard to the welfare and safety of the Church herself. . . . Statements like these, coming from a Churchman, and from such a Churchman, from a representative of the University of Oxford, and from one who himself, ten years ago, maintained the direct contrary, are destructive, no one can say to what extent."

And all this in 1852!* Indeed, this publication bears evidence that the change in Mr. Gladstone's opinions had been known to his friends and acquaintances, and even acted upon by them, at a much earlier date. Near the conclusion Dr. Wordsworth says, "You know with what extreme reluctance and regret I abstained from voting at the last University election" (1847) "on your behalf, because I anticipated from you, sooner or later, the avowal of those new doctrines to which no earthly consideration can induce me to accede." But it is time to see what those new doctrines are, which Mr. Gladstone was known to have attained even before 1847, and which he avowed and enforced in his publication of 1852.

The object of the Letter to Bishop Skinner was to urge that in the Scottish Episcopal communion provision should be made for admitting laymen to Church functions, and in particular that they should have a vote in the synod, or chamber for legislation. The subject is in itself one of great ecclesiastical interest. During the last two years it has been the fundamental and critical question in Ireland, and its bearings on the Church of England are most important. We may, therefore, find room hereafter for some slight notice of the Premier's views on this subject eighteen years ago; but what must in the first place be pointed out is, that he found himself, most characteristically, unable to make even this suggestion without

* A Letter to the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M.P. for the University of Oxford, on the Doctrine of Religious Liberty, as propounded in his Letter to the Bishop of Aberdeen and Primus. By the Rev. Charles Wordsworth, M.A., Warden of Trinity College, Glenalmond, formerly Student of Christ's Church, Oxford. Oxford: John Henry Parker. 1852.

underfounding it by an earnest declaration of principles on the subject of both civil and spiritual government, and of the relations between the two powers. The very first sentence lays before the Scotch Primus the thesis, that "the times in which we live seem to present this peculiar feature, that, as in civil, so in spiritual matters, they tend to devolve upon the governed a portion of the work of government."

Now it will be remembered that the "Autobiography" describes two things as lying at the root of the error which the writer admits in his old position of 1841; one of them being "a miscalculation of the religious state and prospects of the country," which is of course a mere mistake on a point of fact. But the other was an error of theory, for it was due to a "view of the relative position of governors and governed, since greatly modified." So in his accompanying review of the progress of opinion and legislation in Europe and Great Britain on the matter of Church and State, two important elements were noticed. One was the "disintegration of Christendom into many communions;" but the other was "the establishment of the *principle* of popular self-government as the basis of political constitutions." These modern facts, as Mr. Gladstone acknowledges in his recent publication, do tend to relax or dissolve the union of Church and State; but they do it, he holds, "by a process as normal (if it be less beneficial) as that by which the union was originally brought about." In his Letter to Bishop Skinner he goes at least as far as this in acquiescence in or approval of the modern principle, laying down at once that "it would seem that what is called a constitutional system, though not always easy to realise, is, when it can be attained, for the present period of human destinies, the great providential instrument for effective resistance to anarchical designs." But from general views like these he proceeds (after a statement of the importance to the Church of being free in doctrine and discipline) to much more unambiguous avowals.

Here is the earliest public palinode by the author of "The State in its Relations with the Church:"—

"*The time has been* * when, as I think, it was the duty of a good citizen to look with utter aversion on whatever seemed to impair strictness of religious character and profession in the State. With that religious character, consistently and rigidly maintained, it is hard, as we must admit, to reconcile full liberty of conscience; but in maintaining it, for the times of which I speak, the greater good was preserved, and the lesser sacrificed. *It is not so now.* It is now so utter an impossibility to uphold a consistent religious profession in the State, that we must be satisfied with an inconsistent one, and thankful if it do not shock the common reason and sense of justice planted in mankind, by affecting a bastard and deceptive consistency."

* The italics in the following quotations are not Mr. Gladstone's.

This is clearly a repudiation of what Mr. Gladstone elsewhere describes as the master idea of his old system, viz., "that the State as it now stands is capable in this age, as it has been in ages long gone by, of assuming beneficially a responsibility for the inculcation of a particular religion." The use made of the position so laid down is one also with which we have been more lately made familiar.

"But then this inconsistency of profession" on the part of the State, "being radical and systematic, palpably and greatly alters the qualifications and authority of the State in regard to religion, and reduces it more and more to the character, although *circa sacra*, of a temporal agency and influence. The wave of Christianity may indeed be receding from the summits of society, which it took centuries to reach. We have now had before us for many years the undeniable and singular fact that, while the tone and amount of personal religion have been rising in general society, the religious character of the State, as such, has progressively declined. But the provision made by the Almighty for the everlasting maintenance of his truth can never fail, if and where his Church is true to herself. What, then, we (I mean the members of all independent religious bodies, in which capacity only, and as one connected with Scotland, I now write) have to desire is, generally *to be let alone*, and specially not to be put on the bed of Procrustes—a mode of accommodation by no means out of favour in some quarters."

The assimilation of the Episcopal Church in Scotland in these remarks to "all independent religious bodies," and the candid recommendation that for the future it should abandon subversive or political designs, was, of course, the thing which sharpened the perception by Dr. Wordsworth and others of their generally obnoxious tendency. But their monitor was not disposed to leave this matter in doubt. On the one hand, he does not think that "their religious freedom in Scotland is impaired by a cordial and thorough observance of the legal rights and privileges of the Church Establishment;" while, on the other, he speaks with indignation of the "ridiculous attempt" made the previous year by a handful of the clergy and members of that Establishment "to proscribe the appellations belonging to our diocesan episcopacy." And he follows up this two-edged declaration by an eloquent exhortation, and a pledge which will doubtless be yet even more fully redeemed than it has already been.

"Against all such encroachments I for one will steadily set my face, *and will labour to the uttermost*, whether it be ostensibly on our own behalf or on behalf of others, whether for the sake of common justice, or of religious peace, or of divine truth itself, to assert the principle, vital to us all, of a full religious freedom. That principle, I contend, when the State has ceased to bear a definite and full religious character, it is no less our interest than our duty to maintain. Away with the servile doctrine, that religion cannot live but by the aid of Parliament. That aid is a greater or a lesser good, according to circumstances; but conditions are also supposable, under which it would be a great evil. The security of religion lies, first,

in the providence of God and the promise of Christ; next in the religious character and strong sentiment of personal duty and responsibility, so deeply graven on this country and its people. But if that character and sentiment be the mainstay of our reliance here on earth, our first duty must be to see that full scope is given to it; that the development of conscientious convictions, in whatever quarter, is not artificially impeded by legislative meddling; that *however wary and patient we may be as to any question of moving forwards*, above all, we be careful not to move backwards, nor for one moment acquiesce in any kind of tampering with the existing liberty of conscience in the persons either of ourselves or others."

These passages, written in the year 1851, convey Mr. Gladstone's new doctrine with very great significance, if with characteristic vagueness and elasticity of expression. The difference between this pamphlet and that of 1868 is, that the latter deals with the precise question of disestablishment, and has to mark out with something like sharpness the circumstances when so trenchant a measure is necessary and just. The former starts from the point of view of a religious community, or of the Christian Church at large, not yet established, and urges the undesirableness of its exchanging that position for one which may seem to be more advantageous, but is really much worse. For our author's view in 1852 seems to go quite to this length. That establishment is *always* more unfavourable to the great functions for which a church exists than non-establishment, is certainly more than Mr. Gladstone even here says. In no part of his voluminous disquisitions has he committed himself to so rash a proposition, nor is it easy to conceive him doing so. On the contrary, his autobiographical chapter, after affirming the expediency of establishment in all the earlier ages of the Church, gave in its concluding paragraph the circumstances in which, even in these days, an establishment may be maintained. The establishment of a small minority should not exist. The establishment of a nearly unanimous nation should—at least, there is no reason why it should not. That is evidently his later or his present doctrine, at least from the side of the State. But in 1852, when writing not as a statesman but as a member of the Church, he certainly seems not to leave things in this equilibrium. In this, which must have been nearer his period of transition, his passion is for Church freedom, and the whole weight of the writer's exhortation is against establishment, as in this age of the world undesirable. He protests indeed that he writes as the member of an independent religious body, and a Scotchman; and he lays special stress upon the circumstances which make establishment undesirable for the Episcopal Church in that country. But his principles have a larger sweep, and his exhortations are applicable to our times as a whole.

There was a time, he says, when a danger existed that the power

of the Church might absorb or overshadow that of the State. That danger no longer exists, certainly not in Scotland:—

"When the nation is split, as in Scotland, into so very great a variety of religious communions, with no one of them absolutely preponderating in numbers and influence, we have, I should say, much more than the needful assurances, that no such danger can recur; unless, indeed, by encroachments on religious freedom in general, the State should compel all sects and churches that value their respective liberties, to unite against a common danger. Plenary religious freedom, on the other hand, brings out into full vigour, and also into fair and impartial rivalry, the internal energies of each communion, so that they stand simply upon their merits before the world; and should any one of them attempt to trespass on the civil power, all the rest will combine with that power against it. And while freedom of conscience, impartially granted to a variety of communions, is thus the best security against collisions between civil and religious authority, it likewise directly serves the social purposes for which States exist."

And it is striking to find the writer appealing, in proof of the soundness of reasoning used so long ago, to the United States of America:—

"There, surely, of all countries in the Christian world, the peril of encroachment by ecclesiastical on civil authority is the least, and there also religious freedom is the most full and unrestrained.

"I quote this case only to show that religious freedom, while it is the object to which, of all in the political hemisphere, an unestablished body of Christians must naturally look with the most profound interest, is likewise highly beneficial to public order and morality, and need entail no danger whatever to political harmony and the well-being of the State. *Let a minister adopt this for the principle of his ecclesiastical police:* to deal liberally with religious communities, and give them all fair play; and to let them stand sentry upon one another. The laws will be all the more respected, the peace all the better kept."

Public opinion, he believes, is more and more in favour of Church freedom of this kind—the opinion, that is, of those who are outside the religious communities themselves. But he next appeals to what may be called the public opinion of religious bodies themselves—of the members, that is, who are really interested in their welfare. "This portion of public opinion is already in favour of religious freedom in a very great and evidently growing degree; and this among *all* bodies of Scottish religionists, although with various distinctions of amount and kind." In one point, indeed, he rather sarcastically remarks, all religious bodies, whether in Scotland or elsewhere, are pretty much agreed, "We are all, without any exception whatever, in favour of religious freedom for ourselves." Even Erastians, "Those who would seat the civil power on the altar of God, are so minded because there is nothing in their views of doctrine or discipline with which they think the State would interfere. But," he says, in a striking and eloquent passage, summing up principles

that have had large issues already, and have a greater future before them :—

"When I speak of a lover of religious freedom, I mean one who, desiring the full enjoyment of it for his own communion, is not willing only, but anxious, *as he prizes the sacred principle of justice*, to accord to all other religious bodies precisely the same measure, and to guard all alike against secular interference in their concerns, so long as they do not trespass upon the sphere of secular affairs. In this sense of religious freedom, it is certainly a principle still but imperfectly apprehended—a principle more imperfectly apprehended, more darkened by selfishness and sophistry now, than it was fifteen months ago. But its future progress is absolutely certain; for as every class is now with increasing boldness asking the boon on its own behalf, only a little time and experience are requisite to show to each that in religion, just as in matters of civil interest, what he wants to get or keep himself he must be ready to confer or defend, on the same terms, for others. As with property, so with religious freedom: the rights of each man are the rights of his neighbour; he that defends one is the defender of all, and he that trespasses on one assails all. And in these matters the mass of the community will judge fairly when once the facts are laid before them, however they may require time to clear their view of the case, or however they may occasionally tread awry. Given, I say, these two conditions—first, the principle of civil equality before the law, and secondly, the general desire in each man for his own religious freedom—and then the ultimate recognition of such freedom for all is as secure as the maintenance of such equality."

How utterly these extracts annihilate the vulgar Tory idea at the time of the election of 1868 need not be remarked. That idea was not merely that nothing would have been heard about the Irish Church question unless Mr. Gladstone, ousted by Mr. Disraeli, had wanted the latter's place. This was sufficiently met by Sir Roundell Palmer's frank statement that Mr. Gladstone had told him even in 1863 of his change of view on this particular point, a change which he should soon be compelled to divulge. But the usual party calumny went deeper, and though calculated for the meridian of those lower minds with which it has since become an article of faith, it was at that time countenanced by some men who ought to have been incapable of believing or even of patronizing it. What was largely said or insinuated was that the general views and principles by which the Irish measure was supported and illustrated, in that series of Mr. Gladstone's parliamentary and electioneering speeches which then flooded the press, were also recently adopted for the purpose of political gain. That no one except a mind of the lowest mental calibre could even then have believed this is true. Those speeches and utterances bore in themselves abundant evidence of being drawn from deep and fervid fountains of deliberate conviction. The first criticism of the press generally on the appearance of the "Chapter of Autobiography" was that it was just such another illustration of its author's extreme and unwise sensitiveness; a view certainly supported by the sentence in it about

his "blood frozen" by the thought that he could have been presented to the mind of a fellow-creature, even by the candidate for Berwick, as an unprincipled turncoat. But if these imputations, in any form which implied the least touch of dishonesty, scarcely deserved notice, there was another form of them which perhaps required to be met more carefully than has been done in the fragment of apologetic then published. Mr. Gladstone's power of enthusiastic self-persuasion is believed in by many who appreciate and admire him, and not a few, profoundly convinced of his honesty and uprightness in this and every transaction, were inclined to think that the political circumstances in which he found himself towards the end of Lord Palmerston's career had something to do, unconsciously to himself, with the formation of his new opinions. The Liberals hailed their new leader with delight, and recognised with joy the old fervour now applied to the propagation of new views; but not a few of them were disposed to attribute the change to the convergence of external facts and political circumstances, which had gradually shut up an active political imagination to form for itself new horizons, new beliefs, new convictions, and new duties. Such a change, so brought about, might have taken place without much blame to any one. The teaching of fact and experience is a power which all are wise to feel, and that it had, though at a much earlier date, a very serious influence on Mr. Gladstone, he acknowledges himself in his defensive piece already quoted. Yet it appears to us that the publication of 1852 is conclusive proof that the transition was not one influenced from without to such an extent as is ordinarily supposed, or even as the "Chapter of Autobiography" might leave us to imagine. Any one who reads first "The State in its Relations with the Church," of 1841, and then this Scottish Episcopal pamphlet in 1852, may be certain that the change was chiefly one from within. There is a perfect sequence and development of principles contained in the earliest book, through the *medius terminus* of the pamphlet now recalled to public attention, and on to the practical conclusion confided to Sir Roundell Palmer in 1863, and published to the nation in 1868. The chain is at no point broken. Violently as the practical conclusion of the recent legislation differs from that of the early volumes, the principles even of these two are not opposed. On the contrary one sees again and again in the passionate pages which plead for a relation of the State to the Church, that a very little alteration in the writer's view as to facts and details—*e.g.*, a new "calculation as to the religious state and prospects of the country"—would turn the flood with equal might into a very different channel. We remember being much struck with this when glancing over the volumes during the passing of the Suspensory Bill, and two evenings thereafter we

had an amusing illustration of it when sitting under the gallery of the House of Commons. A young member, very nervous and very anxious to speak, waited till in the second great debate on that measure most of the House had gone to dinner, and then jumped to his feet to make a speech against the Bill. His argument consisted chiefly of a quotation from a well-known passage in the beginning of Mr. Gladstone's book on Church and State.

"The union is to the Church of secondary though great importance. *Her* foundations are on the holy hills. Her charter is legibly divine. She, if she should be excluded from the precinct of government, may still fulfil all her functions, and carry them out to perfection. Her condition would be anything rather than pitiable, should she once more occupy the position which she held before the reign of Constantine. But the State, in rejecting her, would actively violate its most solemn duty, and would, if the theory of the connection be sound, entail upon itself a curse."

The last of these sentences was of course the one which our young orator intended to quote, but, confused by the solemn courtesy of Mr. Gladstone's bow in acknowledgment of a complimentary reference to the author, he commenced to read the paper, extracted from his hat, several clauses too soon. And as each sentence describing the independence of the Church and its sufficiency to itself was read, the rising cheers of the astonished House so disturbed his already shaken faculties, that he stopped in dismay just before reading the last, fully convinced that some other document had been substituted for that which he had intended to use. Which things were a parable to us observing them—an illustration at once and a proof of the fact that the principles of the volume quoted, and no others, are developed into the stronger forms and very diverse practical conclusions of the pamphlet of 1852. For while the divided state of the Church, and the constitutionalism of modern states, are both founded upon in that pamphlet, as in the later autobiographical one, the thing chiefly founded upon—the reason most energetically urged for the advice not to seek establishment—is the freedom of a Church unestablished in doctrine and discipline, and the prime importance of preserving that freedom. This seems to be the chief *nexus* between the earlier position of 1841, given in the above paragraph as quoted in a House of Commons speech, and the later, though still not very recent, position of 1852. It seems to follow, therefore, that it is not Mr. Gladstone the politician who has been the instructor of Mr. Gladstone the Churchman. On the contrary, it appears to have been nearly as much the old passion for the purity and excellence of the Church which, working along with a wider knowledge of the actual state of modern society, inspired the new view of what is best both for the Church and for the State. The Churchman has given to the politician, even in this matter of disestablishment, at least as much

as he has borrowed. But however this may be, there has at least never been any break between the old and the new. There is no solution of continuity in 1852, and there is none, we doubt not, down to 1870. The old original principle of the Oxford book, that "the Church, excluded from the precinct of government, may still fulfil all her functions," carries him through all.

The passages already quoted show significantly enough that the desire for the freedom of the Church was Mr. Gladstone's chief reason in 1852. But this is expressly declared. After the leading passage given on p. 7, where he says we must *now* no longer look for a consistent religious profession in the State, he says:—

"I am jealous of all attempts at consistency in this matter, *most of all* because I am convinced that they would and must result in the greatest of civil calamities—the mutilation, under the seal of civil authority, of the Christian religion itself. The garment will not fit the wearer; and if it is to be put on, as his figure cannot change to suit it, it must therefore change to suit him; must stretch here, and draggle there, and tear everywhere."

This danger, "that the State may assume the privilege or function of ultimately deciding both the Church's doctrine and her discipline," was not, he allows, then palpable to all, but it is "plain enough to those who watch for the signs of the times, and who, in the moral atmosphere, can portend foul weather when the sky is red and lowering." And he goes on to show, in a remarkably skilful and comprehensive way, that while the most serious danger of this sort is to be apprehended on the side of establishment, on this account already deprecated by its old champion, it cannot be altogether avoided even in disestablishment. The undue assumption of the State may be in more ways than one. It may be under direct legislative provisions in the case of an Establishment. It may be through the exercise of patronage, and what is termed the power of the purse; and this again is exercised by the State, or by others. But also "it may be, and that almost *ex necessitate rei*, through the administration of the judicial office," and from this unestablished churches neither are or can be exempt. Mr. Gladstone's statement of this curious and important point is quite conclusive, and at the same time singularly instructive—full of value for that great age of the world which we see returning, when the autonomous Christian community looks to the State for justice and toleration, but demands no more:—

"The mere establishment by law of religious freedom, it should be well recollected by all, but especially by the members of unestablished communities, cannot in itself secure their liberty of conscience from practical invasion and curtailment by the judicial power. As bodies, they must have rules. As bodies of human beings, they must occasionally have refractory or dissentient members, perhaps dishonestly seeking to evade the operation of those rules; perhaps honestly but erroneously, nay, perhaps in given cases, both honestly and correctly, desirous to fix upon them a construction

different from that attached to them by the general sense of the religious community to which they belong. And, lastly, as bodies regularly organized they must usually have paid officers, and very commonly also purchasable privileges: so that the sheer laws of their existence necessarily carry us to a point where spiritual rights come to intermix with temporal. When, therefore, any minority or any individuals go into a Court, and raise there a question relating to these paid offices or endowments, or these purchaseable privileges, they raise a question of temporal and civil rights, which does not cease to be such because some other question of spiritual rights runs upon a parallel line with it; and I apprehend it will be found very difficult so to frame the contracts (for such are our canons, and the rules of other unestablished bodies) between the members of a religious society, as to exonerate the Courts from the duty of entertaining, indirectly indeed, but in supposable cases most substantially, questions upon the vital construction of our ecclesiastical laws; not, perhaps, with the same frequency, or the same directness, or the same breadth of scope, as in the case of an Established Church, but yet sufficiently to remind us, that if we wish to be wholly free from meddling, we must not rely implicitly on any written document, but must have arms in our hands for self-defence."

The arms recommended are the entrusting educated laymen with a large share of the administration of Church matters; but Mr. Gladstone goes on to explain that in speaking of self-defence he is far from charging the time-honoured courts of the country with a desire to trespass upon religious liberty. Yet the most conscientious judge may stumble into doing it. He has here often to try a subject-matter with which he is not competently acquainted, and which he does not refer to experts. "In short, right reverend sir, to lay aside circumlocution, and utter outright the word which solicits me, there is great fear lest judges, dragged *pro re nata* into theology, should, and of course to the detriment of somebody or other, talk nonsense."

But this is a risk which, by the writer's own statement, cannot be avoided, and though the statement of it is very valuable for its own sake, it contributes nothing to the knowledge of Mr. Gladstone's historical relation to the question of establishment. It is in the next sentences that he returns to this, when, speaking of judicial decisions, he points out a momentous difference between their range and effect in the case of a voluntary and autonomous church on the one hand, and an established church on the other. In an established church, such decisions bind the actions and regulate the conduct (and even the corporate conscience) of the body. It is otherwise with churches outside.

"This danger is not of the fatal kind to us which it would be if any such judgment of the civil courts involved an obligation upon conscience beyond the limits of the temporalities concerned. Up to that limit, of course, they do, even for a voluntary society, involve such an obligation; but *when they pass beyond it they are waste paper*."

It ought not to be ignored, indeed, that one Established Church has claimed for itself the benefit of the exact distinction which is

here so powerfully put as valid on behalf of voluntary Churches. The Established Church of Scotland before 1843 sought to restrict "to the temporalities" the effect of legal decisions upon its actings; but the result of the magnificent debate then entered into was a solemn decision that the condition of Establishment made this impossible. An Established Church, it was then finally held, is a Church which is bound to obey the State in its ecclesiastical actings as well as in regard to temporalities; which could only escape this by being separate from the State, but, having no original independence, has no right even to separate itself. No one who has perused Mr. Gladstone's early books would be surprised at the epithet "fatal" applied to such a position, even with regard to an Established Church, and his readers will remember the struggle he makes for a different legal position being held by the Church of England. And yet the Established Church of Scotland, even since 1843, is in all its ordinary administration quite free and untrammelled by the State. The English Church is so much more closely connected, wisely or otherwise, with civil regulations, that it is no wonder that both laymen and lawyers unhesitatingly ascribe to her the position which has been authoritatively given even to one in which the Royal Supremacy is unknown; holding, indeed, that the only reason why the claim here has not been equally distinctly repelled is that it has never been so openly made. It may be remembered, too, that in the course of last session Mr. Gladstone, in his place in Parliament, took occasion to recognise "control" on the part of the State as one of the fixed incidents of establishment—at least as establishment is now understood by the legislature of Great Britain.

It will be well, therefore, to recollect that it is control over the conscience of a Voluntary Church alone that is here directly spoken of as fatal, and indeed that throughout the whole pamphlet it is the expediency of a Voluntary Church continuing in its disestablished state that is insisted upon. Yet this last utterance, like all the rest of the publication, proves the connection between the *fundamental* principles of 1841 and those of recent years. According to the former, the Church was to be established only for its truth. It had a claim upon the State, because of the doctrine which it enshrined; and as soon as the State should cease to establish it for its doctrine, it may cease to establish it at all. The State now, as Mr. Gladstone argues in his Autobiography, has long since ceased to establish truth, and one form of truth alone; and it has become an open question, whether, in any particular region of the empire, the continuance of establishment is an expedient thing—a question to be decided in each case on its own merits. But long before he had come so far, we find him, in 1852, earnestly urging a Voluntary Church to remain

in and make the most of its position, and to this end emphasising the fact, that that position makes it free to hold the true doctrine.

It appears, then, that for a young statesman, consumed with a passion for truth,—"of all possessions the most precious to the soul of man,"*—there are two ways of getting rid of a prejudice in favour of establishment of the Church. One is the discovery that the State in modern times will not establish truth as truth; the other is, the belief that putting the truth held by the Church under the guardianship of the State *tends* at least to put it also under the control of the State, a position which for the Church, as a body founded on conscientious conviction, is very nearly suicidal. In the former view, the acknowledgment of a divided condition of opinion in the State makes establishment questionable, as a matter of civil justice; and this is the statesman's point of view. In the latter, the same divided condition makes it doubtful, as a matter of ecclesiastical expediency; and this is the churchman's point of view. One would be inclined for the sake of symmetry and sonorousness, and remembering Mr. Gladstone's early and never-abjured opinions, to say that it was the High-Churchman's view. But this would be to forget that in the constitutional development of England and Scotland at least, it is the Puritan and Presbyterian party, far more than the High-Church one, which has been identified in history with the claim of independence of the Church. And it is impossible to pretend that the passion for doctrine or religious truth has been generally more characteristic of the High Church than of the Low. The principle, therefore, which burns with such a steady flame through the extracts we have given, is best described as a Church feeling, in the most catholic sense. It springs from the older of the two great factors of European civilization—from the Christian consciousness towards God, not from the sense of right of man towards man. Yet at the risk of scorn from the one-eyed Philistinism of our island, and acknowledging that both principles have often been miserably perverted, we must count the former to be of at least as great value as the latter. And we rejoice that, in analysing the personal influence of the most influential statesman of our time—three colossal measures of whose short administration already tower behind us as landmarks of social progress—we rejoice that it is possible to trace at least one-half of that contagious and sacred rage for justice and freedom to the religious element—to trace it, too, as we think, historically and conclusively.

These deductions have left us no room for any notice of Mr. Gladstone's positions on the special subject of the right of laymen to a share of rule in the Church, and to a seat in its synods. Both the

* "Chapter of Autobiography."

general considerations by which he urges this, and the special scheme which he proposes, have an interest extending far beyond the limits of the very limited Scottish body for whose weal they were originally urged. Germane to the present time as this matter is, we must leave it to others. We shall merely give two quotations—one indicating a root-principle, from which the Churchman, not in this instance a High Churchman, derives the layman's right.

"I understand the Reformation, such as you receive it, to have re-established a most important ethical and social principle, in throwing upon each individual Christian the weighty responsibility of being, except in the case of open and palpable offences of whatever kind, his own spiritual director, and himself the sole judge of his own need for help in that kind."

The other is a splendid burst in which the statesman borrows from his own sphere a truth of universal application to all societies, no matter around what idea they happen to be crystallized.

"It is a great and noble secret, that of constitutional freedom, which has given to us the largest liberties, with the steadiest throne and the most vigorous executive, in Christendom. I confess to my strong faith in the virtue of this principle. I have lived now for many years in the midst of the hottest and noisiest of its workshops, and have seen that amidst the clatter and the din a ceaseless labour is going on; stubborn matter is reduced to obedience, and the brute powers of society, like the fire, air, water, and mineral of nature are, with clamour, indeed, but also with might, educated and shaped into the most refined and regular forms of usefulness for man. I am deeply convinced that among us all systems, whether religious or political, which rest on a principle of absolutism, must of necessity be, not, indeed, tyrannical, but feeble and ineffective systems; and that methodically to enlist the members of a community, with due regard to their several capacities, in the performance of its public duties, is the way to make that community powerful and healthful, to give a firm seat to its rulers, and to engender a warm and intelligent devotion in those beneath their sway."

A. T. INNES.

EUROPE AND THE WAR.

FEW epochs in the world's history have seen events of a more stupendous magnitude accomplished within a brief period than those which we are witnessing, and have been witnessing, during the last three months. The sudden collapse of the Second French Empire, for twenty years the terror of half the world, and the substitution for it of a Third Republic; France engaged in a struggle for very life with Germany; German political unity morally, and all but politically, reconstituted; the final absorption by Italy of the temporal power of the Papacy, involving a momentous change in the relation of the second largest Church of Christendom towards civil society in general;—such is the record of a single quarter of the year 1870. Yet Europe looks on still as in a dream, seeming scarcely yet to comprehend the vastness of the spectacle which vitally affects every State, and I might almost say every household in her midst. Till quite recently, for any yet apparent purpose in any but the two combatant nations, beyond desultory efforts of private charity, or some poor piece of side-play like the Belgian treaty, the war might nearly as well have been that of those two doughty West African potentates, Fa-fa and Oleo-funebo. There has been indeed of late a sort of universal hum about mediation—the hum as of a parliament of mice discussing, *sotto voce*, who shall bell the cat. Every neutral wanted every other neutral to mediate;

but—except the Dublin Town Council—no European power seemed inclined to take the initiative in doing so. And the mediation talked of was only one after the fashion of the benevolent by-stander at a street fight, who should pat the winning fighter on the shoulder, and ask him not to hit quite so hard: the answer to which kind of mediation is generally, and deservedly so, a blow between the eyes. Surely the mediation which consists in words and pattings on the back is only of use before the fight has begun; when it has, a resolute grip, supported, if not by the constable's truncheon, at least by a clenched fist, is your only mediator.

It seems, indeed, now certain that an armistice has been actually urged on both belligerents by England, backed by Austria, Italy, Spain—Russia, moreover, undertaking to act separately to the same effect. I would fain be mistaken, but I doubt the wisdom and efficacy of the step. Apart from the preliminary condition said to be insisted on by Prussia, that France should admit the principle of a cession of territory, the terms of an armistice seem to me almost as difficult to settle as those of a peace. To take one question only:—not to revictual Paris and the beleaguered French strongholds during the armistice, would give the main benefit of such an armistice to Germany; to revictual them would give it to France. Still less can I understand the alleged purpose of the armistice—viz., to allow of the election of a Constituent Assembly in France. How can a nation be called upon to elect a representative assembly, with one-third of its territory overrun by an invader? What freedom of election can exist under his sway, or simply in his presence? But if the votes of the invaded districts be not taken (and Prussia, it is said, expressly vetoes the voting of Alsace and Lorraine), how can the voice of the non-invaded districts do duty for that of the nation? The proposal for these elections, although originating with the Committee of Defence itself, seems to me one which cannot be pressed without unfairness to France, and to its present Government. It is as good as any other during the war, being obeyed virtually from the Pyrenees to the Vosges, from the Alps to the Atlantic. It is only weakened by having its title to treat thus solemnly called in question.

Hard, therefore, as it may seem to say so, I do not much care to see an armistice yet. An unwise armistice might rather delay than hasten a real peace. Yet I feel convinced that there never was a crisis which called more imperatively for European deliberation, for European action. Some of the grounds of this opinion I have already indicated, in a paper published in this Review last month. I said there that the war having been turned by German statesmen from a merely dynastic*

* The purely dynastic character of the war on the French part has been strikingly brought out during the past month by the publication of the reports of the Prefects,

into a national one, avowedly now carried on for the purpose of territorial aggrandizement, the danger to which Europe was heretofore exposed from the Napoleonic régime was but displaced; that Europe must remain under arms, on guard against Prussianized Germany. But I expressed then my belief that Prussian politicians did not aim at the utter downfall of France, and would refrain from carrying matters to this extremity.

I can no longer express this hope. However Count Bismark may disclaim the purpose of reducing France to a second-rate power, the progress of German warfare tends but too palpably to her utter annihilation. If the Prussian campaign has been hitherto even more splendidly victorious than the one which was decided by Sadowa, the course of the war has been utterly different. Instead of a mere congeries of populations, Prussia has met with a nation; corrupted and debased indeed by twenty years of despotism; stupefied by the fall of its government; organized only for mechanic obedience, and not for life, and thereby unable to meet the crushing impact of a living force like that of Germany; with scarcely a chief whom it knows well enough to trust and follow heartily; having almost everything in the sphere of morality to learn—truth, duty, self-respect, faith; and yet a nation notwithstanding, pervaded with the profoundest sense of its own unity, ready for any sacrifice short of dismemberment; resisting everywhere unsuccessfully, but yet resisting; willing to obey any governors who will but fight on rather than give up a single department; governed by balloon, by carrier-pigeon, when railways are broken up and telegraph wires cut asunder; in which the voice of party is, for the first time in its history, hushed almost utterly before the claims of the country, so that ex-Pontifical Zouaves fight side by side with Republicans or Orleanists, and a Cathelineau or a Charette follows the same flag with Garibaldi.* Now such a nation must be crushed to be conquered, all but annihilated, before it gives in. And this is what an inexorable logic is forcing the Germans on to. In twenty-three departments, we are told—more than one quarter of the whole number—there has been no autumn corn sown. The richly cultivated environs of Paris are already reduced, by the showing of German corre-

showing clearly that the public sentiment of France was altogether pacific. It stands henceforth demonstrated, that France was forced into war by the selfish ambition of her ruler—or rather, by his selfish fears. The war was simply the last stroke for fortune of a desperate gambler, staking a nation's life on the chance of establishing his dynasty.

* The proceedings of the ultras at Lyons, at Marseilles, in Paris, do not militate against the assertion in the text. The question between them and the Government is simply, who shall best defend the country. There is not a trace in the France of 1870 of an anti-national party, such as there was in 1794, in 1814—except indeed in the person and in the immediate following of the able, but corrupt soldier, who, after having long gloriously held Metz, seems now about to sell it to the enemy.

spondents themselves, to a desert. Every day proves that the German operations consist more and more of mere foraging. For very life Germany is engaged in eating up France; and Count Bismark announces to the world that when Paris is taken, two millions of Frenchmen must starve, for he cannot feed them, I said, in writing before, that the curse of the ages would rest upon Germany if she were allowed to fulfil the downfall of France—upon all other nations who should tamely stand by to see it consummated. I say now that that curse seems nigh at hand.

Nigh at hand, whatever be the immediate issue of the conflict. Every day seems to me to make that issue more doubtful. So long as France continues in her present temper time surely fights as well as works for her; and if so, then, through never mind how many reverses, time and France must conquer. For a country determined to resist, every defeat by an invader is a partial victory. In days like ours, when there can be no more migrations of whole peoples, as in the fourth and following centuries of the Christian era, there is a limit to the efforts of the most successful invader, a point beyond which victorious progress becomes more fatal than defeat. Let every remaining French fort, including those which defend Paris, resist only as stubbornly as Strasburg or Toul, and the conquest of France by the Germans is impossible: all they can achieve is her ruin. If I were to take the authority of a painfully partisan letter by Sir J. G. Tollemache Sinclair to the *Times*, Germany demands not only Alsace and Lorraine for herself, not only Northern France for Belgium, Savoy for Switzerland, Nice and Corsica for Italy, and half the French fleet, but £160,000,000 sterling of war indemnity besides. Where, good God! is France to get them, when some of the very richest and most industrious of her departments are thus torn away—from the remnant of her wasted soil, of her decimated and exhausted people? Yet by this time Germany has hardly a choice between the ruin of France and her own. "Germany is being ground down by this war,"—it was said to me a few weeks ago by one who had but small incentive to sympathize with France, a German refugee from Paris, driven out after five years' stay. Think for a moment of what is meant by the calling out of the Landwehr, even though the call has as yet extended to but one-half the scale of liability by age, embracing only the men of from thirty-five to forty-five, and not those from forty-five to fifty-five. Think what it would be for our English households, if in every one the bread-winner in the prime of life, the young father in most cases, were called on to serve in a foreign country. Think of the paralysis of physical and intellectual production which such a tremendous draft on the vital energies of our country would occasion. Think even of the check upon the increase of population for the

future which it implies. No money compensation would ever requite such an effort; but imagine what it would be for the country if no such compensation could be realized—if the most precious blood of the country had at its own sole cost to be spilled on foreign battlefields, wasted in foreign bivouacs—and you will be able to measure the intensity of ferocious selfishness which now drives Germany to fight on, in order to stave off her own ruin by the ruin of France. On the other hand, France must almost of necessity ruin herself to conquer. She must make a desert in front of the enemy where he might make one only behind him. She must be prepared to destroy all that he may leave undestroyed for his own shelter. Every town, every house, every palace which he occupies becomes hostile territory, to be shelled, burned, wrecked. French shells must avenge the fall of Strasburg on St. Cloud. In fact, let this warfare continue, and the only question is whether both combatants will be ruined, or one only. Meanwhile the war becomes every day more ruthless, as well as ruinous; every day we neutrals even read with increasing callousness of villages set fire to, peasants shot or hanged, in retaliation for the waylaying of individual invaders, or for mere partisan resistance.

Now, if there be one conclusion of modern political economy which is proved to demonstration, it is that Peace, not War, is the general interest of all nations. The human race is in the most homely and practical sense, as well as in the highest spiritual one, a body with many members, in which, if one member suffer, all must suffer with it. The ruin of France, like the ruin of Germany, must be the most serious blow to other nations. Private interests may here and there be benefited; one competitor removed makes room for another. But the balance to the world will be that of loss, not gain; so much actual produce annihilated; so much production rendered impossible for the future; and conversely, so many consumers killed, so many more ruined. I leave to statisticians to calculate the figures of these losses: they will be found appalling. The check given to trade throughout the world is but too visible. To take but one of the less obvious instances amongst ourselves:—I was informed by a newspaper proprietor that the outbreak of the war sent down at once enormously his advertisements, and he instanced the most influential of weekly papers as having suffered yet more severely. Almost everywhere our artisans are complaining of want of employment, Birmingham and its neighbourhood forming, with the mining districts, well nigh the solitary exception—not Sheffield, which, I was assured by one who must be considered an excellent authority (the Secretary of the Sheffield Association of Organized Trades) has scarcely any workmen engaged in the manufacture of warlike implements, and is suffering

severely itself. To take the lowest view of the position, England, and subsidiarily almost every other European country,* is in the case of a tradesman who should see two of his best customers, producers at the same time of some of his choicest wares, engaged in pummelling each other to death.† Surely common sense would prompt an endeavour on his part to separate the combatants, even at the risk of a buffet, still more if he could find any of his neighbours to help him. The dogma of absolute non-interference, whilst two nations are engaged in a life-and-death conflict, is not only the height of selfish cruelty; it is also the perfection of human imbecility.

The mere character then of the struggle, the issue, more apparent every day, which it portends, of sheer ruin to one if not both of two great civilized nations, calls on all Europe collectively, on every State of Europe individually, to wake out of stupor, to devise, contrive, enforce means of putting an end to the warfare. But how? By persuading, or, if need be, compelling, the weaker combatant to succumb?—by showing to France the necessity, if not the reasonableness, of accepting such terms as Prussia offers her?—as sundry politicians and journalists of the Liberal party are benevolently exhorting her to do.

I do not hesitate to say that such conduct would be simply fatuous. What Europe desires and needs is a peace such as the King of Prussia, in his speech to the North German Parliament, declared to be the very object of the war. "Inasmuch," he then said, "as we pursue no other object than the durable establishment of peace in Europe—God be with us, as He was with our forefathers!" And Count Bismarck, in his circular of September 16, speaks also still of a durable peace; but in the same breath he declares that "Whatever peace we may conclude with France, she will only regard it as an armistice, and to avenge her present defeat will attack us as unjustifiably and as ruthlessly as she has done this year, the moment she feels herself strong enough for the enterprise, either herself or in union with allies." Thus, in fact, he demands Strasburg and Metz simply as coigns of vantage for a future war, and himself considers at bottom his so-called peace as a mere armistice, in which the one

* A lady the other day was choosing a basket at a sea-side town on the south coast. She wanted one in the same style as one shown her, but rather smaller. "Oh, no, ma'am," was the reply; "this basket is French, and we can get none like it. We can get no baskets from France now, ma'am, *nor from Germany either*." Here is a trade, humble though it may be, which the war has put a stop to for both belligerents. It avails nothing to Germany to be untouched and victorious; nothing to France to hold the sea; nothing to England to be a willing customer. Production and consumption are alike paralyzed.

† The effects of the war stretch, of course, far beyond Europe. Late news from India showed us the looms of Umritsur standing idle, and a thousand Cashmeeree weavers thrown out of work, for want of French custom for their shawls.

combatant is to be placed in a better position than the other for renewing the fight. How could France accept such terms? If Alsace and Lorraine are to be torn from her as the price of this war, and there is to be yet another, what will then be Germany's demands? What new dismemberments will she insist on? Already Count Bismarck expressly warns France and the world that he does not pledge himself to ask no more another time, even in this present war. Can France welcome the prospect of being eaten up by successive mouthfuls? No French statesman fit to live outside of a lunatic asylum could dare to accept, otherwise than under the pressure of the most hopeless necessity, such a peace as Count Bismarck offers. To Europe at large, its only advantage would be its mere duration as an armistice. Europe demands a durable peace. Count Bismarck replies that he can grant none but an unendurable one. The reply should prove to the dullest that the question needs to be taken out of German hands; that the interests of Europe and the claims of Germany are incompatible.

The character, then, of the peace which Germany offers for the future, no less than that of the warfare now going on, justifies Europe in insisting on having her voice heard. But motives yet deeper and more cogent for European concert, for European action, remain to be considered.

Let us not conceal the fact from ourselves; the whole fabric of European political society is shaken by this war. Belgium, relieved from the fear of France, trembles with a new fear before Prussia. English correspondents have described the almost abject dread of the Prussian soldier entertained by *les braves Belges*. The bullying tone assumed by Prussia henceforth in her dealings towards the little kingdom is unmistakable. Holland, again, has the instinctive sense, whatever may be the professions for the nonce of Prussian statesmen, of being the next victim marked out for destruction by the cyclop. A cry for the mouths of the Rhine will be even easier to raise in Germany than that for the frontier of the "Vogesen." Especially if Prussia wrests away from France part of her fleet, it is impossible that she should remain satisfied with the one war-port of Jahde. Denmark, again, fully believes that the next move against her will be for absorption. That no sense of justice would ever stand in the way is sufficiently proved, not only by past history, but by the demand already put forth that the treaty of Prague should be thrown aside, and the whole of Danish Schleswig unconditionally incorporated with North Germany. Sweden is haunted by a double fear; the increase of Prussia as a naval power is a direct threat to herself, whilst that very increase may be seized by Prussia as a pretext for claiming territorial compensation at Sweden's cost. Russia,

though till now, by her statesmen at least, visibly favouring Prussia, —nay, if the *Standard* speak truly, bound to her by treaty to restrain Austria from interfering—is no less deeply affected by the war, through her desires and her hopes primarily, but these not unmingled with eventual fears. On the one hand, the shattering of French military and naval power is for her the practical abrogation of the Treaty of Paris, which she knows well that England will not enforce alone. She will assuredly find means of renewing her naval strength in the Black Sea, and rendering this more than ever a Russian lake. It is hard to believe that in the aggrandisement of Prussia she will not find a plea for further self-aggrandisement, at the cost of whoever may seem the easiest victim—Roumania, Turkey, Sweden. On the other hand, she knows well enough that she is now, France lying for the time conquered, Germany's one surviving terror; that after a war with France, no war could be so popular with the Germans as a war with Russia; that one of the sorest places in every German patriot's heart is that where rankles the sense of the oppression by Russia of her Germans of Livonia; of the vain appeals made by them hitherto to the sympathies of their kinsmen; of the selfish fears which alone have hitherto made every German statesman's ears deaf to those appeals. Most assuredly the constitution of German unity is a danger to Russia in Livonia, as the development of the German war-navy is a menace even to her very capital.

But let us pass on. If the war must stimulate Russia's tendency to encroachment on her neighbours, by so much must it of course stimulate their fears, render their existence insecure. Roumania and Servia,—those small states which, with an enlarged Montenegro, should be Turkey's most efficient outworks against Russia, if Turkey and they could only understand each other,—which, however much one or other of them may have leaned ere this, or may still lean on Russian support, have strong autonomic instincts, and no wish whatever to be lost in the huge northern empire; and that "sick man" of the south who still lives on, though so long sentenced to death by his medical advisers, have the deepest interest in the establishment of a really secure peace, which shall, if possible, define and settle the conditions of their existence. Of Greece I say nothing; "Guarda e passa" must be her sentence. But Austria is most vitally affected by the crisis. When Southern Germany shall have become an organic whole with Northern, the attraction of the vast mass will be almost irresistible for the outlying molecule of German Austria. But every German claims Bohemia, whilst Bohemia claims to be itself. German Austria could not be drawn into autonomic Germany without the Bohemian question becoming one of arms, and no longer of ballot

boxes, as it is now; whilst behind the Bohemian question lies the weird and spectral one of Poland, that ghostly terror of European politics. It seems likely that, losing its German provinces, the Austrian Empire-kingdom would fly to pieces altogether. It may be true that its centre of gravity is henceforth rather Pesth than Vienna. But it is at least doubtful whether from Pesth a sufficient centripetal force would go forth to bind together a federal empire, even far smaller than the present one. Again, the more you push the Hapsburgs from the upper course of the Danube, the farther you thrust them down its lower one. To a diminished Austrian empire the mouths of the Danube are all but indispensable. But this means the absorption, somehow, of Roumania, the provocation of Russia—most likely direct collision with her. The collapse of France shakes the frail structure of Austrian dualism to its foundations.

Italy, somewhat like Russia, has both hopes and fears from the war. Alone, hitherto, she has reaped unquestionably advantage from it, in the absorption of Rome and its territory. German public opinion, Sir Tollemache Sinclair informs us, encourages her to ask for more. Nice and Corsica are to be her share in the spoils of France. Few probably would grudge her the former; as to Corsica, there are Frenchmen even who would by this time gladly be rid for ever of the fatal birthplace of the Bonapartes. Yet, in spite of kind German solicitations, Italy holds back; and, for a wonder, King Victor Emmanuel and Garibaldi unite in declining the assumption of Nice. And in the refusal there is something more than chivalrous feeling on the part of the one towards the nation to which he owes at least the iron crown, on the part of the other towards a struggling French Republic. Every Italian feels at bottom that if Austria be henceforth no danger to Italy, it might be otherwise with a united Germany, which should absorb the German provinces of Austria. The "Quadrilateral" was pronounced indispensable to Germany by the Frankfort Parliament of 1848-49. The "Tedesco," not the mere Austrian, has been from first to last Italy's bugbear.

Switzerland is in a very similar position to Italy, except that she owes no gratitude to France, which has taken away from her the valley of Dappes, ignored her rights over the Chablais and Faucigny, interfered with the lines of her railways, repeatedly bullied her for harbouring French refugees. She, too, is encouraged by the Germans to share in spoiling France, by claiming for herself all or part of Savoy. But she, too, cannot help being agitated with new fears. Pan-Germanism threatens her directly in her German-Swiss cantons. With such good historians as the Germans, resolute in ignoring alike prescription and popular feeling against themselves, who can tell what flaws might be found in her title-deeds? Especially if the

patrimony of the Hapsburgs were absorbed in a united Germany, who knows but what Swiss bad behaviour toward Vogt Gessler might not even be remembered?

Shall we leave out of this survey those two countries of Europe which, at it were, look away from it towards Africa and the Atlantic, yet one of which actually supplied the pretext to this war? Directly, none are so absolutely untouched by the struggle. Yet it is probable that the future political constitution of Spain, and very likely of Portugal, must be greatly affected by that of France. Republicanism is growing in Spain from day to day, and if the French Republic maintains itself, and commands respect, it seems doubtful whether a Spanish monarchy, even under an Italian prince (supposing the Duke of Aosta, Prim's last candidate, to take the throne) would have root enough to maintain itself against the idea of the "Iberian Republic;" which again, especially if it were to take a federal form (probably the one best suited to the present condition of the peninsula at large), would certainly, if once realized, tend to absorb Portugal by natural attraction. But the workings of the present war may go deeper yet. The Germans have already enlarged it from a war against a dynasty into a war against a nation; as they are carrying it on, they tend to enlarge it still further into a war of races. It was one of the worst follies of the Third Napoleon to have talked of setting up a Latin empire in Mexico (by the aid of a German prince!), to balance the spread of Anglo-Saxon power. But the Germans have responded to this folly through their avowed expectation that England, as a nation of Teuton race, would join the Teutons of Germany in an onslaught on France—an expectation which has actually found its way into German diplomacy, and is the real groundwork of Count Bernstorff's pleas for a *friendly* English neutrality—*i.e.*, a neutrality which should not be neutral. Now if there be one thing more horrible than a war between nation and nation, it would be that clan-feud on a large scale which would consist in a war of races, a blind struggle between the Latin nations because they are Latin, and the Teuton nations because they are Teuton. Yet there are ominous indications already that the challenge thus now thrown out by Germany has been felt, if not taken up. The large benevolence and varied experience of Garibaldi on the one hand, —his well-known affection towards both England and America,—the singular political shrewdness of the Italians as a nation on the other, may guard Italy from being carried away by the cry of Latin against Teuton. But in Spain—the land of political unwisdom—it is being raised already; and the greatest orator of Southern Europe, perhaps of all Continental Europe at present, Emilio Castelar, has ere this ventilated at Tours the idea of a Latin League; whilst it appears

certain that Portuguese, as well as Spaniards, are joining the French foreign legion. Little, then, as Spain is directly interested in the war, and notwithstanding Prim's late rejection of M. de Kératry's overtures, with the utter uncertainty of Spanish politics, a turn in the cards might any day engage Spain in the conflict. This, at least, is certain, that the Hohenzollern candidature, which Spain seemed for a moment inclined to maintain out of hatred to the French Emperor, became intolerable to her from the moment that the fall of the empire placed it beyond objection, as the present choice of the Duke of Aosta indirectly proves.

But since I last wrote on the subject, another element has been thrown into the conflict, the importance of which to Continental Europe it would be folly to under estimate. The man who, as was justly observed by a weekly paper, represents next to the Pope the greatest moral force in Europe, Garibaldi, at first strongly in favour of Germany against the Bonapartes, has now cast in his lot with France against Germany. In the eyes of vast masses of the most generous, the most enthusiastic, the most energetic men and women in every country throughout the world, this fact, whilst saving the struggle from degenerating into a hellish feud of races, will lift it into that divinely terrible thing, a war of principles. From Bergen or Abo to Seville, to Palermo, to Corinth, they will say—"The cause of freedom, of humanity, is that in behalf of which Garibaldi wields the sword!" Many a German artizan, whose faith in the holiness of the struggle henceforth may have been rudely shocked already by the arrest and continued imprisonment of Jacoby, will shudder at the thought that the Italian hero may fall under German bullets. But his death, even if in open fight—and there seem grounds for suspecting, from the threats already held out against foreigners taking service in the French armies, that if the infirm old chief should fall into Prussian hands, he would have small mercy to expect—would send a flame throughout all Europe. Everywhere the popular classes would feel that a blow had fallen on them; everywhere they would bitterly take their rulers to task for not interfering to stop the struggle which has cost a Garibaldi's life; everywhere they would swear revenge. Garibaldi dead would lash to fury the democratic passions of half the Continent; Bismarck and the Germany whom he represents would become the impersonations of all tyranny, a hell-brood with which there can be neither peace nor truce.

Even in our own country such an event would be deeply felt. Our position is indeed peculiar. We are free from direct political interest in the war; free equally, thank God, from those barbarous feelings of national clannishness with which our German cousins had credited us; anxious that France and Germany should alike prosper

—viewing, without a tinge of unfriendliness, the consummated unity of the one, without a tinge of envy, the approaching consummation of unity in the other; having but one abiding interest—peace, lasting peace, between France and Germany, between all nations of the earth. Yet without reverting to those commercial interests which have been already alluded to, or to any pecuniary considerations, it would be folly to suppose that the struggle and its results will not powerfully affect even our political condition. We are friends with both Germany and France; but in spite of all affinities of origin, language, religion, proximity alone binds us as a people to France far more closely than to Germany. Of those of our countrymen whose experience has extended beyond the British Isles, a vast majority know no other foreign country than France. For one person in our professional classes who has a smattering of German, you will find five who have one of French; for one in our trading classes, ten; for one among our artisans, five-and-twenty at least. In every working men's college, mechanics' institute, &c., where foreign languages are taught, the French class is always sure to be the most numerously attended—sometimes as much so as all other classes put together. French plays furnish the staple of our so-called English drama; the leading French novels have in their translated form a popularity which that of no German one has even approached to. Every Englishman who reads a paper has some notions, however wild, about French politics, could tell you the name of at least a dozen French political characters; whilst it is rare to find one to whom German politics are not an absolute mystery, or who, but for this war, could have got much farther than Bismarck and Von Beust, in enumerating German political worthies. Do what we will—to whatever party we may belong—the fate of France must deeply stir us; to what depths the downfall of France might stir us, is a very serious matter to contemplate. The consideration it involves is that of a very delicate subject, but one which must be faced.

It cannot be concealed that our feelings as a people towards monarchy have greatly changed from what they once were. Probably there is far less of passionate, fanatical republicanism than there was towards the close of the last century, or even in and after 1848; but there is also much less of passionate loyalty towards the Crown. Thoughtful men have examined into the worth of constitutional monarchy as practised amongst ourselves, have recognised that in many respects it amounts virtually to a republic without the name, and perhaps the best one yet contrived—at all events, one so good as not to be worth the trouble of changing for the unknown. But there is on almost all sides a tendency to value royalty by its actual worth, not by its claims or its traditions. On the other hand,

republics are scarcely looked on, even by the sincerest monarchists, with the feelings of abhorrent stupor, as it were, of the last century. The duration of the republic of the United States, the recuperative power shown by it in quelling the secession, has opened the eyes of all but the blindest. Those who are least friendly to the Yankee feel, if they do not willingly admit, that it is possible for men of our own blood to live together, to abide as a nation, to be great among the peoples of the earth, under a republican form of government. The tone of the Conservative press towards the French Republic of 1870 is very different from what it was in 1848. It snarls at the "gentlemen of the pavement," yet it accepts the government which is said to be their work, and claims that England should support it. Very revolutionary ideas indeed are finding their way into men's minds. "Really kings and emperors are becoming such a nuisance," it was said to me shortly after the commencement of this war, "that one would almost rather have republics." Who was the speaker? A respectable middle-aged solicitor, who votes sedulously at every election for the Conservative candidate. Diminished loyalty towards the Crown as an ideal, increasing toleration of republicanism, are thus two features of the present English tone of mind, which no statesman should overlook. The effects of the change are scarcely palpable, owing to the peculiar sentiment of the nation at large towards the Queen, a feeling which approximates more to respectful friendship than to devotion. But the feeling is one in the main personal to herself. It seems but yesterday that, under the cloud of a scandal which has happily blown past, in almost every circle some one was shaking his or her head, and doubting whether, if such things went on, England would stand another king. In short, many a man felt then, what perhaps he would fain deny now, that royalty itself in England was by this time on its good behaviour.

Nor must it be overlooked that the class which is most leavened with republican tendencies, whether of the French or the American type, the least able to appreciate the substantial value of constitutional monarchy, is precisely the one to which a large accession of power has accrued through Mr. Disraeli's Reform Bill. Beyond all question, the vast majority of the English working men sympathise deeply with France in the present struggle under its altered circumstances. A genuine, unbought sympathy, as I happen to know, to which every public meeting that is held is a heavy pecuniary sacrifice, paid for in the main with hard-earned or hard-saved shillings and halfcrowns—a sympathy of which outer demonstrations afford no adequate measure, which the average Liberal press, generally in the hands of peace-at-any-price middle-class men, bars out from the means of expression, which is mainly kept passive, I believe, by the

personal confidence still entertained by the bulk of the working-class in Mr. Gladstone and two or three of his colleagues. If alone, or through European intervention, France weathers the present storm, this sympathy may bear no danger with it. But I believe that if republican France—the France henceforth of Garibaldi, of the peoples of Europe — were left to perish, it would turn to a bitterness unspeakable towards Government and Crown.

I accuse no one, suspect no one. I believe that the purpose of our rulers has been that of real, honest, impartial neutrality. I acquit them of all unfriendly feeling towards France; I credit them with a real desire to see her come out of the conflict, at the earliest possible moment, with undiminished strength, and as towards Germany, at least, with uncurtailed territory. On the part of the Queen herself, the whole country (its mere flunkeydom excepted) has hailed, with a satisfaction amounting to relief at this juncture, the breaking through of those traditions of etiquette which almost fatally restrict the marriages of our Royal family to German princes and princesses, by the choice of an English nobleman as a son-in-law. Nothing could better show her Majesty's desire to avoid in future dynastic complications, the suspicion of a dynastic policy. But the marriage of the Princess Louise with the Lord Lorne cannot undo the fact that the husband of the Princess Royal of England stands encamped at the gates of Paris, threatening the French capital with ruin, as the penalty for not accepting the dismemberment of France. Of the possible consequences of that fact let English statesmen beware.

I have now completed this, I fear, tedious survey. I have endeavoured to show that every single State of Europe is vitally affected in its political condition by this war. And it follows further from the survey, that every one is deeply interested in the maintenance of the power of France. The old policy of the balance of power, taken literally, may be an exploded one. To maintain that every State, however constituted, should always preserve the same limits is a policy of mere stagnation, of Egyptian immobility, one which ignores the force of expansion in races, the stirrings of blood among men of the same kin to come together, the lawful impatience of effete dynasties among peoples, the intolerableness of petty sovereignties which have no substantial *raison d'être*. Again, to maintain that every accession of power to one State must be compensated by the like accessions to others is virtually to declare that the strong are on all fitting occasions to prey upon the weak. But what is false of states is true of nations. It is of the interest of all nations that every nation should retain its full vitality, that none should lie at the control of another, under the fire of its guns. Now in spite

of Count Bismarck's arithmetical set-off of Savoy and Nice against Alsace and Lorraine, when he claims the possession of territory and fortresses which shall command Paris, which would enable Germany at the very first blow to strike France at the heart, he claims that which would be death for France, but not for France alone. The substantial influence of France in Europe once gone, not a power would remain nearer than Russia which could balance that of Germany on the land. Every single State of Europe, except Spain and Portugal, would lie at the mercy either of Germany or of Russia. Russia herself would feel that the day of reckoning between Teuton and Slav was coming nigh. And where would England be, after another stride or two of the German colossus—if not to-morrow, after the surrender of the French fleet, yet the day after, when the mouths of the Rhine shall be German?

The present interest of Germany is thus directly antagonistic to that of every State of Europe, Russia only excepted, and that only temporarily. Can it be then that if once European public opinion be brought to a focus, with a sufficient hope of a concentration of European power, Europe should not feel it its duty to interfere for the sake of stopping a fatal war, of establishing a really fruitful and lasting peace?* If steps be not taken in time for this end, if the nations of Europe be not brought together in a common interest to resist the overweening pretensions of Germany, the small self-interests, which now mainly keep them asunder, will cause them to seek their own preservation by complaisance and obsequiousness towards the victor. Promptitude and boldness will give Europe the upper hand of Germany; delay and hesitation will send its several States, one by one, crouching at Germany's feet.

European concert, then, European action is imperative. For this purpose, Garibaldi has, I think, thrown out a hint which might prove useful. Let England apply to the French Government for leave to invite immediately a European Congress to Nice, the territory of which should be provisionally neutralized for the purpose, and placed

* Count Bismarck, indeed, maintains that France can never forget the disaster of Sédan, must always be burning to avenge it, and that it is on this account she must be weakened. No, France will never forget, never forgive Sédan. But not as towards the Prussians. She will easily recognise that in accepting that surrender, they only took advantage of their good fortune. The full weight of her curses will rest more and more on the one arch-traitor who sold his army to save his own skin. Of all pleas of sham humanity, the one put forward by him on that occasion was the hollowest. For every life spared by the capitulation France will sooner or later lose ten. Had the French army been cut to pieces to the last man, it could not but have inflicted the most serious losses on the enemy, whilst the example would have inspirited the whole nation. The Third Napoleon took France to be as cowardly as himself. He fancied she must have sunk under the enormity of the disaster, whilst at the same time he meanly tried to slink out of the formal responsibility of her ruin by throwing the burthen of treating upon the Empress and the Regency. History affords no instance of a surrender so base.

under the direct authority of the congress. Let the invitations to the congress distinctly specify that it is to be held primarily for the purpose of stopping the war; clearly intimate that it is to be a congress, not for talk, but for united action. Let England once take this course resolutely, fearlessly—let it be known that her fleets are ready and at hand—and her invitation is sure to be responded to; though she must not wait for all to respond, but be ready to act the instant a sufficient centre of action is formed. Virtually, such a congress would be such a one as the world has never seen—a congress no longer of States, as in 1814 and the following years, but of nations. For, turn whithersoever we may, the irresistible tide of freedom has swept since 1814 over every European country (Russia scarcely excepted) which did not then enjoy it, everywhere turning the State into a nation, even in those cases in which the former was already large enough to contain the latter, and not, as in the case of Italy, a mere heap of fetters chaining down the nation's limbs. The hollow intriguing, the petty jealousies of the Congress of Vienna, would no longer be borne with in our days, when statesmen are responsible, not to sovereigns only, but to peoples. The time is past for those great diplomatic markets, when populations were sold or bartered away like droves of pigs. A congress in 1870 must be a congress, not only of the nations, but for the nations; one which shall meet for the very purpose of recognising and preserving, not ignoring and violating, the sanctity of national rights, the liberties of human beings.

I said that the Congress should meet primarily for the purpose of putting an end to the war. But to put an end to war is not to establish peace, and it should not separate till peace be really established. The whole framework of European society needs to be consolidated. One powerful guarantee against future wars would be to confirm and extend existing neutralities, or create new ones. Holland might be included within the same guarantee of neutrality as Belgium. Alsace and Lorraine might, if thought needful, be made neutral in the hands of France, from which they claim not to be separated.* Switzerland, above all, needs to be largely strengthened. The Chablais and Faucigny, at least, should be added to her, or rather as much of Savoy as she would care to hold, the remainder being neutralized in the hands of either Italy or France; and her neutrality should, moreover, cover the Tyrol (which, I have been assured, like Savoy, desires to be annexed to her), with power to occupy it in

* The idea of forming Alsace and Lorraine [illegible] neutral state has been broached, in this country [illegible] by Mr. [illegible], the initiator, with M. Charles Cassal, of a joint protest of Frenchmen and Germans against the war, which has received numerous adhesions. But you have no more right to make them [illegible] a separate State against their will, than to transfer their allegiance forcibly to a foreign one.

time of war. An enlarged Switzerland, holding the whole vast mountain fastness of the Alps with its abutments, would be one of the greatest safeguards of European peace. The neutrality alone of Savoy and of the Tyrol would be a powerful bulwark to Italy. Nice meanwhile with its territory might, according to Garibaldi's proposals, be made inter-national, the centre of European diplomacy, the meeting-place of all Congresses. Yet there is another possible neutrality, as important to the north of Europe, as that of Switzerland to the south. As matters now stand, Denmark seems the predestined prey of Germany; even the formation of a Scandinavian league between her, Sweden, and Norway would no longer afford a sufficient equipoise to the devouring Teuton. But let all three be neutralized together under a European guarantee, and the peace of Northern Europe may be to a great extent secured.

But the Congress must not stop short at declarations. The obligations of a guaranteed neutrality should be defined on both sides. Ominous theories have been broached as to those obligations in the case of Belgium; as to whether the refusal of one guarantor to fulfil them did not release the others. The duty of guarantee henceforth must be understood to be not only several as well as joint, but to involve a right of coercion against defaulters. On the other hand, the guaranteed States must be bound both to submit all their own differences amongst themselves or with other Powers to arbitration, and to keep up in a state of efficiency their own appliances for self-defence. I go further, and I say that neutrality should not—at all events, need not—henceforth be purely individual; that neutral States should not only be allowed and encouraged to form alliances and leagues amongst themselves for the maintenance of their respective neutralities, but may be fairly called upon to guarantee each other. Without this, indeed, if the principle of guaranteed neutrality be extended, its weight would fall with quite undue severity on the non-neutral States; those, at least, which might choose to hold by their obligations. Probably it would be found expedient to fix the contingents to be supplied for such purposes, with power however to revise the scale, as the altered necessities of warfare may render it necessary from time to time.

Other questions which should occupy the attention of the Congress are those of the rights and duties of neutrals generally in time of war—their relations to belligerents, especially as respects the traffic in contraband of war, and the law of maritime prize. Nothing can be more absurd than the present system, in which the prize-courts of the belligerent alone dispose of the rights of neutrals. Marvellous, indeed, is the degree of genuine equity which has been attained already in the decisions of such tribunals, thanks mainly to the

eat jurists of England and America. But surely a judge of one lligerent nation is not the person most likely to consider fairly, lmly, dispassionately, the claims of a neutral, whose case is only ought before him as a *primâ facie* one of support given to the ıer belligerent. The tribunal should at least be a mixed one, in ıich a judge from another neutral country should sit by the side the one of the belligerent country. Surely the time is come ıen an international Law of Prize could be established, to serve as e first chapter of an international Code; nor should there be any fficulty in constituting also a system of international tribunals to rry out such law. Would such measures necessarily lead to the ıdue enlargement of the rights of neutrals? I believe, on the ntrary, that the more deeply the subject is considered, the more it ill be felt that it is the duties of neutrals which have to be rendered ore strict, and to be more strictly fulfilled, rather than their -called rights enlarged. I believe that the true right and duty ike of neutrals is to enforce peace, not to feed war, and that the ay on which neutral nations should decide on a general embargo on ll trade with two belligerents, would do more to render war npossible than any number of paper agreements to refer disputes to rbitration. At the same time, I think it is clear that the hour is ome for turning the mere expression of opinion of European diplomacy in favour of the amicable settlement of international disputes t the Paris Conference into something more definite—at least into istinct treaty obligations between the various powers.

Space would fail me here to indicate the various matters of collective nterest which a genuine European Congress might take in hand—questions of tariffs, of a common postal or monetary system, of international ailways, perhaps of an international judicature for these and other urposes, besides such international Prize Courts as I have suggested. What Jacques Arago said of the Daguerreotype when first invented would apply to such a Congress: "The unforeseen is that on which ou most must reckon." Above all, I should wish the Congress not o separate without organizing at least a naval international police.

But there is yet another, and a very different, question, which ould hardly fail to force its way before the Congress—one, indeed, n which England has no official political interest, yet a very vital ocial one. I mean that of the future position of the head of the Roman Catholic Church, and the future relations of that Church to the everal European States. No one can hail with greater satisfaction han myself the extinction of the temporal power of the Papacy, with whatever of ignoble hypocrisy that act may have taken place on he part of the Italian monarch; yet it would be idle to conceal from meself the fact that the event is one of the deepest moment to every

civilized state. The personal strength or stubbornness of character —call it whichever you will—of Pius IX. may mask the effects of the change during his life, but they must soon become apparent. With the extinction of the national franchises of the various branches of the Roman Catholic Church, the despotic powers gradually vested in bishops over the clergy, and latterly in the Pope over the Bishops, the enormous multiplication of Italian sees, and the rights given to bishops *in partibus*—one cannot but see that there is an imminent danger lest the whole organization of the Roman Catholic Church should become a mere tool in the hands of the rulers of Italy, whilst there is no less danger for Italy herself, lest the temptation to wield a tool so powerful should lead her to identify her national policy with the baleful system by which that tool has been forged, and involve her in all the tortuous jugglerie and miserable ambitions which have been bound up with the rule of the Vatican. It is not for a Protestant Englishman to interfere with officious counsels in such a matter. Probably the Roman Catholic powers would find it necessary, at all events, to insist on contributing to the maintenance of the Pontiff and of his spiritual authority, so that he shall not be dependent on the sole support of Italy. Perhaps non-Romanist powers themselves might find it their interest to join in such contribution. Possibly a mutual agreement might be come to as to the relations to be held henceforth between the Papacy and the civil power in all European countries. Means might possibly be devised for calling together a new and genuine Œcumenical Council of the Roman Catholic Church, in which—say through the principle of the vote by nations, and not by mere majorities—the shameless packing of the late practically spurious one with the creatures of the Pontiff might be neutralized, and the fatal mistakes of the present year cancelled. Could such a genuine Roman Catholic council really meet, and freely deliberate and vote, I believe it would form the best preparation for a true Œcumenical Council of Christendom, in which the Reformed Churches of Europe might be recognised and represented, and Protestant Catholicity would find some other expression than the tomfooleries of Dr. Cumming.

God forbid, however, that a European Congress now meeting should occupy itself with even the gravest among such questions as I have indicated, before settling its first terribly earnest business, that of stopping the war—and stopping it, I do not shrink from saying, by force if need be. United Europe is more than a match for Germany, even flushed with her present successes. Peace, genuine peace, is worth Europe's fighting for. Meanwhile, every hour of protracted neutrality is so much help given to Germany. Neutrality is practically only impartial so long as two combatants are, or appear

to be, equally matched; from the moment that one of the two has the upper hand, it is simply the passive acquiescence of the neutral in all the evil that the stronger fighter may wreak upon the weaker. The measure of the collective strength of all neutrals to restrain the victor is, in fact, the measure of the *vis inertiæ* which they place at his disposal, and with which they help him to crush the vanquished. We all recollect with what shamelessness the late Emperor of France avowed that it was his neutrality on the Rhine which had enabled Prussia to trample down Austria at Sadowa. The Austrian correspondent of the *Times* has expressed the growing feeling among the Austrians that every day which prolongs the non-interference policy among neutrals makes them by so much accomplices in the future horrors of war. It does more—it makes them participators in all the logical consequences of the struggle as now carried on; in the substitution of the Bismarckian terror for the Napoleonian; in the unsettlement of the whole European political fabric; in the transformation of Alsace and Lorraine into a new Poland; in all the future violations of national rights, all the future oppressions and absorptions of the weak by the strong, which that iniquity will assuredly encourage and beget; in all the wars which a false peace is sure to breed, with all their ever-increasing horrors. It needs but a manifold, resolute lead, I feel convinced, to take this weight, this curse off the neck of neutral Europe. May England take that lead, and earn for herself the blessing of the peace-maker!

J. M. LUDLOW.

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